fjfY         REESE   LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY    OF   CALIFORNIA. 


Received 
Accessions  No. 


Ofr 


A    THEODICY; 


OB, 


VINDICATION   OF   THE   DIVINE   GIMY, 


AS    MANIFESTED   IN    THE 


CONSTITUTION  AND  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  MORAL  WORLD. 


BY  ALBERT  TAYLOR  BLEDSOE,  LL.  D., 

PROFESSOR     OF     MATHEMATICS     IN     THE     UNIVERSITY     OF     VIRGINIA. 


NEW  YORK: 
PHILLIPS    &    HUNT. 

CINCINNATI: 
CRANSTON    &     STQWE. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1853,  by 

CARLTCTN   &    PHILLIPS, 

3&L&  0  & 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District  of  New- York. 


TO 


professor  lames  |v   CaWl, 


OF   THE   UNIVERSITY    OF   VIRGINIA, 


THIS   VOLUME   IS   INSCRIBED   BY   ONE   WHO   ENTERTAINS   A   HIGH   ADMIRATION 

OF   HIS   INTELLECTUAL   POWERS   AND   LEARNING,    AS   WELL   AS   OF   HIS 

CHARACTER   AS  A  CHRISTIAN   GENTLEMAN. 


INTRODUCTION. 

OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODICY .......^AGK      9 

§  I. — The  failure  of  Plato,  and   other  ancient  philosophers,  to   construct  a 

theodicy,  not  a  ground  of  despair II 

§  II. — The  failure  of  Leibnitz  not  a  ground  of  despair 13 

§  III.— The  system  of  the  moral  universe  not  pvrposely  involved  in  obscurity 

to  teach  us  a  lesson  of  humility 10 

§  IV. — The  littleness  of  the  human  mind  a  ground  of  hope 21 

§  V. — The  construction  of  a  theodicy  not  an  attempt  to  solve  mysteries,  but  to 

dissipate  absurdities 24 

§.VI. — The  spirit  in  which  the  following  work  has  been  prosecuted,  and  the 

relation  of  the  author  to  other  systems 25 

PART  I. 

THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MORAL  EVIL,  OR  SIN,  CONSISTENT  WITH  THE  HOLI- 
NESS OF  GOD 31 

CHAPTER  I. — THE  SCHEME  OF  NECESSITY  DENIES  THAT  MAN  is  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE 

EXISTENCE  OF  SIN 83 

§  I. — The  attempts  of  Calvin  and  Luther  to  reconcile  the  scheme  of  necessity 

with  the  responsibility  of  man 34 

§  II. — The  manner  in  which  Hobbes,  Collins,  and  others,  endeavour  to  reconcile 

necessity  with  free  and  accountable  agency 41 

§  III. — The  sentiments  of  Descartes,  Spinoza,  and  Malebranche,  concerning  the 

relation  between  liberty  and  necessity 45 

§  IV. — The  views  of  Locke,  Tucker,  Hartley,  Priestley,  Helvetius,  and  Diderot, 

with  respect  to  the  relation  between  liberty  and  necessity 50 

|  V. — The  manner  in  which  Leibnitz  endeavours  to  reconcile  liberty  and  neces- 

sity 54 

g  VL— The  attempt  of  Edwards  to  establish  free  and  accountable  agency  on  the 

basis  of  necessity — The  views  of  the  younger  Edwards,  Day,  Chalmers,  Dick, 

D'Aubigne,  Hill, -Shaw,  and  M'Cosh,  concerning  the  agreement  of  liberty 

and  necessity 61 

§  YTT. — The  sentiments  of  Hume.  Brown.  Comte,  and  Mill,  in  relation  to  the 

antagonism  between  liberty  and  necessity 72 

§  VIII.— The  views  of  Kant  and  Sir  William  Hamilton  in  relation  to  the 

antagonism  between  liberty  and  necessity 78 


6  CONTENTS. 

§  IX.— The  notion  of  Lord  Kames  and  Sir  James  Mackintosh  on  the  same 
subject PAGE  81 

§  X. — The  conclusion  of  Moehler,  Tholuck,  and  others,  that  all  speculation  on 

such  a  subject  must  be  vain  and  fruitless 83 

§  XI. — The  true  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  review  of  opinions  and  argu- 
ments    34 

V'MAPTER  II. — THE  SCHEME  OF  NECESSITY  MAKES  GOD  THE  AUTHOR  OF  SIN 86 

§  I. — The  attempts  of  Calvin  and  other  reformers  to  show  that  their  system  of 

necessity  does  not  make  God  the  author  of  sin 87 

§  II. — The  attempt  of  Leibnitz  to  show  that  the  scheme  of  necessity  does  not 

make  God  the  author  of  sin 98 

§  III. — The  maxims  adopted  and  employed  by  Edwards  to  show  that  the 

scheme  of  necessity  does  not  make  God  the  author  of  sin 98 

§  IV. — The  attempts  of  Dr.  Emmons  and  Dr.  Chalmers  to  reconcile  the  scheme 

of  necessity  with  the  purity  of  God 110 

CHAPTER  III. — THE  SCHEME  OF  NECESSITY  DENIES  THE  REALITY  OF  MORAL  DISTINC- 
TIONS   113 

§  I. — The  views  of  Spinoza,  in  relation  to  the  reality  of  moral  distinctions 113 

§  II. — The  attempt  of  Edwards  to  reconcile  the  scheme  of  necessity  with  the 

reality  of  moral  distinctions 114 

§  DTI. — Of  the  proposition  that  "  The  essence  of  the  virtue  and  vice  of  dispo- 
sitions of  the  heart  and  acts  of  the  will  lies  not  in  their  cause,  but  in  their 
nature" 126 

§  IV. — The  scheme  of  necessity  seems  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  reality  of 
moral  distinctions,  not  because  we  confound  natural  and  moral  necessity, 
but  because  it  is  really  inconsistent  therewith.... 129 

CHAPTER  IV. — THE  MORAL  WORLD  NOT  CONSTITUTED  ACCORDING  TO  THE  SCHEME  OF 

NECESSITY 132 

§  I. — The  scheme  of  necessity  is  based  on  a  false  psychology 132 

§  II. — The  scheme  of  necessity  is  directed  against  a  false  issue 142 

§  IDT. — The  scheme  of  necessity  is  supported  by  false  logic 149 

§  IV. — The  scheme  of  necessity  is  fortified  by  false  conceptions 154 

§  V. — The  scheme  of  necessity  is  recommended  by  false  analogies 1GO 

§  VI. — The  scheme  of  necessity  is  rendered  plausible  by  a  false  phraseology 162 

§  VII. — The  scheme  of  necessity  originates  in  a  false  method,  and  terminates 

in  a  false  religion 164 

CHAPTER  V. — THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  THE  HUMAN  WILL  AND  THE  DIVINE  AGENCY 166 

§  I. — General  view  of  the  relation  between  the  divine  and  the  human  power...  1G6 
§  II. — The  Pelagian  platform,  or  view  of  the  relation  between  the  divine  and 

the  human  power. 171 

§  III. — The  Augustinian  platform,  or  view  of  the  relation  between  the  divine 

agency  and  the  human 176 

§  TV. — The  views  of  those  \vho,  in  later  times,  have  symbolized  with  Augustine...  178 
§  V. — The  danger  of  mistaking  distorted  for  exalted  views  of  the  divine 

sovereignty 180 


CONTENTS.  7 

f  H4P1  Ea  VI. — THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MORAL  EVIL,  OR  SIN,  RECONCILED  WITH  THE  HOLINESS 

OF  GOD PAGE  182 

§  I. — The  hypothesis  of  the  soul's  preexistence » 182 

§  II.— The  hypothesis  of  the  Mauicheaus 183 

§  III.— The  hypothesis  of  optimism 185 

§  IV.— The  argument  of  the  atheist— The  reply  of  Leibnitz  and  other  theists— 

The  insufficiency  of  this  reply 189 

§  V. — The  sophism  of  the  atheist  exploded,  and  a  perfect  agreement  shown  to 

subsist  between  the  existence  of  sin  and  the  holiness  of  God 192 

§  VI. — The  true  and  only  foundation  of  optimism 199 

§  VII. — The  glory  of  God  seen  in  the  creation  of  a  world  which  he  foresaw 

would  fall  under  the  dominion  of  sin 203 

§  VIII. — The  little,  captious  spirit  of  Voltaire,  and  other  atheizing  minute 
philosophers 209 

JHAPTER  VII. — OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED 211 

§  I. — It«may  be  objected  that  the  foregoing  scheme  is  "  new  theology" 211 

§  II. — It  may  be  imagined  that  the  views  herein  set  forth  limit  the  omnipotence 

of  God 213 

§  HI. — The  foregoing  scheme,  it  may  be  said,  presents  a  gloomy  view  of  the 

universe 216 

§  IV. — It  may  be  alleged,  that  in  refusing  to  subject  the  volitions  of  men  to  the 
power  and  control  of  God,  we  undermine  the  sentiments  of  humility  and 

submission 218 

§  V.-  The  foregoing  treatise  may  be  deemed  inconsistent  with  gratitude  to  God  222 
§  VI.— It  may  be  contended,  that  it  is  unfair  to  urge  the  preceding  difficulties 
against  the  scheme  of  necessity;  inasmuch  as  the  same,  of  as  great,  diffi- 
culties attach  to  the  system  of  those  by  whom  they  are  urged 223 


PART    II. 

f 

THE  EXISTENCE  OF  NATURAL  EVIL,  OR  SUFFERING,  CONSISTENT  WITH 

THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD 231 

CHAPTER  I. — GOD  DESIRES  AND  SEEKS  THE  SALVATION  OF  ALL  MEN 233 

§  I- — The  reason  why  theologians  have  concluded  that  God  designs  the  salva- 
tion of  only  a  part  of  mankind 235 

§  II- — The  attempt  of  Howe  to  reconcile  the  eternal  ruin  of  a  portion  of  man- 
kind with  the  sincerity  of  God  in  his  endeavours  to  save  them 237 

§  HI. — The  views  of  Luther  and  Calvin  respecting  the  sincerity  of  God  in  his 

endeavours  to  save  those  who  will  finally  perish 242 

CHAPTER  II. — NATURAL  EVIL,  OR  SUFFERING,  AND  ESPECIALLY  THK  SUFFERING  OF  IN- 
FANTS, RECONCILED  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD 243 

§  I. — All  suffering  not  a  pvnishment  for  sin 245 

§  II- — The  imputation  of  sin  not  consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God 250 

§  HI. — The  imputation  of  sin  not  consistent  with  human,  much  less  with  the 

divine  goodness 259 

§  IV. — The  true  ends,  or  final  causes,  of  natural  evil 204 

§  V. — The  importance  of  harmonizLig  reason  and  revelation 272 


8  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  III. — THE  SUFFERINGS  OF  CHRIST  RECONCILED  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD  276 

§  I. — The  sufferings  of  Christ  not  unnecessary PAGE  276. 

§  IL— The  sufferings  of  Christ  a  bright  manifestation  of  the  goodness  of  God....  279 
§  III. — The  objections  of  Dr.  C'hanning,  and  other  Unitarians,  against  the  doc- 
trine of  the  atonement 286 

CHAPTER  IV. — THE  ETERNAL  PUNISHMENT  OF  THE  WICKED  RECONCILED  WITH  THE 

GOODNESS  OF  GOD 294 

§  L — The  false  grounds  upon  which  the  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of  future  punish- 
ment has  been  placed 295 

§  II. — The  unsound  principles  from  which,  if  true,  the  fallacy  of  the  eternity 

of  future  punishment  may  be  clearly  inferred 297 

§  in. — The  eternity  of  future  punishment  an  expression  of  the  divine  goodness  30] 

CHAPTER  V. — THE  DISPENSATION  OF  THE  DIVINE  FAVOURS  RECONCILED  WITH  THE 

GOODNESS  OF  GoD 312 

§  I. — The  unequal  distribution  of  favours,  which   obtains  in  the  economy  of 

natural  providence,  consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God 312 

§  II. — The  Scripture  doctrine  of  election  consistent  with  the  impartiality  of 

the  divine  goodness 317 

§  III. — The  Calvinistic  scheme  of  election  inconsistent  with  the  impartiality 

and  glory  of  the  divine  goodness 323 

§  IV. — The  true  ground  and  reason  of  election  to  eternal  life  shows  it  to  be 

consistent  with  the  infinite  goodness  of  God 330 


COHCLUSIOH. 

A  SUMMARY  VIEW  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  AND  ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  FORE- 
GOING SYSTEM 335 

I. — SUMMARY  OF  THE  FIRST  PART  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM 337 

§  I. — The  scheme  of  necessity  denies  that  man  is  the  responsible  author  of  sin.  338 

§  II. — The  scheme  of  necessity  makes  God  the  author  of  sin 340 

§  III. — The  scheme  of  necessity  denies  the  reality  of  moral  distinctions 341 

§  IV. — The  moral  world  not  constituted  according  to  the  scheme  of  necessity...  343 

§  V. — The  relation  between  the  human  agency  and  the  divine 344 

§  VI. — The  existence  of  moral  evil  consistent  with  the  infinite  purity  of  God....  345 

II. — SUMMARY  OF  THE  SECOND  PART  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM 355 

§  I. — God  desires  the  salvation  of  all  men 355 

§  II. — The  sufferings  of  the  innocent,  and  especially  of  infants,  consistent  with 

the  goodness  of  God 357 

§  III. — The  sufferings  of  Christ  consistent  with  the  divine  goodness 359 

§  IV. — The  eternity  of  future  punishment  consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God.  360 
§  V. — The  true  doctrine  of  election  and  predestination  consistent  with  the 

goodness  of  God 361 

§  VI.— The  question  submitted 364 


INTRODUCTION. 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODICY. 


Introduction. 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODICY. 

HOY,,  '/nder  the  government  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  evil 
could  have  proceeded  from  a  creature  of  his  own,  has  ever  been 
regarded  as  the  great  difficulty  pertaining  to  the  intellectual 
system  of  the  universe.  It  has  never  ceased  to  puzzle  and  per- 
plex the  human  mind.  Indeed,  so  great  and  so  obstinate  has  it 
seemed,  that  it  is  usually  supposed  to  lie  beyond  the  reach  of  the 
human  faculties.  We  shall,  however,  examine  the  grounds  of 
this  opinion,  before  we  exchange  the  bright  illusions  of  hope, 
if  such  indeed  they  be,  for  the  gloomy  forebodings  of  despair. 

SECTION  L 

The  failure  of  Plato  and  other  ancient  philosophers  to  construct  a  Theodicy, 
not  a  ground  of  despair. 

The  supposed  want  of  success  attending  the  labours  of  the 
past,  is,  no  doubt,  the  principal  reason  which  has  induced  so 
many  to  abandon  the  problem  of  evil  in  despair,  and  even  to 
accuse  of  presumption  every  speculation  designed  to  shed  light 
upon  so  great  a  mystery.  But  this  reason,  however  specious 
and  imposing  at  first  view,  will  lose  much  of  its  apparent  force 
upon  a  closer  examination. 

In  every  age  the  same  reasoning  has  been  employed  to  repress 
the  efforts  of  the  human  mind  to  overcome  the  difficulties  by 
which  it  has  been  surrounded  ;  yet,  in  spite  of  such  discourage- 
ments, the  most  stupendous  difficulties  have  gradually  yielded 
to  the  progressive  developments  and  revelations  of  time.  It 
was  the  opinion  of  Socrates,  for  example,  that  the  problem  of 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

the  natural  world  was  unavoidably  concealed  from  mortals,  and 
that  it  was  a  sort  of  presumptuous  impiety,  displeasing  to  the 
gods,  for  men  to  pry  into  it.  If  Newton  himself  had  lived  in 
that  age,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  have  entertained  the  same 
opinion.  It  is  certain  that  the  problem  in  question  would  then 
have  been  as  far  beyond  the  reach  of  his  powers,  as  beyond 
those  of  the  most  ordinary  individual.  The  ignorance  of  the 
earth's  dimensions,  the  manifold  errors  respecting  the  laws  of 
motion,  and  the  defective  state  of  the  mathematical  sciences, 
which  then  prevailed,  would  have  rendered  utterly  impotent 
the  efforts  of  a  thousand  Newtons  to  grapple  with  such  a  prob- 
lem. The  time  was  neither  ripe  for  the  solution  of  that  problem, 
nor  for  the  appearance  of  a  Newton.  It  was  only  after  science 
had,  during  a  period  of  two  thousand  years,  multiplied  her  re- 
sources and  gathered  up  her  energies,  that  she  was  prepared  for 
a  flight  to  the  summit  of  the  world,  whence  she  might  behold 
and  reveal  the  wonderful  art  wherewith  it  hath  been  constructed 
by  the  Almighty  Architect.  Because  Socrates  could  not  con- 
ceive of  any  possible  means  of  solving  the  great  problem  of  the 
material  world,  it  did  not  follow,  as  the  event  has  shown,  that 
it  was  forever  beyond  the  reach  and  dominion  of  man.  We 
should  not  then  listen  too  implicitly  to  the  teach  era  of  despair, 
nor  too  rashly  set  limits  to  the  triumphs  of  the  human  power. 
If  we  may  believe  "the  master  of  wisdom,"  they  are  not  the 
true  friends  of  science,  nor  of  the  world's  progress.  "  By  far 
the  greatest  obstacle,"  says  Bacon,  "  to  the  advancement  of  the 
sciences,  is  to  be  found  in  men's  despair  and  idea  of  impossi- 
bility." 

Even  in  the  minds  of  those  who  cultivate  a  particular  branch 
of  knowledge,  there  is  often  an  internal  secret  despair  of  finding 
the  truth,  which  so  far  paralyzes  their  efforts  as  to  prevent  them 
from  seeking  it  wTith  that  deep  earnestness,  without  which  it  is 
seldom  found.  The  history  of  optics  furnishes  a  most  impressive 
illustration  of  the  justness  of  this  remark.  Previous  to  the  time 
of  Newton,  no  one  seemed  to  entertain  a  real  hope  that  this 
branch  of  knowledge  would  ever  assume  the  form  and  clearness 
of  scientific  truth.  The  laws  and  properties  of  so  ethereal  a  sub- 
stance as  light,'  appeared  to  elude  the  grasp  of  the  human  intel- 
lect ;  and  hence,  no  one  evinced  the  boldness  to  grapple  directly 
with  them.  The  whole  region  of  optics  was  involved  in  miste, 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY   OF  A  THEODICY.  13 

and  those  who  gave  their  attention  to  this  department  of  knowl- 
edge, abandoned  themselves,  for  the  most  part,  to  vague  gen- 
eralities and  loose  conjectures.  In  the  conflict  of  manifold  opin- 
ions, and  the  great  variety  of  hypotheses  which  seemed  to  pro- 
mise nothing  but  endless  disputes,  the  highest  idea  of  the  science 
of  optics  that  prevailed,  was  that  of  something  in  relation  to 
light  which  might  be  plausibly  advanced  and  confidently  main- 
tained. It  was  reserved  for  Newton  to  produce  a  revolution  in 
the  mode  of  treating  this  branch  of  knowledge,  as  well  as  that 
of  physical  astronomy.  Not  despairing  of  the  truth,  he  sternly 
put  away  "  innumerable  fancies  flitting  on  all  sides  around  him," 
and  by  searching  observation  and  experiment,  brought  his  mind 
directly  into  contact  with  things  themselves,  and  held  it  steadily 
to  them,  until  the  clear  light  of  truth  dawned.  The  consequence 
was,  that  the  dreams  of  philosophy,  falsely  so  called,  gave  place 
to  the  clear  realities  of  nature.  It  was  to  the  unconquerable 
hope,  no  less  than  to  the  profound  humility  of  Newton,  that  the 
world  is  indebted  for  his  most  splendid  discoveries,  as  well  as 
for  that  perfect  model  of  the  true  spirit  of  philosophy,  which 
combined  the  infinite  caution  of  a  Butler  with  the  unbounded 
boldness  of  a  Leibnitz.  The  lowliest  humility,  free  from  the 
least  shadow  of  despair,  united  with  the  loftiest  hope,  without 
the  least  mixture  of  presumption,  both  proceeding  from  an  in- 
vincible love  of  truth,  are  the  elements  which  constituted  the 
secret  of  that  patient  and  all-enduring  thought  which  conducted 
the  mind  of  Newton  from  the  obscurities  and  dreams  envelop- 
ing the  world  below  into  the  bright  and  shining  region  of  eter- 
nal truths  above.  In  our  humble  opinion,  Newton  has  done 
more  for  the  great  cause  of  knowledge,  by  the  mighty  impulse 
of  hope  he  has  given  to  the  powers  of  the  human  mind,  than 
by  all  the  sublime  discoveries  he  has  made.  For,  as  Maclaurin 
says :  "  The  variety  of  opinions  and  perpetual  disputes  among 
philosophers  has  induced  not  a  few  of  late,  as  well  as  in  former 
times,  to  think  that  it  was  vain  labour  to  endeavour  to  acquiie 
certainty  in  natural  knowledge,  and  to  ascribe  this  to  some  un- 
avoidable defect  in  the  principles  of  the  science.  But  it  has 
appeared  sufficiently,  from  the  discoveries  of  those  who  have 
consulted  nature,  and  not  their  own  imaginations,  and  particu- 
larly from  what  we  learn  from  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  that  the  fault 
has  lain  in  philosophers  themselves^  and  not  in  philosophy  " 


1 4  INTRODUCTION. 

We  are  persuaded  the  day  will  come,  when  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  despair  of  scepticism  has  been  misplaced,  not  only  with 
regard  to  natural  knowledge,  but  also  in  relation  to  the  great 
problems  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  world.  It  is  true,  that 
Plato  failed  to  solve  these  problems ;  but  his  failure  may  be 
easily  accounted  for,  without  in  the  least  degree  shaking  the 
foundations  of  our  hope.  The  learned  Kitter  has  said,  that 
Plato  felt  the  necessity  imposed  upon  him,  by  his  system,  to 
reconcile  the  existence  of  evil  with  the  perfections  of  God ;  but 
yet,  as  often  as  he  approached  this  dark  subject,  his  views  be- 
came vague,  fluctuating,  and  unsatisfactory.  How  little  insight 
he  had  into  it  on  any  scientific  or  clearly  defined  principle,  is 
obvious  from  the  fact,  that  he  took  shelter  from  its  difficulties 
in  the  wild  hypothesis  of  the  preexisterice  of  souls.  But  the 
impotency  of  Plato's  attempts  to  solve  these  difficulties,  may  be 
explained  without  the  least  disparagement  to  his  genius,  or 
without  leading  us  to  hope  for  light  only  from  the  world's  pos- 
session of  better  minds. 

In  the  first  place,  such  was  the  state  of  mental  science  when 
Plato  lived,  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  any  one  to 
reconcile  the  existence  of  evil  with  the  perfections  of  God.  It 
lias  been  truly  said,  that  "  An  attention  to  the  internal  opera- 
tions of  the  human  mind,  with  a  view  to  analyze  its  principles, 
is  one  of  the  distinctions  of  modern  times.  Among  the  ancients 
scarcely  anything  of  the  sort  was  known." — Robert  Hall.  Yet 
without  a  correct  analysis  of  the  powers  of  the  human  mind, 
and  of  the  relations  they  sustain  to  each  other,  as  well  as  to  ex- 
ternal objects  and  influences,  it  is  impossible  to  shed  one  ray  of 
light  on  the  relation  subsisting  between  the  existence  of  moral 
evil  and  the  divine  glory.  The  theory  of  motion  is  "  the  key 
to  nature."  It  was  with  this  key  that  Newton,  the  great  high- 
priest  of  nature,  entered  into  her  profoundest  recesses,  and  laid 
open  her  most  sublime  secrets  to  the  admiration  of  mankind. 
In  like  manner,  the  true  theory  of  action  is  the  key  to  the  intel- 
lectual world,  by  which  its  difficulties  are  to  be  laid  open  and 
its  enigmas  solved.  Not  possessing  this  key,  it  was  as  impossi- 
ble for  Plato,  or  for  any  other  philosopher,  to  penetrate  the 
mystery  of  sin's  existence,  as  it  would  have  been,  without  a 
knowledge  of  the  laws  of  motion,  to  comprehend  the  stupendous 
problem  of  the  material  universe. 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODICY.  15 

Secondly,  the  ancient  philosophers  laboured  under  the  in- 
superable disadvantage,  that  the  sublime  disclosures  of  revela- 
tion had  not  been  made  known  to  the  world.  Hence  the  ma- 
terials were  wanting  out  of  which  to  construct  a  Theodicy,  or 
vindication  of  the  perfections  of  God.  For  if  we  could  see  only 
so  much  of  this  world's  drama  as  is  made  known  by  the  light 
of  nature,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  reconcile  it  with  the  char- 
acter of  its  great  Author.  No  one  was  more  sensible  of  this 
defect  of  knowledge  than  Plato  himself;  and  its  continuance 
was,  in  his  view,  inconsistent  with  the  goodness  of  the  divine 
Being.  Hence  his  well-known  prediction,  that  a  teacher  would 
be  sent  from  God  to  clear  up  the  darkness  of  man's  present 
destiny,  and  to  withdraw  the  veil  from  its  future  glory.  The 
facts  of  revelation  cannot,  of  course,  be  logically  assumed  as 
verities,  in  an  argument  with  the  atheist ;  but  still,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  see,  they  may,  in  connexion  with  other  truths,  be  made 
to  serve  a  most  important  and  legitimate  function  in  exploding 
his  sophisms  and  objections. 

SECTION  IL 
The  failure  of  Leibnitz  not  a  ground  of  despair. 

It  is  alleged,  that  since  Leibnitz  exhausted  the  resources  of 
his  vast  erudition,  and  exerted  the  powers  of  his  mighty  intel- 
lect without  success,  to  solve  the  problem  in  question,  it  is  in 
vain  for  any  one  else  to  attempt  its  solution.  Leibnitz,  himself, 
was  too  much  of  a  philosopher  to  approve  of  such  a  judgment 
in  relation  to  any  human  being.  He  could  never  have  wished, 
or  expected  to  see  "  the  empire  of  man,  which  is  founded  in  the 
sciences,"  permanently  confined  to  the  boundaries  of  a  single 
mind,  however  exalted  its  powers,  or  comprehensive  its  attain- 
ments. He  finely  rebuked  the  false  humility  and  the  disguised 
arrogance  of  Descartes,  in  affirming  that  the  sovereignty  of  God 
and  the  freedom  of  man  could  never  be  reconciled.  "  If  L>es- 
cartes,"  says  he,  "  had  confessed  such  an  inability  for  himself 
alone,  this  might  have  savoured  of  humility ;  but  it  is  other- 
wise, when,  because  he  could  not  find  the  means  of  solving  this 
difficulty,  he  declares  it  an  impossibility  for  all  ages  and  for  all 
minds."  We  have,  at  least,  the  authority  and  example  of 
Leibnitz,  in  favour  of  the  propriety  of  cultivating  this  depart- 

I 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

ment  of  knowledge,  with  a  view  to  shed  light  on  the  great 
problem  of  the  intellectual  world. 

His  failure,  if  rightly  considered,  is  not  a  ground  for  despond- 
ency. He  approached  the  problem  in  question  in  a  wrong 
spirit.  The  pride  of  conquering  difficulties  is  the  unfortunate 
disposition  with  which  he  undertook  to  solve  it.  His  well-known 
boast,  that  with  him  all  difficult  things  are  easy,  and  all  easy 
things  difficult,  is  a  proof  that  his  spirit  was  not  perfectly 
adapted  to  carry  him  forward  in  a  contest  with  the  dark  enigmas 
of  the  universe.  Indeed,  if  we  consider  what  Leibnitz  has  actu- 
ally done,  we  shall  perceive,  that  notwithstanding  his  wonder- 
ful powers,  he  has  rendered  many  easy  things  difficult,  as  well 
as  many  difficult  things  easy.  The  best  way  to  conquer  diffi- 
culties is,  if  we  may  j  udge  from  his  example,  not  to  attack  them 
directly,  and  with  the  pride  of  a  conqueror,  but  simply  to  seek 
after  the  truth.  If  we  make  a  conquest  of  all  the  truth,  this 
will  make  a  conquest  of  all  the  difficulties  within  our  reach. 
It  is  wonderful  with  what  ease  a  difficulty,  which  may  have  re- 
sisted the  direct  siege  of  centuries,  will  sometimes  fall  before  a 
single  inquirer  after  truth,  who  had  not  dreamed  of  aiming  at 
its  solution,  until  this  seemed,  as  if  by  accident,  to  offer  itself  to 
his  mind.  If  we  pursue  difficulties,  they  will  be  apt  to  fly  from 
us  and  elude  our  grasp ;  whereas,  if  we  give  up  our  minds  to  an 
honest  and  earnest  search  after  truth,  they  will  come  in  with 
their  own  solutions. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  difficulty  in  question  has  been  increased 
rather  than  diminished  by  the  speculations  of  Leibnitz.  This 
has  resulted  from  a  premature  and  extreme  devotion  to  system — 
a  source  of  miscarriage  and  failure  common  to  Leibnitz,  and  to 
most  others  who  have  devoted  their  attention  to  the  origin  of 
evil.  On  the  one  hand,  exaggerated  views  concerning  the 
divine  agency,  or  equally  extravagant  notions  on  the  other,  re- 
specting the  agency  of  man,  have  frequently  converted  a  seem- 
ing into  a  real  contradiction.  In  general,  the  work  of  God  has 
been  conceived  in  such  a  relation  to  the  powers  of  man,  as  to 
make  the  latter  entirely  disappear;  or  else  the  power  of  man 
has  been  represented  as  occupying  so  exalted  and  independent 
a  position,  as  to  exclude  the  Almighty  from  his  rightful  dominion 
over  the  moral  world.  Thus,  the  Supreme  Being  has  generally 
been  shut  out  from  the  affaire  and  government  of  the  world  by 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OP  A  THEODICY.  17 

one  side,  and  his  energy  rendered  so  all-pervading  by  the  other, 
as  really  to  make  him  the  author  of  evil.  In  this  way,  the  dif- 
ficulties concerning  the  origin  and  existence  of  evil  have  been 
greatly  augmented  by  the  very  speculations  designed  to  solve 
them.  For  if  God  takes  little  or  no  concern  in  the  affairs  and 
destiny  of  the  moral  world,  this  clearly  seems  to  render  him  re- 
sponsible for  the  evil  which  he  might  easily  have  prevented ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  pervades  the  moral  world  with  his 
power  in  such  a  manner  as  to  bring  all  things  to  pass,  this  as 
clearly  seems  to  implicate  him  in  the  turpitude  of  sin. 

After  having  converted  the  seeming  discrepancy  between  the 
divine  power  and  human  agency  into  a  real  contradiction,  it  is 
too  late  to  endeavour  to  reconcile  them.  Yet  such  has  been 
the  case  with  most  of  the  giant  intellects  that  have  laboured  to 
reconcile  the  sovereignty  of  God  and  the  moral  agency  of  man. 
It  will  hereafter  be  clearly  seen,  we  trust,  that  it  is  not  possible 
for  any  one,  holding  the  scheme  of  a  Calvin,  or  a  Leibnitz,  or  a 
Descartes,  or  an  Edwards,  to  show  an  agreement  between  the 
power  of  God  and  the  freedom  of  man ;  since  according  to  these 
systems  there  is  an  eternal  opposition  and  conflict  between 
them.  It  is  no  ground  of  despair,  then,  that  the  mighty  minds 
of  the  past  have  failed  to  solve  the  problem  in  question,  if  the 
cause  of  their  failure  may  be  traced  to  the  errors  of  their  own 
systems,  and  not  to  the  inherent  difficulties  of  the  subject. 

Those  who  have  endeavoured  to  solve  the  problem  in  ques- 
tion have,  for  the  most  part,  been  necessitated  to  fail  in  conse- 
quence of  having  adopted  a  wrrong  method.  Instead  of  begin- 
ning with  observation,  and  carefully  dissecting  the  world  wrhich 
God  has  made,  so  as  to  rise,  by  a  clear  analysis  of  things,  to 
the  general  principles  on  which  they  have  been  actually  framed 
and  put  together,  they  have  set  out  from  the  lofty  region  of 
universal  abstractions,  and  proceeded  to  reconstruct  the  world 
for  themselves.  Instead  of  beginning  with  the  actual,  as  best 
befits  the  feebleness  of  the  human  intellect,  and  working  their 
way  up  into  the  great  system  of  things,  they  have  taken  their 
position  at  once  in  the  high  and  boundless  realm  of  the  ideal, 
and  thence  endeavoured  to  deduce  the  nature  of  the  laws  and 
phenomena  of  the  real  world.  This  is  the  course  pursued  by 
Plato,  Leibnitz,  Hobbes,  Descartes,  Edwards,  and,  indeed,  most 
of  those  great  thinkers  who  have  endeavoured  to  shed  light  on 


18  INTKODUCTION. 

the  problem  in  question.  Hence  each  has  necessarily  become 
"  a  sublime  architect  of  words,"  whose  grand  and  imposing  sys- 
tem of  shadows  and  abstractions  has  but  a  slight  foundation  in 
the  real  constitution  and  laws  of  the  spiritual  world.  Their 
writings  furnish  the  most  striking  illustration  of  the  profound 
aphorism  of  Bacon,  that  "the  usual  method  of  discovery  and 
prc  of,  by  first  establishing  the  most  general  propositions,  then 
applying  and  proving  the  intermediate  axioms  according  to 
these,  is  the  parent  of  error  and  tfo  calamity  of  every  science" 
He  who  would  frame  a  real  model  of  the  world  in  the  under- 
standing, such  as  it  is  found  to  be,  not  such  as  man's  reason  has 
distorted,  must  pursue  the  opposite  course.  Surely  it  cannot  be 
deemed  unreasonable,  that  this  course  should  be  most  diligently 
applied  to  the  study  of  the  intellectual  world ;  especially  as  it 
has  wrought  such  wonders  in  the  province  of  natural  knowl- 
edge, and  that  too,  after  so  many  ages  had,  according  to  the 
former  method,  laboured  upon  it  comparatively  in  vain.  Be- 
cause the  human  mind  has  not  been  able  to  bridge  over  the 
impassable  gulf  between  the  ideal  and  the  concrete,  so  as  to 
effect  a  passage  from  the  former  to  the  latter,  it  certainly  does 
not  follow,  that  it  should  forever  despair  of  so  far  penetrating 
the  apparent  obscurity  and  confusion  of  real  things,  as  to  see 
that  nothing  which  God  has  created  is  inconsistent  with  the 
eternal,  immutable  glory  of  the  ideal :  or,  in  other  words,  be- 
cause the  real  world  and  the  ideal  cannot  be  shown  to  be 
connected  by  a  logical  dependency,  it  does  not  follow,  that  the 
actual  creation  and  providence  of  God,  that  all  his  works  and 
ways  cannot  be  made  to  appear  consistent  with  the  idea  of  an 
absolutely  perfect  being  and  of  the  eternal  laws  according  to 
which  his  power  acts:  that  is  to  say,  because  the  high  a  priori 
method,  which  so  magisterially  proceeds  to  pronounce  what 
must  fo,  has  failed  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  moral  world,  it 
does  not  follow,  that  the  inductive  method,  or  that  which  cau- 
tiously begins  with  an  examination  of  what  w,  may  not  finally 
rise  to  the  sublime  contemplation  of  what  ought  to  ~be  /  and,  in 
the  light  of  God's  own  creation,  behold  the  magnificent  model 
of  the  actual  universe  perfectly  conformed  to  the  transcendent 
and  unutterable  glory  of  the  ideal. 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODICY.  19 


SECTION  IIL 

The  system  of  the  moral  universe  not  purposely  involved  in  obscurity  to 
teach  us  a  lesson  of  humility. 

But  the  assertion  is  frequently  made,  that  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  world  is  purposely  left  in  obscurity  and  apparent 
confusion,  in  order  to  teach  man  a  lesson  of  humility  and  sub- 
mission, by  showing  him  how  weak  and  narrow  is  the  human 
mind.  We  have  not,  however,  been  able  to  find  any  sufficient 
reason  or  foundation  for  such  an  opinion.  As  every  atom  in 
the  universe  presents  mysteries  which  baffle  the  most  subtle 
research  and  the  most  profound  investigation  of  the  human 
intellect,  we  cannot  see  how  any  reflecting  mind  can  possibly 
find  an  additional  lesson  of  humility  in  the  fact,  that  the  system 
of  the  universe  itself  is  involved  in  clouds  and  darkness.  Would 
it  not  be  strange,  indeed,  if  the  mind,  whose  grasp  is  not  suf- 
ficient for  the  mysteries  of  a  single  atom,  should  be  really  hum- 
bled by  the  conviction  that  it  is  too  wreak  and  limited  to  fathom 
the  wonders  of  the  universe?  Does  the  insignificance  of  an 
egg-shell  appear  from  the  fact  that  it  cannot  contain  the  ocean  ? 

The  truth  is,  that  the  more  clearly  the  majesty  and  glory  of 
the  divine  perfections  are  displayed  in  the  constitution  and 
government  of  the  world,  the  more  clearly  shall  we  see  the 
greatness  of  God  and  the  littleness  of  man.  No  true  knowledge 
can  ever  impress  the  human  mind  with  a  conceit  of  its  own 
greatness.  The  farther  its  light  expands,  the  greater  must  be- 
come the  visible  sphere  of  the  surrounding  darkness ;  and  its 
highest  attainment  in  real  knowledge  must  inevitably  terminate 
in  a  profound  sense  of  the  vast,  unlimited  extent  of  its  own  ig- 
norance. Hence,  wre  need  entertain  no  fear,  that  man's  humil- 
ity will  ever  be  endangered  by  too  great  attainments  in  science. 
Presumption  is,  indeed,  the  natural  offspring  of  ignorance,  and 
not  of  knowledge.  Socrates,  as  we  have  already  seen,  endeav- 
oured to  inculcate  a  lesson  of  humility,  by  reminding  his  con- 
temporaries how  far  the  theory  of  the  material  heavens  w^as  be- 
yond the  reach  of  their  faculties.  And  to  enforce  this  lesson, 
he  assured  them  that  it  was  displeasing  to  the  gods  for  men  to 
attempt  to  pry  into  the  wonderful  art  wherewith  they  had  con- 
structed the  universe.  In  like  manner,  the  poet,  at  a  much 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

later  period,  puts  the  following  sentiment  into  the  mouth  of  an 
angel : — 

M  To  ask  or  search,  I  blame  thee  not ;  for  heaven 

Is  as  the  book  of  God  before  thee  set, 

Wherein  to  read  his  wondrous  works,  and  learn 

His  seasons,  hours,  or  days,  or  months,  or  years : 

This  to  attain,  whether  heaven  move  or  earth, 

Imports  not  if  thou  reckon  right ;  the  rest 

From  man  or  angel  the  great  Architect 

Did  wisely  to  conceal,  and  not  divulge 

His  secrets,  to  be  scann'd  by  them  who  ought 

Rather  admire  ;  or,  if  they  list  to  try 

Conjecture,  he  his  fabric  of  the  heavens 

Hath  left  to  their  disputes,  perhaps  to  move 

His  laughter  at  their  quaint  opinions  wide 

Hereafter." 

All  this  may  be  very  well,  no  doubt,  for  him  by  whom  it  was 
uttered,  and  for  those  who  may  have  received  it  as  an  everlast- 
ing oracle  of  truth.  But  the  true  lesson  of  humility  was  taught 
by  Newton,  when  he  solved  the  'problem  of  the  world,  and  re- 
vealed the  wonderful  art  displayed  therein  by  the  Supreme 
Architect.  Never  before,  in  the  history  of  the  human  race, 
was  so  impressive  a  conviction  made  of  the  almost  absolute 
nothingness  of  man,  when  measured  on  the  inconceivably  mag- 
nificent scale  of  the  universe.  No  one,  it  is  well  known,  felt 
this  conviction  more  deeply  than  Newton  himself.  "I  have 
been  but  as  a  child,"  said  he,  "  playing  on  the  sea-shore ;  now 
finding  some  pebble  rather  more  polished,  and  now  some  shell 
rather  more  agreeably  variegated  than  another,  while  the  im- 
mense ocean  of  truth  extended  itself  unexplored  before  me." 

It  is,  indeed,  strangely  to  forget  our  littleness,  as  well  as  the 
limits  which  this  necessarily  sets  to  the  progress  of  the  under- 
standing, to  imagine  that  the  Almighty  has  to  conceal  anything 
with  a  view  to  remind  us  of  the  weakness  of  our  powers.  In- 
deed, everything  around  us,  and  everything  within  us,  brings 
home  the  conviction  of  the  littleness  of  man.  There  is  not  a 
page  of  the  history  of  human  thought  on  which  this  lesson  is 
not  deeply  engraved.  Still  we  do  not  despair.  We  find  a 
ground  of  hope  in  the  very  littleness  as  well  as  in  the  great 
ness  of  the  human  powers. 


OF  THE   POSSIBILITY   OF  A  THEODICY.  21 


SECTION  IV. 
The  littleness  of  the  hvman  mind  a  ground  of  hope. 

"We  would  yield  to  no  one  in  a  profound  veneration  for  the 
great  intellects  of  the  past.  But  let  us  not  be  dazzled  and 
blinded  by  the  splendour  of  their  achievements.  Let  us 
look  at  it  closely,  and  see  how  wonderful  it  is — this  thing  called 
the  human  mind.  The  more  I  think  of  it,  the  more  it  fills  me 
with  amazement.  I  scarcely  know  which  amazes  me  the  more, 
its  littleness  or  its  grandeur.  Now  I  see  it,  with  all  its  high 
powers  and  glorious  faculties,  labouring  under  the  ambiguity 
of  a  word,  apparently  in  hopeless  eclipse  for  centuries.  Shall  I 
therefore  despise  it  ?  Before  I  have  time  to  do  so,  the  power 
and  the  light  which  is  thus  shut  out  from  the  world  by  so  piti- 
ful a  cause,  is  revealed  in  all  its  glory.  I  see  this  same  intelli- 
gence forcing  its  way  through  a  thousand  hostile  appearances, 
resisting  innumerable  obstacles  pressing  on  all  sides  around  it, 
overcoming  deep  illusions,  and  inveterate  opinions,  almost  as 
firmly  seated  as  the  very  laws  of  nature  themselves.  I  see  it 
rising  above  all  these,  and  planting  itself  in  the  radiant  seat  of 
truth.  It  embraces  the  plan,  it  surveys  the  work  of  the  Su- 
preme Architect  of  all  things.  It  follows  the  infinite  reason, 
and  recognises  the  almighty  power,  in  their  sublimest  manifes- 
tations. I  rejoice  in  the  glory  of  its  triumphs,  and  am  ready 
to  pronounce  its  empire  boundless.  But,  alas !  I  see  it  again 
baffled  and  confounded  by  the  wonders  and  mysteries  of  a 
single  atom ! 

I  see  this  same  thing,  or  rather  its  mightiest  representatives, 
with  a  Newton  or  a  Leibnitz  at  their  head,  in  full  pursuit  of  a 
shadow,  and  wasting  their  wonderful  energies  in  beating  the  air. 
They  have  measured  the  world,  and  stretched  their  line  upon 
the  chambers  of  the  great  deep.  They  have  weighed  the  sun, 
moon,  and  stars,  and  marked  out  their  orbits.  They  have  de- 
termined the  laws  according  to  which  all  worlds  and  all  atoms 
move — according  to  which  the  very  spheres  sing  together.  And 
yet.  when  they  came  to  measure  "  the  force  of  a  moving  body," 
they  toil  for  a  century  at  the  task,  and  finally  rest  in  the  amazing 
conclusion,  that  "  the  very  same  thing  may  have  two  measures 
widely  different  from  each  other  1"  Alas !  that  the  same  mind, 


22  INTRODUCTION". 

that  the  same  god-like  intelligence,  which  has  measured  worlds 
and  systems,  should  thus  have  wasted  its  stupendous  energies 
in  striving  to  measure  a  metaphor ! 

When  I  think  of  its  grandeur  and  its  triumphs,  I  bow  with 
reverence  before  its  power,  and  am  ready  to  despair  of  ever 
seeing  it  go  farther  than  it  has  already  gone ;  but  when  I  think 
of  its  littleness  and  its  failures,  I  take  courage  again,  and  de- 
termine to  toil  on  as  a  living  atom  among  living  atoms.  The 
glory  of  its  triumphs  does  not  discourage  me,  because  I  also  see 
its  littleness ;  nor  can  its  littleness  extinguish  in  me  the  light 
of  hope,  because  I  also  see  the  glory  of  its  triumphs.  And 
surely  this  is  right ;  for  the  intellect  of  man,  so  conspicuously 
combining  the  attributes  of  the  angel  and  of  the  worm,  is  not 
to  be  despised  without  infinite  danger,  nor  followed  without  in- 
finite caution. 

Such,  indeed,  is  the  weakness  and  fallibility  of  the  human 
mind,  even  in  its  brightest  forms,  that  we  cannot  for  a  moment 
imagine,  that  the  inherent  difficulties  of  the  dark  enigma  of  the 
world  are  insuperable,  because  they  have  not  been  clearly  and 
fully  solved  by  a  Leibnitz  or  an  Edwards.  On  the  contrary, 
we  are  perfectly  persuaded  that  in  the  end  the  wonder  will  be, 
not  that  such  a  question  should  have  been  attempted  after  so 
many  illustrious  failures,  but  that  any  such  failure  should  have 
been  made.  This  will  appear  the  more  probable,  if  we  con- 
sider the  precise  nature  of  the  problem  to  be  solved,  and  not 
lose  ourselves  in  dark  and  unintelligible  notions.  It  is  not  to 
do  some  great  thing — it  is  simply  to  refute  the  sophism  of  the 
atheist.  If  God  were  both  willing  and  able  to  prevent  sin, 
which  is  the  only  supposition  consistent  with  the  idea  of  God, 
says  the  atheist,  he  would  certainly  have  prevented  it,  and  sin 
would  never  have  made  its  appearance  in  the  world.  But  sin 
has  made  its  appearance  in  the  world ;  and  hence,  God  must 
have  been  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  prevent  it.  JSTow,  if 
we  take  either  term  of  this  alternative,  we  must  adopt  a  con- 
clusion which  is  at  war  with  the  idea  of  a  God. 

Such  is  the  argument  of  the  atheist ;  and  sad  indeed  must 
be  the  condition  of  the  Christian  world  if  it  be  forever  unable 
to  meet  and  refute  such  a  sophism.  Yet,  it  is  the  error  involved 
in  this  sophism  which  obscures  our  intellectual  vision,  and  causes 
30  perplexing  a  darkness  to  spread  itself  over  the  moral  order 


- 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODI 


and  beauty  of  the  world.  Hence,  in  grappling  with  the  sup- 
posed great  difficulty  in  question,  we  do  not  undertake  to  re- 
move a  veil  from  the  universe — we  simply  undertake  to  remove 
a  sophism  from  our  own  minds.  Though  we  have  so  spoken  in 
accommodation  with  the  views  of  others,  the  problem  of  the 
moral  world  is  not,  in  reality,  high  and  difficult  in  itself,  like 
the  great  problem  of  the  material  universe.  We  repeat,  it  is 
simply  to  refute  and  explode  the  sophism  of  the  atheist.  Let 
this  be  blown  away,  and  the  darkness  whicl}  seems  to  overhang 
the  moral  government  of  the  world  will  disappear  like  the 
mists  of  the  morning. 

If  such  be  the  nature  of  the  problem  in  question,  and  such 
it  will  be  found  to  be,  it  is  certainly  a  mistake  to  suppose 
that  "it  must  be  entangled  with  perplexities  while  we  see 
but  in  part."*  It  is  only  while  we  see  amiss,  and  not  while 
we  see  in  part,  that  this  problem  must  wear  the  appearance 
of  a  dark  enigma.  It  is  clear,  that  our  knowledge  is,  and 
ever  must  be,  exceedingly  limited  on  all  sides;  and  if  we 
must  understand  the  whole  of  the  case,  if  we  must  comprehend 
the  entire  extent  of  the  divine  government  for  the  universe  and 
for  eternity,  before  we  ca'n  remove  the  difficulty  in  question,  we 
must  necessarily  despair  of  success.  But  we  cannot  see  any 
sufficient  ground  to  support  this  oft-repeated  assertion.  Because 
the  field  of  our  vision  is  so  exceedingly  limited,  we  do  not  see 
why  it  should  be  forever  traversed  by  apparent  inconsistencies 
and  contradictions.  In  relation  to  the  material  universe,  our 
space  is  but  a  point,  and  our  time  but  a  moment ;  and  yet.  as 
that  inconceivably  grand  system  is  now  understood  by  us,  there 
is  nothing  in  it  which  seems  to  conflict  with  the  dictates  of  rea- 
son, or  with  the  infinite  perfections  of  God.  On  the  contrary, 
the  revelations  of  modern  science  have  given  an  emphasis  and  a 
sublimity  to  the  language  of  inspiration,  that  "  the  heavens  de- 
clare the  glory  of  the  Lord,"  which  had,  for  ages,  been  con- 
cealed from  the  loftiest  conception  of  the  astronomer. 

Nor  did  it  require  a  knowledge  of  the  whole  material  universe 
to  remove  the  difficulties,  or  to  blast  the  objections  which 
atheists  had,  in  all  preceding  ages,  raised  against  the  perfections 
of  its  divine  Author.  Such  objections,  as  is  well  known,  were 
raised  before  astronomy,  as  a  science,  had  an  existence.  Lucre- 

0  Johnson's  Works,  vol.  iv,  p.  286. 


24  INTRODUCTION. 

• 

tins,  for  example,  though  he  deemed  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars, 
no  larger  than  they  appear  to  the  eye,  and  supposed  them  to 
revolve  around  the  earth,  undertook  to  point  out  and  declaim 
against  the  miserable  defects  which  he  saw,  or  fancied  he  saw, 
in  the  system  of  the  material  world.  That  is  to  say,  he  under- 
took to  criticise  and  find  fault  with  the  great  volume  of  nature, 
before  he  had  even  learned  its  alphabet.  The  objections  of 
Lucretius,  which  appeared  so  formidable  in  his  day,  as  well  as 
many  others  that  have  since  been  raised  on  equally  plausible 
grounds,  have  passed  away  before  the  progress  of  science,  and 
now  seem  like  the  silly  prattle  of  children,  or  the  insane  babble 
of  madmen.  But  although  such  difficulties  have  been  swept 
away,  and  our  field  of  vision  cleared  of  all  that  is  painful  and 
perplexing,  nay,  brightened  with  all  that  is  grand  and  beautiful, 
we  seem  to  be  farther  than  ever  from  comprehending  the  whole 
of  the  case — from  grasping  the  amazing  extent  and  glory  of  the 
material  globe.  And  why  may  not  this  ultimately  be  the  case 
also  in  relation  to  the  moral  universe  ?  Why  should  every  at- 
tempt to  clear  up  its  difficulties,  and  blow  away  the  objections 
of  atheism  to  its  order  and  beauty,  be  supposed  to  originate  in 
presumption  and  to  terminate  in  impiety?  Are  we  so  much 
the  less  interested  in  knowing  the  ways  of  God  in  regard  to  the 
constitution  and  government  of  the  moral  world  than  of  the 
material,  that  he  should  purposely  conceal  the  former  from  us, 
while  he  has  permitted  the  latter  to  be  laid  open  so  as  to 
ravish  our  minds  ?  We  can  believe  no  such  thing ;  and  we  are 
not  willing  to  admit  that  there  is  any  part  of  the  creation  of 
God  in  which  omniscience  alone  can  cope  with  the  atheist. 

SECTION  V. 

The  construction  of  a  Theodicy,  not  an  attempt  to  solve  mysteries,  "but  to 
dissipate  absurdities.  - 

As  we  have  merely  undertaken  to  refute  the  atheist,  and  vin- 
dicate the  glory  of  the  divine  perfections,  so  it  would  be  a 
grievous  mistake  to  suppose,  that  we  are  about  to  pry  into  the 
holy  mysteries  of  religion.  No  sound  mind  is  ever  perplexed 
by  the  contemplation  of  mysteries.  Indeed,  they  are  a  source 
of  positive  satisfaction  and  delight.  If  nothing  were  dark, — 
if  all  around  us,  and  above  us,  were  clearly  seen, — the  truth 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODICY.  25 

itself  would  soon  appear  stale  and  mean.  Everything  truly 
great  must  transcend  the  powers  of  the  human  mind ;  and  hence, 
if  nothing  were  mysterious,  there  would  be  nothing  worthy  of 
our  veneration  and  worship.  It  is  mystery,  indeed,  which  lends 
such  unspeakable  grandeur  and  variety  to  the  scenery  of  the 
moral  world.  Without  it,  all  would  be  clear,  it  is  true,  but 
nothing  grand.  There  would  be  lights,  but  no  shadows.  And 
around  the  very  lights  themselves,  there  would  be  nothing 
soothing  and  sublime,  in  which  the  soul  might  rest  and  the  im- 
agination revel. 

Hence  it  is  no  part  of  our  object  to  pry  into  mystery,  but  to 
get  rid  of  absurdity.  And  in  our  humble  opinion,  this  would 
long  since  have  been  done,  and  the  difficulty  in  question  solved, 
had  not  the  friends  of  truth  incautiously  given  the  most  power- 
ful protection  to  the  sophism  and  absurdity  of  the  atheist,  by 
throwing  around  it  the  sacred  garb  of  mystery. 


SECTION  VI. 

The  spirit  in  which  the  following  work  has  leen  prosecuted,  and  the  relation 
of  the  author  to  other  systems. 

In  conclusion,  we  offer  a  few  remarks  in  relation  to  the  man- 
ner and  spirit  in  which  the  following  work  lias  been  undertaken 
and  prosecuted.  In  the  first  place,  the  writer  may  truly  say, 
that  he  did  not  enter  on  the  apparently  dark  problem  of  the 
moral  world  with  the  least  hope  that  he  should  be  able  to 
throw  any  light  upon  it,  nor  with  any  other  set  purpose  and  de- 
sign. He  simply  revolved  the  subject  in  mind,  because  he  was 
by  nature  prone  to  such  meditations.  So  far  from  having  aimed 
at  things  usually  esteemed  so  high  and  difficult  with  a  feeling 
of  presumptuous  confidence,  he  has,  indeed,  suffered  most  from 
that  spirit  of  despondency,  that  despair  of  scepticism,  against 
which,  in  the  foregoing  pages,  he  has  appeared  so  anxious  to 
caution  others.  It  has  been  patient  reflection,  and  the  reading 
of  excellent  authors,  together  with  an  earnest  desire  to  know  the 
truth,  which  has  delivered  him  from  the  power  of  that  spirit, 
and  conducted  him  to  what  now  so  clearly  seems  "  the  bright 
and  shining  light  of  truth." 

It  was,  in  fact,  while  engaged  in  meditation  on  the  powers 
and  susceptibilities  of  the  human  mind,  as  well  as  on  the  rela- 


26  INTKODUCTION. 

tions  they  sustain  to  each  and  to  otlier  things,  and  not  in  any 
d  rect  attempt  to  elucidate  the  origin  of  evil,  that  the  first  clear 
li  ^ht  appeared  to  dawn  on  this  great  difficulty  :  and  in  no  other 
way,  he  humbly  conceives,  can  the  true  philosophy  of  the 
spiritual  world  ever  be  comprehended.  For,  as  the  laws  of 
matter  had  first  to  be  studied  and  traced  out  in  relation  to 
bodies  on  the  earth,  before  they  could  be  extended  to  the 
heavens,  and  made  to  explain  its  wonderful  mechanism ;  so 
must  the  laws  and  phenomena  of  the  human  mind  be  correctly 
analyzed  and  clearly  defined,  in  order  to  obtain  an  insight  into 
the  intellectual  system  of  the  universe.  And  just  in  pro- 
portion as  the  clouds  and  darkness  hanging  over  the  phe- 
nomena of  our  own  minds  are  made  to  disappear,  will  the  intel- 
lectual system  of  the  world  which  God  "  has  set  in  our  hearts," 
become  more  distinct  and  beautiful  in  its  proportions.  For  it 
is  the  mass  of  real  contradictions  and  obscurities,  existing  in  the 
little  world  within,  which  distorts  to  our  view  the  great  world 
without,  and  causes  the  work  and  ways  of  God  to  appear  so  full 
of  disorders.  Hence,  in  proportion  as  these  real  contradictions 
and  obscurities  are  removed,  will  the  mind  become  a  truer 
microcosm,  or  more  faithful  mirror,  in  which  the  image  of  the 
universe  will  unfold  itself,  free  from  the  apparent  disorders  and 
confusion  which  seem  to  render  it  unworthy  of  its  great  Author 
and  Euler. 

Secondly,  the  relation  which  the  writer  sustains  to  other  sys- 
tems, has  been,  it  appears  to  himself,  most  favourable  to  a  suc- 
cessful prosecution  of  the  following  speculations.  Whether  at 
the  outset  of  his  inquiries,  he  was  the  more  of  an  Arminian  or 
of  a  Calvinist,  he  is  unable  to  say  ;  but  if  his  crude  and  imper- 
fectly developed  sentiments  had  then  been  made  knowrn,  it  is 
probable  he  would  have  been  ranked  with  the  Arminians.  Be 
this  as  it  may,  it  is  certain  that  he  was  never  so  much  of  an 
Arminian,  or  of  anything  else,  as  to  imagine  that  Calvinism 
admitted  of  nothing  great  and  good.  On  the  contrary,  he  has 
ever  believed  that  the  Calvinists  were  at  least  equal  to  any 
other  body  of  men  in  piety,  which  is  certainly  the  highest  and 
noblest  of  all  qualities.  And  besides,  it  was  a  constant  delight 
to  him  to  read  the  great  master-pieces  of  reasoning  which  Cal- 
vinism had  furnished  for  the  instruction  and  admiration  of 
mankind.  By  this  means  he  came  to  believe  that  the  scheme 


OF  THE   POSSIBILITY  OF  A  THEODICY.  27 

of  the  Arminians  could  not  be  maintained,  and  his  faith  in  it 
was  gradually  undermined. 

But  although  he  thus  submitted  his  mind  to  the  dominion  of 
Calvinism,  as  advocated  by  Edwards,  and  earnestly  espoused  it 
with  some  exceptions ;  he  never  felt  that  profound,  internal 
satisfaction  of  the  truth  of  the  system,  after  which  his  rational 
nature  continually  longed,  and  which  it  struggled  to  realize. 
He  certainly  expected  to  find  this  satisfaction  in  Calvinism,  if 
anywhere.  Long,  therefore,  did  he  pass  over  every  portion  of 
Calvinism,  in  order  Jo  discover,  if  possible,  how  its  foundations 
might  be  rendered  more  clear  and  convincing,  and  all  its  parts  har- 
monized among  themselves  as  well  as  with  the  great  undeniable 
facts  of  man's  nature  and  destiny.  While  engaged  in  these 
inquiries,  he  has  been  more  than  once  led  to  see  what  appeared 
to  be  a  flaw  in  Calvinism  itself ;  but  without  at  first  perceiving 
all  its  consequences.  By  reflection  on  these  apparent  defects  ; 
nay,  by  protracted  and  earnest  meditation  on  them,  his  sus- 
picions have  been  confirmed  and  his  opinions  changed.  If 
what  now  so  clearly  appears  to  be  the  truth  is  so  or  not,  it  is 
certain  that  it  has  not  been  embraced  out  of  a  spirit  of  oppo- 
sition to  Calvinism,  or  to  any  other  system  of  religious  faith 
whatever.  Its  light,  whether  real  or  imaginary,  has  dawned 
upon  his  mind  while  seeking  after  truth  amid  the  foundations 
of  Calvinism  itself ;  and  this  light  has  been  augmented  more 
by  reading  the  works  of  Calvinists  themselves,  than  those  of 
their  opponents. 

These  tilings  are  here  set  down,  not  because  the  writer  thinks 
they  should  have  any  weight  or  influence  to  bias  the  judgment 
of  the  reader,  but  because  he  wishes  it  to  be  understood  that 
he  entertains  the  most  profound  veneration  for  the  great  and 
good  men  whose  works  seem  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  follow- 
ing design  to  vindicate  the  glory  of  God,  and  which,  therefore, 
he  will  not  scruple  to  assail  in  so  far  as  this  may  be  necessary 
to  his  purpose.  It  is,  indeed,  a  matter  of  deep  and  inexpressible 
regret,  that  in  our  conflicts  with  the  powers  of  darkness,  we 
should,  however  undesigneclly,  be  weakened  and  opposed  by 
Christian  divines  and  philosophers.  But  so  it  seems  to  be.  and 
we  dare  not  cease  to  resist  them.  And  if,  in  the  following 
attempt  to  vindicate  the  glory  of  God,  it  shall  become  neces- 
sary to  call  in  question  the  infallibility  of  the  great  founders  of 


28  INTRODUCTION'. 

human  systems,  this,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  will  not  "be  deemed  an 
unpardonable  offence. 

Thus  has  the  writer  endeavoured  to  work  his  way  through 
the  mingled  lights  and  obscurity  of  human  systems  into  a  bright 
and  beautiful  vision  of  the  great  harmonious  system  of  the  world 
itself.  It  is  certainly  either  a  sublime  truth,  or  else  a  glorious 
illusion,  which  thus  enables  him  to  rise  above  the  apparent 
disorders  and  perturbations  of  the  world,  as  constituted  and 
governed  by  the  Almighty,  and  behold  the  real  order  and 
harmony  therein  established.  The  ideal  creations  of  the  poet 
and  the  philosopher  sink  into  perfect  insignificance  beside 
the  actual  creation  of  God.  Where  clouds  and  darkness 
once  appeared  the  most  impenetrable,  there  scenes  of  inde- 
scribable magnificence  and  beauty  are  now  beheld  with  inex- 
pressible delight ;  the  stupendous  cloud  of  evil  no  longer  hangs 
overhead,  but  rolls  beneath  us,  while  the  eternal  Reason  from 
above  permeates  its  gloom,  and  irradiates  its  depths.  We  now 
behold  the  reason,  and  absolutely  rejoice  in  the  contemplation, 
of  that  which  once  seemed  like  a  dark  blot  on  the  world's 
design. 

In  using  this  language,  we  do  not  wish  to  be  understood 
as  laying  claim  to  the  discovery  of  any  great  truth,  or  any  new 
principle.  Yet  we  do  trust,  that  we  have  attained  to  a  clear 
and  precise  statement  of  old  truths.  And  these  truths,  thus 
clearly  defined,  we  trust  that  we  have  seized  with  a  firm  grasp, 
and  carried  as  lights  through  the  dark  places  of  theology, 
so  as  to  expel  thence  the  errors  and  delusions  by  which  its 
glory  has  been  obscured.  Moreover,  if  we  have  not  succeeded, 
nor  even  attempted  to  succeed,  in  solving  any  mysteries,  prop- 
erly so  called,  yet  may  we  have  removed  certain  apparent 
contradictions,  which  have  been  usually  deemed  insuperable  to 
the  human  mind. 

But  even  if  the  reader  should  be  satisfied  beforehand,  that  no 
additional  light  will  herein  be  thrown  on  the  problem  of  the 
moral  world,  yet  would  we  remind  him,  that  it  does  not  neces- 
sarily follow  that  the  ensuing  discourse  is  wholly  unworthy  of 
his  attention :  for  the  materials,  though  old,  may  be  presented 
in  new  combinations,  and  much  may  be  omitted  which  has 
disfigured  and  obscured  the  beauty  of  most  other  systems. 
Although  no  new  fountains  of  light  may  be  opened,  yet  may 


OF  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  #A  THEODICY.  20 

the  vision  of  the  soul  be  so  purged  of  certain  films  of  error  as 
to  enable  it  to  reflect  the  glory  of  the  spiritual  universe,  j  ust  as 
a  single  dew-drop  is  seen  to  mirror  forth  the  magnificent  cope  of 
heaven  with  all  its  multitude  of  stars. 

We  have  sought  the  truth,  and  how  far  we  have  found  it,  no 
one  should  proceed  to  determine  without  having  first  read  and 
examined.  We  have  sought  it,  not  in  Calvinism  alone,  nor  in 
Arminianism  alone,  nor  in  any  other  creed  or  system  of  man's 
devising.  In  every  direction  have  we  diligently  sought  it, 
as  our  feeble  abilities  would  permit ;  and  yet,  we  hope,  it  will 
be  found  that  the  body  of  truth  which  we  now  have  to  offer  is 
not  a  mere  hasty  patchwork  of  superficial  eclecticism,  but  a 
living  and  organic  whole.  By  this  test  we  could  wish  to  be 
tried ;  for,  as  Bacon  hath  well  said,  "  It  is  the  harmony  of  any 
philosophy  in  itself  that  giveth  it  light  and  credence."  And  in 
the  application  of  this  test,  we  could  also  wish,  that  the  reader 
would  so  far  forget  his  sectarian  predilections,  if  he  have  any, 
as  to  permit  his  mind  to  be  inspired  by  the  immortal  words  of 
Milton,  which  we  shall  here  adopt  as  a  fitting  conclusion  of  these 
our  present  remarks : — 

"Truth,  indeed,  came  once  into  the  world  with  her  divine 
Master,  and  was  a  perfect  shape  most  glorious  to  look  on ;  but 
when  he  ascended,  and  his  apostles  after  him  were  laid  asleep, 
then  straight  arose  a  wicked  race  of  deceivers,  who,  as  that 
story  goes  of  the  Egyptian  Typhon,  with  his  conspirators,  how 
they  dealt  with  the  good  Osiris,  took  the  virgin,  Truth,  hewed 
her  lovely  form  into  a  thousand  pieces,  and  scattered  them  to 
the  four  winds.  From  that  time  ever  since  the  sad  friends  of 
Truth,  such  as  durst  appear,  imitating  the  careful  search  that 
Isis  made  for  the  mangled  body  of  Osiris,  went  up  and  down 
gathering  up  limb  by  limb  still  as  they  could  find  them.  •  We 
have  not  yet  found  them  all,  nor  ever  shall  do,  till  her  Master's 
second  coming;  he  shall  bring  together  every  joint  and  mem- 
ber, and  shall  mould  them  into  an  immortal  feature  of  loveli- 
ness and  perfection.  Suffer  not  these  licensing  prohibitions  to 
stand  at  every  place  of  opportunity,  forbidding  and  disturbing 
them  that  Continue  seeking,  that  continue  to  do  our  obsequies 
to  the  torn  body  of  our  martyred  saint.  We  boast  our  light ; 
but  if  we  look  not  wisely  on  the  sun  itself,  it  smites  us  into  dark- 
ness. Who  can  discern  those  planets  that  are  oft  combust,  and 


30  INTRODUCTION. 

those  stars  of  brightest  magnitude,  that  rise  and  set  with  the 
sun,  until  the  opposite  motion  of  their  orbs  bring  them  to  such 
a  place  In  the  firmament,  where  they  may  be  seen  morning  or 
evening  ?  The  light  which  we  have  gained  was  given  us,  not 
to  be  ever  staring  on,  but  by  it  to  discover  onward  things  more 
remote  from  our  knowledge.  It  is  not  the  unfrocking  of  a  priest, 
the  unmitring  of  a  bishop,  and  the  removing  him  from  off  the 
Presbyterian  shoulders,  that  will  make  us  a  happy  nation ;  no, 
if  other  things  as  great  in  the  Church,  and  in  the  rule  of  life, 
both  economical  and  political,  be  not  looked  into  and  reformed, 
we  have  looked  so  long  upon  the  blaze  that  Zuinglius  and  Calvin 
have  beaconed  up  to  us,  that  we  are  stark  blind.  There  be  who 
perpetually  complain  of  schisms  and  sects,  and  make  it  such  a 
calamity  that  any  man  dissents  from  their  maxims.  It  is  their 
own  pride  and  ignorance  which  causes  the  disturbing,  who 
neither  will  hear  with  meekness,  nor  can  convince,  yet  all  must 
be  suppressed  which  is  not  found  in  their  Syntagma.  They  are 
the  tremblers,  they  are  the  dividers  of  unity,  who  neglect  and 
permit  not  others  to  unite  those  dissevered  pieces  which  are 
yet  wanting  to  the  body  of  truth.  To  be  still  searching  what 
we  know  not,  by  what  we  know,  still  closing  up  truth  to  truth 
as  we  find  it,  (for  all  her  body  is  homogeneal  and  proportional,) 
this  is  the  golden  rule  in  theology  as  well  as  in  arithmetic, 
and  makes  up  the  best  harmony  in  a  Church ;  not  the  forced 
and  outward  union  of  cold,  and  neutral,  and  inwardly-divided 
minds." 


PART  I. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MORAL  EVIL,  OR  SIN,  CONSISTENT 
WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD. 


What  Time  this  World's  great  Workmaist  >,r  did  cass, 
To  make  all  things  such  as  we  now  behold, 

It  seems  that  he  before  his  eyes  had  plast 
A  goodly  patterne,  to  whose  perfect  mould 

He  fashion'd  them  as  comely  as  he  could, 

That  now  so  fair  and  seemly  they  appear, 

As  naught  may  be  amended  anywhere. 

That  wondrous  patterne,  wheresoe'er  it  be, 
Whether  in  earth  laid  up  in  secret  store, 

Or  else  in  heav'n,  that  no  man  may  it  see 
With  sinful  eyes,  for  feare  it  to  defltvre, 

Is  perfect  Beau;«e. 

8 


A    THEODICY 


PART  I. 


CHAPTEK  I. 

THE  SCHEME  uF  NECESSITY  DENIES  THAT  MAN  IS  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE 
EXISTENCE  OF  SIN. 

Ye,  who  live, 

Do  so  each  cause  refer  to  Heaven  above, 
E'en  as  its  motion,  of  necessity, 
Drew  with  it  all  that  moves.     If  this  were  so, 
Free  choice  in  you  were  none  ;  nor  justice  would 
There  should  be  joy  for  virtue,  woe  for  ill. — DANTE. 

THE  doctrine  of  necessity  has  been,  in  all  ages  of  the  world,  the 
great  stronghold  of  atheism.  It  is  the  mighty  instrument  with 
which  the  unbeliever  seeks  to  strip  man  of  all  accountability, 
and  to  destroy  our  faith  and  confidence  in  God,  by  tracing  up 
the  existence  of  all  moral  evil  to  his  agency.  "The  opinion  of 
necessity,"  says  Bishop  Butler,  "  seems  to  be  the  very  basis  in 
which  infidelity  grounds  itself."  It  will  not  be  denied  that  this 
opinion  seems,  at  first  view,  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  free 
agency  and  accountability  of  man,  and  that  it  appears  to  im- 
pair our  idea  of  God  by  staining  it  with  impurity.  Hence  it 
has  been  used,  by  the  profligate  and  profane,  to  excuse  men  for 
their  crimes.  It  is  against  this  use  of  the  doctrine  that  we  in- 
tend to  direct  the  force  of  our  argument. 

But  here  the  question  arises :  Can  we  refute  the  argument 
against  the  accountability  of  man,  without  attacking  the  doc- 
trine on  which  it  is  founded  ?  If  we  can  meet  this  argument 
at  all,  it  must  be  either  by  showing  that  no  such  consequence 
flows  from  the  scheme  of  necessity,  or  by  showing  that  the 
scheme  itself  is  false.  "We  cannot  meet  the  sceptic,  who  seeks 

3 


34  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

to  excuse  his  sins,  and  to  cast  dishonour  on  God,  and  expose 
his  sophistry,  unless  we  can  show  that  his  premises  are  unsound, 
or  that  his  conclusions  are  false.  We  must  do  the  one  or  the 
other  of  these  two  things ;  or,  whatever  we  may  think  of  his 
moral  sensibility,  we  must  acknowledge  the  superiority  of  his 
reason  and  logic.  After  long  and  patient  meditation  on  the 
subject,  we  have  been  forced  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  only 
way  to  repel  the  argument  of  the  sceptic,  and  cause  the  intrin- 
sic lustre  of  man's  free-agency  to  appear,  is  to  unravel  and 
ro.fute  the  doctrine  of  necessity. 

If  we  could  preserve  the  scheme  of  necessity,  and  at  the  same 
time  avoid  the  consequences  in  question,  we  may  fairly  con- 
clude that  the  means  of  doing  so  have  been  found  by  some  of 
the  illustrious  advocates  of  that  scheme.  HOWT,  then,  do  they 
vindicate  their  own  system  ?  How  do  they  repel  the  frightful 
consequences  which  infidelity  deduces  from  it?  This  is  the 
first  question  to  be  considered ;  and  the  discussion  of  it  will 
occupy  the  remainder  of  the  present  chapter. 

SECTION"  I. 

The  attempts  of  Calvin  and  Luther  to  reconcile  the  scheme  of  necessity  with 
the  responsibility  of  man. 

Nothing  can  be  more  unjust  than  to  bring,  as  has  often  been 
done,  the  unqualified  charge  of  fatalism  against  the  great  Pro- 
testant reformers.  The  manner  in  which  this  odious  epithet  is 
frequently  used,  applying  it  without  discrimination  to  the  bright- 
est ornaments  and  to  the  darkest  specimens  of  humanity,  is  cal- 
culated to  engender  far  more  heat  than  light.  Indeed,  under  this 
very  ambiguous  term,  three  distinct  schemes  of  doctrine,  widely 
different  from  each  other,  are  set  forth ;  schemes  which  every  can- 
did inquirer  after  truth  should  be  careful  to  distinguish.  The  first 
is  that  scheme  of  fatalism  which  rests  on  the  fundamental  idea 
that  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  besides  matter  and  local  mo- 
tion. This  doctrine,  of  course,  denies  the  spirituality  of  the 
Divine  Being,  as  wrell  as  of  all  created  souls,  and  strikes  a  fatal 
blow  at  the  immutability  of  moral  distinctions.  It  is  unneces- 
sary to  say,  that  in  such  a  sense  of  the  word,  neither  Calvin  nor 
Luther  can  be  justly  accused  of  fatalism  ;  as  it  is  well  known 
that  both  of  them  maintained  the  spirituality  of  God,  as  well  a& 
the  reality  of  moral  distinctions  prior  to  all  human  laws. 


Chapter  1.)  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  35 

The  second  scheme  of  fatalism  rises  above  the  first  in  point 
of  dignity  and  purity  of  character.  It  proceeds  on  the  idea 
that  all  things  in  heaven  and  earth  are  bound  together  by  "  an 
implexed  series  and  concatenation  of  causes:"  it  admits  the 
existence  of  God,  it  is  true,  but  yet  it  regards  him  as  merely  the 
greatest  and  brightest  link  in  the  adamantine  universal  chain 
of  necessity.  According  to  this  scheme,  as  well  as  to  the  former, 
the  very  idea  of  moral  liberty  is  inconceivable  and  impossible. 
This  portentous  scheme  was  perfectly  understood  and  expressly 
repudiated  by  Calvin.  In  reference  to  this  doctrine,  which  was 
maintained  by  the  ancient  Stoics,  he  says :  "  That  dogma  is 
falsely  and  maliciously  charged  upon  us.  For  we  do  not,  with 
the  Stoics,  imagine  a  necessity  arising  from  a  perpetual  con- 
catenation and  intricate  series  of  causes  contained  in  nature ; 
but  we  make  God  the  Arbiter  and  Governor  of  all  things,  who,  in 
his  own  wisdom,  has,  from  all  eternity,  decreed  w^hat  he  would 
do,  and  now  by  his  own  power  executes  what  he  decreed." 

Here  we  behold  the  nature  of  the  third  scheme,  which  has 
been  included  under  the  term  fatalism.  It  recognises  God  as 
the  great  central  and  all-controlling  power  of  the  universe.  It 
does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  liberty ;  for  it  recognises  its 
actual  existence  in  the  Divine  Being.  "  If  the  divine  wrill,"  says 
Calvin,  "  has  any  cause,  then  there  must  be  something  ante- 
cedent, on  which  it  depends ;  which  it  is  impious  to  suppose." 
According  to  Calvin,  it  is  the  uncaused  divine  will  which  makes 
the  "  necessity  of  all  things."  He  frequently  sets  forth  the 
doctrine,  that,  from  all  eternity,  God  decreed  whatever  should 
come  to  pass,  not  excepting,  but  expressly  including,  the  de- 
liberations and  "  volitions  of  men,"  and  by  his  own  power  now 
executes  his  decree.  As  we  do  not  wrish  to  use  opprobrious 
names,  we  shall  characterize  these  three  several  schemes  of  doc- 
trine by  the  appellations  given  to  them  by  their  advocates.  The 
first  we  shall  call,  "  materialistic  fatalism  ;"  the  second,  "  Stoical 
fatalism ;"  and  the  third  we  shall  designate  by  the  term,  "  ne- 
cessity" 

"Widely  as  these  schemes  may  differ  in  other  respects,  they 
have  one  feature  in  common  :  they  all  seem  to  bear  wdth  equal 
stringency  on  the  human  will,  and  deprive  it  of  that  freedom 
which  is  now  conceded  to  be  indispensable  to  render  men  ac- 
countable for  their  actions.  If  our  volitions  be  produced  by  a 


36  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

series  of  causes,  according  to  the  Stoical  notion  of  fate,  or  by 
the  omnipotence  of  God,  they  would  seem  to  be  equally  neces- 
sitated and  devoid  of  freedom.  Hence,  in  attacking  one  of 
these  schemes  at  this  point,  we  really  attack  them  all.  We 
shall  first  consider  the  question,  then,  How  does  Calvin  attempt 
to  reconcile  his  doctrine  with  the  accountability  of  man  ?  How 
does  he  show,  for  example,  that  the  first  man  was  guilty  and 
justly  punishable  for  a  transgression  in  which  he  succumbed 
to  the  divine  omnipotence  ? 

If  a  man  is  really  laid  under  a  necessity  of  sinning,  it  would 
certainly  seem  impossible  to  conceive  that  he  is  responsible  for 
his  sins.  Nay,  it  would  not  only  seem  impossible  to  conceive 
this,  but  it  would  also  appear  very  easy  to  understand,  that 
he  could  not  be  responsible  for  them.  In  order  to  remove  this 
difficulty,  and  repel  the  attack  of  his  opponents,  Calvin  makes 
a  distinction  between  "  co-action  and  necessity."  "  ]STow,  when 
I  assert,"  says  he,  "  that  the  will,  being  deprived  of  its  liberty, 
is  necessarily  drawn  or  led  into  evil,  I  should  wonder  if  any 
one  considered  it  as  a  harsh  expression,  since  it  has  nothing  in 
it  absurd,  nor  is  it  unsanctioned  by  the  custom  of  good  men. 
It  offends  those  who  know  not  how  to  distinguish  between 
necessity  and  compulsion."*  Let  us  see,  then,  what  is  this 
distinction  between  necessity  and  compulsion,  or  co-action, 
(as  Calvin  sometimes  calls  it,)  which  is  to  take  off  all  appear- 
ance of  harshness  from  his  views.  "We  are  not  to  imagine 
that  this  is  a  distinction  without  a  difference ;  for,  in  truth, 
there  is  no  distinction  in  philosophy  which  may  be  more  easily 
made,  or  more  clearly  apprehended.  It  is  this :  Suppose  a 
man  wrills  a  particular  thing,  or  external  action,  and  it  is  pre- 
vented from  happening  by  any  outward  restraint ;  or  suppose 
he  is  unwilling  to  do  a  thing,  and  he  is  constrained  to  do  it 
against  his  will ;  he  is  said  to  labour  under  compulsion  or  co- 
action.  Of  course  he  is  not  accountable  for  the  failure  of  the 
consequence  of  his  will  in  the  one  case,  nor  for  the  consequence 
of  the  force  imposed  on  his  body  in  the  other.  This  kind  of 
necessity  is  called  co-action  by  Calvin  and  Luther  ;  it  is  usually 
denominated  "  natural  necessity  "  by  Edwards  and  his  followers ; 
though  it  is  also  frequently  termed  compulsion,  or  co-action,  by 
them. 

0  Institutes,  b.  ii,  c.  iii. 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  37 

Tliis  natural  necessity,  or  co-action,  it  is  admitted  on  all  hands, 
destroys  accountability  for  external  conduct,  wherever  it  ob- 
tains. Indeed,  if  a  man  is  compelled  to  do  a  thing  against  his 
will,  this  is  not,  properly  speaking,  his  act  at  all ;  nor  is  it  an 
omission  of  his,  if  he  wills  to  do  a  thing,  and  is  necessarily  pre- 
vented from  doing  it  by  external  restraint.  But  it  should  be 
observed  that  natural  necessity,  or  co-action,  reaches  no  deeper 
than  the  external  conduct;  and  can  excuse  for  nothing  else. 
As  it  does  not  influence  the  will  itself,  so  it  cannot  excuse  for 
acts  of  the  will.  Indeed,  it  presupposes  the  existence  of  a 
volition,  or  act  of  the  will,  whose  natural  consequences  it  coun- 
teracts and  overcomes.  Hence,  if  the  question  were — Is  a  man 
accountable  for  his  external  actions,  that  is,  for  the  motions  of 
his  body,  we  might  speak  of  natural  necessity,  or  co-action, 
with  propriety ;  bat  not  so  when  the  question  relates  to  internal 
acts  of  the  will.  All  reference  to  natural  necessity,  or  co-action, 
in  relation  to  such  a  question,  is  wholly  irrelevant.  No  one 
doubts,  and  no  one  denies,  that  the  motions  of  the  body  are 
controlled  by  the  volitions  of  the  mind,  or  by  some  external 
force.  The  advocates  for  the  inherent  activity  and  freedom  of 
the  mind,  do  not  place  them  in  the  external  sphere  of  matter, 
in  the  passive  and  necessitated  movements  of  body  :  they  seek 
not  the  living  among  the  dead. 

But  to  do  justice  to  these  illustrious  men,  they  did  not  attempt, 
as  many  of  their  followers  have  done,  to  pass  off  this  freedom 
from  external  co-action  for  the  freedom  of  the  will.  Indeed, 
neither  of  them  contended  for  the  freedom  of  the  will  at  all, 
nor  deemed  such  freedom  requisite  to  render  men  accountable 
for  their  actions.  This  is  an  element  which  has  been  wrought 
into  their  system  by  the  subsequent  progress  of  human  knowl- 
edge. Luther,  it  is  well  known,  so  far  from  maintaining  the 
freedom  of  the  mind,  wrote  a  work  on  the  "  Bondage  of  the 
Human  Will,"  in  reply  to  Erasmus.  "  I  admit,"  says  he,  "  that 
man's  will  is  free  in  a  certain  sense ;  not  because  it  is  now  in 
the  same  state  it  was  in  paradise,  but  because  it  was  made  free 
originally,  and  may,  through  God's  grace,  'become  so  again"* 
And  Calvin,  in  his  Institutes,  has  written  a  chapter  to  show 
that  "man,  in  his  present  state,  is  despoiled  of  freedom  of 
will,  and  subjected  to  a  miserable  slavery."  He  "  was  endowed 

c  Scott's  Luther  and  Ref.,  vol.  i,  pp.  70,  71. 


38  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

with  free  will,"  says  Calvin,  "  by  which,  if  he  had  chosen,  he 
might  have  obtained  eternal  life."*  Thus,  according  to  both 
Luther  and  Calvin,  man  was  by  the  fall  despoiled  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  will. 

Though  they  allow  a  freedom  from  co-action,  they  repudiate 
the  idea  of  calling  this  a  freedom  of  the  will.  "  Lombard  at 
length  pronounces,"  says  Calvin,  "that  we  are  not  therefore 
possessed  of  free-will,  because  we  have  an  equal  power  to  do 
or  to  think  either  good  or  evil,  but  only  because  we  are  free 
from  constraint.  And  this  liberty  is  not  diminished,  although 
we  are  corrupt,  and  slaves  of  sin,  and  capable  of  doing  nothing 
but  sin.  Then  man  will  be  said  to  possess  free-will  in  this 
sense,  not  that  he  has  an  equally  free  election  of  good  and 
evil,  but  because  he  does  evil  voluntarily,  and  not  by  con- 
straint. That  indeed,  is  true ;  but  what  end  could  it  answer 
to  deck  out  a  thing  so  diminutive  with  a  title  so  superb  ?"f 
Truly,  if  Lombard  merely  meant  by  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
for  which  he  contended,  a  freedom  from  external  restraint, 
or  co-action,  Calvin  might  well  contemptuously  exclaim, 
"  Egregious  liberty  !"£  It  wras  reserved  for  a  later  period  in 
the  history  of  the  Church  to  deck  out  this  diminutive  thing 
with  the  superb  title  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and  to  pass  it 
off  for  the  highest  and  most  glorious  liberty  of  which  the 
human  mind  can  form  any  conception.  Ilobbes,  it  will  be 
hereafter  seen,  was  the  first  wrho,  either  designedly  or  unde- 
signedly,  palmed  off  this  imposture  upon  the  world. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  in  the  history  of  the  human  mind, 
that  the  most  powerful  and  imposing  arguments  used  by  the 
early  reformers  to  disprove  the  freedom  of  the  will  have  been 
as  confidently  employed  by  their  most  celebrated  followers  to 
establish  that  very  freedom  on  a  solid  basis.  It  is  well  known, 
for  example,  that  Edwards,  and  many  other  great  men,  have 
employed  the  doctrine  of  the  foreknowledge  of  God  to  prove 
philosophical  necessity,  without  which  they  conclude  there  can 
be  no  rational  foundation  for  the  freedom  of  the  will.  Yet,  in 
former  times,  this  very  doctrine  was  regarded  as  the  most  for- 
midable instrument  with  which  to  overthrow  and  demolish  that 
very  freedom.  Thus  Luther  calls  the  foreknowledge  of  God  a 
thunderbolt  to  dash  the  doctrine  of  free-will  into  atoms.  And 

0  Institutes,  b.  i,  c.  xv.  t  Ibid.,  b.  ii,  c.  ii.  t  Ibid. 


Chapter  LJ  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  39 

who  can  forbear  to  agree  with  Luther  so  far  as  to  say,  that  if 
the  foreknowledge  of  God  proves  anything  in  opposition  to  the 
freedom  of  the  will,  it  proves  that  it  is  under  the  most  absolute 
and  uncontrollable  necessity  ?  It  clearly  seems,  that  if  it  proves 
anything  in  favour  of  necessity,  it  proves  everything  for  which 
the  most  absolute  necessitarian  can  contend.  Accordingly,  a 
distinguished  Calvinistic  divine  has  said,  that  if  our  volitions  be 
foreseen,  we  can  no  more  avoid  them  "  than  we  can  pluck  the 
sun  out  of  the  heavens."* 

But  though  the  reformers  were  thus,  in  some  respects,  more 
true  to  their  fundamental  principle  than  their  followers  have 
been,  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  they  are  free  from  all  incon- 
sistencies and  self  contradiction.  Thus,  if  "  foreknowledge  is 
a  thunderbolt"  to  dash  the  doctrine  of  free-will  into  atoms,  it 
destroyed  free-will  in  man  before  the  fall  as  well  as  after. 
Hence  the  thunderbolt  of  Luther  falls  upon  his  own  doctrine, 
that  man  possessed  free-will  in  his  primitive  state,  with  as  much 
force  as  it  can  upon  the  doctrine  of  his  opponents.  He  is  evi 
dently  caught  in  the  toils  he  so  confidently  prepared  for  his 
adversary.  And  how  many  of  the  followers  of  the  great  re- 
former adopt  his  doctrine,  and  wield  his  thunderbolts,  without 
perceiving  how  destructively  they  recoil  on  themselves !  Though 
they  ascribe  free-will  to  man  as  one  of  the  elements  of  his  pris- 
tine glory,  yet  they  employ  against  it  in  his. present  condition 
arguments  which,  if  good  for  anything,  would  despoil,  not  only 
man,  but  the  whole  universe  of  created  intelligences — nay,  the 
great  Uncreated  Intelligence  himself — of  every  vestige  and 
shadow  of  such  a  power. 

It  is  a  wonderful  inconsistency  in  Luther,  that  he  should  so 
often  and  so  dogmatically  assert  that  the  doctrine  of  free-will 
falls  prostrate  before  the  prescience  of  God,  and  at  the  same 
time  maintain  the  freedom  of  the  divine  will.  If  foreknowledge 
is  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  free-will,  it  is  clear  that 
the  will  of  God  is  not  free  ;  since  it  is  on  all  sides  conceded  that 
all  his  volitions  are  perfectly  foreseen  by  him.  Yet  in  the 
face  of  this  conclusion,  which  so  clearly  and  so  irresistibly  follows 
from  Luther's  position,  he  asserts  the  freedom  of  the  divine  will, 
as  if  he  were  perfectly  unconscious  of  the  self-contradiction  in 
which  he  is  involved.  "  It  now  then  follows,"  says  he,  "  that 

0  Dick's  Theology. 


40  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1 

free-will  is  plainly  a  divine  term,  and  can  be  applicable  to  none 
but  the  Divine  Majesty  only."*  .  .  .  „  He  even  says,  If  free- 
will "be  ascribed  unto  men,  it  is  not  more  properly  ascribed, 
than  the  divinity  of  God  himself  would  be  ascribed  unto  them  ; 
which  would  be  the  greatest  of  all  sacrilege.  Wherefore, 
it  becomes  theologians  to  refrain  from  the  use  of  this  term 
altogether,  whenever  they  wish  to  speak  of  human  ability,  and 
to  leave  it  to  be  applied  to  God  only."f  And  we  may  add, 
if  they  would  apply  it  to  God,  it  becomes  them  to  refrain  from 
all  such  arguments  as  would  show  even  such  an  application 
of  it  to  be  absurd. 

In  like  manner,  Calvin  admits  that  the  human  soul  possessed 
a  free-will  in  its  primitive  state,  but  has  been  despoiled  of  it 
by  the  fall,  and  is  now  in  bondage  to  a  "miserable  slavery." 
But  if  the  necessity  which  arises  from  the  power  of  sin  over  the 
will  be  inconsistent  with  its  freedom,  how  are  we  to  reconcile 
the  freedom  of  the  first  man  with  the  power  exercised  by  the 
Almighty  over  the  wills  of  all  created  beings  ?  So  true  it  is, 
that  the  most  systematic  thinker,  who  begins  by  denying  the 
truth,  will  be  sure  to  end  by  contradicting  himself. 

In  one  respect,  as  we  have  seen,  Calvin  differs  from  his  fol- 
lowers at  the  present  day ;  the  denial  of  free-will  he  regards  as 
perfectly  reconcilable  with  the  idea  of  accountability.  Al- 
though our  volitions  are  absolutely  necessary  to  us,  although 
they  may  be  produced  in  us  by  the  most  uncontrollable  power 
in  the  universe,  yet  are  we  accountable  for  them,  because  they 
are  our  volitions.  The  bare  fact  that  we  will  such  and  such  a 
thing,  without  regard  to  how  we  come  by  the  volition,  is  suf- 
ficient to  render  us  accountable  for  it.  We  must  be  free  from 
tin  external  co-action,  he  admits,  to  render  us  accountable  for 
our  external  actions ;  but  not  from  an  internal  necessity,  to  ren- 
der us  accountable  for  our  internal  volitions.  But  this  does  not 
seem  to  be  a  satisfactory  reply  to  the  difficulty  in  question.  We 
ask,  How  a  man  can  be  accountable  for  his  acts,  for  his  voli- 
ions,  if  they  are  caused  in  him  by  an  infinite  power  ?  and  we 
are  told,  Because  they  are  his  acts.  This  eternal  repetition  of 
the  fact  in  which  all  sides  are  agreed,  can  throw  no  light  on 
the  point  about  which  we  dispute.  We  still  ask,  How  can  a 
man  be  responsible  for  an  act,  or  volition,  which  is  necessitated 

0  Bondage  of  the  Will,  sec.  xxvi.  | 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  41 

to  arise  in  liis  mind  by  Omnipotence  ?  If  any  one  should  reply, 
with  Dr.  Dick,  that  we  do  not  know  how  he  can  be  account- 
able for  such  an  act,  yet  we  should  never  deny  a  thing  because 
we  cannot  see  how  it  is;  this  would  not  be  a  satisfactory 
answer.  For,  though  it  is  certainly  the  last  weakness  of  the 
human  mind  to  deny  a  thing,  because  we  cannot  see  how  it  is ; 
yet  there  is  a  great  difference  between  not  being  able  to  see 
Jww  a  thing  is,  and  being  clearly  able  to  see  that  it  cannot  be 
anyhow  at  all, — between  being  unable  to  see  how  two  things 
agree  together,  and  being  able  to  see  that  two  ideas  are  utterly 
repugnant  to  each  other.  Hence  we  mean  to  ask,  that  if  a 
man's  act  be  necessitated  in  him  by  an  infinite,  omnipotent 
power,  over  which  he  had,  and  could  have,  no  possible  control, 
can  we  not  see  that  he  cannot  be  accountable  for  it?  We  have 
no  difficulty  whatever  in  believing  a  mystery ;  but  when  we 
are  required  to  embrace  what  so  plainly  seems  to  be  an  ab- 
surdity, we  confess  that  our  reason  is  either  weak  enough,  or 
strong  enough,  to  pause  and  reluctate. 


SECTION  II. 

The  manner  in  which  Holies,   Collins,  and  others,  endeavour  to  reconcile 
necessity  with  free  and  accountable  agency. 

The  celebrated  philosopher  of  Malmsbury  viewed  all  things  as 
bound  together  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect ;  and  he  was, 
beyond  doubt,  one  of  the  most  acute  thinkers  that  ever  advo- 
cated the  doctrine  of  necessity.  From  some  of  the  sentiments 
expressed  towards  the  conclusion  of  "  The  Leviathan,"  which 
have,  not  without  reason,  subjected  him  to  the  charge  of  atheism, 
we  may  doubt  his  entire  sincerity  when  he  pretends  to  advo- 
cate the  doctrine  of  necessity  out  of  a  zeal  for  the  Divine  Sove- 
reignty and  the  dogma  of  Predestination.  If  he  hoped  by  this 
avowal  of  his  design  to  propitiate  any  class  of  theologians,  he 
must  have  been  greatly  disappointed ;  for  his  speculations  were 
universally  condemned  by  the  Christian  world  as  atheistical  in 
tlnjir  tendency.  This  charge  has  been  fixed  upon  him,  in  spite 
of  his  solemn  protestations  against  its  injustice,  and  his  earnest 
endeavours  to  reconcile  his  scheme  of  necessity  with  the  free- 
agency  and  accountability  of  man. 

"I  conceive,"  says  Ilobbes,  "that  nothing  taketh  beginning 


42  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

from  itself,  but  from  the  action  of  some  other  immediate  agent 
without  itself.  And  that  therefore,  when  first  a  man  hath  an 
appetite  or  will  to  something,  to  which  immediately  before  he 
had  no  appetite  nor  will,  the  cause  of  his  will  is  not  the  will 
itself,  but  something  else  not  in  his  own  disposing ;  so  that  it  is 
out  of  controversy,  that  of  voluntary  actions  the  will  is  the  neces- 
sary cause,  and  by  this  which  is  said,  the  will  is  also  caused 
by  other  things  whereof  it  disposeth  not,  it  followeth,  that  volun- 
tary actions  have  all  of  them  necessary  causes,  and  therefore 
are  necessitated."  This  is  clear  and  explicit.  There  is  no  con- 
troversy, he  truly  says,  that  voluntary  actions,  that  is,  external 
actions  proceeding  from  the  will,  are  necessitated  by  the  will. 
And  as  according  to  his  postulate,  the  will  or  volition  is  also 
caused  by  other  things  of  which  it  has  no  disposal,  so  they  are 
also  necessitated.  In  other  words,  external  voluntary  actions 
are  necessarily  caused  by  volitions,  and  volitions  are  necessarily 
caused  by  something  else  other  than  the  will ;  and  consequently 
the  chain  is  complete  between  the  cause  of  volition  and  its 
effects.  How,  then,  is  man  a  free-agent?  and  how  is  he 
accountable  for  his  actions?  Hobbes  has  not  left  these 
questions  unanswered ;  and  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose,  as 
is  too  often  done,  that  his  argument  in  favour  of  necessity 
evinces  a  design  to  sap  the  foundations  of  human  respon- 
sibility. 

He  answers  these  questions  precisely  as  they  were  answered 
by  Luther  and  Calvin  more  than  a  hundred  years  before  his 
time.  In  order  to  solve  this  great  difficulty,  and  establish  an 
agreement  between  necessity  and  liberty,  he  insists  on  the  dis- 
tinction between  co-action  and  necessity.  Sir  James  Mackin- 
tosh says,  that  "  in  his  treatise  de  Servo  Arbitrio  against  Eras- 
mus, Luther  states  the  distinction  between  co-action  and  neces- 
sity as  familiar  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  before  it  was  proposed 
by  Hobbes,  or  condemned  in  the  Jansenists."*  According  to  his 
definition  of  liberty,  it  is  merely  a  freedom  from  co-action,  or  ex- 
ternal compulsion.  "  I  conceive  liberty,"  says  he,  "  to  be  rightly 

0  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy,  note  0.  Indeed,  this  distinction  appears 
quite  as  clearly  in  the  writings  of  Augustine,  as  it  does  in  those  of  Luther,  or 
Calvin,  or  Hobbes.  He  repeatedly  places  our  liberty  and  ability  in  this,  that  we 
can  "  keep  the  commandments  if  ive  will,"  which  is  obviously  a  mere  freedom 
from  external  co-action.  See  Part  ii,  ch.  iv,  sec.  2. 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  43 

defined  in  this  manner :  Liberty  is  the  absence  of  all  the  impedi- 
ments to  action  that  are  not  contained  in  the  nature  and  intrinsical 
qualities  of  the  agent :  as  for  example,  the  water  is  said  to  de- 
scend freely,  or  to  have  liberty  to  descend  by  the  channel  of 
the  river,  because  there  is  no  impediment  that  way ;  but  not 
across,  because  the  banks  are  impediments;  and  though  the 
water  cannot  ascend,  yet  men  never  say  it  wants  liberty  to 
ascend,  but  the  faculty  or  power,  because  the  impediment  is 
in  the  nature  of  the  water  and  intrinsical."  According  to  this 
definition,  though  a  man's  volitions  were  thrown  out,  not  by 
himself,  but  by  some  irresistible  power  working  within  his 
mind,  say  the  power  of  the  Almighty,  yet  he  would  be  free, 
provided  there  were  no  impediments  to  prevent  the  external 
effects  of  his  volitions.  This  is  the  liberty  which  water,  im- 
pelled by  the  power  of  gravity,  possesses  in  descending  the 
channel  of  a  river.  It  is  the  liberty  of  the  winds  and  waves  of 
the  sea,  which,  by  a  sort  of  metaphor,  is  supposed  to  reign  over 
the  dominions  of  a  mechanical  and  materialistic  fate.  It  is  the 
most  idle  of  all  idle  things  to  speak  of  such  a  liberty,  or  rather, 
to  use  the  word  in  such  a  sense,  when  the  controversy  relates  to 
the  freedom  of  the  mind  itself.  What  has  such  a  thing  to  do 
with  the  origin  of  human  volitions,  or  the  nature  of.  moral 
agency?  Is  there  no  difference  between  the  motion  of  the 
body  and  the  action  of  mind  ?  Or  is  there  nothing  in  the  uni- 
verse of  God  but  mere  body  and  local  motion  ?  If  there  is  not, 
then,  indeed,  we  neither  have  nor  can  conceive  any  higher 
liberty  than  that  which  the  philosopher  is  pleased  to  allow  us 
to  possess ;  but  if  there  be  mind,  then  there  may  be  things  in 
heaven  and  earth  which  are  not  dreamed  of  in  his  philosophy. 

The  definition  which  Collins,  the  disciple  of  Hobbes,  has 
given  of  liberty,  is  the  same  as  that  of  his  master.  "  I  contend," 
says  he,  "  for  liberty,  as  it  signifies  a  power  in  man  to  do  as  he 
wills  or  pleases."  The  doing  here  refers  to  the  external  action, 
which,  properly  speaking,  is  not  an  act  at  all,  but  merely  a 
change  of  state  in  the  body.  The  body  merely  suffers  a  change 
of  place  and  position,  in  obedience  to  the  act  of  the  vi  ill ;  it 
does  not  act,  nor  can  it  act,  because  it  is  passive  in  its  nature. 
To  do  as  one  wills,  in  this  sense,  is  a  freedom  of  the  body  from 
co-action ;  it  is  not  a  freedom  of  the  will  from  internal  neces- 
sity. Collins  says  this  is  "  a  valuable  liberty,"  and  he  says 


44  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

truly ;  for  if  one  were  thrown  into  prison,  he  could  not  go 
wherever  he  might  please,  or  do  as  he  might  will.  But  the 
imprisonment  of  the  body  does  not  prevent  a  man  from  being 
a  free-agent.  He  also  tells  us  truly,  that  "  many  philosophers 
and  theologians,  both  ancient  and  modem,  have  given  defini- 
tions of  liberty  that  are  consistent  with  fate  and  necessity " 
But  then,  their  definitions,  like  his  own,  had  no  reference  to 
the  acts  of  the  mind,  but  to  the  motions  of  the  body  ;  and  it  is 
a  grand  irrelevancy,  we  repeat,  to  speak  of  such  a  thing,  when 
the  question  relates,  not  to  the  freedom  of  the  body,  but  the 
freedom  of  the  mind.  Calvin  truly  says,  that  to  call  this  exter- 
nal freedom  from  co-action  or  natural  necessity  a  freedom  of 
the  will,  is  to  decorate  a  most  diminutive  thing  with  a  superb 
title ;  but  the  philosopher  of  Malmsbury,  and  his  ingenious  dis- 
ciple, seem  disposed  to  confer  the  high-sounding  title  and 
empty  name  on  us,  in  order  to  reconcile  us  to  the  servitude  and 
chains  in  which  they  have  been  pleased  to  bind  us. 

This  idea  of  liberty,  common  to  Hobbes  and  Collins,  which 
Mackintosh  says  wras  familiar  to  Luther  and  Calvin  at  least  a 
hundred  and  thirty  years  before,  is  in  reality  of  much  earlier 
origin.  It  was  maintained  by  the  ancient  Stoics,  by  whom  it  is 
as  clearly  set  forth  as  by  Ilobbes  himself.  The  \vell-known 
illustration  of  the  Stoic  Chrysippus,  so  often  mentioned  by  Leib- 
nitz and  others,  is  a  proof  of  the  correctness  of  this  remark : 
"  Suppose  I  push  against  a  heavy  body,"  says  he :  "  if  it  be 
square,  it  will  not  move  ;  if  it  be  cylindrical,  it  will.  "What  the 
difference  of  form  is  to  the  stone,  the  difference  of  disposition 
is  to  the  mind."  Tims  his  notion  of  freedom  was  derived  from 
matter,  and  supposed  to  consist  in  the  absence  of  friction  !  The 
idea  of  liberty  thus  deduced  from  that  which  is  purely  and  per- 
fectly passive,  from  an  absolutely  necessitated  state  of  body, 
was  easily  reconciled  by  him  with  his  doctrine  of  fate. 

Is  it  not  strange  that  Mr.  Hazlitt,  after  adopting  this  defini- 
tion of  liberty,  should  have  supposed  that  he  allowed  a  real 
freedom  to  the  will  ?  "I  prefer  exceedingly,"  says  he,  "  to  the 
modern  instances  of  a  couple  of  billiard-balls,  or  a  pair  of  scales, 
the  illustration  of  Chrysippus."  We  cannot  very  well  see,  how 
the  instance  of  a  cylinder  is  so  great  an  improvement  on  that 
of  a  billiard-ball ;  especially  as  a  sphere,  and  not  a  cylinder,  is 
free  to  move  in  all  directions. 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  45 

The  truth  is,  we  must  quit  the  region  of  dead,  inert,  passive 
matter,  if  we  would  form  an  idea  of  the  true  meaning  of  the 
term  liberty,  as  applied  to  the  activity  of  living  agents.  Mr. 
1  Fazlitt  evidently  loses  himself  amid  the  ambiguities  of  language, 
when  he  says,  that  "  I  so  far  agree  with  Hobbes  and  differ  from 
Locke,  in  thinking  that  liberty,  in  the  most  extended  and  ab- 
stracted sense,  is  applicable  to  material  as  well  as  voluntary 
agents"  Still  this  very  acute  writer  makes  a  few  feeble  and 
ineffectual  efforts  to  raise  our  notion  of  the  liberty  of  moral 
agents  above  that  given  by  the  illustration  of  Chrysippus  in 
Cicero.  "  My  notion  of  a  free  agent,  I  confess,"  says  he,  "  is 
not  that  represented  by  Mr.  Hobbes,  namely,  one  that  when  all 
things  necessary  to  produce  the  effect  are  present,  can  never- 
theless not  produce  it ;  but  I  believe  a  free-agent  of  whatever 
kind  is  one  which,  where  all  things  necessary  to  produce  the 
effect  are  present,  can  produce  it ;  its  own  operation  not  being 
hindered  by  anything  else.  The  body  is  said  to  be  free  when 
it  has  the  power  to  obey  the  direction  of  the  will ;  so  the  will 
may  be  said  to  be  free  when  it  has  the  power  to  obey  the  dic- 
tates of  the  understanding."*  Thus  the  liberty  of  the  will  is 
made  to  consist  not  in  the  denial  that  its  volitions  are  produced, 
but  in  the  absence  of  impediments  which  might  hinder  its 
operations  from  taking  effect.  This  idea  of  liberty,  it  is  evi- 
dent, is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  materialistic  fatalism  of 
Hobbes,  which  is  so  much  admired  by  Mr.  Hazlitt. 

SECTION  III. 

The  sentiments  of  Descartes,  Spinoza,  and  MalebrancTie,  concerning  the  rela- 
tion between  liberty  and  necessity. 

No  one  was  ever  more  deeply  implicated  in  the  scheme  of 
necessity  than  Descartes.  "Mere  philosophy,"  says  he,  "is 
enough  to  make  us  know  that  there  cannot  enter  the  least 
thought  into  the  mind  of  man,  but  God  must  will  and  have 
willed  from  all  eternity  that  it  should  enter  there."  His  argu-  ^_ 
ment  in  proof  of  this  position  is  short  and  intelligible.  "  God," 
says  he,  "  could  not  be  absolutely  perfect  if  there  could  happen 
anything  in  this  world  which  did  not  spring  entirely  from  him." 
Hence  it  follows,  that  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  absolute  per- 

c  Literary  Remains,  p.  65. 


46  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

fections  of  God  to  suppose  that  a  being  created  by  him  could 
put  forth  a  volition  which  does  not  spring  entirely  from  him, 
and  not  even  in  part  from  the  creature. 

Yet  Descartes  is  a  warm  believer  in  the  doctrine  of  free- 
will. On  the  ground  of  reason,  he  believes  in  an  absolute  pre- 
destination of  all  things ;  and  yet  he  concludes  from  experience 
that  man  is  free.  If  we  ask  how  these  things  can  hang  to- 
gether, he  replies,  that  we  cannot  tell ;  that  a  solution  of  this 
difficulty  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human  faculties.  Now, 
it  is  evident,  that  reason  cannot  "make  us  know"  one  thing, 
and  experience  teach  another,  quite  contrary  to  it ;  for  no  two 
truths  can  ever  contradict  each  other.  Those  who  adopt  this 
mode  of  viewing  the  subject,  generally  remind  us  of  the  feeble- 
ness of  human  reason,  and  of  the  necessary  limits  to  all  human 
speculation.  Though,  as  disciples  of  Butler,  we  are  deeply  im- 
pressed with  these  truths,  yet,  as  disciples  of  Bacon,  we  do  not 
intend  to  despair  until  we  can  discover  some  good  and  sufficient 
reason  for  so  doing.  It  seems  to  us,  that  the  reply  of  Leibnitz 
to  Descartes,  already  alluded  to,  is  not  without  reason.  "It 
might  have  been  an  evidence  of  humility  in  Descartes,"  says 
he,  "  if  he  had  confessed  his  own  inability  to  solve  the  difficulty 
in  question ;  but  not  satisfied  with  confessing  for  himself,  he 
does  so  for  all  intelligences  and  for  all  times." 

But,  after  all,  Descartes  has  really  endeavoured  to  solve  the 
problem  which  he  declared  insoluble ;  that  is,  to  reconcile  the 
infinite  perfections  of  God  with  the  free-agency  of  man.  lie 
struggles  to  break  loose  from  this  dark  mystery ;  but,  like  the 
charmed  bird,  he  struggles  and  flutters  in  vain,  and  finally 
yields  to  its  magical  influence.  In  his  solution,  this  great 
luminary  of  science,  like  others  before  him,  seems  to  suffer  a 
sad  eclipse.  "  Before  God  sent  us  into  the  world,"  says  he,  "  he 
knew  exactly  what  all  the  inclinations  of  our  wills  would  be ; 
it  is  he  that  has  implanted  them  in  us ;  it  is  he  also  that  ha& 
disposed  all  things,  so  that  such  or  such  objects  should  present 
themselves  to  us  at  such  or  such  times,  by  means  of  which  lie 
has  known  that  our  free-will  would  determine  us  to  such  or 
such  actions,  and  he  has  willed  thai  it  should  be  so  ;  ~but  lie  hat> 
not  willed  to  constrain  us  thereto"  This  is  found  in  a  letter  to 
the  Princess  Elizabeth,  for  whose  benefit  he  endeavoured  to 
reconcile  the  liberty  of  man  with  the  perfections  of  God.  It 


Chapter!.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  47 

brings  us  back  to  the  old  distinction  between  necessity  and 
co-action.  God  brings  our  volitions  to  pass ;  lie  wills  them ;  they 
"  spring  entirely  from  him ;"  but  we  are  nevertheless  free, 
because  he  constrains  not  our  external  actions,  or  compels  us  to 
do  anything  contrary  to  our  wills !  We  cannot  suppose,  how- 
ever, that  this  solution  of  the  problem  made  a  very  clear  or 
deep  impression  on  the  mind  of  Descartes  himself,  or  he  would 
not,  on  other  occasions,  have  pronounced  every  attempt  at  the 
solution  of  it  vain  and  hopeless. 

In  his  attempt  to  reconcile  the  free-agency  of  man  with  the 
divine  perfections,  Descartes  deceives  himself  by  a  false  analogy. 
Thus  he  supposes  that  a  monarch  "who  has  forbidden  duelling, 
and  who,  certainly  knowing  that  two  gentlemen  will  fight,  if 
they  should  meet,  employs  infallible  means  to  bring  them  to- 
gether. They  meet,  they  light  each  other :  their  disobedience 
of  the  laws  is  an  effect  of  their  free-wTill ;  they  are  punishable." 
"  What  a  king  can  do  in  such  a  case,"  he  adds,  "  God  wrho  has 
an  infinite  power  and  prescience,  infallibly  does  in  relation  to 
all  the  actions  of  men."  But  the  king,  in  the  supposed  case, 
does  not  act  on  the  minds  of  the  duellists ;  their  disposition  to 
disobey  the  laws  does  not  proceed  from  him ;  whereas,  accord- 
ing to  the  theory  of  Descartes,  nothing  enters  into  the  mind 
of  man  which  does  not  spring  entirely  from  God.  If  we  sup- 
pose a  king,  who  has  direct  access  to  the  mind  of  his  subject, 
like  God,  and  who  employs  his  power  to  excite  therein  a  mur- 
derous intent  or  any  other  particular  disposition  to  disobey  the 
law,  we  shall  have  a  more  apposite  representation  of  the  divine 
agency  according  to  the  theory  of  Descartes.  Has  anything 
ever  been  ascribed  to  the  agency  of  Satan  himself  which  could 
more  clearly  render  him  an  accomplice  in  the  sins  of  men  ? 

From  the  bosom  of  Cartesianism  two  systems  arose,  one  in 
principle,  but  widely  different  in  their  developments  and  ulti- 
mate results.  WQ  allude  to  the  celebrated  schemes  of  Spinoza 
and  Malebranche.  Both  set  out  with  the  same  exaggerated 
view  of  the  sublime  truth  that  God  is  all  in  all ;  and  each  gave 
a  diverse  development  to  this  fundamental  position,  to  this  cen- 
tral idea,  according  as  the  logical  faculty  predominated  over 
the  moral,  or  the  moral  faculty  over  the  logical.  Father  Male- 
branche, by  a  happy  inconsistency,  preserved  the  great  moral 
interests  of  the  world  against  the  invasion  of  a  remorseless  logic. 


48  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

Spinoza,  on  the  contrary,  could  follow  out  his  first  principle 
almost  to  its  last  consequence,  even  to  the  entire  extinction  of 
the  moral  light  of  the  universe,  and  the  enthronement  of  "blind 
power,  with  as  little  concern,  with  as  profound  composure,  as 
if  he  were  merely  discussing  a  theorem  in  the  mathematics. 

"  All  things,"  says  he,  "  determined  to  such  and  such  actions, 
are  determined  by  God ;  and,  if  God  determines  not  a  thing  to 
act,  it  cannot  determine  itself."*  From  this  proposition  he 
drew  the  inference,  that  things  which  are  produced  by  God. 
could  not  have  existed  in  any  other  manner,  nor  in  any  other 
order,  f  Thus,  by  the  divine  power,  all  things  in  heaven  and 
earth  are  bound  together  in  the  iron  circle  of  necessity.  It 
required  no  great  logical  foresight  to  perceive  that  this  doctrine 
shut  all  real  liberty  out  of  the  created  universe ;  but  it  did 
require  no  little  moral  firmness,  or  very  great  moral  insensi- 
bility, to  declare  such  a  consequence  with  the  unflinching  auda- 
city which  marks  its  enunciation  by  Spinoza.  He  repeatedly 
declares,  in  various  modes  of  expression,  that  "  the  soul  is  a 
spiritual  automaton,"  and  possesses  no  such  liberty  as  is  usually 
ascribed  to  it.  All  is  necessary,  and  the  very  notion  of  a  free- 
will is  a  vulgar  prejudice.  "All  I  have  to  say,"  he  coolly 
remarks,  "to  those  who  believe  that  they  can  speak  or  keep 
silence — in  one  word,  can  act — by  virtue  of  a  free  decision  of 
the  soul,  is,  that  they  dream  with  their  eyes  open.";]:  Though 
he  thus  boldly  denies  all  free-will,  according  to  the  common 
notion  of  mankind ;  yet,  no  less  than  Hobbes  and  Collins,  he 
allows  that  the  soul  possesses  "  a  sort  of  liberty."  "  It  is  free," 
says  he,  in  the  act  of  affirming  that  "  two  and  two  are  equal  to 
four ;"  thus  finding  the  freedom  of  the  soul  which  he  is  pleased 
to  allow  the  world  to  possess  in  the  most  perfect  type  of  neces- 
sity it  is  possible  to  conceive. 

But  Spinoza  does  not  employ  this  idea  of  liberty,  nor  any 
other,  to  show  that  man  is  a  responsible  being.  This  is  not  at 
all  strange  ;  the  wonder  is,  that  after  having  demonstrated  that 
"  the  prejudice  of  men  concerning  good  and  evil,  merit  and 
demerit,  praise  and  blame,  order  and  confusion,  beauty  and 
deformity,"  are  nothing  but  dreams,  he  should  have  felt  bound 
to  defend  the  position,  that  we  may  be  justly  punished  for  our 

**  Ethique,  premiere  partie,  prop.  xxvi.  f  Ibid.,  prop,  xxxiv. 

J  EtJiique,  Des  Passions,  prop,  ii  and  Scholium. 


Chapter  I.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GODJ 

offences  by  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  world.  Hi's  -defence  of 
this  doctrine  we  shall  lay  before  the  reader  without  a  word  of 
comment.  "  Will  you  say,"  he  replies  to  Oldenburg,  "  that  God 
cannot  be  angry  with  the  wicked,  or  that  all  men  are  worthy 
of  beat'tude?  In  regard  to  the  first  point,  I  perfectly  agree 
that  God  cannot  be  angry  at  anything  which  happens  according 
to  his  decree,  but  I  deny  that  it  results  that  all  men  ought  to 
be  happy ;  for  men  can  be  excusable,  and  at  the  same  time  be 
deprived  of  beatification,  and  made  to  suffer  a  thousand  ways. 
A  horse  is  excusable  for  being  a  horse,  and  not  a  man  ;  but  that 
prevents  not  that  he  ought  to  be  a  horse,  and  not  a  man.  He 
who  is  rendered  mad  by  the  bite  of  a  dog,  is  surely  excusable, 
and  yet  we  ought  to  constrain  him.  In  like  manner,  the  man 
who  cannot  govern  his  passions,  nor  restrain  them  by  the  fear 
of  the  laws,  though  excusable  on  account  of  the  infirmity  of  his 
nature,  can  nevertheless  not  enjoy  peace,  nor  the  knowledge 
and  the  love  of  God ;  and  i^  is  necessary  that  he  should 
perish."* 

It  was  as  difficult  for  Father  Malebranche  to  restrain  his 
indignation  at  the  system  of  Spinoza,  as  it  was  for  him  to  ex- 
pose its  fallacy,  after  having  admitted  its  great  fundamental 
principle.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  facts  stated  by  M.  Sais- 
set :  "  When  Mairan,"  says  he,"  still  young,  and  having  a  strong 
passion  for  the  study  of  the  '  Ethique,'  requested  Malebranche 
to  guide  him  in  that  perilous  route ;  we  know  with  what  urgency, 
bordering  on  importunity,  he  pressed  the  illustrious  father 
to  show  him  the  weak  point  of  Spinozism,  the  precise  place 
where  the  rigour  of  the  reasoning  failed,  the  paralogism  con- 
tained in  the  demonstration.  Malebranche  eluded  the  question, 
and  could  not  assign  the  paralogism,  after  which  Mairan  so  ear- 
nestly sought :  '  It  is  not  that  the  paralogism  is  in  such  o." 
such  places  of  the  Ethique,  it  is  everywhere.'"!  In  this  impa- 
tient judgment,  Father  Malebranche  uttered  more  truth  than 
lie  could  very  well  perceive  ;  the  paralogism  is  truly  everywhere, 
because  this  whole  edifice  of  words,  "  this  frightful  chimera," 
is  really  assumed  in  the  arbitrary  definition  of  the  term  sub- 
stance. We  might  say  with  equal  truth,  that  the  fallacy  of 
Malebran die's  scheme  is  also  everywhere  ;  for  although  it  stops 

0  CEuvres  de  Spinoza,  tome  ii,  350. 

f  Introduction  to  the  "  CEuvres  de  Spinoza,"  by  M.  Saisset. 
4 


50  MORAL   EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

short  of  the  consequences  so  sternly  deduced  by  Spinoza,  it  sets 
out  from  the  same  distorted  view  of  the  sovereignty  and  domin- 
ion of  God,  from  which  those  consequences  necessarily  flow. 

Spinoza,  who  had  but  few  followers  during  his  lifetime,  has 
been  almost  idolized  by  the  most  celebrated  savans  of  modern 
Germany.  Whether  this  will  ultimately  add  to  the  glory  of 
Spinoza,  or  detract  from  that  of  his  admirers,  we  shall  leave  the 
reader  and  posterity  to  determine.  In  the  mean  time,  we  shall 
content  ourselves  with  a  statement  of  the  fact,  in  the  language 
of  M.  Saisset :  "  Everything,"  says  he,  "  appears  extraordinary 
in  Spinoza  ;  his  person,  his  style,  his  philosophy ;  but  that  which 
is  more  strange  still,  is  the  destiny  of  that  philosophy  among 
men.  Badly  known,  despised  by  the  most  illustrious  of  his  con- 
temporaries, Spinoza  died  in  obscurity,  and  remained  buried 
during  a  century.  All  at  once  his  name  reappeared  with  an 
extraordinary  eclat ;  his  works  were  read  with  passion  ;  a  new 
world  was  discovered  in  them,  with  a  horizon  unknown  to  our 
fathers ;  and  the  god  of  Spinoza,  which  the  seventeenth  century 
had  broken  as  an  idol,  became  the  god  of  Lessing,  of  Goethe, 
of  Novalis." 

"The  solitary  thinker  whom  Malebranche  called  a  wretch, 
Schleiermacher  reveres  and  invokes  as  equal  to  a  saint.  That 
4  systematic  atheist,'  on  whom  Bayle  lavished  outrage,  has  been 
for  modern  Germany  the  most  religious  of  men.  '  God-intoxi- 
cated,' as  Novalis  said,  c  he  has  seen  the  world  through  a  thick 
cloud,  and  man  has  been  to  his  troubled  eyes  only  a  fugitive 
mode  of  Being  in  itself.'  In  that  system,  in  fine,  so  shocking 
and  so  monstrous,  that  '  hideous  chimera,'  Jacobi  sees  the  last 
word  of  philosophy,  Schelling  the  presentiment  of  the  true 
philosophy." 


SECTION  IV. 

The  views  of  LocTce,  TucJcer,  Hartley,  Priestley,  ffelvetius,  and  JDiderot,  with 
respect  to  the  relation  between  liberty  and  necessity. 

Locke,  it  is  well  known,  adopted  the  notions  of  free-agency 
given  by  Hobbes.  "In  this,"  says  he,  "consists  freedom,  viz., 
in  our  being  able  to  act  or  not  to  act,  according  as  we  shall 
choose  or  will."*  And  this  notion  of  liberty,  consisting  in  a 

0  Book  ii,  chapters  21,  27. 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  51 

freedom  from  external  co-action,  has  received  an  impetus  and 
currency  from  the  influence  of  Locke  which  it  would  not  other- 
wise have  obtained.  Neither  Calvin  nor  Luther,  as  we  have 
seen,  pretended  to  hold  it  up  as  the  freedom  of  the  will.  This 
was  reserved  for  Hobbes  and  his  immortal  follower,  John 
Locke,  who  has,  in  his  turn,  been  copied  by  a  host  of  illustrious 
disciples  who  would  have  recoiled  from  the  more  articulate  and 
consistent  development  of  this  doctrine  by  the  philosopher  of 
Malmsbury.  It  is  only  because  Locke  has  enveloped  it  in  a 
cloud  of  inconsistencies  that  it  has  been  able  to  secure  the  ven- 
eration of  the  great  and  good. 

It  is  remarkable,  that  although  Locke  adopted  the  definition 
of  free-will  given  by  Hobbes,  and  which  the  latter  so  easily 
reconciled  with  the  omnipotence  and  omniscience  of  God  ;  yet 
he  expressly  declares  that  he  had  found  it  impossible  to  recon- 
cile those  attributes  in  the  Divine  Being  with  the  free-agency 
of  man.  Surely  no  such  difficulty  could  have  existed,  if  his 
definition  of  free-agency,  or  free-will,  be  correct ;  for  although 
omnipotence  itself  might  produce  our  volitions,  we  might  still 
be  free  to  act,  to  move  in  accordance  with  our  volitions.  But 
the  truth  is,  there  was  something  more  in  Locke's  thoughts  and 
feelings,  in  the  inmost  working  of  his  nature,  with  respect  to 
moral  liberty,  than  there  was  in  his  definition.  The  inconsist- 
ency and  fluctuation  of  his  views  on  this  all-important  subject 
are  fully  reflected  in  his  chapter  on  power. 

Both  in  Great  Britain  and  France,  the  most  illustrious  suc- 
cessors of  Locke  soon  delivered  themselves  from  his  incon- 
sistencies and  self-contradictions.  Hartley  was  not  in  all  re- 
spects a  follower  of  Locke,  it  is  true,  though  he  admitted  his 
definition  of  free-agency.  u  It  appears  to  me,"  says  Hartley, 
"  that  all  the  most  complex  ideas  arise  from  sensation,  and  that 
reflection  is  not  a  distinct  source,  as  Mr.  Locke  makes  it."  By 
this  mutilation  of  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  it  was  reduced  back 
to  that  dead  level  of  materialism  in  which  Hobbes  had  left  it,, 
and  from  which  the  former  had  scarcely  endeavoured  to  raise 
it.  Hence  arose  the  rigid  scheme  of  necessity,  for  which 
Hartley  is  so  zealous  an  advocate.  In  reading  his  treatise  on 
the  "  Mechanism  of  the  Human  Mind,"  we  are  irresistibly  com- 
pelled to  feel  the  conviction  that  the  only  circumstance  which 
prevents  the  movements  of  the  soul  from  being  subjected  to 


52  MORAL  EVII    CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

mathematical  calculation,  and  made  a  branch  of  dynamics,  is 
the  want  of  a  measure  of  the  force  of  motives.  If  this  want 
were  supplied,  then  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  might  be,  ac- 
cording to  his  view  of  its  nature  and  operations,  »con  verted  into 
a  portion  of  mechanics.  Yet  this  excellent  man  did  not  im- 
agine for  a  moment  that  he  upheld  a  scheme  which  is  at  war 
with  the  great  moral  interests  of  the  world.  He  supposes  it  is 
no  matter  how  we  come  by  our  volitions,  provided  our  bodies 
be  left  free  to  obey  the  impulses  of  the  will ;  this  is  amply  suf- 
ficient to  render  us  accountable  for  our  actions,  and  to  vindicate 
the  moral  government  of  God.  Tims  did  he  fall  asleep  with  a 
specious,  but  most  superficial  dream  of  liberty,  which  has  no 
more  to  do  with  the  real  question  concerning  the  moral  agency 
of  man  than  if  it  related  to  the  winds  of  heaven  or  to  the  waves 
of  the  sea.  Accordingly  this  is  the  view  of  liberty  which  he 
repeatedly  holds  up  as  all-sufficient  to  secure  the  great  moral 
interest  of  the  human  race. 

His  great  disciple,  Dr.  Priestley,  pursues  precisely  the  same 
course.  "  If  a  man,"  says  he,  "  be  wholly  a  material  being,  and 
the  power  of  thinking  the  result  of  a  certain  organization  of  the 
brain,  does  it  not  follow  that  all  his  functions  must  be  regulated 
by  the  laws  of  mechanism,  and  that  of  consequence  his  actions 
proceed  from  an  irresistible  necessity?"  And  again,  he  ob- 
serves, "  the  doctrine  of  necessity  is  the  immediate  result  of  the 
materiality  of  man,  for  mechanism  is  the  undoubted  consequence 
of  materialism."*  Priestley,  however,  allows  us  to  possess  free- 
will as  defined  by  Hobbes,  Locke,  and  Hartley. 

Helvetius  himself  could  easily  admit  such  a  liberty  into  his 
unmitigated  scheme  of  necessity,  but  he  did  not  commit  the 
blunder  of  Locke  and  Hartley,  in  supposing  that  it  bore  on  the 
great  question  concerning  the  freedom  of  the  mind.  "It  is 
true,"  he  says,  "  wre  can  form  a  tolerably  distinct  idea  of  the 
word  liberty,  understood  in  its  common  sense.  A  man  is  fret 
who  is  neither  loaded  with  irons  nor  confined  in  prison,  nor  in- 
timidated like  the  slave  with  the  dread  of  chastisement :  in  this 
sense  the  liberty  of  man  consists  in  the  free  exercise  of  his 
power ;  I  say,  of  his  power,  because  it  would  be  ridicule  us  to 
mistake  for  a  want  of  liberty  the  incapacity  we  are  under  to 
pierce  the  clouds  like  the  eagle,  to  live  under  the  water  like  the 

0  Disquisitions  and  Introduction,  p.  5. 


Chapter!.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  53 

whale,  or  to  become  king,  emperor,  or  pope.  "We  have  so  far 
a  sufficiently  clear  idea  of  the  word.  But  this  is  no  longer  the 
case  when  we  come  to  apply  liberty  to  the  will.  What  must 
this  liberty  then  mean  2  We  can  only  understand  by  it  a  free 
power  of  willing  or  not  willing  a  thing :  but  this  power  would 
imply  that  there  may  be  a  will  without  motives,  and  conse- 
quently an  effect  without  a  cause.  A  philosophical  treatise  on 
the  liberty  of  the  will  would  be  a  treatise  of  effects  without  a 
cause."* 

In  like  manner,  Diderot  had  the  sagacity  to  perceive  that 
the  idea  of  liberty,  as  defined  by  Locke,  did  not  at  all  come 
into  conflict  with  his  portentous  scheme  of  irreligion,  which  had 
grounded  itself  on  the  doctrine  of  necessity.  Having  pro- 
nounced the  .term  liberty,  as  applied  to  the  will,  to  be  a  word 
without  meaning,  he  proceeds  to  justify  the  infliction  of  punish- 
ment on  the  same  grounds  on  which  it  is  vindicated  by  Hobbes 
and  Spinoza.  "  But  if  there  is  no  liberty,"  says  he,  "  there  is 
no  action  that  merits  either  praise  or  blame,  neither  vice  nor 
virtue,  nothing  that  ought  to  be  either  rewarded  or  punished. 
What  then  is  the  distinction  among  men  ?  The  doing  of  good 
and  the  doing  of  evil !  The  doer  of  ill  is  one  who  must  be 
destroyed,  not  punished.  The  doer  of  good  is  lucky,  not  virtu- 
ous. But  though  neither  the  doer  of  good  nor  of  ill  be  free,  mar 
is,  nevertheless,  a  being  to  be  modified ;  it  is  for  this  reason  the 
doer  of  ill  should  be  destroyed  upon  the  scaffold.  From  thence 
the  good  effects  of  education,  of  pleasure,  of  grief,  of  grandeur, 
of  poverty,  &c. ;  from  thence  a  philosophy  full  of  pity,  strongly 
attached  to  the  good,  nor  more  angry  with  the  wicked  than 

with  the  whirlwind  which  fills  one's  eyes  with  dust." 

"  Adopt  these  principles  if  you  think  them  good,  or  show  me 
that  they  are  bad.  If  you  adopt  them,  they  will  reconcile  you 
too  with  others  and  with  yourself:  you  will  neither  be  pleased 
nor  angry  with  yourself  for  being  what  you  are.  Reproach 
others  for  nothing,  and  repent  of  nothing,  this  is  the  first  step 
to  wisdom.  Besides  this  all  is  prejudice  and  false  philosophy." 

Though  these  consequences  irresistibly  flow  from  the  doctrine 
of  necessity,  yet  the  injury  resulting  from  them  would  be  far 
less  if  they  were  maintained  only  by  such  men  as  Helvetius 
and  Diderot.  It  is  when  such  errors  receive  the  sanction  of 

0  Helvetius  on  the  Mind,  p.  44. 


M  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  {Part  1, 

Christian  philosophers,  like  Hartley  and  Leibnitz,  and  are  rec- 
ommended to  the  human  mind  by  a  pious  zeal  for  the  glory  of 
God,  that  they  are  apt  to  obtain  a  frightful  currency  and  be- 
come far  more  desolating  in  their  effects.  "The  doctrine  of 
necessity,"  says  Hartley,  "has  a  tendency  to  abate  all  resent- 
ment against  men:  since  all  they  do  against  us  is  by  the  ap- 
pointment of  God,  it  is  rebellion  against  him  to  be  offended 
with  them" 

SECTION  v. 

The  manner  in  which  Leibnitz  endeavours  to  reconcile  liberty  and  necessity. 

Leibnitz  censures  the  language  of  Descartes,  in  which  he 
ascribes  all  the  thoughts  and  volitions  of  men  to  God,  and  com- 
plains that  he  thereby  shuts  out  free-agency  from  the  world. 
It  becomes  a  very  curious  question,  then,  how  Leibnitz  himself, 
who  was  so  deeply  implicated  in  the  scheme  of  necessity,  has 
been  able  to  save  the  great  interests  of  morality.  He  does  not, 
for  a  moment,  call  in  question  "the  great  demonstration  from 
cause  and  effect "  in  favour  of  necessity.  It  is  well  known  that 
he  has  more  than  once  compared  the  human  mind  to  a  balance, 
in  wThich  reasons  and  inclinations  take  the  place  of  weights ;  he 
supposes  it  to  be  just  as  impossible  for  the  mind  to  depart  from 
the  direction  given  to  it  by  "  the  determining  cause,"  as  it  is  for 
a  balance  to  turn  in  opposition  to  the  influence  of  the  greatest 
weight. 

Nor  is  he  pleased  with  Descartes's  appeal  to  consciousness  to 
prove  the  doctrine  of  liberty.  In  reply  to  this  appeal,  he  says : 
"The  chain  of  causes  connected  one  with  another  reaches  very 
far.  Wherefore  the  reason  alleged  by  Descartes,  in  order  to 
prove  the  independence  of  our  free  actions,  by  a  pretended 
vigorous  internal  feeling,  has  no  force.*  We  cannot,  strictly 
speaking,  feel  our  independence ;  and  we  do  not  always  per- 
ceive the  causes,  frequently  imperceptible,  on  which  our  reso- 
lution depends.  It  is  as  if  a  needle  touched  with  the  loadstone 
were  sensible  of  and  pleased  with  its  turning  toward  the  north. 

'•-  Mr.  Stewart  says :  "  Dr.  Hartley  was,  I  believe,  one  of  the  first  (if  not  the 
first)  who  denied  that  our  consciousness  is  in  favour  of  our  free-agency." — 
Stewart's  Works,  vol.  v,  Appendix.  This  is  evidently  a  mistake.  In  the  above 
passage,  Leibnitz,  with  even  more  point  than  Hartley,  denies  that  our  conscious- 
ness is  in  favour  of  free-agency. 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  55 

For  it  would  believe  that  it  turned  itself,  independently  of  any 
other  cause,  not  perceiving  the  insensible  motions  of  the  mag- 
netic matter."*  Thus,  he  seems  to  represent  the  doctrine  of 
liberty  as  a  mere  dream  and  delusion  of  the  mind,  and  the  iron 
scheme  of  necessity  as  a  stern  reality.  Is  it  in  the  power  of 
Leibnitz,  then,  any  more  than  it  was  in  that  of  Descartes,  to 
reconcile  such  a  scheme  with  the  free-agency  and  accountability 
of  man  ?  Let  us  hear  him  and  determine. 

Leibnitz  repudiates  the  notion  of  liberty  given  by  Hobbes 
and  Locke.  In  his  "Nouveaux  Essais  sur  L'Entendement 
Humain,"  a  work  in  which  he  combats  many  of  the  doctrines  of 
Locke,  the  insignificance  of  his  idea  of  the  freedom  of  the  will 
is  most  clearly  and  triumphantly  exposed.  Philalethe,  or  the 
representative  of  Locke,  says:  ''Liberty  is  the  power  that  a 
man  has  to  do  or  not  to  do  an  action  according  to  his  will" 
Theophile,  or  the  representative  of  Leibnitz,  replies :  "  If  men 
understood  only  that  by  liberty,  when  they  ask  whether  the 
will  is  free,  their  question  would  be  truly  absurd."  And  again  : 
"  The  question  ought  not  to  be  asked,"  says  Philalethe,  "  if  the 
will  is  free :  that  is  to  speak  in  a  very  improper  manner :  but 
if  man  is  free.  This  granted,  I  say  that,  when  any  one  can,  by 
the  direction  or  choice  of  his  mind,  prefer  the  existence  of  one 
action  to  the  non-existence  of  that  action  and  to  the  contrary, 
that  is  to  say,  when  he  can  make  it  exist  or  not  exist,  according 
to  his  will,  then  he  is  free.  And  we  can  scarcely  see  how  it 
could  l)e  possible  to  conceive  a  being  more  free  than  one  who  is 
capable  of  doing  what  he  wills."  Theophile  rejoins:  "When 
we  reason  concerning  the  liberty  of  the  will,  we  do  not  demand 
if  the  man  can  do  what  he  wills,  but  if  he  has  a  sufficient  inde- 
pendence in  the  will  itself;  we  do  not  ask  if  he  has  free  limbs 
or  elbow-room,  but  if  the  mind  is  free,  and  in  what  that  free- 
dom consists,  "f 

«. 

0  Essais  de  Theodicee,  p.  99. 

f  "  Hobbes  defines  a  free-agent,"  says  Stewart,  "  to  be  'he  that  can  do  if  he 
will,  and  forbear  if  he  will.'  The  same  definition  has  been  adopted  by  Leibnitz, 
by  Collins,  by  Gravezende,  by  Edwards,  by  Bonnet,  and  by  all  later  necessitari- 
ans." The  truth  is,  as  we  have  seen,  that  instead  of  adopting,  Leibnitz  has  very 
clearly  refuted,  the  definition  of  Hobbes.  Mr.  Harris,  in  his  work  entitled  "  The 
Primeval  Man,"  has  also  fallen  into  the  error  of  ascribing  this  definition  of  liberty 
to  Leibnitz.  Surely,  these  very  learned  authors  must  have  forgotten,  that  Leib- 
nitz wrote  a  reply  to  Hobbes,  in  which  he  expressly  combats  his  views  of  liberty. 


56  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  i, 

Having  thus  exploded  the  delusive  notion  of  liberty  which 
Locke  had  borrowed  from  Hobbes,  Leibnitz  proceeds  to  take 
what  seems  to  be  higher  ground.  He  expressly  declares,  that 
in  older  to  constitute  man  an  accountable  agent,  he  must  be 
free,  not  only  from  constraint,  but  also  from  necessity.  In  the 
adoption  of  this  language,  Leibnitz  seems  to  speak  with  the  ad- 
vocates of  free-agency ;  but  does  he  think  with  them  ?  The 
sound  is  pleasant  to  the  ear ;  but  what  sense  is  it  intended  to 
convey  to  the  mind?  Leibnitz  shall  be  his  own  interpreter. 
"  All  events  have  their  necessary  causes,"  says  Hobbes.  "  Bad," 
replies  Leibnitz :  "  they  have  their  determining  causes,  by  wrhich 
we  can  assign  a  reason  for  them ;  but  they  have  not  necessary 
causes."  Now  does  this  signify  that  an  event,  that  a  volition, 
is  not  absolutely  and  indissolubly  connected  with  its  "  determin- 
ing cause?"  Is  this  the  grand  idea  from  which  the  light  of 
liberty  is  to  beam  on  a  darkened  and  enslaved  world  ?  By  no 
means.  We  must  indulge  no  fond  hopes  or  idle  dreams  of  the 
kind.  Yolition  is  free  from  necessity,  adds  Leibnitz ;  because 
u  the  contrary  could  happen  without  implying  a  contradiction" 
This  is  the  signification  which  he  attaches  to  his  own  language  ; 
and  it  is  the  only  meaning  of  which  it  is  susceptible  in  accord- 
ance with  his  system.  Thus,  Leibnitz  saw  and  clearly  exposed 
the  futility  of  speaking  about  a  freedom  from  co-action  or  re- 
straint, when  the  question  is,  not  whether  the  body  is  untram- 
melled, but  whether  the  mind  itself  is  free  in  the  act  of  willing. 
But  he  did  not  see,  it  seems,  that  it  is  equally  irrelevant  to 
speak  of  a  freedom  from  a  mathematical  necessity  in  such  a 
connexion ;  although  this,  as  plainly  as  the  other  sense  of  the 
word,  has  no  conceivable  bearing  on  the  point  in  dispute.  If  a 
volition  were  produced  by  the  omnipotence  of  God,  irresistibly 
acting  on  the  human  mind,  still  it  would  not  be  necessary,  in 
the  sense  of  Leibnitz,  since  it  might  and  would  have  been  dif- 
ferent if  God  had  so  willed  it ;  the  contrary  volition  implying 
no  contradiction.  Is  it  not  evident,  that  to  suppose  the  mind 
may  thus  be  bound  to  act,  and  yet  be  free  because  the  contrary 
act  implies  no  contradiction,  is  merely  to  dream  of  liberty,  anc 
to  mistake  a  shadow  for  a  substance  ? 

As  the  opposite  of  a  volition  implies  no  contradiction,  says 
Leibnitz,  so  it  is  free  from  an  absolute  necessity;  that  is  to 
say,  it  might  have,  been  different,  nay,  it  must  have  been  dif 


Chapter!.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  57 

ferent,  from  what  it  is,  provided  its  determining  cause  had 
been  different.  The  same  thing  may  be  said  of  the  motions  of 
matter.  "We  may  say  that  they  are  also  free,  because  the  oppo- 
site motions  imply  no  contradiction  ;  and  we  only  have  to  vary 
the  force  in  order  to  vary  the  motion.  Hence,  freedom  in  this 
sense  of  the  word  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  absolute  and 
uncontrolled  dominion  of  causes  over  the  will ;  for  what  can 
be  more  completely  necessitated  than  the  motions  of  the  body  ? 

The  demand  of  his  own  nature,  which  so  strongly  impelled 
Leibnitz  to  seek  and  cling  to  the  freedom  of  the  mind,  as  the 
basis  of  moral  and  accountable  agency,  could  not  rest  satisfied 
with  so  unsubstantial  a  shadow.  After  all,  he  has  felt  con- 
strained to  have  recourse  to  the  hypothesis  of  a  preestablished 
harmony  in  order  to  restore,  if  possible,  the  liberty  which  his 
scheme  of  necessity  had  banished  from  the  universe.  It  is  no 
part  of  our  intention  to  examine  this  obsolete  fiction ;  we  merely 
wish  to  show  how  essential  Leibnitz  regarded  it  to  a  solution 
of  the  difficulty  under  consideration.  "  I  come  now,"  says  he, 
u  to  show  how  the  action  of  the  will  depends  on  causes ;  that 
there  is  nothing  so  agreeable  to  human  nature  as  this  depend- 
ence of  our  actions,  and  that  otherwise  we  should  fall  into  an 
absurd  and  insupportable  fatality  ;  that  is  to  say,  into  the  Mo- 
hammedan fate,  which  is  the  worst  of  all,  because  it  does  away 
with  foresight  and  good  counsel.  However,  it  is  well  to  explain 
how  this  dependency  of  our  voluntary  actions  does  not  prevent 
that  there  may  be  at  the  bottom  of  things  a  marvellous  spon- 
taneity in  us,  which  in  a  certain  sense  renders  the  mind,  in  its 
resolutions,  independent  of  the  physical  influence  of  all  other 
creatures.  This  spontaneity,  lut  little  known  hitherto,  which 
raises  our  empire  over  our  actions  as  much  as  it  is  possible,  is 
a  consequence  of  the  system  of  pre  established  harmony"  Thus, 
in  order  to  satisfy  himself  that  our  actions  are  really  free  and 
independent  of  the  physical  influence  of  other  creatures,  lie  has 
recourse  to  a  fiction  in  which  few  persons  ever  concurred  with 
him,  and  which  is  now  universally  regarded  as  one  of  the  vaga- 
ries and  dreams  of  philosophy.  If  we  are  to  be  saved  from  an 
insupportable  fate  only  by  such  means,  our  condition  must 
indeed  be  one  of  forlorn  hopelessness. 

Before  we  take  leave  of  Leibnitz,  there  is  one  view  of  the 
difficulty  in  question  which  we  wish  to  notice,  not  because  it  is 


58  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

peculiar  to  him,  but  because  it  is  very  clearly  stated  and  con- 
fidently relied  on  by  him.  It  is  common  to  most  of  the  advo- 
cates of  necessity,  and  it  is  exceedingly  imposing  in  its  appear- 
ance and  effect.  "  Men  of  all  times,"  says  he,  "  have  been 
troubled  by  a  sophism,  which  the  ancients  called  the  'rohon 
paresseusej  because  it  induces  them  to  do  nothing,  or  at  least 
to  concern  themselves  about  nothing,  and  to  follow  only  the 
present  inclination  to  pleasure.  For,  say  they,  if  the  future  is 
necessary,  that  which  is  to  happen  will  happen  whatever  I  may 
do.  But  the  future,  say  they,  is  necessary,  either  because  the 
Divinity  foresees  all  things,  and  even  preestablishes  them  in 
governing  the  universe  ;  or  because  all  things  necessarily  come 
to  pass  by  a  concatenation  of  causes."*  Leibnitz  illustrated  the 
fallacy  of  this  reasoning  in  the  following  manner :  "  By  the 
same  reason  (if  it  is  valid)  I  could  say — If  it  is  WTitten  in  the 
archives  of  fate,  that  poison  will  kill  me  at  present,  or  do  me 
harm,  this  will  happen,  though  I  should  not  take  it ;  and  if  that 
is  not  written,  it  will  not  happen,  though  I  should  take  it ;  and, 
consequently,  I  can  follow  my  inclination  to  take  whatever  is 
agreeable  with  impunity,  however  pernicious  it  may  be  ;  which 
involves  a  manifest  absurdity.  .  .  .  This  objection  staggers  them 
a  little,  but  they  always  come  back  to  their  reasoning,  turned 
in  different  points  of  view,  until  we  cause  them  to  comprehend 
in  what  the  defect  of  their  sophism  consists.  It  is  this,  that  it 
is  false  that  the  event  will  happen  whatever  we  may  do  ;  it  will 
happen,  because  we  do  that  which  leads  to  it ;  and  if  the  event 
is  WTitten,  the  cause  which  will  make  it  happen  is  also  written. 
Thus  the  connexion  (liaison)  of  effects  and  their  causes,  so  far 
from  establishing  the  doctrine  of  a  necessity  prejudicial  to  prac- 
tice, serves  to  destroy  it."f  The  same  reply  is  found  more  than 
once  in  the  course  of  the  same  great  work  ;  and  it  is  employed 
by  all  necessitarians  in  defence  of  their  system.  But  it  is  not 
a  satisfactory  answer.  It  overlooks  the  real  difficulty  in  the 
case,  and  seeks  to  remove  an  imaginary  one.  The  question  is. 
not  whether  a  necessary  connexion  between  our  volitions  and 
their  effects  is  a  discouragement  to  practice,  but  whether  a  neces- 
sary connexion  between  our  volitions  and  their  causes  is  so. 
It  is  very  true,  that  no  man  would  be  accountable  for  his  exter- 
nal actions  or  their  consequences,  if  there  were  no  fixed  relation 

0  Essais  de  Theodicee,  pp.  5,  6.  f  I(IM  P-  8- 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  59 

between  these  and  his  volitions.  If,  when  a  man  willed  one 
thing,  another  should  happen  to  follow  which  he  did  not  will, 
of  course  he  would  not  be  responsible  for  it.  And  if  there  were 
no  certain  or  fixed  connexion  between  his  external  actions  and 
their  consequences,  either  as  they  affected  himself  or  others,  he 
certainly  would  not  be  responsible  for  those  consequences.  This 
connexion  between  causes  and  effects,  this  connexion  between 
volitions  and  their  consequences,  is  indispensable  to  our  account- 
ability for  such  consequences.  But  for  such  a  connexion,  noth- 
ing could  be  more  idle  and  ridiculous  than  to  endeavour  to  do  any- 
thing ;  for  we  might  will  one  thing,  and  another  would  take  place. 
But  must  the  same  necessary  connexion  exist  between  the 
causes  of  our  volitions  and  the  volitions  themselves,  before  we 
can  be  accountable  for  these  volitions,  for  these  effects  ?  This 
is  the  question.  Leibnitz  has  lost  sight  of  it,  and  deceived  him- 
self by  a  false  application  of  his  doctrine.  The  doctrine  of 
necessity,  when  applied  to  volitions  and  their  effects,  is  indis- 
pensable to  build  up  man's  accountability  for  his  external 
conduct  and  its  consequences.  But  the  same  doctrine,  when 
applied  to  establish  a  fixed  and  unalterable  relation  between 
the  causes  of  volition  and  volition  itself,  really  demolishes  all 
responsibility  for  volition,  and  consequently  for  its  external 
results.  Leibnitz  undertook  to  show  that  a  necessary  connexion 
between  volition  and  its  causes  does  not  destroy  man's  account- 
ability for  his  volitions ;  and  he  has  shown,  what  no  one  ever 
doubted,  that  a  necessary  connexion  between  volition  and  its 
effects  does  not  destroy  accountability  for  those  effects !  Strange 
as  this  confusion  of  things  is,  it  is  made  by  the  most  celebrated 
advocates  of  the  doctrine  of  necessity ;  which  shows,  we  think, 
that  the  doctrine  hardly  admits  of  a  solid  defence.  Thus  Ed- 
wards, for  example,  insists  that  the  doctrine  of  necessity  is  so 
far  from  rendering  our  endeavours  vain  and  useless,  that  it  is 
an  indispensable  condition  or  prerequisite  to  their  success.  In 
illustration  of  this  point,  he  says :  "Let  us  suppose  a  real  and 
sure  connexion  between  a  man  having  his  eyes  open  in  the  clear 
daylight,  with  good  organs  of  sight,  and  seeing ;  so  that  seeing 
is  connected  with  opening  his  eyes,  and  not  seeing  with  his  not 
opening  his  eyes ;  and  also  the  like  connexion  between  such  a 
man  attempting  to  open  his  eyes  and  his  actually  doing  it :  the 
supposed  established  connexion  between  these  antecedents  and 


60  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  L, 

consequents,  let  the  connexion  be  never  so  sure  arid  necessary, 
certainly  does  not  prove  that  it  is  in  vain  for  a  man  in  such 
circumstances  to  attempt  to  open  his  eyes,  in  order  to  seeing ; 
his  aiming  at  that  event,  and  the  use  of  the  means,  being  the 
effect  of  his  will,  does  not  break  the  connexion,  or  hinder  the 
success." 

"  So  that  the  objection  we  are  upon  does  not  lie  against  the 
doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  events  by  a  certainty  of  connexion 
and  consequence :  on  the  contrary,  it  is  truly  forcible  against 
the  Arminian  doctrine  of  contingence  and  self-determination, 
which  is  inconsistent  with  such  a  connexion.  If  there  be  no 
connexion  between  those  events  wherein  virtue  and  vice  con- 
sist, and  anything  antecedent ;  then  there  is  no  connexion 
between  these  events  and  any  means  or  endeavours  used  in 
order  to  them :  and  if  so,  then  those  means  must  be  in  vain. 
The  less  there  is  of  connexion  between  foregoing  things  and  fol- 
lowing ones,  so  much  the  less  there  is  between  means  and  end, 
endeavours  and  success  ;  and  in  the  same  proportion  are  means 
and  endeavours  ineffectual  and  in  vain." 

In  like  manner,  Dr.  Chalmers,  in  his  defence  of  the  doctrine 
of  necessity,  has  in  all  his  illustrations  confounded  the  con- 
nexion between  a  volition  and  its  antecedent,  with  the  relation 
between  a  volition  and  its  consequent.  To  select  one  such 
illustration  from  many,  it  would  be  idle,  says  he,  for  a  man  to 
labour  and  toil  after  wealth,  if  there  were  no  fixed  connexion 
between  such  exertion  and  the  accumulation  of  riches. 

We  reply  to  all  such  illustrations, — It  is  true,  there  must  be 
a  fixed  connexion  between  our  endeavours  or  voluntary  exer- 
tions and  their  consequences,  in  order  to  render  such  endeavours 
or  exertions  of  any  avail,  or  to  render  us  accountable  for  such 
consequences.  But  it  should  be  forever  borne  in  mind,  thai 
the  question  is  not  whether  a  fixed  connexion  obtains  between 
our  volitions  and  their  sequents,  but  whether  a  necessary  con- 
nexion exists  between  our  volitions  and  their  antecedents.  The 
question  is,  not  whether  the  will  be  a  power  which  is  often  fol- 
lowed by  necessitated  effects ;  but  whether  there  be  a  power 
behind  the  will  by  which  its  volitions  are  necessitated.  And 
this  being  the  question,  what  does  it  signify  to  tell  us,  th&t  the 
will  is  a  producing  power?  We  deny  that  volitions  and  their 
antecedents  are  necessarily  connected ;  and  our  opponents  re 


Chapter!.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  61 

fute  us  by  showing  that  volitions  and  their  sequents  are  thus 
connected  !  We  deny  that  A  and  B  are  necessarily  connected ; 
and  this  position  is  overthrown  and  demolished  by  showing  that 
B  and  C  are  thus  connected !  Is  it  not  truly  wonderful  that 
such  men  as  a  Leibnitz,  an  Edwards,  and  a  Chalmers,  should, 
in  their  zeal  to  maintain  a  favourite  dogma,  commit  so  great  an 
oversight,  and  so  grievously  deceive  themselves  ? 

SECTION  VI. 

The  attempt  of  Edwards  to  establish  free  and  accountable  agency  on  the  basis 
of  necessity — The  views  of  the  younger  Edwards,  Day,  Chalmers,  Dick, 
D^Aubigne,  Hill,  Shaw,  and  M'Cosh,  concerning  the  agreement  of  liberty 
and  necessity. 

The  great  metaphysician  of  New-England  insists,  that  his 
scheme,  and  his  scheme  alone,  is  consistent  with  the  free- 
agency  and  accountability  of  man.  But  how  does  he  show  this  ? 
Does  he  endeavour  to  shake  the  stern  argument  by  which  all 
things  seem  bound  together  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  ? 
Does  he  even  intimate  a  doubt  with  respect  to  the  perfect  co- 
herency and  validity  of  this  argument?  Does  he  once  enter  a 
protest  against  the  doctrine  of  the  Stoics,  or  of  the  materialistic 
fatalists,  according  to  which  all  things  in  heaven  and  earth  are 
involved  in  an  "implex  series  of  causes?"  He  does  not.  On 
the  contrary,  he  has  stated  and  enforced  the  great  argument 
from  cause  and  effect,  in  the  strongest  possible  terms.  He 
contends  that  volition  is  caused,  not  by  the  will  nor  the  mind, 
but  by  the  strongest  motive.  This  is  the  cause  of  volition,  and 
it  is  impossible  for  the  effect  to  be  loose  from  its  cause.  It  is 
an  inherent  contradiction,  a  glaring  absurdity,  to  say  that  mo- 
tive is  the  cause  of  volition,  and  yet  admit  that  volition  may, 
or  may  not,  follow  motive.  This  is  to  say,  indeed,  that  motive 
is  the  cause,  and  yet  that  it  is  not  the  cause,  of  volition ;  which 
is  a  contradiction  in  terms.*  So  far  from  saying  anything, 
then,  to  extricate  the  volitions  of  men  from  the  adamantine 
circle  of  necessity,  he  has  exerted  his  prodigious  energies  to 
fasten  them  therein. 

Hence  the  question  arises,  Has  he  left  any  room  for  the  in- 
troduction of  that  freedom  of  the  mind,  which  it  is  the  great 
object  of  his  inquiry  to  establish  upon  its  true  foundations? 
0  Inquiry,  part  ii,  sec.  viii. 


62  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  1, 

The  liberty  for  which  he  contends,  is,  after  all  his  labours,  pre- 
cisely that  advocated  by  Hobbes  and  Collins,  and  no  other. 
It  is  a  freedom  from  co-action,  and  not  from  necessity.  But  ho 
is  entitled  to  speak  for  himself,  and  we  shall  permit  him  so  to 
do :  "  The  plain  and  obvious  meaning  of  the  word  freedom  and 
liberty,"  says  he,  "  in  common  speech,  is  the  power,  opportunity, 
or  advantage,  that  any  one,  has,  to  do  as  he  pleases.  Or,  in  other 
words,  his  being  free  from  hinderance  or  impediment  in  the 
way  of  doing  or  conducting  in  any  respect  as  he  wills.  And 
the  contrary  to  liberty,  whatever  name  we  call  it  by,  is  a  per- 
son being  hindered,  or  unable  to  conduct  as  he  will,  or  being 
necessitated  to  do  otherwise."  Here,  it  will  be  seen,  that  liberty, 
according  to  this  notion  of  it,  has  no  relation  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  will  arises,  or  comes  into  existence;  if  one's  external 
conduct  can  only  follow  his  will,  he  is  free. 

"  There  are  two  things,"  says  he,  "  contrary  to  what  is  called 
liberty  in  common  speech.  One  is  constraint,  otherwise  called 
force,  compulsion,  and  co-action'  wThich  is  a  person  being  ne- 
cessitated to  do  a  thing  contrary  to  his  will.  The  other  is  re- 
straint •  which  is,  his  being  hindered,  and  not  having  power  to 
do  according  to  his  will.  But  that  which  has  no  will  cannot 
be  the  subject  of  these  things."  This  definition,  it  is  plain,  pre- 
supposes the  existence  of  a  volition ;  and  liberty  consists  in  the 
absence  of  co-action.  It  has  no  relation  to  the  question  as  to 
how  we  come  by  our  volitions,  whether  they  are  put  forth  by 
the  mind  itself  without  being  necessitated,  or  whether  they  are 
necessarily  produced  in  us.  It  leaves  this  great  fundamental 
question  untouched. 

On  this  subject  his  language  is  perfectly  explicit.  There  is 
nothing  in  Kames,  nor  Collins,  nor  Crombie,  nor  Hobbes,  nor 
any  other  writer,  more  perfectly  unequivocal.  "  But  one  tiling 
more,"  says  he,  "  I  would  observe  concerning  what  is  vulgarly 
called  liberty,  namely,  that  power  and  opportunity  for  one  to 
do  and  conduct  as  he  will,  or  according  to  his  choice,  is  all  that 
is  meant  by  it,  without  taking  into  the  meaning  of  the  word 
anything  of  the  cause  of  that  choice,  or  at  all  considering 
how  the  person  came  to  have  such  a  volition,  or  internal  habit 
and  bias;  whether  it  was  determined  by  some  internal  ante- 
cedent volition,  or  whether  it  happened  without  a  cause; 
whether  it  were  necessarily  connected  with  something  foregoing, 


Chapter  I.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  63 

or  not  connected.  Let  the  person  come  by  his  choice  any  Iww, 
yet,  if  he  is  able,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  way  to  hinder  his 
pursuing  and  executing  his  will,  the  man  is  perfectly  free  ac- 
cording to  the  primary  and  common  notion  of  freedom"  Now 
this  is  all  the  definition  of  liberty  with  which  his  "  Inquiry  " 
furnishes  us ;  and  this,  he  says,  is  "  sufficient  to  show  what  is 
meant  by  liberty,  according  to  the  common  notion  of  mankind, 
and  in  the  usual  and  primary  acceptation  of  the  word." 

It  is  easy  to  see,  that  there  is  no  difficulty  in  reconciling 
liberty,  in  such  a  sense,  with  the  most  absolute  scheme  of  ne- 
cessity or  fatalism  the  world  has  ever  seen.  Let  a  man  come 
by  his  volition  ANY  now ;  let  it  be  produced  in  him  by  the  di- 
rect and  almighty  power  of  God  himself;  yet,  "he  is  perfectly 
free,"  provided  there  is  no  external  co-action  to  prevent  his 
volition  from  producing  its  natural  effects ! 

President  Day  is  not  pleased  with  the  definition  contained  in 
the  "  Inquiry ;"  and  in  this  particular  we  think  he  has  dis- 
covered a  superior  sagacity  to  Edwards.  But  his  extreme 
anxiety  to  save  the  credit  of  his  author  has  betrayed  him,  it 
seems  to  us,  into  an  apology  which  will  not  bear  a  close  ex- 
amination. "On  the  subject  of  liberty  or  freedom,"  says  he, 
"  which  occupies  a  portion  of  the  fifth  section  of  Edwards's 
first  book,  he  has  been  less  particular  than  was  to  be  expected, 
considering  that  this  is  the  great  object  of  inquiry  in  his  work. 
His  explanation  of  what  he  regards  as  the  proper  meaning  of 
the  term  is  applicable  to  the  liberty  of  outward  action,  to  what 
is  called  by  philosophers  external  liberty."  "  This  is  very  well 
as  far  as  it  goes.  But  the  professed  object  of  his  book,  accord- 
ing to  the  title-page,  is  an  inquiry  concerning  the  freedom  of 
the  will,  not  the  freedom  of  the  external  conduct.  We  natu- 
rally look  for  his  meaning  of  this  internal  liberty.  "What  he 
has  said,  in  this  section,  respecting  freedom  of  the  will,  has 
rather  the  appearance  of  evading  such  a  definition  of  it  as 
might  be  considered  his  own."*  Now,  is  it  possible  that  Presi- 
dent Edwards  has  instituted  an  inquiry  into  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  and  written  a  great  book  in  defence  of  it,  and  yet  has 
evaded  giving  his  own  definition  of  it?  If  so,  then  he  may 
have  demolished  the  views  of  others  on  this  subject,  but  he  has 
certainly  not  established  his  own  in  their  stead ;  and  hence,  for 
0  Day's  Examination  of  Edwards  on  the  Will,  sec.  v,  pp.  80,  81. 


t>4  MORAL    EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

aught  we  know,  he  really  did  not  believe  in  the  freedom  of  the 
will  at  all ;  and,  for  all  his  work  shows,  there  may  be  no  such 
freedom.  For  how  is  it  possible  for  any  man  to  establish  his 
views  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  if  he  is  not  at  sufficient  pains 
to  explain  his  meaning  of  the  terms,  and  forbears  even  to  give 
his  own  definition  of  them  ? 

But  the  truth  is,  the  author  of  the  "  Inquiry  "  has  placed  il 
beyond  all  controversy,  that  he  has  been  guilty  of  no  such 
omission  or  evasion.  He  has  left  no  room  to  doubt  that  the  def- 
inition of  liberty,  which  he  says  is  in  conformity  "  with  the 
Common  notion  of  mankind,"  is  his  own.  He  always  uses  this 
definition  when  he  undertakes  to  repel  objections  against  his 
scheme  of  necessity.  "  It  is  evident,"  he  says,  "  that  such  a 
providential  disposing  and  determining  of  men's  moral  actions, 
though  it  infers  a  moral  necessity  of  those  actions,  yet  it  does 
not  in  the  least  infringe  the  real  liberty  of  mankind,  the  only 
liberty  that  common  sense  teaches  to  be  necessary  to  moral  agency, 
which,  AS  HAS  BEEN  DEMONSTRATED,  is  not  inconsistent  with  such 
necessity."*  He  defines  liberty  in  the  very  words  of  Collins 
and  Hobbes,  to  mean  the  power  or  opportunity  any  one  has 
"  to  do  as  he  pleases ;"  or,  in  other  words,  to  do  "  as  he  wills?\ 
This  definition,  he  says,  is  according  to  the  primary  and  com- 
mon notion  of  mankind ;  and  now  he  declares,  that  "  this  is  the 
only  liberty  common  sense  teaches  is  necessary  to  moral  agency." 
It  is  very  strange  that  any  one  should  have  read  the  great  work 
of  President  Edwards  without  perceiving  that  this  is  the  sense 
in  which  he  always  uses  the  term  when  he  undertakes  to  repel 
the  attacks  of  his  adversaries.  To  select  only  one  instance  out 
of  many,  he  says,  "  If  the  Stoics  held  such  a  fate  as  is  repug- 
nant to  any  liberty,  consisting  in  our  doing  as  we  please,  I  ut- 
terly deny  such  a  fate.  If  they  held  any  such  fate  as  is  not 
consistent  with  the  common  and  universal  notions  that  mankind 
have  of  liberty,  activity,  moral  agency,  virtue,  and  vice,  I  dis- 
claim any  such  thing,  and  think  I  have  demonstrated  the  scheme 
I  maintain  is  no  such  scheme.":}:  Thus  he  always  has  recourse 
to  this  definition  of  liberty,  consisting  in  the  power  or  oppor- 
tunity any  one  has  "to  do  as  he  pleases,"  or,  in  other  words, 
"  as  he  wills,"  whenever  he  attempts  to  reconcile  his  doctrine 
with  the  moral  agency  and  accountability  of  man,  or  to  vindi- 

0  Inquiry,  part  iv,  sec.  9.  f  Ibid.  J  Ibid.,  sec.  7. 


Chapter  I.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  65 

cate  it  against  the  attacks  of  his  opponents.  We  must  suppose 
then,  that  Edwards  has  given  his  own  definition  of  liberty  in 
the  Inquiry,  or  we  must  conclude  that  he  defended  his  system 
by  the  use  of  an  idea  of  liberty  which  he  did  not  believe  to  be 
coirect;  that  when  he  alleged  that  he  "had  demonstrated"  his 
doctrine  to  be  consistent  with  free-agency,  he  only  meant  with 
a  false  and  atheistical  notion  of  free-agency. 

We  are  not  surprised  that  President  Day  does  not  like  this 
definition  of  liberty;  but  we  are  somewhat  surprised,  we  con- 
fess, that  such  an  idea  of  liberty  should  be  so  unhesitatingly 
adopted  from  Edwards,  and  so  confidently  set  forth  as  the 
highest  conceivable  notion  thereof,  by  Dr.  Chalmers.  He  does 
not  seem  to  entertain  the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  either  that  the 
definition  of  liberty  contained  in  the  Inquiry  is  that  of  Ed- 
wards himself,  or  that  which  is  fully  founded  in  truth.  He 
freely  concedes,  that  "  we  can  do  as  we  please,"  and  supposes 
that  the  reader  may  be  startled  to  hear  that  tin's  is  "  cordially 
admitted  by  the  necessitarians  themselves !" 

But  this  concession  he  easily  reconciles  with  the  tenet  of  necesr 
sity.  "  To  say  that  you  can  do  as  you  please,"  says  he,  "  is  just  to 
affirm  one  of  those  sequences  which  take  place  in  the  phenom- 
ena of  mind — a  sequence  whereof  a  volition  is  the  antecedent, 
and  the  performance  of  that  volition  is  the  consequent.  It  is 
a  sequence  which  no  advocate  of  the  philosophical  necessity  is 
ever  heard  to  deny.  Let  the  volition  ever  be  formed,  and  if  it 
point  to  some  execution  which  lies  within  the  limits  we  have 
just  adverted  to,  the  execution  of  it  will  follow."*  Thus,  his 
notion  of  liberty  makes  it  consist  in  the  absence  of  external  im- 
pediments, which  might  break  the  connexion  of.  a  volition  and 
its  consequent,  and  not  in  the  freedom  of  the  will  itself  from 
the  absolute  dominion  of  causes.  Such  an  idea  of  free-will,  it 
must  be  confessed,  is  very  well  adopted  by  one  who  intends  to 
maintain  "  a  rigid  and  absolute  predestination"  of  all  events. 

The  manner  in  which  Edwards  attempts  to  reconcile  the  freo- 
agenyy  and  accountability  of  man  with  the  great  argument 
from  the  law  of  causation,  or  with  his  doctrine  of  necessity,  is, 
as  we  have  seen,  precisely  the  same  as  that  adopted  by  Hobbes. 
There  is  not  a  shade  of  difference  between  them.  It  is,  indeed, 
easy  to  demonstrate  that  liberty,  according  to  this  definition  of 

0  Institutes  of  Theology,  vol.  ii,  part  iii,  chap,  i. 
6 


66  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

it,  is  not  inconsistent  with  necessity;  and  it  is  just  as  easy  to 
demonstrate,  that  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  any  scheme  of  fate 
that  has  ever  been  heard  of  among  men.  The  will  may  be  ab- 
solutely necessitated  in  all  its  acts,  and  yet  the  body  may  be 
free  from  external  co-action  or  natural  necessity ! 

But  though  there  is  this  close  agreement  between  Hobbea 
and  Edwards,  there  are  some  points  of  divergency  between 
Edwards  and  Calvin.  The  former  comes  forward  as  the  advo- 
cate of  free-will,  the  latter  expressly  denies  that  we  have  a  free- 
will. Calvin  admits  that  we  may  be  free  from  co-action  or 
compulsion ;  but  to  call  this  freedom  of  the  will,  is,  he  con- 
siders, to  decorate  a  most  "  diminutive  thing  with  a  superb 
title."  And  though  this  is  all  the  freedom  Edwards  allows  us 
to  possess,  yet  he  does  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  his  doctrine 
is  perfectly  consistent  with  "  the  highest  degree  of  liberty  that 
ever  could  be  thought  of,  or  that  ever  could  possibly  enter  into 
the  heart  of  man  to  conceive." 

The  only  liberty  we  possess,  according  to  all  the  authors  re- 
ferred to,  is  a  freedom  of  the  body  and  not  of  the  mind. 
Though  the  younger  Edwards  is  a  strenuous  advocate  of  his 
father's  doctrine,  he  has  sometimes,  without  intending  to  do  so, 
let  fall  a  heavy  blow  upon  it.  lie  finds,  for  instance,  the  fol- 
lowing language  in  the  writings  of  Dr.  West,  "  he  might  have 
omitted  doing  the  thing  if  he  would,"  and  he  is  perplexed  to 
ascertain  its  meaning.  "  To  say  that  if  a  man  had  chosen  not 
to  go  to  a  debauch,  (for  that  is  the  case  put  by  Dr.  West,)  he 
would,  indeed,  have  chosen  not  to  go  to  it,  is  too  great  trifling 
to  be  ascribed  to  Dr.  West."  "  Yet  to  say,"  he  continues,  "  that 
the  man  could  have  avoided  the  external  action  of  going,  &c., 
if  he  would,  would  be  equally  trifling ;  for  the  question  before 
us  is  concerning  the  liberty  of  the  will  or  mind,  and  not  the 
body."  The  italics  are  his  own.  It  seems,  then,  that  in  the 
opinion  of  the  younger  Edwards  it  is  very  great  trifling  to  speak 
of  the  power  to  do  an  external  action  in  the  present  controversy, 
because  it  relates  to  the  will  w  mind,  and  not  to  the  body.  Wo 
believe  this  remark  to  be  perfectly  just,  and  although  it  was 
aimed  at  the  antagonist  of  President  Ed\vards,  it  falls  with 
crushing  weight  on  the  doctrine  of  President  Edwards  him- 
self. Is  it  not  wonderful  that  so  just  a  reflection  did  not 
occur  to  the  younger  Edwards,  in  relation  to  the  definition 


Chapter  I.I  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  67 

of  liberty  contained  in  the  great  work  he  had  undertaken  to 
defend  ? 

We  have  now  seen  how  some  of  the  early  reformers,  and 
some  of  the  great  thinkers  in  after-times,  have  endeavoured  to 
reconcile  the  scheme  of  necessity  with  the  free-agency  and 
accountability  of  man.  Before  quitting  this  subject,  however, 
we  wish  to  adduce  a  remarkable  passage  from  one  of  the  most 
correct  reasoners,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most  impressive  writers 
that  in  modern  times  have  advocated  the  doctrines  of  Calvinism. 
"  Here  we  come  to  a  question,"  says  he,  "  which  has  engaged 
the  attention,  and  exercised  the  ingenuity,  and  perplexed  the 
wits  of  men  in  every  age.  If  God  has  foreordained  whatever 
comes  to  pass,  the  whole  series  of  events  is  necessary,  and 
human  liberty  is  taken  awaj.  Men  are  passive  instruments  in 
the  hands  of  their  Maker ;  they  can  do  nothing  but  what  they 
are  secretly  and  irresistibly  impelled  to  do  ;  they  are  not,  there- 
fore, responsible  for  their  actions ;  and  God  is  the  author  of 
sin."  After  sweeping  away  some  attempts  to  solve  this  diffi- 
culty, he  adds  :  "  It  is  a  more  intelligible  method  to  explain 
the  subject  by  the  doctrine  which  makes  liberty  consist  in  the 
power  of  acting  according  to  the  prevailing  inclination,  or  the 
motive  which  appears  strongest  to  the  mind.  Those  actions 
are  free  which  are  the  effects  of  volition.  In  whatever  manner 
the  state  of  mind  which  gave  rise  to  volition  has  been  produced, 
the  liberty  of  the  agent  is  neither  greater  nor  less.  It  is  his  will 
alone  which  is  to  ~be  considered,  and  not  the  means  by  which  it 
has  been  determined.  If  God  foreordained  certain  actions,  and 
placed  men  in  such  circumstances  that  the  actions  would  cer- 
tainly take  place  agreeably  to  the  laws  of  the  mind,  men  are 
nevertheless  moral  agents,  because  they  act  voluntarily  and  are 
responsible  for  the  actions  which  consent  has  made  their  own. 
Liberty  does  not  consist  in  the  power  of  acting  or  not  acting , 
~but  in  acting  from  choice.  The  choice  is  determined  by  some- 
thing in  the  mind  itself,  or  by  something  external  influencing 
the  mind ;  but  whatever  is  the  cause,  the  choice  makes  the 
action  free,  and  the  agent  accountable.  If  this  definition  of 
liberty  be  admitted,  you  will  perceive  that  it  is  possible  to 
reconcile  thefreedorr*  of  the  will  with  absolute  decrees  ;  but  tee 
have  not  got  rid,  of  every  difficulty"  Now  this  definition  of 
liberty,  it  is  obvious,  is  precisely  the  same  as  that  given  by 


68  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

President  Edwards,  and  nothing  could  be  more  perfectly 
adapted  to  effect  a  reconciliation  between  the  freedom  of  the 
will  and  the  doctrine  of  absolute  decrees.  How  perfectly  it 
shapes  the  freedom  of  man  to  fit  the  doctrine  of  predestination  ! 
It  is  a  fine  piece  of  workmanship,  it  is  true ;  but  as  the  learned 
and  candid  author  remarks,  we  must  not  imagine  that  we  have 
"got  rid  of  every  difficulty."  For,  "Z>y  this  theory"  he  con- 
tinues, "  human  actions  appear  to  ~be  as  necessary  as  the  motions 
of  matter  according  to  the  laws  of  gravitation  and  attraction  • 
and  man  seems  to  l>e  a  machine,  conscious  of  his  movements, 
and  consenting  to  them,  J)ut  impelled  by  something  different 
from  himself"*  Such  is  the  candid  confession  of  this  devoted 
Calvinist. 

We  have  now  seen  the  nature  of  that  freedom  of  the  will 
which  the  immortal  Edwards  has  exerted  all  his  powers  to 
recommend  to  the  Christian  world !  "  Egregious  liberty !'' 
exclaimed  Calvin.  "  It  merely  allows  us  elbow-room,"  says 
Leibnitz.  "  It  seems,  after  all,  to  leave  us  mere  machines," 
says  Dick.  "  It  is  trifling  to  speak  of  such  a  thing,"  says  the 
younger  Edwards,  in  relation  to  the  will.  "  Why,  surely,  this 
cannot  be  what  the  great  President  Edwards  meant  by  the 
freedom  of  the  will,"  says  Dr.  Day.  He  certainly  must  have 
evaded  his  own  idea  on  that  point.  Is  it  not  evident,  that  the 
house  of  the  necessitarian  is  divided  against  itself  ? 

Necessitarians  not  only  refute  each  other,  but  in  most  cases 
each  one  contradicts  himself.  Thus  the  younger  Edwards  says, 
it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  a  po\ver  to  act  according  to  our  choice, 
when  the  question  relates,  not  to  the  freedom  of  the  body,  but 
to  the  freedom  of  the  mind  itself.  He  happens  to  see  the 
absurdity  of  this  mode  of  speaking  when  he  finds  it  in  his  adver- 
sary, Dr.  West ;  and  yet  it  is  precisely  his  own  definition  of 
freedom.  "  But  if  by  liberty,"  says  he,  "  be  meant  a  power 
of  willing  and  choosing,  an  exemption  from  co-action  and 
natural  necessity,  and  power,  opportunity,  and  advantage,  to 
execute  our  own  choice  /  in  this  sense  we  hold  liberty."f  Tims 
he  returns  to  the  absurd  idea  of  free-will  as  consisting  in  "  elbow- 
room,"  which  merely  allows  our  choice  or  volition  to  pass  into 
effect.  Dr.  Dick  is  guilty  of  the  same  inconsistency.  Though 

0  Lectures  on  Theology,  by  the  late  Rev.  John  Dick,  D.  D. 
f  Dissertation,  p.  41. 


Chapter  L]  WITH  THE   HOLINESS   OF  GOD.  69 

lie  admits,  as  we  have  seen,  that  this  definition  of  liberty  does 
not  get  rid  of  every  difficulty,  but  seems  to  leave  us  mere 
"machines;"  yet  he  has  recourse  to  it,  in  order  to  reconcile 
the  Calvinistic  view  of  divine  grace  with  the  free-agency  of 
man.  "The  great  objection,"  says  he,  "against  the  invinci- 
bility of  divine  grace,  is,  that  it  is  subversive  of  the  liberty  of 
the  will."*  But,  he  replies,  "  True  liberty  consists  in  doing 
what  we  do  with  knowledge  and  from  choice" 

Yet  as  if  unconscious  that  their  greatest  champions  were 
thus  routed  and  overthrown  by  each  other,  we  see  hundreds  of 
minor  necessitarians  still  fighting  on  with  the  same  weapr  as, 
perfectly  unmindful  of  the  disorder  and  confusion  which  reigns 
around  them  in  their  own  ranks.  Thus,  for  example,  D'Au- 
bign£  says,  "  It  were  easy  to  demonstrate  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  reformers  did  not  take  away  from  man  the  liberty  of  a 
moral  agent,  and  reduce  him  to  a  passive  machine."  Now, 
how  does  the  historian  so  easily  demonstrate  that  the  doctrine 
of  necessity,  as  held  by  the  reformers,  does  not  deny  the  liberty 
of  a  moral  agent  ?  Why,  by  simply  producing  the  old  effete 
notion  of  the  liberty  of  the  will,  as  consisting  in  freedom  from 
co-action ;  as  if  it  had  never  been,  and  never  could  be,  called 
in  question.  "Every  action  performed  without  external  re- 
straint," says  he,  "  and  in  pursuance  of  the  determination  of 
the  soul  itself,  is  a  free  action."f  This  demonstration,  it  is 
needless  to  repeat,  would  save  any  scheme  of  fatalism  from 
reproach,  as  well  as  the  doctrine  of  the  reformers. 

The  scheme  of  the  Calvinists  is  defended  in  the  same  man- 
ner in  Hill's  Divinity  :  "  The  liberty  of  a  moral  agent,"  says 
he,  "  consists  in  the  power  of  acting  according  to  his  choice ; 
and  those  actions  are  free,  which  are  performed  without  any 
external  compulsion  or  restraint,  in  consequence  of  the  deter- 
mination of  his  own  mind."  "  According  to  the  Calvinists," 
says  Mr.  Shaw,  in  his  Exposition  of  the  Confession  of  Faith, 
"  the  liberty  of  a  moral  agent  consists  in  the  power  of  acting 
according  to  his  choice ;  and  those  actions  are  free  which  are 
performed  without  any  external  compulsion  or  restraint,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  determination  of  his  own  inind."^  Such,  if  we 
may  believe  these  learned  Calvinists,  is  the  idea  of  the  freedom 

0  Dick's  Lectures,  vol.  ii,  p.  157.  f  History  of  the  Reformation,  b.  v. 

\  Hill's  Divinity,  ch.  ix,  sec.  iii. 


70  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

of  the  will  which  belongs  to  their  system.  If  this  be  so,  then 
it  must  be  conceded  that  the  Calvinistic  definition  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  will  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  most  absolute 
scheme  of  fatality  which  ever  entered  into  the  heart  )f  man  to 
conceive. 

The  views  of  M'Cosh  respecting  the  freedom  of  the  will,  seem, 
at  first  sight,  widely  different  from  those  of  other  Calvinists  and 
necessitarians.  The  freedom  and  independence  of  the  will  is 
certainly  pushed  as  far  by  him  as  it  is  carried  by  Cousin,  Cole- 
ridge, Clarke,  or  any  of  its  advocates  in  modem  times.  "  True 
necessitarians,"  says  he,  "  should  learn  in  what  way  to  hold  and 
defend  their  doctrine.  Let  them  disencumber  themselves  of  all 
that  doubtful  argument,  derived  from  man  being  supposed  to 
be  swayed  by  the  most  powerful  motive."*  Again:  "The 
truth  is,"  says  he,  "it  is  not  motive,  properly  speaking,  that 
determines  the  working  of  the  will ;  but  it  is  the  will  that 
imparts  the  strength  to  the  motive.  As  Coleridge  says, '  It  is 
the  man  that  makes  the  motive,  and  not  the  motive  the  man.'  "f 
According  to  this  Calvinistic  divine,  the  will  is  not  determined 
by  the  strongest  motive;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  self-active  and 
self-determined.  "  Mind  is  a  self-acting  substance,"  says  he  ; 
"  and  hence  its  activity  and  independence."  In  open  defiance 
of  all  Calvinistic  and  necessitarian  philosophy,  he  even  adopts 
the  self-determining  powTer  of  the  will.  "  Nor  have  neces- 
sitarians," says  he,  "  even  of  the  highest  order,  been  sufficiently 
careful  to  guard  the  language  employed  by  them.  Afraid  of 
making  admissions  to  their  opponents,  we  believe  that  none  of 
them  have  fully  developed  the  phenomena  of  human  sponta- 
neity. Even  Edwards  ridicules  the  idea  of  the  faculty  or  power 
of  will,  or  the  soul  in  the  use  of  that  power  determining  its  own 
volitions.  Now,  we  hold  it  to  be  an  incontrovertible  fact,  and 
one  of  great  importance,  that  the  true  determining  cause  of 
every  given  volition  is  not  any  mere  anterior  incitement,  but 
the  very  soul  itself,  by  its  inherent  power  of  will.";};  Surely, 
the  author  of  such  a  passage  cannot  be  accused  of  being  afraid 
to  make  concessions  to  his  opponents.  But  this  is  not  ail.  If 
possible,  he  rises  still  higher  in  his  views  of  the  lofty,  not  to 
Bay  god-like,  independence  of  the  human  will.  "  We  rejoice," 

0  The  Divine  Government,  Physical  and  Moral,  b.  iii,  ch.  i,  sec.  iii. 
f  Id.,  b.  iii,  ch.  i,  sec.  ii.  J  Ibid. 


Chapter  LI  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  71 

says  lie,  "  to  recognise  such  a  being  in  man.  We  trust  that  we 
are  cherishing  no  presumptuous  feeling,  when  we  believe  him 
to  be  free,  as  his  Maker  is  free.  We  believe  him,  morally 
speaking,  to  be  as  independent  of  external  control  as  his  Ore 
ator  must  ever  be — as  that  Creator  was  when,  in  a  past  eternity, 
there  was  no  external  existence  to  control  him."* 

Yet,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  Mr.  M'Cosh  trembles  at  the  idea 
of  "  removing  the  creature  from  under  the  control  of  God ;" 
and  hence,  he  insists  as  strenuously  as  any  other  necessitarian, 
that  the  mind,  and  all  its  volitions,  are  subjected  to  the  domin- 
ion of  causes.  "  We  are  led  by  an  intuition  of  our  nature," 
says  he,  "  to  a  belief  in  the  invariable  connexion  between  cause 
and  effect ;  and  we  see  numerous  proofs  of  this  law  of  cause 
and  effect  reigning  in  the  human  mind  as  it  does  in  the  exter- 
nal world,  and  reigning  in  the  will  as  it  does  in  every  other 
department  of  the  mind."f  Again  :  "  It  is  by  an  intuition  of 
our  nature  that  we  believe  this  thought  or  feeling  could  not 
have  been  produced  without  a  cause  ;  and  that  this  same  cause 
will  again  and  forever  produce  the  same  effects.  And  this 
intuitive  principle  leads  us  to  expect  the  reign  of  causation,  not 
only  among  the  thoughts  and  feelings  generally,  but  among  the 
wishes  and  volitions  of  the  soul.":): 

Kow  here  is  the  question,  How  can  the  soul  be  self-active, 
self-determined,  and  yet  all  its  thoughts,  and  feelings,  and  voli- 
tions, have  producing  causes  ?  How  can  it  be  free  and  inde- 
pendent in  its  acts,  and  yet  under  the  dominion  of  efficient 
causes  ?  How  can  the  law  of  causation  reign  in  all  the  states 
of  the  mind,  as  it  reigns  over  all  the  movements  of  matter,  and 
yet  leave  it  as  free  as  was  the  Creator  when  nothing  beside  him- 
self existed  ?  In  other  words,  How  is  such  a  scheme  of  necessity 
to  be  reconciled  with  such  a  scheme  of  liberty?  The  author 
replies,  We  are  not  bound  to  answer  such  a  question  § — nor  are  we. 
As  we  understand  it,  the  very  idea  of  liberty,  as  above  set  forth 
by  the  author,  is  a  direct  negative  of  his  doctrine  of  necessity. 

But  although  he  has  taken  so  much  pains  to  dissent  from  his 
necessitarian  brethren,  and  to  advocate  the  Arrninian  notion 
of  free-will,  Mr.  M'Cosh,  nevertheless,  falls  back  upon  the  old 
Calvinistic  definition  of  liberty,  as  consisting  in  a  freedom  from 

0  The  Divine  Government,  Physical  and  Moral,  b.  iii,  ch.  i,  sec.  ii. 
f  Ibid.  |  Ibid.  §  Ibid. 


72  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

external  co-action,  in  order  to  find  a  basis  for  human  respon- 
sibility. It  may  seem  strange,  that  after  all  his  labour  in  laying 
the  foundation,  he  should  not  build  upon  it ;  but  it  is  strictly 
true.  "  If  any  man  asserts,"  says  he,  "  that  in  order  to  respon- 
sibility, the  will  must  be  free — that  is,  free  from  physical 
restraint ;  free  to  act  as  he  pleases — we  at  once  and  heartily 
agree  with  him  ;  and  we  maintain  that  in  this  sense  the  will  is 
free,  as  free  as  it  is  possible  for  any  man  to  conceive  it  to  be." 
And  again  :  "If  actions  do  not  proceed  from  the  will,  but  from 
something  else,  from  mere  physical  or  external  restraint,  then 
the  agent  is  not  responsible  for  them.  But  if  the  deeds  proceed 
from  the  will,  then  it  at  once  attaches  a  responsibility  to  them. 
Place  before  the  mind  a  murder  committed  by  a  party  through 
pure  physical  compulsion  brought  to  bear  on  the  arm  that 
inflicts  the  blow,  and  the  conscience  says,  here  no  guilt  is 
attachable.  But  let  the  same  murder  be  done  with  the  thorough 
consent  of  the  will,  the  conscience  stops  not  to  inquire  whether 
this  consent  lias  been  caused  or  no"*  Thus,  after  all  his  dissent 
from  Edwards,  he  returns  precisely  to  Edwards's  definition  of 
the  freedom  of  the  will  as  the  ground  of  human  responsibility  ; 
after  all  his  strictures  upon  "  necessitarians  of  the  first  order," 
he  falls  back  upon  precisely  that  notion  of  free-will  which  was 
so  long  ago  condemned  by  Calvin,  and  exploded  by  Leibnitz, 
and  which  relates,  as  we  have  so  often  seen,  not  to  acts  of  the 
will  at  all,  but  only  to  the  external  movements  of  the  body. 

SECTION  VII. 

The  sentiments  of  Hume,  Brown,  Comte,  and  Mill,  in  relation  to  tlie  antag- 
onism between  liberty  and  necessity. 

Mr.  Hume  has  disposed  of  the  question  concerning  liberty 
and  necessity,  by  the  application  of  his  celebrated  theory  of 
cause  and  effect.  According  to  this  theory,  the  idea  of  power, 
of  efficacy,  is  a  mere  chimera,  which  has  no  corresponding 
reality  in  nature,  and  should  be  ranked  among  the  exploded 
prejudices  of  the  human  mind.  "  One  event  follows  another," 
says  he ;  "  but  we  never  can  observe  any  tie  between  them. 
They  seem  conjoined,  but  never  connected. ."f 

0  The  Divine  Government,  Physical  and  Moral,  b.  iii,  ch.  i,  sec.  ii. 
t  Hume's  Works,  Liberty  and  Necessity. 


Chapter!]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  73 

We  shall  not  stop  to  examine  this  hypothesis,  which  has 
been  so  often  refuted.  We  shall  merely  remark  in  passing, 
that  it  owes  its  existence  to  a  false  method  of  philosophizing. 
Its  author  set  out  with  the  doctrine  of  Locke,  that  all  our  ideas 
are  derived  from  sensation  and  reflection  ;  and  because  he  could 
not  trace  the  idea  of  power  to  either  of  these  sources,  he  denied 
its  existence.  Hence  we  may  apply  to  him,  with  peculiar  force, 
the  judicious  and  valuable  criticism  which  M.  Cousin  has 
bestowed  upon  the  method  of  Locke.  Though  Mr.  Hume 
undertakes,  as  his  title-page  declares,  to  introduce  the  inductive 
method  into  the  science  of  human  nature,  he  departed  from 
that  method  at  the  very  first  step.  Instead  of  beginning,  as  he 
should  have  done,  by  ascertaining  the  ideas  actually  in  our 
minds,  and  noting  their  characteristics,  and  proceeding  to  trace 
them  up  to  their  sources,  he  pursued  the  diametrically  opposite 
course.  He  first  determined  and  fixed  the  origin  of  all  our 
ideas ;  and  every  idea  which  was  not  seen  to  arise  from  this 
preestablished  origin,  he  declared  to  be  a  mere  chimera.  He 
thus  caused  nature  to  bend  to  hypotheses ;  instead  of  anat- 
omizing and  studying  the  world  of  mind  according  to  the 
inductive  method,  he  pursued  the  high  a  priori  road,  and  recon- 
structed it  to  suit  his  preestablished  origin  of  human  knowledge. 
This  was  not  to  study  and  interpret  the  work  of  God  "  in  the 
profound  humiliation  of  the  human  soul  ;"*  but  to  re-write  the 
volume  of  nature,  and  omit  those  parts  which  did  not  accord 
with  the  views  and  wishes  of  the  philosopher.  In  the  pithy 
language  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  he  "  did  not  anatomize,  but 
truncate." 

If  this  doctrine  be  true,  it  is  idle  to  talk  about  free-agency, 
for  there  is  no  such  thing  as  agency  in  the  world.  It  is  true, 
there  is  a  thing  which  we  call  volition,  or  an  act  of  the  mind ; 
but  this  does  not  produce  the  external  change  by  which  it  is 
followed.  The  two  events  co-exist,  but  there  is  no  connecting 
tie  between  them.  "  They  are  conjoined,  but  not  connected/' 
In  short,  according  to  this  scheme,  all  things  are  equally  free, 
and  all  equally  necessary.  In  other  words,  there  is  neither 
freedom  nor  necessity  in  the  usual  acceptation  of  the  terms, 
and  the  whole  controversy  concerning  them,  which  has  agitated 
the  learned  for  so  many  ages,  dwindles  down  into  a  mere  empty 

0  Bacon. 


74  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  parti, 

and  noisy  logomachy.  Indeed,  this  is  the  conclusion  to  which 
Mr.  Hume  himself  comes ;  expressly  maintaining  that  the  con- 
troversy in  question  has  been  a  dispute  about  words.  We  are 
not  to  suppose  from  this,  however,  that  he  forbears  i  >  give  a 
definition  of  liberty.  His  idea  of  free-agency  is  precisely  that 
of  Hobbes,  and  so  many  others  before  him.  "  By  liberty,"  says 
he,  "  we  can  only  mean  a  power  of  acting  or  not  acting  accord- 
ing to  the  determination  of  the  will :  that  is,  if  we  choose  to 
remain  at  rest,  we  may ;  if  we  choose  to  move,  we  also  may."* 
Such  he  declares  is  all  that  can  possibly  be  meant  by  the  term 
liberty  •  and  hence  it  follows  that  any  other  idea  of  it  is  a  mere 
dream.  The  coolness  of  this  assumption  is  admirable  ;  but  it  is 
fully  equalled  by  the  conclusion  which  follows.  If  we  will  ob- 
serve these  two  circumstances,  says  he,  and  thereby  render  our 
definition  intelligible,  Mr.  Hume  is  perfectly  persuaded  "  that 
all  mankind  will  be  found  of  one  opinion  with  regard  to  it." 
If  Mr.  Hume  had  closely  looked  into  the  great  productions  of 
his  own  school,  he  would  have  seen  the  utter  improbability,  that 
necessitarians  themselves  would  ever  concur  in  such  a  notion  of 
liberty.f 

If  Mr.  Hume's  scheme  were  correct,  it  would  seem  that 
nothing  could  be  stable  or  fixed ;  mind  would  be  destitute  of 
energy  to  move  within  its  own  sphere,  or  to  bind  matter  in  its 
orbit.  All  things  would  seem  to  be  in  a  loose,  disconnected, 
and  fluctuating  state.  But  this  is  not  the  view  which  he  had  of 
the  matter.  Though  he  denied  that  there  is  any  connecting  link 

0  Of  Liberty  and  Necessity. 

f  Although  Mr.  Hume  gives  precisely  the  same  definition  of  liberty  as  that  ad- 
vanced by  Hobbes,  Locke,  and  Edwards,  he  had  the  sagacity  to  perceive  that  this 
related  not  to  the  freedom  of  the  will,  but  only  of  the  body.  Hence  he  says,  "  In 
short,  if  motives  are  not  under  our  power  or  direction,  which  is  confessedly  the 
fact,  we  can  at  bottom  have  NO  LIBERTY."  We  are  not  at  all  surprised,  therefore, 
at  the  reception  which  Hume  gave  to  the  great  work  of  President  Edwards,  as 
set  forth  in  the  following  statement  of  Dr.  Chalmers,  concerning  the  appendix  to 
the  "  Inquiry."  "  The  history  of  this  appendix,"  says  he,  "  is  curious.  It  has 
only  been  subjoined  to  the  later  editions  of  his  work,  and  did  not  accompany  the 
first  impression  of  it.  Several  copies  of  this  impression  found  their  way  into  this 
country,  and  created  a  prodigious  sensation  among  the  members  of  a  school  then 
in  all  its  glory.  I  mean  the  metaphysical  school  of  our  northern  metropolis, 
whereof  Hume,  and  Smith,  and  Lord  Kames,  and  several  others  among  the  more 
conspicuous  infidels  and  semi-infidels  of  that  day,  were  the  most  distinguished 
members.  They  triumphed  in  the  book  of  Edwards,  as  that  which  set  a  conclu- 
sive seal  on  their  principles,"  &c. — Institutes  of  Theology,  vol.  ii,  ch.  ii. 


Chapter!]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  75 

among  events,  yet  lie  insisted  that  the  connexion  subsisting 
among  them  is  fixed  and  unalterable.  "  Let  any  one  define  a 
cause,"  says  he,  "  without  comprehending,  as  part  of  the  defini- 
tion, a  necessary  connexion  with  its  effect;  and  let  him  show 
distinctly  the  origin  of  the  idea  expressed  by  the  definition,  and 
I  shall  readily  give  up  the  whole  controversy."*  This  is  the 
philosopher  who  has  so  often  told  us,  that  events  are  "  conjoined, 
not  connected." 

The  motives  of  volition  given,  for  example,  and  the  volition 
invariably  and  inevitably  follows.  How  then,  may  we  ask,  can 
a  man  be  accountable  for  his  volitions,  over  wThich  he  has  no 
power,  and  in  which  he  exerts  no  power?  This  question  has 
not  escaped  the  attention  of  Mr.  Hume.  Let  us  see  his  answer. 
He  admits  that  liberty  "  is  essential  to  morality. "f  For  "  as 
actions  are  objects  of  our  moral  sentiment  so  far  only  as  they 
are  indications  of  the  internal  character,  passions,  and  affections, 
it  is  impossible  that  they  can  give  rise  either  to  praise  or  blame, 
when  they  proceed,  not  from  these  principles,  but  are  derived 
altogether  from  external  violence."  It  is  true,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  if  our  external  actions,  the  motions  of  the  body,  proceed 
not  from  our  volitions,  but  from  external  violence,  wre  are  not 
responsible  for  them.  This  is  conceded  on  all  sides,  and  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  question.  But  suppose  our  external  ac- 
tions are  inevitably  connected  with  our  volitions,  and  our  voli- 
tions as  inevitably  connected  with  their  causes,  how  can  we  be 
responsible  for  either  the  one  or  the  other?  This  is  the  ques- 
tion which  Mr.  Hume  has  evaded  and  not  fairly  met. 

Mr.  Hume's  notion  about  cause  and  effect  has  been  greatly 
extended  by  its  distinguished  advocate,  Dr.  Thomas  Brown; 
whose  acuteness,  eloquence,  and  elevation  of  character,  have 
given  it  a  circulation  which  it  could  never  have  received  from 
the  influence  of  its  author.  Almost  as  often  as  divines  have 
occasion  to  use  this  notion,  they  call  it  the  doctrine  of  Dr.  Brown, 
and  omit  to  notice  its  true  atheistical  paternity  and  origin. 

The  defenders  of  this  doctrine  are  directly  opposed,  in  regard 
to  a  fundamental  point,  to  all  other  necessitarians.  Though 
they  deny  the  existence  of  all  power  and  efficacy,  they  still  hold 
that  human  volitions  are  necessary ;  while  other  necessitarians 
ground  their  doctrine  on  the  fact,  that  volitions  are  produced  by 

0  Of  Liberty  and  Necessity.  f  Ibid. 


V6  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

the  most  powerful,  the  most  efficacious  motives.  They  are  not 
only  at  war  with  other  necessitarians,  they  are  also  at  war  with 
themselves.  Let  us  see  if  this  may  not  be  clearly  shown. 

According  to  the  scheme  in  question,  the  mind  does  not  act 
upon  the  body,  nor  the  body  upon  the  mind;  for  there  is  no 
power,  and  consequently  no  action  of  power,  in  the  universe. 
Now,  it  is  known  that  it  was  the  doctrine  of  Leibnitz,  that  two 
substances  so  wholly  unlike  as  mind  and  matter  could  not  act 
upon  each  other ;  and  hence  he  concluded  that  the  phenomena 
of  the  internal  and  external  worlds  were  merely  "  conjoined,  not 
connected"  The  soul  and  body  run  together — to  use  his  own 
illustration — like  two  independent  watches,  without  either  ex- 
erting any  influence  upon  the  movements  of  the  other.  Thus 
arose  his  celebrated,  but  now  obsolete  fiction,  of  a  preestablished 
harmony.  Now,  if  the  doctrine  of  Hume  and  Brown  be  true, 
this  sort  of  harmony  subsists,  not  only  in  relation  to  mind  and 
body,  but  in  relation  to  all  things  in  existence.  Mind  never 
acts  upon  body,  nor  mind  upon  mind.  Hence,  this  doctrine 
is  but  a  generalization  of  the  preestablished  harmony  of  Leib- 
nitz, with  the  exception  that  Mr.  Hume  did  not  contend  that 
this  wonderful  harmony  was  established  by  the  Divine  Being. 
Is  it  not  wonderful  that  so  acute  a  metaphysician  as  Dr.  Brown 
should  not  have  perceived  the  inseparable  affinity  between  his 
doctrine  and  that  of  Leibnitz  ?  Is  it  not  wonderful  that,  instead 
of  perceiving  this  affinity,  he  should  have  poured  ridicule  and 
contempt  upon  the  doctrine  of  which  his  own  was  but  a  gener- 
alization ?  Mr.  Mill,  another  able  and  strenuous  advocate  of 
Mr.  Hume's  theory  of  causation,  has  likewise  ranked  the  pre- 
established  harmony  of  Leibnitz,  as  well  as  the  system  of  occa- 
sional causes  peculiar  to  Malebranche,  among  the  fallacies  of 
the  human  mind.  Thus  they  are  at  war  with  themselves,  as 
well  as  writh  their  great  coadjutors  in  the  cause  of  necessity. 

M.  Oomte,  preeminently  distinguished  in  every  branch  of 
science",  has  taken  the  same  one-sided  view  of  nature  as  that 
which  is  exhibited  in  the  theory  under  consideration ;  but  he 
does  not  permit  himself  to  be  encumbered  by  the  inconsistencies 
observable  in  his  great  predecessors.  On  the  contrary,  he 
boldly  carries  out  his  doctrine  to  its  legitimate  consequences, 
denying  the  existence  of  a  God,  the  free-agency  of  man,  and 
the  reality  of  moral  distinctions. 


*W^j 
Stor 

Chapter  L]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  77 

Mr.  Mill  also  refuses  to  avail  himself  of  the  notion  of  liberty 
entertained  by  Hobbes  and  Hume,  in  order  to  lay  a  foundation 
for  human  responsibility.  He  sees  that  it  really  cannot  be 
made  to  answer  such  a  purpose.  He  also  sees,  that  the  doc- 
trine of  necessity,  as  usually  maintained,  is  liable  to  the  objec- 
tions urged  against  it,  that  "it  tends  to  degrade  the  moral 
nature  of  man,  and  to  paralyze  our  desire  of  excellence."*  In 
making  this  concession  to  the  advocates  of  liberty,  he  speaks 
from  his  own  "  personal  experience."  The  only  way  to  escape 
these  pernicious  consequences,  he  says,  is  to  keep  constantly 
before  the  mind  a  clear  and  unclouded  view  of  the  true  theory 
of  causation,  which  will  prevent  us  from  supposing,  as  most 
necessitarians  do,  that  there  is  a  real  connecting  link  or  influ- 
ence between  motives  and  volitions,  or  any  other  events.  So 
strong  is  the  prejudice  (as  he  calls  it)  in  favour  of  such  connec- 
tion, that  even  those  who  adopt  Mr.  Hume's  theory,  are  not 
habitually  influenced  by  it,  but  frequently  relapse  into  the  old 
error  which  conflicts  with  the  free-agency  and  accountability 
of  man,  and  hence  an  advantage  which  their  opponents  have 
had  over  them. 

These  remarks  are  undoubtedly  just.  There  is  not  a  single 
writer,  from  Mr.  Hume  himself,  down  to  the  present  day,  who 
has  been  able  either  to  speak  or  to  reason  in  conformity  with 
his  theory,  however  warmly  he  may  have  embraced  it.  Mr. 
Mill  himself  has  not  been  more  fortunate  in  this  respect  than 
many  of  his  distinguished  predecessors.  It  is  an  exceedingly 
difficult  thing,  by  the  force  of  speculation,  to  silence  the  voice 
of  nature  within  us.  If  it  were  necessary  we  might  easily 
show,  that  if  we  abstract  "the  common  prejudice,"  in  regard 
to  causation,  it  will  be  as  impossible  to  read  Mr.  Mill's  work  on 
logic,  as  to  read  Mr.  Hume's  writings  themselves,  without  per- 
ceiving that  many  of  its  passages  have  been  stripped  of  all 
logical  coherency  of  thought.  The  defect  which  he  so  clearly 
sees  in  the  writings  of  other  advocates  of  necessity,  not  except- 
ing those  who  embrace  his  own  paradox  in  relation  to  cause 
and  effect,  we  can  easily  perceive  in  his  own. 

The  doctrine  of  causation,  under  consideration,  annihilates  one 
of  the  clearest  and  most  fundamental  distinctions  ever  made  in 
philosophy ;  the  distinction  between  action  and  passion,  between 

0  Mill's  Logic,  pp.  522,  523. 


f  8  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  i, 

mind  and  matter.  Matter  is  passive,  mind  is  active.  The  very 
first  law  of  motion  laid  down  in  the  Principia,  a  work  so  much 
admired  by  M.  Comte  and  Mr.  Mill,  is  based  on  the  idea  that 
matter  is  wholly  inert,  and  destitute  of  power  either  to  move 
itself,  or  to  check  itself  when  moved  by  anything  ah  extra. 
This  will  not  be  denied.  But  is  mind  equally  passive  ?  Is 
there  nothing  in  existence  which  rises  above  this  passivity  of 
the  material  world?  If  there  is  not,  and  such  is  the  evident 
conclusion  of  the  doctrine  in  question,  then  all  things  flow  on 
in  one  boundless  ocean  of  passivity,  while  there  is  no  First 
Mover,  no  Self-active  Agent  in  the  universe.  Indeed,  Mr. 
Mill  has  expressly  declared,  that  the  distinction  between  agent 
and  patient  is  illusory.*  If  this  be  true,  we  are  persuaded  that 
M.  Comte  has  been  more  successful  in  delivering  the  world 
from  the  being  of  a  God,  than  Mr.  Mill  has  been  in  relieving 
it  from  the  difficulties  attending  the  scheme  of  necessity. 


SECTION  VIII. 

The  views  of  Kant  and  Sir  William  Hamilton  in  relation  to  the  antagonism 
between  liberty  and  necessity. 

"To  clear  up  this  seeming  antagonism  between  the  mecha- 
nism of  nature  and  freedom  in  one  and  the  self-same  given 
action,  we  must  refer,"  says  Kant,  "to  what  was  advanced  in 
the  critique  of  pure  reason,  or  what,  at  least,  is  a  corollary  from 
it,  viz.,  that  the  necessity  of  nature  which  may  not  consort  with 
the  freedom  of  the  subject,  attaches  simply  to  a  thing  standing 
under  the  relations  of  time,  i.  e.,  to  the  modifications  of  the 
acting  subject  as  phenomena,  and  that,  therefore,  so  far  (i.  e.,  as 
phenomena)  the  determinators  of  each  act  lie  in  the  foregoing 
elapsed  time,  and  are  quite  beyond  his  power,  (part  of  which 
are  the  actions  man  has  already  performed,  and  the  phenomenal 
character  he  has  given  himself  in  his  own  eyes,)  yet,  e  contra, 
the  self-same  subject,  being  self-conscious  of  itself  as  a  thing  in 
itself,  considers  its  existence  as  somewhat  detached  from  the 
conditions  of  time,  and  itself,  so  far  forth,  as  only  determinable 
by  laws  given  it  by  its  own  reason."f 

Kant  has  said,  that  this  "  intricate  problem,  at  whose  solution 
centuries  have  laboured,"  is  not  to  be  solved  by  "a  jargon  of 

0  Mill's  Logic,  book  ii,  chap,  v,  sec.  4.  |  Metaphysics  of  Ethics. 


Chapter!.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  79 

words."  If  so,  may  we  not  doubt  whether  he  has  taken  the 
best  method  to  solve  it?  His  solution  shows  one  thing  at  least, 
viz.,  that  he  was  not  satisfied  with  any  of  the  solutions  of  his 
predecessors,  for  his  is  wholly  unlike  them.  Kant  saw  that  the 
question  of  liberty  and  necessity  related  to  the  will  itself,  and 
not  to  the  consequences  of  the  will's  volitions.  Hence  he  was 
compelled  to  reject  those  weak  evasions  of  the  difficulty  of 
reconciling  them,  and  to  grapple  directly  with  the  difficulty 
itself.  Let  us  see  if  this  was  not  too  much  for  him.  Let  us 
see  if  he  has  been  able  to  maintain  the  doctrine  of  necessity, 
holding  it  as  a  "demonstrated  truth,"  and  at  the  same  time 
give  the  idea  of  liberty  a  tenable  position  in  his  system. 

If  we  would  clear  up  the  seeming  antagonism  between  the 
mechanism  of  nature  and  freedom  in  regard  to  the  same  voli- 
tion, says  he,  we  must  remember,  that  the  volition  itself,  as 
standing  under  the  conditions  of  time,  is  to  be  considered  as 
subject  to  the  law  of  mechanism:  yet  the  mind  which  puts 
forth  the  volition,  being  conscious  that  it  is  a  thing  somewhat 
detached  from  the  conditions  of  time,  is  free  from  the  law  of 
mechanism,  and  determinable  by  the  laws  of  its  own  reason. 
That  is  to  say,  the  volitions  of  mind  falling  under  the  law  of 
cause  and  effect,  like  all  other  events  which  appear  in  time, 
are  necessary ;  while  the  mind  itself,  which  exists  not  exactly  in 
time,  is  free.  We  shall  state  only  two  objections  to  this  view. 
In  the  first  place,  it  seems  to  distinguish  the  mind  from  its  act, 
not  modally,  i.  e.,  as  a  thing  from  its  mode,  but  numerically, 
i.  e.,  as  one  thing  from  another  thing.  But  who  can  do  this? 
Who  regards  an  act  of  the  mind,  a  volition,  as  anything  but 
the  mind  itself  as  existing  in  a  state  of  willing?  In  the  second 
place,  it  requires  us  to  conceive,  that  the  act  of  the  mind  is 
necessitated,  while  tl;e  mind  itself  is  free  in  the  act  thus  necessi- 
tated. But  who  can  do  this  ?  On  the  contrary,  who  can  fail 
to  see  in  this  precisely  the  same  seeming  antagonism  which 
Kant  undertook  to  remove  ?  To  tell  us,  that  volition  is  necessi- 
tated because  it  exists  in  time,  but  the  mind  is  free  because  it 
does  not  exist  in  time,  is,  one  would  think,  a  very  odd  way  to 
dispel  the  darkness  which  hangs  over  the  grand  problem  of  life. 
It  is  to  solve  one  difficulty  merely  by  adding  other  difficulties 
to  it.  Hence,  the  world  will  never  be  much  wiser,  we  are 
inclined  to  suspect,  with  respect  to  the  seeming  antagonism 


80  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

between  liberty  and  necessity,  in  consequence  of  the  specula- 
tions of  the  philosopher  of  Konigsberg,  especially  since  his 
great  admirer,  Mr.  Coleridge,  forgot  to  fulfil  his  promise  to 
write  the  history  of  a  man  who  existed  in  "  neither  time  nor 
space,  but  a-one  side." 

Though  Kant  made  the  attempt  in  his  Metaphysics  of  Ethics 
to  overcome  the  speculative  difficulty  in  question,  it  is  evident 
that  he  is  not  satisfied  with  his  own  solution  of  it,  since  he  has 
repeatedly  declared,  that  the  practical  reason  furnishes  the  only 
ground  on  which  it  can  be  surmounted.  "  This  view  of  Kant," 
says  Knapp,  "  implying  that  freedom,  while  it  is  a  postulate  of 
our  practical  reason,  (i.  e.,  necessary  to  be  assumed  in  order  to 
moral  action,)  is  yet  inconsistent  with  our  theoretical  reason, 
(i.  e.,  incapable  of  demonstration,  and  contrary  to  the  conclu- 
sions to  which  the  reflecting  mind  arrives})  is  now  very  gener- 
ally rejected."* 

In  regard  to  this  point,  there  seems  to  be  a  perfect  coin- 
cidence between  the  philosophy  of  Kant  and  that  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton.  "In  thought,"  says  the  latter,  "we  never  escape 
determination  and  necessity."f  If  the  scheme  of  necessity 
never  fails  to  force  itself  upon  our  thought,  how  are  we  then 
to  get  rid  of  it,  so  as  to  lay  a  foundation  for  morality  and 
accountability?  This  question,  the  author  declares,  is  too  much 
for  the  speculative  reason  of  man ;  and  being  utterly  baffled  in 
that  direction,  we  can  only  appeal  to  the  fact  of  consciousness, 
in  order  to  establish  the  doctrine  of  liberty.  "  The  philosophy 
which  I  profess,"  says  he,  "  annihilates  the  theoretical  problem — • 
How  is  the  scheme  of  liberty,  or  the  scheme  of  necessity,  to  be 
rendered  comprehensible  ? — by  showing  that  both  schemes  are 
equally  inconceivable ;  but  it  establishes  liberty  practically  as 
a  fact,  by  showing  that  it  is  either  itself  an  immediate  datum, 
or  is  involved  in  an  immediate  datum  of  consciousness."^:  We 
shall  hereafter  see,  why  the  scheme  of  necessity  always  riveted 
the  chain  of  conviction  on  the  thought  of  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
and  compelled  him  to  have  recourse  to  an  appeal  to  conscious- 
ness in  order  to  escape  its  delusive  power. 

0  Knapp's  Theology,  p.  520.      f  Reid's  Works,  note,  p.  611.      \  Id.,  p.  599,  note. 


Chapter  LI  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD  81 

SECTION  IX. 
The  notion  of  Lord  Kames  and  Sir  James  Mackintosh  on  the  same  subject. 

Lord  Kames  boldly  cut  the  knot  which  philosophy  had  failed 
to  unravel  for  him.  Supposing  the  doctrine  of  necessity  to  be 
settled  on  a  clear  and  firm  basis,  he  resolved  our  feelings  of 
liberty  into  "a  deceitful  sense"  which  he  imagined  the  Al- 
mighty had  conferred  on  man  for  wise  and  good  purposes.  He 
concluded  that  if  men  could  see  the  truth,  in  regard  to  the 
scheme  of  necessity,  without  any  illusion  or  mistake,  they  would 
relax  their  exertions  in  all  directions,  and  passively  submit  to 
the  all-controlling  influences  by  which  they  are  surrounded. 
But  God,  he  supposed,  out  of  compassion  for  us,  concealed  the 
truth  from  our  eyes,  in  order  that  we  might  be  induced  to  take 
care  of  ourselves,  by  the  pleasant  dream  that  we  really  have 
the  power  to  do  so. 

We  shall  not  stop  to  pull  this  scheme  to  pieces.  We  shall 
only  remark,  that  it  is  a  pity  the  philosopher  undertook  to 
counteract  the  benevolent  design  of  the  Deity,  and  to  expose 
the  cheat  and  delusion  by  which  he  intended  to  govern  the 
world  for  its  benefit.  But  the  author  himself,  it  is  but  just  to 
add,  had  the  good  sense  and  candour  to  renounce  his  own  scheme ; 
and  hence  we  need  dwell  no  longer  upon  it.  It  remains  at  the 
present  day  only  as  a  striking  example  of  the  frightful  contor- 
tions of  the  human  mind,  in  its  herculean  efforts  to  escape  from 
the  dark  labyrinth  of  fate  into  the  clear  and  open  light  of 
nature. 

Sir  James  Mackintosh,  though  familiar  with  the  speculations 
of  preceding  philosophers,  was  satisfied  with  none  of  their  solu- 
tions of  the  great  problem  under  consideration,  and  conse- 
quently he  has  invented  one  of  his  own.  This  solution  is 
founded  on  his  theory  of  the  moral  sentiments,  which  is  peculiar 
to  himself.  This  theory  is  employed  to  show  how  it  is,  that 
although  we  may  come  by  our  volitions  according  to  the  scheme 
of  necessity,  yet  we  do  not  perceive  the  causes  by  which  they 
are  necessarily  produced,  and  consequently  imagine  that  we 
are  free.  Thus,  the  "feeling  of  liberty,"  as  he  calls  it,  is 
resolved  into  an  illusory  judgment,  and  the  scheme  of  necessity 
is  exhibited  in  all  its  adamantine  strength,  "  It  seems  impossi 

6 


82  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

ble,"  says  lie,  "  for  reason  to  consider  occurrences  otherwise  than 
as  bound  together  by  the  connexion  of  cause  and  effect ;  and 
in  this  circumstance  consists  the  strength  of  the  necessitarian 
system."* 

We  shall  offer  only  one  remark  on  this  extraordinary  hypoth- 
esis. If  the  theory  of  Sir  James  were  true,  it  could  only  show, 
that  although  our  volitions  are  necessarily  caused,  we  do  not 
perceive  the  causes  by  which  they  are  produced.  But  this  fact 
has  never  been  denied :  it  has  always  been  conceded,  that  we 
ascertain  the  existence  of  efficient  causes,  excepting  the  acts  of 
our  minds,  only  by  means  of  the  effects  they  produce.  Both 
Leibnitz  and  Edwards  long  ago  availed  themselves  of  this 
undisputed  fact,  in  order  to  account  for  the  belief  which  men 
entertain  in  regard  to  their  internal  freedom.  "Thus,"  says 
Edwards,  "  I  find  myself  possessed  of  my  volitions  before  I  can 
see  the  effectual  power  and  efficacy  of  any  cause  to  produce 
them,  for  the  power  and  efficacy  of  the  cause  are  not  seen  hut  by 
the  effect,  and  this,  for  aught  I  know,  may  make  some  imagine 
that  volition  has  no  cause"  We  shall  see  hereafter  that  this  is 
a  very  false  account  of  the  genesis  of  the  common  belief,  that 
we  possess  an  internal  freedom  from  necessity ;  but  it  is  founded 
on  the  truth  which  no  one  pretends  to  deny,  that  external  effi- 
cient causes  can  only  be  seen  by  their  effects,  and  not  by  any 
direct  perception  of  the  mind.  It  was  altogether  a  work  of 
supererogation,  then,  for  Sir  James  Mackintosh  to  bring  forth 
his  theory  of  moral  sentiments  to  establish  the  possibility  of  a 
thing  which  preceding  philosophers  had  admitted  to  be  a  fact. 
It  requires  no  elaborate  theory  to  convince  us  that  a  thing 
might  exist  without  our  perceiving  it,  when  it  is  conceded  on 
all  sides,  that  even  if  it  did  exist,  we  have  no  power  by  which 
to  perceive  it.  With  this  single  remark,  we  shall  dismiss  a 
scheme  which  resolves  our  conviction  of  internal  liberty  into  a 
mere  illusion,  and  which,  however  pure  may  have  been  the 
intentions  of  the  author,  really  saps  the  foundation  of  moral 
obligation,  and  destroys  the  nature  of  virtue. 

*  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy,  p.  275. 


JiiApterL]  WITH  THE   HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  83 


SECTION  X. 

T\e  conclusion  of  Mozhler,  Tholuck,  and  others,  that  all  speculation  on  sucfi 
a  subject  must  be  vain  and  fruitless. 

Considering  the  vast  wilderness  of  speculation  which  exists  on 
the  subject  under  consideration,  it  is  not  at  all  surprising  that 
many  should  turn  away  from  every  speculative  view  of  it  with 
disgust,  and  endeavour  to  dissuade  others  from  such  pursuits. 
Accordingly  Moehler  has  declared,  that  "  so  often  as,  without 
regard  to  revelation,  the  relation  of  the  human  spirit  to  God  hath 
been  more  deeply  investigated,  men  have  found  themselves  forced 

to  the  adoption  of  pantheism,  and,  with  it,  the  most 

arrogant  deification  of  man"*  And  Tholuck  spreads  out  the 
reasoning  from  effect  to  cause,  by  which  all  things  are  referred 
to  God,  and  God  himself  only  made  the  greatest  and  brightest 
link  in  the  chain ;  and  assuming  this  to  be  an  unanswerable  ar- 
gument, he  holds  it  up  as  a  dissuasive  from  all  such  speculations. 
He  believes  that  reason  necessarily  conducts  the  mind  to  fatalism. 

We  cannot  concur  with  these  celebrated  writers,  and  we 
would  deduce  a  far  different  conclusion  from  the  speculations 
of  necessitarians.  This  sort  of  scepticism  or  despair  is  more 
common  in  Germany  than  it  is  in  this  country ;  for  there,  spec- 
ulation pursuing  no  certain  or  determinate  method^  has  shown 
itself  in  all  its  wild  and  desolating  excesses.  But  it  is  sophistry, 
and  not  reason,  that  leads  the  human  mind  astray;  and  we 
believe  that  reason,  in  all  cases,  is  competent  to  detect  and 
expose  the  impositions  of  sophistry.  We  do  not  believe  that 
one  guide  which  the  Almighty  has  given  us,  can,  by  the  legiti- 
mate exercise  of  it,  lead  us  to  a  different  result  from  that  of 
another  guide.  We  are  persuaded  that  if  reason  seems  to  force 
us  into  any  system  which  is  contradicted  by  the  testimony  of 
our  moral  nature,  or  by  the  truths  of  revelation,  this  is  unsound 
speculation :  it  is  founded  either  on  false  premises,  or  else 
springs  from  false  conclusions,  which  reason  itself  may  correct, 
either  by  pointing  out  the  fallacy  of  the  premises,  or  the  logical 
incoherency  of  the  argument.  We  do  not  then  intend  t(. 
abandon  speculation,  but  to  plant  it,  if  we  can,  on  a  better 
foundation,  and  build  it  up  according  to  a  better  method. 

0  Moehler 's  Symbolism,  p.  117. 


84  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 


SECTION  XL 
The  true  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  review  of  opinions  and  arguments. 

All  the  mighty  logicians  we  have  yet  named  have  yielded  to 
"the  demonstration"  in  favour  of  necessity,  but  we  do  not 
know  that  one  of  them  has  ever  directed  the  energies  of  his 
mind  to  pry  into  its  validity.  They  have  all  pursued  the 
method  so  emphatically  condemned  by  Bacon,  and  the  result 
has  verified  his  prediction.  "  The  usual  method,"  says  he,  "  of 
discovery  and  proof  by  first  establishing  the  most  general  pro- 
positions, then  applying  and  proving  the  intermediate  axioms 
according  to  these,  is  the  parent  of  error  and  the  calamity  of 
every  science."*  They  have  set  out  with  the  universal  law  of 
causality  or  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  and  thence 
have  proceeded  to  ascertain  and  determine  the  actual  nature 
and  processes  of  things.  We  may  despair  of  ever  being  able  to 
determine  a  single  fact,  or  a  single  process  of  nature,  by  rea- 
soning from  truisms;  we  must  begin  in  the  opposite  direction 
and  learn  "  to  dissect  nature,"  if  we  would  behold  her  secrets 
and  comprehend  her  mysteries. 

By  pursuing  this  method  it  will  be  seen,  and  clearly  seen, 
that  "  the  great  demonstration "  which  has  led  so  many  philo- 
sophers in  chains,  is,  after  all,  a  sophism.  We  have  witnessed 
their  attempts  to  reconcile  the  great  fact  of  man's  free-agency 
with  this  boasted  demonstration  of  necessity.  But  how  inter- 
minable is  the  confusion  among  them  ?  If  a  few  of  them  concur 
in  one  solution,  this  is  condemned  by  others,  and  not  unfre- 
quently  by  the  very  authors  of  the  solution  itself.  We  entertain 
too  great  a  respect  for  their  abilities  not  to  believe,  that  if  there 
had  been  any  means  of  reconciling  these  things  together,  they 
would  long  since  have  discovered  them,  and  come  to  an  agree- 
ment among  themselves,  as  well  as  made  the  truth  known  to 
the  satisfaction  of  mankind.  But  as  it  is,  their  speculations  are 
destitute  of  harmony — are  filled  with  discordant  elements.  In- 
stead of  the  clear  and  steady  light  of  truth,  illuminating  the 
great  problem  of  existence,  we  are  bewildered  by  the  glare  of 
a  thousand  paradoxes ;  instead  of  the  sweet  voice  of  harmony, 
reaching  and  calling  forth  a  response  from  the  depths  of  the 

c  Novum  Organum,  book  i,  aph.  69. 


Chapter!.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  85 

human  soul,  the  ear  is  stunned  and  confounded  with  a  frightful 
roar  of  confused  sounds. 

"We  shall  not  attempt  to  hold  the  scheme  of  necessity,  and 
reconcile  it  with  the  fact  of  man's  free-agency.  We  shall  not 
undertake  a  task,  in  the  prosecution  of  which  a  Descartes,  a 
Leibnitz,  a  Locke,  and  an  Edwards,  not  to  mention  a  hundred 
others,  have  laboured  in  vain.  But  we  do  not  intend  to  aban- 
don speculation.  On  the  contrary,  we  intend  to  show,  so 
clearly  and  so  unequivocally  that  every  eye  may  see  it,  that 
the  great  boasted  demonstration  in  favour  of  necessity  is  a  pro- 
digious sophism.  We  intend  to  do  this;  because  until  the 
mental  vision  be  purged  of  the  film  of  this  dark  error,  it  can 
never  clearly  behold  the  intrinsic  majesty  and  glory  of  God's 
creation,  nor  the  divine  beauty  of  the  plan  according  to  which 
it  is  governed. 


80  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 


CHAPTEK  H. 

THE  SCHEME  OF  NECESSITY  MAKES  GOD  THE  AUTHOR  OP  SIN. 

I  told  ye  then  he  should  prevail,  and  speed 
On  his  bad  errand ;  man  should  be  seduced, 
And  flatter'd  out  of  all,  believing  lies 
Against  his  Maker ;  no  decree  of  mine 
Concurring  to  necessitate  his  fall, 
Or  touch'd  with  slightest  moment  of  impulse 
His  free-will,  to  her  own  inclining  left 
In  even  scale. — MILTON. 

THE  scheme  of  necessity,  as  we  have  already  said,  presents  two 
phases  in  relation  to  the  existence  of  moral  evil ;  one  relating 
to  the  agency  of  man,  and  the  other  to  the  agency  of  God.  In 
the  preceding  chapter,  we  examined  the  attempts  of  the  most 
learned  and  skilful  advocates  of  this  scheme  to  reconcile  it  with 
the  free-agency  and  accountability  of  man.  We  have  seen 
how  ineffectual  have  been  all  their  endeavours  to  show  that 
their  doctrine  does  not  destroy  the  responsibility  of  man  for 
his  sins. 

It  is  the  design  of  the  present  chapter  to  consider  the  doctrine 
of  necessity  under  its  other  aspect,  and  to  demonstrate  that  it 
makes  God  the  author  of  sin.  If  this  can  be  shown,  it  may 
justly  lead  us  to  suspect  that  the  scheme  contains  within  its 
bosom  some  dark  fallacy,  which  should  be  dragged  from  its 
hiding-place  into  the  open  light  of  day,  and  exposed  to  the 
abhorrence  and  detestation  of  mankind. 

In  discussing  this  branch  of  our  subject,  we  shall  pursue  the 
c  yurse  adopted  in  relation  to  the  first ;  for  if  the  doctrine  of 
necessity  does  not  make  God  the  author  of  sin,  we  may  con- 
clude that  this  has  been  shown  by  some  one  of  its  most  profound 
and  -enlightened  advocates.  If  the  attempts  of  a  Calvin,  and  an 
Edwards,  and  a  Leibnitz,  to  maintain  such  a  doctrine,  and  yet 
vindicate  the  purity  of  God  may  be  shown  to  be  signal  failures, 
we  may  well  doubt  whether  there  is  a  real  agreement  between 
these  tenets  as  maintained  by  them.  Nay,  if  in  order  to  vin- 
dicate their  system  from  so  great  a  reproach,  they  have  been 


Chapter  IL1  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  87 

compelled  to  adopt  positions  which  are  clearly  inconsistent  with 
the  divine  holiness,  and  thus  to  increase  rather  than  to  diminish 
the  reproach  ;  surely  their  system  itself  should  be  more  than 
suspected  of  error.  We  shall  proceed,  then,  with  this  view,  to 
examine  their  speculations  in  regard  to  the  agency  of  God  in 
itc*  connexion  with  the  origin  and  existence  of  moral  evil. 


SECTION  I. 

The  attempts  of  Calvin  and  other  reformers  to  show  that  the  system  of  neces- 
sity does  not  make  God  the  author  of  sin. 

Most  of  the  advocates  of  divine  providence  have  endeavoured 
to  soften  their  views,  so  as  to  bring  them  into  a  conformity 
with  the  common  sentiments  of  mankind,  by  supposing  that 
God  merely  permits,  without  producing  the  sinful  volitions  of 
men.  But  Calvin  rejects  this  distinction  with  the  most  positive 
disdain.  "  A  question  of  still  greater  difficulty  arises,"  says  he, 
"from  other  passages,  where  God  is  said  to  incline  or  draw 
Satan  himself  and  all  the  reprobate.  For  the  carnal  under- 
standing scarcely  comprehends  how  he,  acting  by  their  means, 
and  even  in  operations  common  to  himself  and  them,  is  free 
from  any  fault,  and  yet  righteously  condemns  those  whose 
ministry  he  uses.  Hence  was  invented  the  distinction  between 
doing  and  permitting ;  because  to  many  persons  this  has  ap- 
peared an  inexplicable  difficulty,  that  Satan  arid  all  the  impious 
are  subject  to  the  power  and  government  of  God,  so  that  he 
directs  their  malice  to  whatever  end  he  pleases,  and  uses  their 
crimes  for  the  execution  of  his  judgments.  The  modesty  of 
those  who  are  alarmed  by  absurdity,  might  perhaps  be  excusa- 
ble, if  they  did  not  attempt  to  vindicate  the  divine  justice  from 
all  accusation  by  a  pretence  utterly  destitute  of  any  foundation 
in  truth"*  Here  the  distinction  between  God's  permitting  and 
doing  in  relation  to  the  sins  of  men,  is  declared  by  Calvin  to 
be  utterly  without  foundation  in  truth,  and  purely  chimerical. 
So,  in  various  other  places,  he  treats  this  distinction  as  "  too 
veak  to  be  supported."  "  The  will  of  God,"  says  he,  "  is  the 
supreme  and  first  cause  of  things;"  and  he  quotes  Augustine 
\\  ith  approbation  to  the  effect,  that  "  He  does  not  remain  an 
idle  spectator,  determining  to  permit  anything;  there  is  an 

0  Institutes,  book  i,  chap,  xviii. 


88  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

intervention  of  an  actual  volition,  if  I  may  be  allowed  the 
expression,  which  otherwise  could  never  be  considered  a  cause."* 
According  to  Calvin,  then,  nothing  ever  happens  in  the  uni- 
verse, not  even  the  sinful  volitions  of  men,  which  is  not  caused 
by  God,  even  by  "  the  intervention  of  an  actual  volition  "  of  the 
supreme  will. 

It  is  evident  that  Calvin  scorns  to  have  any  recourse  to  a 
permissive  will  in  God,  in  order  to  soften  down  the  stupendous 
difficulties  under  wrhich  his  system  seems  to  labour.  On  the 
contrary,  he  sometimes  betrays  a  little  impatience  with  those 
who  had  endeavoured  to  mitigate  the  more  rugged  features  of 
what  he  conceived,  to  be  the  truth.  "  The  fathers,"  says  he, 
"are  sometimes  too  scrupulous  on  this  subject,  and  afraid  of 
a  simple  confession  of  the  truth."f  He  entertains  no  such 
fears.  He  is  even  bold  and  rigid  enough  in  his  consistency  to 
say,  "that  God  often  actuates  the  reprobate  by  the  interposi- 
tion of  Satan,  but  in  such  a  manner  that  Satan  himself  acts  his 
part  by  the  divine  impulse."^:  And  again,  he  declares  that  by 
means  of  Satan,  "God  excites  the  will  and  strengthens  the 
efforts"  of  the  reprobate.§  Indeed,  his  great  work,  whenever 
it  touches  upon  this  awful  subject,  renders  it  perfectly  clear 
that  Calvin  despises  all  weak  evasions  in  the  advocacy  of  his 
stern  doctrine. 

It  has  been  truly  said,  that  Calvin  never  thinks  of  "  deducing 
the  fall  of  man  from  the  abuse  of  human  freedom."  So  far  is 
he  from  this,  indeed,  that  he  seems  to  lose  his  patience  with 
those  who  trace  the  origin  of  moral  evil  to  such  a  source." 
"  They  say  it  is  nowhere  declared  in  express  terms,"  says  Calvin, 
"  that  God  decreed  Adam  should  perish  by  his  defection ;  as 
though  the  same  God,  whom  the  Scriptures  represent  as  doing 
whatever  he  pleases,  created  the  noblest  of  his  creatures  with- 
out any  determinate  end.  They  maintain,  that  he  was  possess- 
ed of  free  choice,  that  he  might  be  the  author  of  his  own  fate, 
but  tl-at  God  decreed  nothing  more  than  to  treat  him  according 
to  his  desert.  If  so  weak  a  scheme  as  this  be  received,  what 
will  become  of  God's  omnipotence,  by  which  he  governs  all 
things  according  to  his  secret  counsel,  independently  of  every 
person  or  thing  besides."!  The  fall  of  man,  says  Calvin,  was 

0  Institutes,  book  i,  chap.  xvi.  |  W.,  book  ii,  chap.  iv.  J  Id.,  book  i,  chap, 
xviii.  8  Id.,  book  iii,  chap,  xxiii.  ||  Id.,  book  iii,  chap,  xxiii,  sec.  4,  7. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  89 

decreed  from  all  eternity,  and  it  was  brought  to  pass  by  the 
omnipotence  of  God.  To  suppose  that  Adam  was  the  author 
of  his  own  fate  and  fall,  is  to  deny  the  omnipotence  of  God,  and 
to  rob  him  of  his  sovereignty. 

Now,  if  to  say  that  God  created  man,  and  then  left  his  sin 
to  proceed  wholly  from  himself,  be  to  rob  God  of  his  omnipo- 
tence, and  to  affirm  that  he  made  man  for  no  determinate  end, 
the  same  consequences  would  follow  from  the  position  that  God 
created  Satan,  and  then  left  his  sin  and  rebellion  to  proceed 
wholly  from  himself.  Bat,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  very 
thing  which  Calvin  so  vehemently  denies  in  regard  to  man, 
he  asserts  in  relation  to  Satan ;  and  he  even  feels  called  upon 
to  make  this  assertion  in  order  to  vindicate  the  divine  purity 
against  the  calumny  of  being  implicated  in  the  sin  of  Satan ! 
"  But  since  the  devil  was  created  by  God,"  says  he,  "  wTe  must 
remark,  that  this  wickedness  which  we  attribute  to  his  nature 
is  not  from  creation,  but  from  corruption.  For  whatever  evil 
quality  he  has,  he  has  acquired  by  his  defection  and  fall.  And 
of  this  Scripture  apprizes  us ;  but,  believing  him  to  have  come 
from  God,  just  as  he  now  is,  we  shall  ascribe  to  God  himself 
that  which  is  in  direct  opposition  to  him.  For  this  reason, 
Christ  declares,  that  Satan,  '  when  he  speaketh  a  lie,  speaketh 
of  his  own;'  and  adds  the  reason,  'because  he  abode  not  in 
the  truth.'  When  he  says  that  he  abode  not  in  the  truth,  he 
certainly  implied  that  he  had  once  been  in  it ;  and  when  he 
calls  him  the  father  of  a  lie,  Tie  precludes  his  imputing  to  God 
the  depravity  of  his  nature,  which  originated  wholly  from  him- 
self. Though  these  things  are  delivered  in  a  brief  and  rather 
obscure  manner,  yet  they  are  abundantly  sufficient  to  vindicate 
the  majesty  of  God  from  every  calumny."*  Thus,  in  order  to 
show  that  God  is  not  the  author  of  sin,  Calvin  assumes  the  very 
positions  in  regard  to  the  rebellion  of  Satan  which  his  opponents 
have  always  felt  constrained  to  adopt  in  regard  to  the  transgres- 
sion of  man.  What  then,  on  Calvin's  own  principles,  becomes 
of  the  omnipotence  of  God?  Does  this  extend  merely  to  man 
and  not  to  Satan?  Is  it  not  evident  that  Calvin's  scheme  in 
regard  to  the  sin  of  the  first  man,  is  here  most  emphatically 
condemned  out  of  his  own  mouth?  Does  lie  not  here  endorse 
the  very  consequence  which  his  adversaries  have  been  accus- 

0  Institutes,  book  i,  chap,  xiv,  sec.  16. 


90  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

tomed  to  deduce  from  his  scheme  of  predestination,  namely, 
that  it  makes  God  the  author  of  sin  ? 

Tliis  scheme  of  doctrine,  it  must  be  confessed,  is  not  without 
its  difficulties.  It  clothes  man,  as .  he  came  from  the  hand  of 
his  Maker,  with  the  glorious  attributes  of  freedom  ;  but  to  what 
end?  Is  this  attribute  employed  to  account  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  sin  into  the  world  ?  Is  it  employed  to  show  that  man, 
and  not  God,  is  the  author  of  moral  evil  ?  It  is  sad  to  reflect 
that  it  is  not.  The  fall  of  man  is  referred  to  the  direct  "  omnip- 
otence of  God."  The  feeble  creature  yields  to  the  decree  and 
power  of  the  Almighty,  who,  because  he  does  so,  kindles  into 
the  most  fearful  wrath  and  dooms  him  and  all  his  posterity  to 
temporal,  spiritual,  and  eternal  death.  Such  is  the  doctrine 
which  is  advanced,  in  order  to  secure  the  omnipotence  of  God, 
and  to  exalt  his  sovereignty.  But  is  it  not  a  great  leading 
feature  of  deism  itself,  that  it  exalts  the  power  of  God  at  the 
expense  of  his  infinite  moral  perfections  ?  So  we  have  under- 
stood the  matter;  and  hence,  it  seems  to  us,  that  Christian 
divines  should  be  more  guarded  in  handling  the  attribute  of 
omnipotence.  "  The  rigid  theologians,"  says  Leibnitz,  "  have 
held  the  greatness  of  God  in  higher  estimation  than  his  good- 
ness, the  latitudinarians  have  done  the  contrary ;  true  ortho- 
doxy has  these  two  perfections  equally  at  heart.  The  error 
which  abases  the  greatness  of  God  should  be  called  anthropo- 
morpMsm,  and  despotism  that  which  divests  him  of  his  good- 
ness."* 

If  Calvin's  doctrine  be  true,  God  is  not  the  author  of  sin, 
inasmuch  as  he  made  man  pure  and  upright ;  but  yet,  by  the 
same  power  which  created  him,  has  he  plunged  him  into  sin 
and  misery.  Now,  if  the  creation  of  man  with  a  sinful  nature 
be  inconsistent  with  the  infinite  purity  of  God,  will  it  not  be 
difficult  to  reconcile  with  that  purity  the  production  of  sin  in 
man,  after  his  creation,  by  an  act  of  the  divine  omnipotence  ? 

If  we  ask,  How  can  God  be  just  in  causing  man  to  sin,  and 
then  punishing  him  for  it  ?  Calvin  replies,  That  all  his  dealings 
with  us  "  are  guided  by  equity."f  We  know,  indeed,  that  all 
his  ways  are  guided  by  the  most  absolute  and  perfect  justice; 
and  this  is  the  very  circumstance  which  creates  the  difficulty. 
The  more  clearly  we  perceive,  and  the  more  vividly  we  realize, 

0  Theodice,  p.  365.  f  Institutes,  book  i,  chap.  xiv. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  91 

the  perfection  of  tlie  divine  equity,  the  more  heavily  does  the 
difficulty  press  upon  our  minds.  This  assurance  brings  us  no 
relief;  we  still  demand,  if  God  be  just,  as  in  truth  he  is,  how 
can  he  deal  with  us  after  such  a  manner  ?  The  answer  we  ob- 
tain is,  that  God  is  just.  And  if  this  does  not  satisfy  us,  we  are 
reminded  that  "  it  is  impossible  ever  wholly  to  prevent  the 
petulance  and  murmurs  of  impiety."*  We  seek  for  light,  and, 
instead  of  light,  we  are  turned  off  with  reproaches  for  the  want 
of  piety.  We  have  not  that  faith,  we  humbly  confess,  which. 
"  from  its  exaltation  looks  down  on  these  mists  with  contempt  ;"f 
but  we  have  a  reason,  it  may  be  "  a  carnal  understanding," 
which  longs  to  be  enlarged  and  enlightened  by  faith.  Hence, 
it  cannot  but  murmur  when,  instead  of  being  enlarged  and  en- 
lightened by  faith,  it  is  utterly  overwhelmed  and  confounded 
by  it.  And  these  murmurings  of  reason,  which  we  can  no  more 
prevent  than  we  could  stop  the  heavings  of  the  mighty  ocean 
from  its  depths,  are  met  and  sought  to  be  quelled  with  the  re- 
buke, "  Who  art  thou,  O  man,  that  repliest  against  God  ?"  We 
reply  not  against  God,  but  against  man's  interpretation  of  God's 
word ;  and  who  art  thou,  O  man,  that  puttest  thyself  in  the 
place  of  God  ?  "  Men,"  saith  Bacon,  "  are  ever  ready  to  usurp 
the  style,  '  Non  ego,  sed  Dominus  ;'  and  not  only  so,  but  to 
bind  it  with  the  thunder  and  denunciation  of  curses  and  anathe- 
mas, to  the  terror  of  those  who  have  not  sufficiently  learned  out 
of  Solomon,  that  the  *  causeless  curse  shall  not  come.' " 

In  relation  to  the  subject  under  consideration,  the  amiable 
and  philosophic  mind  of  Melancthon  seems  to  have  been  more 
consistent,  at  one  time,  than  that  of  most  of  the  reformers. 
"  He  laid  down,"  says  D'Aubigne,  "  a  sort  of  fatalism,  which 
might  lead  his  readers  to  think  of  God  as  the  author  of  evil,  and 
which  consequently  has  no  foundation  in  Scripture :  '  since 
whatever  happens,'  said  he,  '  happens  by  necessity,  agreeably 
to  divine  foreknowledge,  it  is  plain  our  will  hath  no  liberty 
whatever.' "  It  is  certainly  a  very  mild  expression  to  say,  that 
the  doctrine  of  Melancthon  might  lead  his  readers  to  think  of 
God  as  the  author  of  evil.  This  is  a  consequence  which  the 
logical  mind  of  Melancthon  did  not  fail  to  draw  from  his  own 
scheme  of  necessity.  In  his  commentary  on  the  Epistle  to  the 
"Romans,  in  the  edition  of  1525,  he  asserted  "  that  God  wrought 

0  Institutes,  book  iii,  ch.  xxiii.  |  Id.,  book  i,  ch.  xviii. 


92  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

all  tilings,  evil  as  well  as  good ;  that  he  was  the  author  of  Da- 
vid's adultery,  and  the  treason  of  Judas,  as  well  as  of  Paul's 
conversion." 

This  doctrine  was  maintained  by  Melancthon  on  practical  aa 
well  as  on  speculative  grounds.  It  is  useful,  says  he,  in  its 
tendency  to  subdue  human  arrogance ;  it  represses  the  wisdom 
and  cunning  of  human  reason.  We  have  generally  observed, 
that  whenever  a  learned  divine  denounces  the  arrogancy  of 
reason,  and  insists  on  an  humble  submission  to  his  own  doc- 
trines, that  he  has  some  absurdity  which  he  wishes  us  to  em- 
brace; he  feels  a  sort  of  internal  consciousness  that  human 
reason  is  arrayed  against  him,  and  hence  he  abuses  and  vilifies 
it.  But  reason  is  not  to  be  kept  in  due  subordination  by  any 
such  means.  If  sovereigns  would  maintain  a  legitimate  author- 
ity over  their  subjects,  they  should  bind  them  with  wise  and 
wholesome  laws,  and  not  with  arbitrary  and  despotic  enact- 
ments, which  are  so  well  calculated  to  engender  hatred  and  re- 
bellion. In  like  manner,  the  best  possible  way  to  tame  -the 
refractory  reason  of  man,  and  hold  it  in  subjection,  is  to  bind  it 
with  the  silken  cords  of  divine  truth,  and  not  fetter  it  with  the 
harsh  and  galling  absurdities  of  man's  invention.  Melancthon 
himself  furnished  a  striking  illustration  of  the  justness  of  this 
remark ;  for  although,  like  other  reformers,  he  taught  the 
doctrine  of  a  divine  fatality  of  all  events,  in  order  to  hum- 
ble the  pride  of  the  human  intellect,  his  own  reason  afterward 
rebelled  against  it.  He  not  only  recanted  the  monstrous 
doctrine  which  made  God  the  author  of  sin,  but  he  openly 
combatted  it. 

In  the  writings  of  Beza  and  Zwingle  there  are  passages,  in 
relation  to  the  origin  of  evil,  more  offensive,  if  possible,  than 
any  we  have  adduced  from  Calvin  and  Melancthon.  The  mode 
in  which  the  reformers  defended  their  common  doctrine  was, 
with  some  few  exceptions,  the  same  in  substance.  They  have 
said  nothing  which  can  serve  to  dispel,  or  even  materially  les- 
sen, the  stupendous  cloud  of  difficulties  which  their  scheme 
spreads  over  the  moral  government  of  God. 

Considering  the  condition  of  the  Church,  the  state  of  human 
knowledge,  and,  in  short,  all  the  circumstances  of  the  times  in 
which  the  reformers  lived  and  acted,  it  is  not  very  surprising 
that  they  should  have  fallen  into  such  errors.  The  corruptions 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE   HOLINESS   OF   GOD.  93 

of  human  nature,  manifesting  themselves  in  the  Romish  Church, 
had  so  extravagantly  exalted  the  powers  of  man,  and  especially 
of  the  priesthood,  and  so  greatly  depressed  or  obscured  the  sov- 
ereignty of  God,  that  the  reformers,  in  fighting  against  these 
abuses,  were  naturally  forced  into  the  opposite  extreme.  It  is 
not  at  all  wonderful,  we  say,  that  a  reaction,  which  shook  the 
very  foundations  of  the  earth,  should  have  carried  the  authors 
of  it  beyond  the  bounds  of  moderation  and  truth.  They  would 
have  been  more  than  human  if  they  had  not  fallen  into  some 
such  errors  as  these  which  we  have  ascribed  to  them.  But  the 
great  misfortune  is,  that  these  errors  should  have  been  stereo- 
typed and  fixed  in  the  symbolical  books  of  the  Protestant 
Churches,  and  made  to  descend  from  the  reformers  to  their 
children's  children,  as  though  they  were  of  the  very  essence  of 
the  faith  once  delivered  to  the  saints.  This  is  the  misfortune, 
the  lamentable  evil,  which  has  furnished  the  Romish  Church 
with  its  most  powerful  weapons  of  attack  ;*  which  has  fortified 
the  strongholds  of  atheism  and  infidelity ;  and  which  has,  be- 
yond all  question,  fearfully  retarded  the  great  and  glorious 
cause  of  true  religion. 

If  we  would  examine  the  most  elaborate  efforts  to  defend 
these  doctrines,  or  rather  the  great  central  dogma  of  necessity 
from  which  they  all  radiate,  we  must  descend  to  later  times ; 
we  must  turn  our  attention  to  the  immortal  writings  of  a  Leib- 
nitz and  an  Edwards. 


SECTION  II. 

The  attempt  of  Leibnitz  to  show  that  the  scheme  of  necessity  does  not  make 
God  the  author  of  sin. 

Tliis  philosopher  employed  all  the  resources  of  a  sublime 
genius,  and  all  the  stores  of  a  vast  erudition,  in  order  to  main- 
tain the  scheme  of  necessity,  and  at  the  same  time  vindicate 
the  purity  of  the  Divine  Being.  That  subtle  and  adroit  sceptic, 
M.  Bayle,  had  drawn  out  all  the  consequences  of  the  doctrine 
of  necessity  in  opposition  to  the  free-agency  of  man,  and  to  the 
holiness  of  God.  Leibnitz  wrote  his  great  "  Essais  de  Theodicee," 
for  the  purpose  of  refuting  these  conclusions  of  Bayle,  as  well 
as  those  of  all  other  sceptics,  and  of  reconciling  his  system  with 

0  See  Moehler's  Symbolism. 


94  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

the  divine  attributes.  In  the  preface  to  his  work  he  says,  "We 
show  that  evil  has  another  source  than  the  will  of  God;  and 
that  we  have  reason  to  say  of  moral  evil,  that  God  only  permits 
it,  and  that  he  does  not  will  it.  But  what  is  more  important, 
we  show  that  God  can  not  only  permit  sin,  but  even  concur 
therein,  and  contribute  to  it,  without  prejudice  to  his  holiness; 
although,  absolutely  speaking,  he  might  have  prevented  it." 
Such  is  the  task  which  Leibnitz  has  undertaken  to  perform ;  let 
us  see  how  he  has  accomplished  it. 

"  The  ancients,"  says  he,  "  attributed  the  cause  of  evil  to  mat- 
ter ;  but  where  shall  we,  who  derive  all  things  from  God,  find 
the  source  of  evil  ?"*  He  has  more  than  once  answered  this 
question,  by  saying  that  the  source  of  evil  is  to  be  found  in  the 
ideas  of  the  divine  mind.  "  Chrysippus,"  says  he,  "  has  reason 
to  allege  that  vice  comes  from  the  original  constitution  of  some 
spirits.  It  is  objected  to  him  that  God  has  formed  them;  and 
he  can  only  reply,  that  the  imperfection  of  matter  does  not  per- 
mit him  to  do  better.  This  reply  is  good  for  nothing ;  for  matter 
itself  is  indifferent  to  all  forms,  and  besides  God  has  made  it. 
Evil  comes  rather  from  forms  themselves,  but  abstract ;  that  is  to 
say,  from  ideas  that  God  has  not  produced  by  an  act  of  his  will, 
no  more  than  he  has  produced  number  and  figures ;  and  no 
more,  in  one  word,  than  all  those  possible  essences  which  we 
regard  as  eternal  and  necessary ;  for  they  find  themselves  in 
the  ideal  region  of  pc-ssibles  ;  that  is  to  say,  in  the  divine  under- 
standing. God  is  tVen  not  the  author  of  those  essences,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  only  possibilities ;  but  there  is  nothing  actual, 
but  what  he  discerned  and  called  into  existence ;  and  he  has 
permitted  evil,  because  it  is  enveloped  in  the  best  plan  which 
is  found  in  the  region  of  possibles ;  that  plan  the  supreme  wis- 
dom could  not  fail  to  choose.  It  is  this  notion  which  at  once 
satisfies  the  wisdom,  the  power,  and  the  goodness  of  God,  and 
yet  leaves  room  for  the  entrance  of  evil."f 

In  reading  the  lofty  speculations  of  Leibnitz,  we  have  been 
often  led  to  wonder  how  one,  whose  genius  was  so  great,  could 
have  permitted  himself  to  rest  in  conceptions  which  appear  so 
vague  and  indistinct.  In  the  above  passage  we  have  both  light 
and  obscurity ;  and  we  find  it  difficult  to  determine  which  pre- 
dominates over  +he  other.  We  are  clearly  told  that  God  is  not 

c  Theodicee,  p.  85.  fid.,  p.  264. 


Chapter  IL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  95 

the  author  of  evil,  because  this  proceeds  from  abstract  forms 
which  were  from  all  eternity  enveloped  in  his  understanding, 
and  not  from  any  operation  of  his  will.  But  how  does  evil 
proceed  from  abstract  forms ;  from  the  ideal  region  of  the  pos- 
sible ?  Leibnitz  does  not  mean  that  evil  proceeds  from  abstract 
ideas,  before  they  are  embodied  in  the  creation  of  real  moral 
agents.  Why  then  did  God  create  beings  which  he  knew  from 
all  eternity  would  commit  sin  ?  and  why,  having  created  them, 
did  he  contribute  to  their  sins  by  a  divine  concourse  ?  This  is 
coming  down  from  the  ideal  region  of  the  possible,  into  the 
world  of  real  difficulties. 

According  to  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz,  God  created  every 
intelligent  being  in  the  universe  with  a  perfect  knowledge  of 
its  whole  destiny ;  and  there  is,  moreover,  a  concourse  of  the 
divine  will  with  all  their  volitions.  Now,  here  we  are  in  the 
very  midst  of  the  concrete  world,  and  here  is  a  difficulty  which 
cannot  be  avoided  by  a  flight  into  the  ideal  region  of  the  pos- 
sible. How  can  there  be  a  concourse  of  the  divine  will  with 
the  human  will  in  one  and  the  same  sinful  volition,  without 
a  stain  upon  the  immaculate  purity  of  God?  How  can  the 
Father  of  Lights,  by  an  operation  of  his  will,  contribute  to  our 
sinful  volitions,  without  prejudice  to  his  holiness?  Tliis  is  the 
problem  which  Leibnitz  has  promised  to  solve ;  and  we  shall, 
with  all  patience,  listen  to  his  solution. 

The  solution  of  this  problem,  says  he,  is  effected  by  means 
of  the  "  privative  nature  of  evil."  We  shall  state  this  part  of 
his  system  in  his  own  words  :  "  As  to  the  physical  concourse," 
says  he,  "  it  is  here  that  it  is  necessary  to  consider  that  truth 
which  has  made  so  much  noise  in  the  schools,  since  St.  Augus- 
tine has  shown  its  importance,  that  evil  is  a  privation,  whereas 
the  action  of  God  produces  only  the  positive.  This  reply  passes 
for  a  defective  one,  and  even  for  something  chimerical  in  the 
minds  of  many  men ;  but  here  is  an  example  sufficiently  anal- 
ogous, which  may  undeceive  them." 

"  The  celebrated  Kepler,  and  after  him  M.  Descartes,  have 
spoken  of  the  natural  inertia  of  bodies,  and  that  we  can  con- 
sider it  as  a  perfect  image,  and  even  as  a  pattern  of  the  original 
limitation  of  creatures,  in  order  to  make  us  see  that  privation  is 
the  formal  cause  of  the  imperfections  and  inconveniences  which 
are  found  in  substance  as  well  as  in  actions.  Suppose  that  the 


96  MORAL   EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

current  of  a  river  carries  along  with  it  many  vessels  which 
have  different  cargoes,  some  of  wood,  and  others  of  stone  ;  somo 
more,  and  some  less.  It  will  happen  that  the  vessels  which 
are  more  heavily  laden  will  move  more  slowly  than  the  others, 
provided  there  is  nothing  to  aid  their  progress  .  .  .  Let  us  com- 
pare the  force  which  the  current  exercises  over  the  vessels  and 
what  it  communicates  to  them,  with  the  action  of  God,  who 
produces  and  preserves  whatever  is  positive  in  the  creature, 
and  imparts  to  them  perfection,  being,  and  force ;  let  us  com- 
pare, I  say,  the  inertia  of  matter  with  the  natural  imperfection 
of  creatures,  and  the  slowness  of  the  more  heavily  laden  vessel 
with  the  defect  which  is  found  in  the  qualities  and  in  the  actions 
of  the  creature,  and  we  shall  perceive  that  there  is  nothing  so 
just  as  this  comparison.  The  current  is  the  cause  of  the  move- 
ment of  the  vessel,  but  not  of  its  retardation ;  God  is  the  cause 
of  the  perfection  in  the  nature  and  the  actions  of  the  creature, 
but  the  limitation  of  the  receptivity  of  the  creature  is  the  cause 
of  the  defect  in  its  actions.  Tims  the  Platonists,  St.  Augustine, 
and  the  schoolmen,  have  reason  to  say  that  God  is  the  material 
cause  of  evil,  which  consists  in  what  is  positive,  and  not  the 
formal  cause  of  it,  wrhich  consists  in  privation,  as  we  can  say 
that  the  current  is  the  material  cause  of  the  retardation,  without 
being  its  formal  cause ;  that  is  to  say,  is  the  cause  of  the  swift- 
ness of  the  vessel,  without  being  the  cause  of  the  bounds  of  that 
swiftness.  God  is  as  little  the  cause  of  sin,  as  the  current  of  the 
river  is  the  cause  of  the  retardation  of  the  vessel."*  Or  as  Leib- 
nitz elsewhere  says,  God  is  the  author  of  all  that  is  positiveln 
our  volitions,  and  the  pravity  of  them  arises  from  the  necessary 
imperfection  of  the  creature. 

We  have  many  objections  to  this  mode  of  explaining  the 
origin  of  moral  evil,  some  few  of  which  we  shall  proceed  to 
state.  1.  It  is  a  hopeless  attempt  to  illustrate  the  processes  of 
the  mind  by  the  analogies  of  matter.  All  such  illustrations  are 
better  adapted  to  darken  and  confound  the  subject,  than  to 
throw  light  upon  it.  If  we  would  know  anything  about  the 
nature  of  moral  evil,  or  its  origin,  we  must  study  the  subject 
in  the  light  of  consciousness,  and  in  the  light  of  consciousness 
alone.  Dugald  Stewart  has  conferred  on  Descartes  the  proud 
distinction  of  having  been  the  first  philosopher  to  teach  the 
0  Thfeodicee,  pp.  89, 90. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  97 

true  method  according  to  which  the  science  of  mind  should  be 
studied.  "  lie  laid  it  down  as  a  first  principle,"  says  Stewart, 
"  that  nothing  comprehensible  by  the  imagination  can  be  at 
all  subservient  to  the  knowledge  of  mind ;  and  that  the  sensible 
images  involved  in  all  our  common  forms  of  speaking  concern- 
ing its  operations,  are  to  be  guarded  against  with  the  most 
anxious  care,  as  tending  to  confound  in  our  apprehensions,  two 
classes  of  phenomena,  which  it  is  of  the  last  importance  to  dis- 
tinguish accurately  from  eacli  other."*  2.  The  privative  nature 
of  evil,  as  it  is  called,  is  purely  a  figment  of  the  brain  ;  it  is  an 
invention  of  the  schoolmen,  which  has  no  corresponding  reality 
in  nature.  When  Adam  put  forth  his  hand  to  pluck  the  for- 
bidden fruit,  and  ate  it,  he  committed  a  sinful  act.  But  why 
was  it  sinful  ?  Because  he  knew  it  was  wrong ;  because  his  act 
was  a  voluntary  and  known  transgression  of  the  command  of 
God.  Now,  if  God  had  caused  all  that  was  positive  in  this 
sinful  act,  that  is,  if  he  had  caused  Adam  to  will  to  put  forth 
his  hand  and  eat  the  fruit,  it  is  plain  that  he  would  have  been 
the  cause  of  his  transgression.  Nothing  can  be  more  chimerical, 
it  seems  to  us,  than  this  distinction  between  being  the  author 
of  the  substance  of  an  act,  and  the  author  of  its  pravity.  If 
Adam  had  obeyed,  that  is,  if  he  had  refused  to  eat  the  forbid- 
den fruit,  such  an  act  would  not  have  been  more  positive  than 
the  actual  series  of  volitions  by  which  he  transgressed.  3.  If 
what  we  call  sin,  arises  from  the  necessary  imperfection  of  the 
creature,  as  the  slowness  of  a  vessel  in  descending  a  stream 
arises  from  its  cargo,  how  can  he  be  to  blame  for  it ;  or,  in 
other  words,  how  can  it  be  moral  evil  at  all  ?  And,  4.  Leibnitz 
has  certainly  committed  a  very  great  oversight  in  this  attempt 
to  account  for  the  origin  of  evil.  He  explains  it,  by  saying 
that  it  arises  from  the  necessary  imperfection  of  the  creature 
which  limits  its  receptivity  ;  but  does  he  mean  that  God  cannot 
communicate  holiness  to  the  creature  ?  Does  he  mean  that  God 
endeavours  to  communicate  holiness,  and  fails  in  consequence 
of  the  necessary  imperfection  of  the  creature  ?  If  so,  what 
becomes  of  the  doctrine  which  he  everywhere  advances,  that 
God  can  very  easily  cause  virtue  or  holiness  to  exist  if  he  should 
choose  to  do  so  ?  If  God  can  very  easily  cause  this  to  exist,  as 
Leibnitz  contends  he  can,  notwithstanding  the  necessary  iinper- 

0  Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy,  p.  114. 
7 


98  MORAL  EVII    CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

fection  of  the  creature,  why  has  he  not  done  so  ?  Is  it  not 
evident,  that  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz  merely  play  s  over  the 
surface  of  this  great  difficulty,  and  decks  it  out  with  the  orna- 
ments of  fancy,  instead  of  reaching  down  to  the  bottom  of  it, 
and  casting  the  illuminations  of  his  genius  into  its  depths  \ 


SECTION  IIL 

The  maxims  adopted  and  employed  by  Edwards  to  show  that  the  scheme  of 
does  not  make  God  the  author  of  sin. 


"This  remarkable  man,"  says  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  "the 
metaphysician  of  America,  was  formed  among  the  Calvinists 
of  New-England,  when  their  stern  doctrine  retained  its  vigor- 
ous authority.  His  power  of  subtle  argument,  perhaps  un- 
matched, certainly  unsurpassed  among  men,  was  joined,  as  in 
some  of  the  ancient  mystics,  with  a  character  which  raised  his 
piety  to  fervour."  It  is  in  his  great  work  on  the  will,  as  well 
as  in  some  of  his  miscellaneous  observations,  that  Edwards,  has 
put  forth  the  powers  of  his  mind,  in  order  to  show  that  the 
scheme  of  necessity  does  not  obscure  the  lustre  of  the  divine  per- 
fections. "With  the  exception  of  the  Essais  de  Theodicee  of 
Leibnitz,  it  is  perhaps  the  greatest  effort  the  human  mind  has 
ever  made  to  get  rid  of  the  seeming  antagonism  between  the 
scheme  of  necessity  and  the  holiness  of  God. 

According  to  the  system  of  Edwards,  as  well  as  that  of  his 
opponents,  sin  would  not  have  been  committed  unless  it  were 
permitted  by  God.  But  in  the  scheme  of  Edwards,  the  agency 
of  God  bears  a  more  intimate  relation  to  the  origin  and  exist- 
ence of  sin  than  is  implied  by  a  bare  permission  of  it.  "  God," 
says  he,  disposes  "the  state  of  events  in  such  a  manner,  for 
wise,  holy,  and  most  excellent  ends  and  purposes,  that  sin,  if  it 
be  permitted  or  not  hindered,  will  most  certainly  and  infallibly 
follow."*  And  this  occurrence  of  sin,  in  consequence  of  his 
disposing  and  ordering  events,  enters  into  his  design.  For 
Edwards  truly  says,  that  "  If  God  disposes  all  events,  so  that 
the  infallible  existence  of  the  events  is  decided  by  his  providence, 
then,  doubtless,  he  thus  orders  and  decides  things  knowingly 
and  on  design.  God  does  not  do  what  he  does,  nor  order  what 
he  orders,  accidentally  and  unawares,  either  without  or  Reside 

0  Inquiry,  p.  246. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE   HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  99 

his  intention."  Tims,  we  are  told,  that  God  so  arranges  and 
disposes  the  events  of  his  providence  as  to  bring  sin  to  pass,  and 
that  he  does  so  designedly.  This  broad  proposition  is  laid 
down,  not  merely  with  reference  to  sin  in  general,  but  to  cer- 
tain great  sins  in  particular.  "  So  that,"  says  Edwards,  "  what 
these  murderers  of  Christ  did,  is  spoken  of  as  what  God  brought 
to  pass  or  ordered,  and  that  by  which  he  fulfilled  his  own  word." 
According  to  Edwards,  then,  the  events  of  God's  providence 
are  arranged  with  a  view  to  bring  all  the  sinful  deeds  of 
men  "certainly  and  infallibly"  to  pass,  as  well  as  their  holy 
acts. 

Now,  here  the  question  arises,  Is  this  doctrine  consistent 
with  the  character  of  God?  Is  it  not  repugnant  to  his  in- 
finite holiness?  We  affirm  that  it  is;  Edwards  declares  that 
it  is  not.  Let  us  see,  then,  if  his  position  does  not  involve 
him  in  insuperable  difficulties,  and  in  irreconcilable  contra- 
dictions. 

Edwards  supposes  that  some  one  may  object :  "  All  that  these 
things  amount  to  is,  that  God  may  do  evil  that  good  may 
come;  which  is  justly  esteemed  immoral  and  sinful  in  men, 
and  therefore  may  be  justly  esteemed  inconsistent  with  the  per- 
fections of  God."  This  is  a  fair  and  honest  statement  of  the 
objection;  now  let  us  hear  the  reply.  "I  answer,"  says 
Edwards,  "  that  for  God  to  dispose  and  permit  evil  in  the  man- 
ner that  has  been  spoken  of,  is  not  to  do  evil  that  good  may 
come ;  for  it  is  not  to  do  evil  at  all."  It  is  not  to  do  evil  at  all, 
says  he,  for  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  world  to  arrange  events 
around  one  of  his  creatures  in  such  a  manner  that  they  will 
certainly  and  infallibly  induce  him  to  commit  sin.  "Why  is  not 
this  to  do  evil  ?  At  first  view,  it  certainly  looks  very  much  like 
doing  evil ;  and  it  is  not  at  once  distinguishable  from  the  temp- 
tations ascribed  to  Satanic  agency.  Why  is  it  not  to  do 
evil,  then,  when  it  is  done  by  the  Almighty  ?  It  is  not  to  do 
evil,  says  Edwards,  because  when  God  brings  sin  certainly  and 
infallibly  to  pass,  he  does  so  "  for  wise  and  holy  purposes." 
This  is  his  answer:  "In  order  to  a  thing's- being  morally  evil, 
theie  must  be  one  of  these  two  things  belonging  to  it:  either  it 
must  be  a  thing  unfit  and  unsuitable  in  its  own  nature,  or  it 
must  have  a  bad  tendency,  or  it  must  be  done  for  an  evil  end. 
But  neither  of  these  things  can  be  attributed  to  God's  ordering 


100  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

and  permitting  such  events  as  the  immoral  acts  of  creatures  for 
good  ends."*  Let  us  examine  this  logic. 

We  are  gravely  told,  that  God  designedly  brings  the  sinful 
acts  of  men  to  pass  by  the  use  of  most  certain  and  infallible 
means ;  but  this  is  not  to  do  evil,  because  he  has  a  good  end  in 
view.  His  intention  is  right ;  he  brings  sin  to  pass  for  "  wise 
and  holy  purposes."  Let  us  come  a  little  closer  to  this  doctrine, 
and  see  what  it  is.  It  will  not  be  denied,  that  if  any  bein^ 
should  bring  sin  to  pass  without  any  end  at  all,  except  to  secure 
its  existence,  this  would  be  a  sinful  agency.  If  any  being 
should,  knowingly  and  designedly,  bring  sin  to  pass  in  another, 
without  any  "  w^ise  and  holy  purposes,"  all  mankind  will  agree 
in  pronouncing  the  deed  to  be  morally  wrong.  But  precisely 
the  same  deed  is  not  wrong  in  God,  says  Edwards,  because  in 
his  case  it  proceeds  from  "  a  wise  and  holy  purpose,"  and  he  has 
"  a  good  end  in  view."  That  is  to  say,  the  means,  in  themselves 
considered,  are  morally  wrong ;  but  being  employed  for  a  wise 
and  holy  purpose,  for  the  attainment  of  a  good  end,  they  are 
sanctified  !  This  is  precisely  the  doctrine,  that  the  end  sancti- 
fies the  means.  Is  it  not  wonderful,  that  any  system  should  be 
so  dark  and  despotic  in  its  power  as  to  induce  the  mind  of  an 
Edwards,  ordinarily  so  amazing  for  its  acuteness  and  so  exalted 
in  its  piety,  to  vindicate  the  character  of  God  upon  such 
grounds  ? 

The  defence  of  Edwards  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  play 
on  the  term  evil.  When  it  is  said,  that  "  wre  may  do  evil  that 
good  may  come ;"  the  meaning  of  the  maxim  is,  that  the  means 
in  such  a  case  and  under  such  circumstances  ceases  to  be  evil. 
The  maxim  teaches  that  "  we  may  do  evil,"  that  it  is  lawful  to 
do  evil,  with  a  view  to  the  grand  and  glorious  end  to  be  attained 
by  it.  Or,  in  other  words,  that  it  is  right  to  do  what  would 
otherwise  be  morally  evil,  in  order  to  accomplish  a  good  end. 
If  Edwards  had  considered  the  other  form  of  the  same  odious 
maxim,  namely,  that  "  the  end  sanctifies  the  means,"  he  would 
have  found  it  impossible  to  evade  the  force  of  its  application  to 
his  doctrine.  He  could  not  have  escaped  from  the  difficulty 
of  his  position  by  a  play  upon  the  word  evil.  He  would  have 
seen  that  he  had  undertaken  to  justify  the  conduct  of  the  Father 
of  Lights,  by  supposing  it  to  be  governed  by  the  most  corrupt 

.      °  Inquiry,  part  iv,  sec.  ix. 


Chapter  IL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  101 

maxim  of  the  most  corrupt  system  of  casuistry  the  world  has 
ever  seen. 

What  God  does,  says  Edwards,  is  not  evil  at  all ;  hecanse  his 
purpose  is  holy,  because  his  object  is  good,  his  intention  is 
right.  In  like  manner,  the  maxim  says,  that  when  the  end  is 
good  and  holy,  "  it  sanctifies  the  means."  The  means  may  be 
impure  in  themselves  considered,  but  they  are  rendered  pure 
by  the  cause  in  which  they  are  employed.  This  doctrine  has 
been  immortalized  by  Pascal,  in  his  "Provincial  Letters;"  and 
we  cannot  better  dismiss  the  subject  than  with  an  extract  from 
the  "Provincial  Letters."  "I  showed  yon,"  says  the  Jesuitical 
father,  "how  servants  might,  wTith  a  safe  conscience,  manage 
certain  troublesome  messages ;  did  you  not  observe  that  it  is 
simply  taking  off  their  intention  from  the  sin  itself,  and  fixing 
it  on  the  advantage  to  be  gained."*  On  this  principle,  stealing, 
and  lying,  and  murder,  may  all  be  vindicated.  "  Caramuel, 
our  illustrious  defender,"  says  the  Jesuit,  "  in  his  Fundamental 

Theology," enters  into  the  examination  of  many  new 

questions  resulting  from  this  principle,  (of  directing  the  inten- 
tion,) as,  for  example,  whether  the  Jesuits  may  kill  the  Jansen- 
ists  ?  "  Alas,  father !"  exclaimed  Pascal,  "  this  is  a  most  sur- 
prising point  in  theology!  I  hold  the  Jansenists  already  no 
better  than  dead  men  by  the  doctrine  of  Father  Launy."  "  Aha, 
sir,  you  are  caught ;  for  Caramuel  deduces  the  very  opposite 
conclusion  from  the  same  principles."  "  How  so  ?"  said  Pascal. 
"Observe  his  words,  n.  1146  and  1147,  p.  547  and  548.  The 
Jansenists  call  the  Jesuits  Pelagians ;  may  they  be  killed  for 
BO  doing?  No — for  this  plain  reason,  that  the  Jansenists  are 
no  more  able  to  obscure  the  glory  of  our  society,  than  an  owl 
can  hide  the  sun;  in  fact,  they  promote  it,  though  certainly 
against  their  intention — occidi  non  possunt,  quia  nooere  non 
potuerum.''  "Alas,  father,"  says  Pascal,  "and  does  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Jansenists  depend  solely  upon  their  capacity  of 
injuring  your  reputation  ?  If  that  be  the  case,  I  am  afraid  they 
are  not  in  a  very  good  predicament ;  for  if  the  slightest  proba- 
bility should  arise  of  their  doing  you  any  hurt,  they  may  be 
despatched  at  once.  You  can  perform  the  deed  logically  and 
in  form ;  for  it  is  only  to  direct  your  intention  right,  and  you 
Insure  a  quiet  conscience.  What  a  blessedness  for  those  who 

0  Letter  viL 


102  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

can  endure  injuries  to  know  this  charming  doctrine!  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  how  miserable  is  the  condition  of  the  offending 
party !  Really,  father,  it  would  be  better  to  have  to  do  with 
people  totally  devoid  of  all  religion,  than  with  those  \vho  have 
received  instructions  so  far  only  as  to  this  point,  relative  to 
directing  the  intention.  I  am  afraid  the  intention  of  the  mur- 
derer is  no  consolation  to  the  wounded  person.  He  can  have 
no  perception  of  this  secret  direction — poor  man !  he  is  conscious 
only  of  the  Uow  he  receives;  and  I  am  not  certain  whether 
he  would  not  be  less  indignant  to  be  cruelly  massacred  by  peo- 
ple in  a  violent  transport  of  rage,  than  to  be  devoutly  killed 
for  conscience'  sake."  Now,  we  submit  it  to  the  candid  reader, 
whether  the  reasoning  here  ascribed  to  the  Jesuit  by  Pascal,  is 
not  exactly  parallel  with  that  on  which  Edwards  justifies  the 
procedure  of  the  Almighty  ?  If  God  may  choose  sin  and  bring 
it  to  pass,  without  contracting  the  least  impurity,  because  his 
intention  is  directed  aright,  to  a  wise  and  good  end,  may  we 
not  be  permitted  to  imitate  his  example  ?  And  again,  if  God 
thus  employs  the  creature  as  an  instrument  to  accomplish  his 
wise  and  holy  purposes,  why  should  he  pour  out  the  vials  of  his 
wrath  upon  him  for  having  yielded  to  the  dispensations  of  his 
almighty  power  ?  In  order  to  save  his  doctrine  from  reproach, 
Edwards  has  invented  a  distinction,  which  next  demands  our 
attention.  "There  is  no  inconsistence,"  says  he,  "  in  supposing 
that  God  may  hate  a  thing  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  considered 
simply  as  evil,  and  yet  that  it  may  be  his  will  it  should  come 
to  pass,  considering  all  consequences.  I  believe  there  is  no 
person  of  good  understanding  who  will  venture  to  say,  he  is 
certain  that  it  is  impossible  it  should  be  best,  taking  in  the 
whole  compass  and  extent  of  existence,  and  all  consequences  in 
the  endless  series  of  events,  that  there  should  be  such  a  thing 
as  moral  evil  in  the  world.  And  if  so,  it  will  certainly  follow, 
that  an  infinitely  wise  Being,  wTho  always  chooses  what  is  best, 
must  choose  that  there  should  be  such  a  thing.  And  if  so, 
then  such  a  choice  is  not  evil,  but  a  wise  and  holy  choice. 
And  if  so,  then  that  Providence  which  is  agreeable  to  such  a 
choice,  is  a  wise  and  holy  Providence.  Men  do  will  sin  as  sin, 
and  so  are  the  authors  and  actors  of  it ;  they  love  it  as  sin,  and 
for  evil  ends  and  purposes.  God  does  not  will  sin  as  sin,  or  for 
the  sake  of  anything  evil ;  though  it  be  his  pleasure  so  to  order 


Chapter  TT.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  103 

things  that,  he  permitting,  sin  will  come  to  pass,  for  the  sake 
of  the  great  good  that  by  his  disposal  shall  be  the  consequence. 
His  willing  to  order  things  so  that  evil  should  come  to  pass  for 
the  sake  of  the  contrary  good,  is  no  argument  that  he  does  not 
hate  evil  as  evil ;  and  if  so,  then  it  is  no  reason  why  he  may 
not  reasonably  forbid  evil  as  evil,  and  punish  it  as  such."* 
Here  we  are  plainly  told,  that  although  God  hates  sin  as  sin, 
yet,  all  things  considered,  he  prefers  that  it  should  come  to  pass, 
and  even  helps  it  into  existence.  But  man  loves  and  commits 
evil  as  such,  and  is  therefore  j  ustly  punishable  for  it. 

There  are  several  serious  objections  to  this  extraordinary  dis- 
tinction. It  is  not  true  that  men  love  and  commit  sin  as  sin. 
Sin  is  committed,  not  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  pleasure 
which  attends  it.  If  sin  did  not  gratify  the  appetites,  or  the 
passions,  or  the  desires  of  men,  it  would  not  be  committed  at  all ; 
there  would  be  no  temptation  to  it,  and  it  would  be  seen  as  it  is 
in  its  own  loathsome  nature.  Indeed,  to  speak  with  philosoph- 
ical accuracy,  sin  is  never  a  direct  object  of  our  affections  or 
choice ;  we  simply  desire  certain  things,  as  Adam  did  the  for- 
bidden fruit,  and  we  seek  our  gratification  in  them  contrary  to 
the  will  of  God.  This  constitutes  our  sin.  The  direct  object  of 
our  choice  is,  not  disobedience,  not  sin,  but  the  forbidden  thing, 
the  prohibited  gratification.  We  do  not  love  and  choose  the 
disobedience,  but  the  thing  which  leads  us  to  disobey.  This  is 
so  very  plain  and  simple  a  matter,  that  we  cannot  but  wonder 
that  honest  men  should  have  lost  sight  of  it  in  a  mist  of 
words,  and  built  up  their  theories  in  the  dark. 

Secondly,  the  above  position,  into  which  Edwards  has  been 
forced  by  the  exigencies  of  his  doctrine  concerning  evil,  is 
directly  at  war  with  the  great  fundamental  principle  on  which 
his  whole  system  rests,  namely,  that  the  will  is  always  deter- 
mined by  the  greatest  apparent  good.  For  how  is  it  possible 
that  men  should  commit  sin  as  sin,  and  for  its  own  sake,  if  they 
never  do  anything  except  what  is  the  most  agreeable  to  them  ? 
How  is  it  possible  that  they  pursue  moral  evil  merely  as  moral 
evil,  and  yet  pursue  it  as  the  greatest  apparent  good?  If  it 
should  be  said  that  men  love  sin  merely  as  sin,  and  therefore  it 
pleases  them  to  choose  it  for  its  own  sake,  this  reply  would  bo 
without  foundation.  For,  as  we  have  already  seen,  there  is  no 

0  Inquiry,  part  iv,  sec.  ix. 


104  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

such  principle  in  human  nature  as  the  love  of  sin  as  such,  or  for 
its  own  sake ;  and  consequently  sin  can  never  delight  or  please 
the  human  mind  as  it  is  in  itself.  And,  besides,  it  is  self-con- 
tradictory ;  for  the  question  is,  How  can  a  man  commit  sin  for 
its  own  sake  on  account  of  the  pleasure  it  affords  him  ?  It 
wruld  be  an  attempt  to  explain  an  hypothesis  which  denies  the 
veiy  fact  to  be  explained  by  it. 

In  the  third  place,  if  the  philosophy  of  Edwards  be  true,  no 
good  reason  can  be  assigned  why  men  should  restrain  themselves 
from  the  commission  of  sin :  for,  all  things  considered,  God  pre- 
fers the  sin  which  actually  exists,  and  infallibly  brings  it  to 
pass.  He  prefers  it  on  account  of  the  great  good  he  intends  to 
educe  from  it.  Why  then  should  we  not  also  prefer  its  exist- 
ence ?  God  is  sovereign ;  he  will  permit  no  more  sin  than  he 
can  and  will  render  subservient  to  the  highest  good  of  the  uni- 
verse ;  and  so  much  as  is  for  the  highest  good  he  will  bring  into 
existence.  Why,  then,  should  we  give  ourselves  any  concern 
about  the  matter  ?  Why  should  we  fear  that  there  may  be  too 
much  sin  in  the  world,  or  why  should  we  blame  other  men  for 
their  crimes  and  oifences  ? 

The  inference  which  we  have  just  mentioned  as  necessarily 
flowing  from  the  doctrine  of  Edwards,  has  actually  been  drawn 
by  some  of  the  most  illustrious  advocates  of  that  doctrine.  Thus 
says  Hartley,  as  we  have  already  seen,  "  since  all  men  do  against 
us  is  by  the  appointment  of  God,  it  is  rebellion  against  him  to 
be  offended  with  them."  This  is  so  clearly  the  logical  inference 
from  the  doctrine  in  question,  that  it  is  truly  wonderful  how  any 
one  can  possibly  fail  to  perceive  it. 

We  are  told  by  Leibnitz  and  Edwards,  that  we  should  not 
presume  to  act  on  the  principle  of  permitting  sin  in  others,  or 
•of  bringing  it  to  pass,  on  account  of  the  good  that  we  may  educe 
from  it ;  because  such  an  affair  is  too  high  for  us.  But,  surely, 
we  need  have  no  weak  fears  on  this  ground ;  for  although  it 
may  be  too  high  for  us,  they  do  not  pretend  that  it,  is  too  high 
for  God.  He  will  allow  no  more  sin  to  make  its  appearance  in 
the  woi'ld,  say  they,  than  he  will  cause  to  redound  to  the  good 
of  the  universe.  He  prefers  it  for  that  reason,  and  why  should 
we  not  respond,  amen!  to  his  preference?  Why  should  we 
give  ourselves  any  concern  about  sin?  May  we  not  follow  our 
own  inclinations,  leaving  sin  to  take  its  course,  and  rest  quietly 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  105 

in  Providence  ?  To  tins  question  it  will  be  replied,  as  Calvin 
and  Edwards  repeatedly  reply,  that  the  revealed,  and  not  the 
secret,  will  of  God  is  the  rule  of  our  duty.  We  do  not  obj  ect 
to  this  doctrine ;  we  acknowledge  its  perfect  propriety  and  cor- 
rectness :  but  it  is  no  reply  to  the  consequence  we  have  deduced 
from  the  philosophy  of  Edwards.  It  only  shows  that  his  philos- 
ophy leads  to  a  conclusion  which  is  in  direct  opposition  to  reve- 
lation. So  far  from  objecting  that  any  should  turn  from  the 
philosophy  of  Edwards  to  revelation,  in  order  to  find  reasons 
why  evil  should  not  be  committed  by  us,  we  sincerely  regret 
that  such  a  departure  from  a  false  philosophy,  and  return  to  a 
true  religion,  is  not  more  permanent  and  universal. 

The  doctrine  of  Edwards  on  this  subject  destroys  the  harmony 
of  the  divine  attributes.  It  represents  God  as  having  two  wills ; 
or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  it  represents  him  as  having  pub- 
lished a  holy  law  for  the  government  of  his  creatures,  which  he 
does  not,  in  all  cases,  wish  them  to  obey.  On  the  contrary,  he 
prefers  that  some  of  them  should  violate  his  holy  law ;  and  not 
only  so,  but  he  adopts  certain  and  infallible  means  to  lead  them 
to  violate  and  trample  it  under  foot.  It  is  admitted  by  Ed- 
wards, that  in  this  sense  God  really  possesses  two  wills ;  but  he 
still  denies  that  this  shows  any  inconsistency  in  the  nature  of  God. 

Edwards  says,  that  the  will  of  God  does  not  oppose  sin  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  it  prefers  sin,  and  that,  therefore,  there  is  no 
inconsistency  in  the  case.  But  let  us  not  deceive  ourselves  by 
words.  Is  it  true,  that  sin  is  opposed  by  what  is  called  the 
revealed  will  of  God,  by  his  command ;  and  yet  that  it  is,  all 
things  considered,  chosen  by  his  secret  and  working  will?  He 
commands  one  thing,  and  yet  works  to  bring  another  to  pass ! 
He  prohibits  all  sin,  under  the  awful  penalty  of  eternal  death, 
and  yet  secretly  arranges  and  plans  things  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  secure  the  commission  of  it ! 

We  have  already  seen  one  of  these  defences.  God  "hates 
sin  as  it  is  in  itself;"  and  hence  he  prohibits  it  by  his  command. 
"Yet  it  may  be  his  will  it  should  come  to  pass,  considering  all 
its  consequences ;"  and  hence  his  secret  will  is  bent  on  bringing 
it  into  existence.  There  is  no  inconsistency  here,  says  Ed- 
wards, because  the  divine  will  relates  to  two  different  objects; 
namely,  to  "sin  considered  simply  as  sin,"  and  to  "sin  con- 
sidered in  all  its  consequences."  We  do  not  care  whethei 


106  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

the  two  propositions  contradict  each  other  or  not;  it  is  abun- 
dantly evident,  as  we  have  seen,  that  it  makes  God  choose  that 
which  he  hates,  even  sin  itself,  as  the  means  of  good.  It  makes 
the  end  sanctify  the  means,  even  in  the  eye  of  the  holy  God. 
This  doctrine  we  utterly  reject  and  infinitely  abhor.  "We  had 
rather  have  "  our  sight,  hearing,  and  motive  power,  and  what 
not  besides,  disputed,  and  even  torn  away  from  us,  than  suffer 
ourselves  to  be  disputed  into  a  belief,"  that  the  holy  God  can 
choose  moral  evil  as  a  means  of  good.  We  had  rather  believe 
all  the  fables  in  the  Talmud  and  the  Koran,  than  that  the  ever- 
blessed  God  should,  by  his  providence  and  his  powder,  plunge 
his  feeble  creatures  into  sin,  and  then  punish  them  with  ever- 
lasting torments  for  their  transgression.  We  know  of  nothing 
in  the  Pantheism  of  Spinoza,  or  in  the  atheism  of  Hobbes,  more 
revolting  than  this  hideous  dogma. 

The  great  metaphysician  of  New-England  has  made  a  still 
further  attempt  to  vindicate  the  dogma  in  question.  "  The 
Arminians,"  says  he,  "ridicule  the  distinction  between  the 
secret  and  revealed  will  of  God,  or,  more  properly  expressed, 
the  distinction  between  the  decree  and  law  of  God ;  because 
we  say  he  may  decree  one  thing  and  command  another.  And 
so,  they  argue,  we  hold  a  contrariety  in  God,  as  if  one  will  of 
his  contradicted  another.  However,  if  they  will  call  this  a 
contradiction  of  wills,  wre  know  that  there  is  such  a  thing ;  so 
that  it  is  the  greatest  absurdity  to  dispute  about  it.  We  and 
they  know  it  was  God's  secret  will,  that  Abraham  should  not 
sacrifice  his  son  Isaac  ;  but  yet  his  command  was,  that  he  should 
do  it."*  Such  is  the  instance  produced  by  this  acute  divine, 
to  show  that  the  secret  will  of  God  may  prefer  the  very  thing 
which  is  condemned  by  his  revealed  will  or  law ;  and  on  the 
strength  of  it,  he  is  bold  to  say,  "  We  know  it,  so  that  it  is  the 
greatest  absurdity  to  dispute  about  it" 

We  have  often  seen  this  passage  of  Scripture  produced  by 
infidels,  to  show  that  the  Old  Testament  contains  unworthy 
representations  of  God.  If  Edwards  had  undertaken  to  refute 
the  infidel  ground  in  relation  to  this  passage,  he  might  have 
done  so  with  very  great  ease :  but  then  he  would  at  the  same 
time  have  refuted  himself.  The  Scriptural  account  of  God's 
commanding  Abraham  to  offer  up  his  son  Isaac,  was  long  ago 

0  Edwards's  Works,  vol.  vii,  p.  406. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  107 

employed  by  the  famous  infidel  Hobbes  to  show  that  there  are 
two  wills  in  God.  This  argument  of  Hobbes  has  been  refuted 
by  Leibnitz.  "  Hobbes  contends,"  says  Leibnitz,  "that  God  wills 
not  always  what  he  commands,  as  when  he  commands  Abra- 
ham to  sacrifice  his  son :"  and  he  replies,  that  "  God,  in  com- 
manding Abraham  to  sacrifice  his  son,  willed  the  obedience,  and 
not  the  action,  which  he  prevented  after  having  the  obedience  ; 
for  that  was  not  an  action  which  merited  in  itself  to  be  willed : 
but  such  is  not  the  case  with  those  actions  which  he  positively 
wills,  and  which  are  indeed  worthy  of  being  the  objects  of  his 
will ;  such  as  piety,  charity,  and  every  virtuous  action  which 
God  commands,  and  such  as  the  avoidance  of  sin,  more  repug- 
nant to  the  divine  perfections  than  any  other  thing.  It  is  incom- 
parably better,  therefore,  to  explain  the  will  of  God,  as  we 
have  done  it  in  this  work."*  It  is  evident  that  Leibnitz  did 
not  relish  the  idea  of  two  wills  in  God ;  and  perhaps  few  pious 
minds  would  do  so,  if  it  were  presented  to  them  by  an  atheist. 
But  there  was  too  close  an  affinity  between  the  philosophy  of 
Leibnitz  and  that  of  Hobbes,  to  permit  the  former  to  furnish 
the  most  satisfactory  refutation  of  the  argument  of  the  latter. 

This  command  to  Abraham  does  not  show  that  there  ever 
was  any  such  contrariety  between  the  revealed  and  the  decretal 
wills  of  God,  as  is  contended  for  by  Hobbes  and  Edwards. 
God  intended,  as  we  are  told,  to  prove  the  faith  of  Abraham, 
in  order  that  it  might  shine  forth  and  become  a  bright  example 
to  all  succeeding  ages.  For  this  purpose  he  commanded  him 
to  take  his  only  son,  whom  he  loved,  and  go  into  the  land  of 
Moriah,  and  there  offer  him  up  as  a  burnt-offering  upon  one 
of  the  mountains.  Abraham  obeyed  without  a  murmur.  After 
several  days  travelling  and  preparation,  Abraham  has  reached 
the  appointed  place,  and  is  ready  for  the  sacrifice.  His  son 
Isaac  is  bound,  and  laid  upon  the  altar;  the  father  stretches 
forth  his  hand  to  take  the  knife  and  slay  him.  But  a  voice  is 
heard,  saying,  "  Lay  not  thine  hand  on  the  lad  ;  neither  do  thou 
anything  unto  him."  Now,  the  conduct  of  Abraham  on  this 
memorable  occasion,  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  exhibitions 
of  confidence  in  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God,  which  the 
history  of  the  world  has  furnished.  It  deserves  to  be  held  up 
to  the  admiration  of  mankind,  and  to  be  celebrated  in  all  ages 

0  Theodicee,  p.  327. 


108  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

of  the  world.  We  sincerely  pity  the  man,  who  is  so  taken  up 
with  superficial  appearances,  or  who  is  so  destitute  of  sympathy 
with  the  moral  greatness  and  beauty  of  soul  manifested  in  this 
simple  narrative,  that  he  can  approach  it  in  a  little,  captious, 
sneering  spirit,  rather  than  in  an  attitude  of  profound  admira- 
tion. But  our  business,  at  present,  is  not  so  much  with  the 
laughing  sceptic  as  with  the  grave  divine. 

What  evidence,  then,  does  this  story  furnish  that  the  secret 
will  of  God  had  anything  to  do  with  the  simple  but  sublime 
transaction  which  it  records?  God  commanded  Abraham  to 
repair  to  the  land  of  Moriah  with  his  son  Isaac ;  but  are  we 
informed  that  his  secret  will  was  opposed  to  the  patriarch's 
going  thither,  or  that  it  opposed  any  obstacle  to  his  obedience? 
Are  we  told  that  God  so  arranged  the  events  of  his  providence 
as  to  render  the  disobedience  of  Abraham,  in  any  one  partic- 
ular, certain  and  infallible  ?  We  cannot  find  the  shadow  of  any 
such  information  in  the  sacred  story.  And  is  there  the  least 
intimation,  that  when  Abraham  was  commanded  to  stay  the 
uplifted  knife,  the  secret  will  of  God  was  in  favour  of  its  being 
plunged  into  the  bosom  of  his  son?  Clearly  there  is  not. 
Where,  then,  is  the  discrepancy  between  the  revealed  and  the 
secret  wills  of  God  in  this  case,  which  we  are  required  to  see  ? 
Where  is  this  discrepancy  so  plainly  manifested,  that  we  abso- 
lutely know  its  existence,  so  that  it  is  the  height  of  absurdity 
to  dispute  against  it  ? 

If  there  is  any  contrariety  at  all  in  this  case,  it  is  between 
the  revealed  will  of  God  in  commanding  Abraham  to  offer  up 
his  son,  and  his  subsequently  revealed  will  to  desist  from  the 
sacrifice.  It  does  not  present  even  a  seeming  inconsistency 
between  his  secret  will  and  his  command,  but  between  two 
portions  of  his  revealed  will.  This  seeming  inconsistency 
between  the  command  of  God  and  his  countermand,  in  relation 
to  the  same  external  action,  has  been  fully  removed  by  Leibnitz  ; 
and  if  it  had  not  been,  it  is  just  as  incumbent  on  the  abettors 
of  Edwards's  scheme  to  explain  it,  as  it  is  upon  his  opponents. 
If  God  had  commanded  Abraham  to  do  a  thing,  and  yet  exerted 
his  secret  will  to  make  him  violate  the  injunction,  this  would 
have  been  a  case  in  point :  but  there  is  no  such  case  to  be  found 
in  the  word  of  God. 

It  may  not  be  improper,  in  this  connexion,  to  quote  the  fol- 


Chapter  H.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.     d      LSE 

if  v?      Cr  7 

lowing  judicious  admonition  of  Howe  :  "Take  veecp  says  he, 
"  that  we  do  not  oppose  the  secret  and  revealed  wS£OT-  God  to 
one  another,  or  allow  ourselves  so  much  as  to  imagine  an  oppo- 
sition or  contrariety  between  them.  And  that  ground  being 
once  firmly  laid  and  stuck  to,  as  it  is  impossible  that  there  can 
be  a  will  against  a  will  in  God,  or  that  he  can  be  divided  from 
himself,  or  against  himself,  or  that  he  should  reveal  anything 
to  us  as  his  will  that  is  not  his  will,  (it  being  a  thing  inconsist- 
ent with  his  nature,  and  impossible  to  him  to  lie,)  that  being,  I 
say,  firmly  laid,  (as  nothing  can  be  firmer  or  surer  than  that,) 
then  measure  all  your  conceptions  of  the  secret  will  of  God  by 
his  revealed  will,  about  which  you  may  be  sure.  But  never 
measure  your  conceptions  of  his  revealed  by  his  secret  will ; 
that  is,  by  what  you  may  imagine  concerning  that.  For  you  can 
but  imagine  while  it  is  secret,  and  so  far  as  it  is  unrevealed."* 

"  It  properly  belongs,"  says  Edwards,  "  to  the  supreme  abso- 
lute Governor  of  the  universe,  to  order  all  important  events 
within  his  dominions  by  wisdom ;  but  the  events  in  the  moral 
world  are  of  the  most  important  kind,  such  as  the  moral  actions 
of  intelligent  creatures,  and  the  consequences.  These  events  will 
be  ordered  by  something.  They  will  either  be  disposed  by 
wisdom,  or  they  will  be  disposed  by  chance ;  that  is,  they  will 
be  disposed  by  blind  and  undesigning  causes,  if  that  were  pos- 
sible, and  could  be  called  a  disposal.  Is  it  not  better  that 
the  good  and  evil  which  happen  in  God's  world  should  be 
ordered,  regulated,  bounded,  and  determined  by  the  good 
pleasure  of  an  infinitely  wise  being,  than  to  leave  these  things  to 
fall  out  by  chance,  and  to  be  determined  by  those  causes  which 
have  no  understanding  and  aim  ?  ....  It  is  in  its  own  nature  fit, 
that  wisdom,  and  not  chance,  should  order  these  things."f 

In  our  opinion,  if  there  be  no  other  alternative,  it  is  better  • 
that  sin  should  be  left  to  chance,  than  ascribed  to  the  high  and 
holy  One.  But  why  must  sin  be  ordered  and  determined  by 
the  supreme  Ruler  of  the  world,  or  else  be  left  to  chance  ? 
Has  the  great  metaphysician  forgotten,  that  there  may  be  such 
things  as  men  and  angels  in  the  universe ;  or  does  he  mean, 
witli  Spinoza,  to  blot  out  all  created  agents,  and  all  subordinate 
agency,  from  existence  ?  If  not,  then  certainly  God  may  refuse 
to  be  the  author  of  sin,  without  leaving  it  to  blind  chance, 

0  HOWP'S  Works,  p.  1142.  f  On  the  Will,  part  iv,  sec.  ix. 


110  VORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

which  is  incapable  of  such  a  thing.  He  may  leave  it,  as  we 
conceive  he  has  done,  to  the  determination  of  finite  created 
intelligences.  If  sin  is  to  come  into  the  world,  as  come  it  evi- 
dently does,  it  is  infinitely  better,  we  say,  that  it  should  be  left 
to  proceed  from  the  creature,  and  not  be  made  to  emanate  from 
God  himself,  the  fountain  of  light,  and  the  great  object  of  all 
adoration.  It  is  infinitely  better  that  the  high  and  holy  One 
should  do  nothing  either  by  his  wisdom  or  by  his  decree,  by 
his  providence  or  his  power,  to  help  this  hideous  thing  to  raise 
its  head  amid  the  inconceivable  splendours  of  his  dominion. 

Such  speculations  as  those  of  Edwards  and  Leibnitz,  in  our 
opinion,  only  reflect  dishonour  and  disgrace  upon  the  cause 
they  are  intended  to  subserve.  It  is  better,  ten  thousand  times 
better,  simply  to  plant  ourselves  upon  the  moral  nature  of  man, 
and  the  irreversible  dictates  of  common  sense,  and  annihilate 
the  speculations  of  the  atheist,  than  to  endeavour  to  parry  them 
off  by  such  invented  quibbles  and  sophisms.  They  give  point, 
and  pungency,  and  power  to  the  shafts  of  the  sceptic.  If  we 
meet  him  on  the  common  ground  of  necessity,  he  will  snap  all 
such  quibbles  like  threads  of  tow,  and  overwhelm  us  with  the 
floods  of  irony  and  scorn.  For,  in  the  memorable  words  of 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  "  It  can  easily  be  proved  by  those  who 
are  able  and  not  afraid  to  reason,  that  the  doctrine  of  necessity 
is  subversive  of  religion,  natural  and  revealed."  To  perceive 
this,  it  requires  neither  a  Bayle,  nor  a  Hobbes,  nor  a  Hume ;  it 
only  requires  a  man  who  is  neither  unable  nor  afraid  to  reason. 


SECTION  IV. 

The  attempts  of  Dr.  Emmons  and  Dr.  Chalmers  to  reconcile  the  scheme  of 

with  the  purity  of  God. 


As  we  have  dwelt  so  long  on  the  speculations  of  President 
Edwards  concerning  the  objections  in  question,  we  need  add 
but  a  few  remarks  in  relation  to  the  views  of  the  above-men- 
tioned authors  on  the  same  subject.  The  sentiments  of  Dr. 
Emmons  on  the  relation  between  the  divine  agency  and  the  sin- 
ful actions  of  men,  are  even  more  clearly  defined  and  boldly 
expressed  than  those  of  President  Edwards.  The  disciple  is 
more  open  and  decided  than  the  master.  "Since  mind  can- 
not act/'  says  he,  "  any  more  than  matter  can  move,  without  a 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  Ill 

divine  agency,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  men  can  be  left  to 
the  freedom  of  their  own  will,  to  act,  or  not  to  act,  independ- 
ently of  a  divine  influence.  There  must  be,  therefore,  the 
exercise  of  a  divine  agency  in  every  human  action,  without 
which  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  that  God  should  govern  moral 
agents,  and  make  mankind  act  in  perfect  conformity  to  his 
designs."4'  "  He  is  now  exercising  his  powerful  and  irresistible 
agency  upon  the  heart  of  every  one  of  the  human  race,  and 
producing  either  holy  or  unholy  exercises  in  it."f  "  It  is  often 
thought  and  said,  that  nothing  more  was  necessary  on  God's 
part,  in  order  to  fit  Pharaoh  for  destruction,  than  barely  to 
leave  him  to  himself.  But  God  knew  that  no  external  means 
and  motives  would  be  sufficient  of  themselves  to  form  his  moral 
character.  He  determined  therefore  to  operate  on  his  heart 
itself,  and  cause  him  to  put  forth  certain  evil  exercises  in  view 
of  certain  external  motives.  When  Moses  called  upon  him  to 
let  the  people  go,  God  stood  by  him,  and  moved  him  to  refuse. 
When  the  people  departed  from  his  kingdom,  God  stood  by 
him  and  moved  him  to  pursue  after  them  with  increased  malice 
and  revenge.  And  what  God  did  on  such  particular  occasions, 
he  did  at  all  times.":):  It  is  useless  to  multiply  extracts  to  the 
same  effect.  Could  language  be  more  explicit,  or  more  revolt- 
ing to  the  moral  sentiments  of  mankind  ? 

If  God  is  alike  the  author  of  all  our  volitions,  sinful  as  well 
as  holy,  one  wonders  by  what  sort  of  legerdemain  the  authors 
of  the  doctrine  have  contrived  to  ascribe  all  the  glory  and  all 
the  praise  of  our  holy  actions  to  God,  and  at  the  same  time  all 
the  shame  and  condemnation  of  our  evil  actions  to  ourselves. 
In  relation  to  the  holy  actions  of  men,  all  the  praise  is  due  to 
God,  say  they,  because  they  were  produced  by  his  power. 
Why  is  not  the  moral  turpitude  of  their  evil  actions,  then,  also 
ascribed  to  God,  inasmuch  as  he  is  said  to  produce  them  by  his 
irresistible  and  almighty  agency  ?  We  are  accountable  for  our 
evil  acts,  say  Dr.  Emmons  and  Calvin,  because  they  are  volun- 
tary. Are  not  our  moral  acts,  our  virtuous  acts,  also  voluntary  ? 
Certainly  they  are ;  this  is  not  denied ;  and  yet  we  are  not 
allowed  to  impute  the  moral  quality  of  the  acts  to  the  agent  in 
such  cases.  This  whole  school  of  metaphysicians,  indeed,  from 
Calvin  down  to  Emmons,  can  make  God  the  author  of  our  evil 
°Emmons's  Works,  vol.  iv,  p.  372.  f  Ibid.,  P-  388-  I  K>id.,  P-  327 


112  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

acts,  by  an  exertion  of  his  omnipotence,  and  yet  assert  that 
because  they  are  voluntary  we  are  justly  blameworthy  and 
punishable  for  them ;  but  though  our  virtuous  acts  are  also 
voluntary,  they  still  insist  the  praiseworthiness  of  them  is  to  be 
ascribed  exclusively  to  Him  by  whom  they  were  produced. 
The  plain  truth  is,  that  as  the  scheme  originated  in  a  particular 
set  purpose  and  design,  so  it  is  one-sided  in  its  views,  arbitrary 
in  its  distinctions,  and  full  of  self-contradictions. 

The  simple  fact  seems  to  be,  that  if  any  effect  be  produced 
in  our  minds  by  the  power  of  God,  it  is  a  passive  impression, 
and  is  very  absurdly  called  a  voluntary  state  of  the  will.  And 
even  if  such  an  impression  could  be  a  voluntary  state,  or  a  voli 
tion,  properly  so  called,  we  should  not  be  responsible  for  it, 
because  it  is  produced  by  the  omnipotence  of  God  This,  we 
doubt  not,  is  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  universal  con- 
sciousness and  voice  of  mankind,  and  cannot  be  resisted  by  the 
sophistical  evasions  of  particular  men,  how  great  soever  may  be 
their  genius,  or  exalted  their  piety. 

We  shall,  in  conclusion,  add  one  more  great  name  to  the  list 
of  those  who,  from  their  zeal  for  the  glory  of  the  divine  omnipo- 
tence, have  really  and  clearly  made  God  the  author  of  sin. 
The  denial  of  his  scheme  of  "a  rigid  and  absolute  predes- 
tination," as  he  calls  it,  Dr.  Chalmers  deems  equivalent  to  the 
assertion,  that  "  things  grow  up  from  the  dark  womb  of  non- 
entity, which .  omnipotence  did  not  summon  into  being,  and 
which  omniscience  could  not  foretell."  And  again,  "  At  this 
rate,  events  would  come  forth  uncaused  from  the  womb  of  non- 
entity, to  which  omnipotence  did  not  give  birth,  and  which 
omniscience  could  not  foresee."*  Now  all  this  is  spoken,  be  it 
remembered,  in  relation  to  the  volitions  or  acts  of  men.  But 
if  there  are  no  such  events,  except  such  as  omnipotence  gives 
birth  to,  or  summons  into  being,  how  clear  and  how  irresistible 
is  the  conclusion  that  God  is  the  author  of  the  sinful  acts  of  the 
creature  ?  It  were  better,  we  say,  ten  thousand  times  better, 
that  sin,  that  monstrous  birth  of  night  and  darkness,  should 
grow  up  out  of  the  womb  of  nonentity,  if  such  were  the  only 
alternative,  than  that  it  should  proceed  from  the  bosom  of  God. 

°  Institutes  of  Theology,  vol.  ii,  chap.  iii. 


Chapter  III.-}  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  11* 


CHAPTEK   III. 

THE  SCHEME  OF  NECESSITY  DENIES  THE  REALITY  OF  MORAL  DISTINCfiONa 

Our  voluntary  service  He  requires, 

Not  our  necessitated ;  such  with  him 

Finds  no  acceptance,  nor  can  find ;  for  how 

Can  hearts,  not  free,  be  tried  whether  they  serve 

Willing  or  no,  who  will  but  what  they  must 

By  destiny,  and  can  no  other  choose  ? — MILTON. 

IN  the  preceding  chapters  we  have  taken  it  for  granted  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  moral  good  and  evil,  and  endeavoured 
to  show,  that  if  the  scheme  of  necessity  be  true,  man  is  absolved 
from  guilt,  and  God  is  the  author  of  sin.  But,  in  point  of  fact, 
if  the  scheme  of  necessity  be  true,  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
moral  good  or  evil  in  this  lower  world ;  all  distinction  between 
virtue  and  vice,  moral  good  and  evil,  is  a  mere  dream,  and  we 
really  live  in  a  non-moral  world.  This  has  been  shown  by 
many  of  the  advocates  of  necessity. 

SECTION  I. 
The  views  of  Spinoza  in  relation  to  the  reality  of  moral  distinctions. 

It  is  shown  by  Spinoza,  that  all  moral  distinctions  vanish 
before  the  iron  scheme  of  necessity.  They  are  swept  away  as  the 
dreams  of  vulgar  prejudice  by  the  force  of  Spinoza's  logic ;  yet 
little  praise  is  due,  we  think,  on  that  account,  to  the  superiority 
of  his  acumen.  The  wonder  is,  not  that  Spinoza  should  have 
drawn  such  an  inference,  but  that  any  one  should  fail  to  draw 
it.  For  if  our  volitions  are  necessitated  by  causes  over  which 
we  have  no  control,  it  seems  to  follow,  as  clear  as  noonday, 
that  they  cannot  be  the  objects  of  praise  or  blame — cannot  be 
our  virtue  or  vice.  So  far  is  it  indeed  from  requiring  any 
logical  acuteness  to  perceive  such  an  inference,  that  it  demands, 
as  we  shall  see,  the  very  greatest  ingenuity  to  keep  from  per- 
ceiving it.  Hence,  in  our  humble  opinion,  the  praise  which  has 
oeen  lavished  on  the  logic  of  Spinoza  is  not  deserved. 

His  superior  consistency  only  shows  one  of  two  things— 

8 


114  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

either  that  he  possessed  a  stronger  reasoning  faculty  than  his 
great  master,  Descartes,  or  a  weaker  moral  sense.  In  our 
opinion,  it  shows  the  latter.  If  his  moral  sentiments  had  been 
vigorous  and  active,  they  would  have  induced  him,  no  doubt, 
either  to  invent  sophistical  evasions  of  such  an  inference,  or  to 
reject  the  doctrine  from  which  it  flows.  If  a  Descartes,  a 
Leibnitz,  or  an  Edwards,  for  example,  had  seen  the  conse- 
quences of  the  scheme  of  necessity  as  clearly  as  they  were  seen 
by  Spinoza,  his  moral  nature  would  have  recoiled  from  it  with 
such  force  as  to  dash  the  premises  to  atoms.  If  any  praise, 
then,  be  due  to  Spinoza  for  such  triumphs  of  the  reasoning 
power,  it  should  be  given,  not  to  the  superiority  of  his  logic, 
but  to  the  apathy  of  his  moral  sentiments.  For  our  part, 
greatly  as  we  admire  sound  reasoning  and  consistency  in  specu- 
lation, we  had  rather  be  guilty  of  ten  thousand  acts  of  logical 
inconsistency,  such  as  those  of  Edwards,  or  Leibnitz,  or  Des- 
cartes, than  to  be  capable  of  resting  in  the  conclusion  to  which 
the  logic  of  Spinoza  conducted  him — that  every  moral  distinc 
tion  is  a  vulgar  prejudice,  and  that  the  existence  of  moral  good 
ness  is  a  dream.* 

SECTION  II. 

The  attempt  of  Edwards  to  reconcile  the  scheme  of  necessity  with  the  reality 
of  moral  distinctions. 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  see,  perhaps,  that  a  necessary 
holiness,  or  a  necessary  sin,  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  if  we 
would  only  allow  reason  to  speak  for  itself,  instead  of  extorting 
testimony  from  it  by  subjecting  it  to  the  torture  of  a  false  logic. 
For  what  proposition  can  more  clearly  carry  its  own  evidence 
along  with  it,  than  that  whatever  is  necessary  to  us,  that  what- 
ever we  cannot  possibly  avoid,  is  neither  our  virtue  nor  our 
fault  ?  What  can  be  more  unquestionable,  than  that  we  can 
be  neither  to  praise  nor  to  blame,  neither  justly  rewardable  nor 
punishable  for  anything  over  whose  existence  we  have  no  power 

*  Empb.atically  as  this  conclusion  is  stated  by  Spinoza,  and  harshly  as  it  is 
thrust  by  him  against  the  moral  sense  of  the  reader,  he  could  not  himself  find 
a  perfect  rest  therein.  Nothing  can  impart  this  to  the  reflective  and  inquiring 
mind  but  truth.  Hence,  even  Spinoza  finds  himself  constrained  to  speak  of  the 
duty  of  love  to  God,  and  so  forth ;  all  of  which,  according  to  his  own  conclusion, 
is  irrelative  nonsense. 


Chapter  III.]  \YITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  115 

or  control  ?  Yet  this  question,  apparently  so  plain  and  simple 
in  itself,  has  been  enveloped  in  clouds  of  metaphysical  subtilty, 
and  obscured  by  huge  masses  of  scholastic  jargon.  If,  on  this 
subject,  we  have  wandered  in  the  dim  twilight  of  uncertain 
speculation,  instead  of  walking  in  the  clear  open  day,  this  has 
been,  it  seems  to  us,  because  we  have  neglected  the  wise  admoni- 
tion of  Barrow,  that  logic,  however  admirable  in  its  place,  was 
not  designed  as  an  instrument  "to  put  out  the  sight  of  our 
eyes." 

It  shall  be  our  first  object,  then,  to  pull  down  and  destroy 
"the  invented  quibbles  and  sophisms"  which  have  so  long 
darkened  and  confounded  the  light  of  reason  and  conscience  in 
relation  to  the  nature  of  moral  good  and  evil,  to  dispel  the 
clouds  which  have  been  so  industriously  thrown  around  this 
subject,  in  order  that  the  bright  and  shining  light  of  nature 
may,  free  and  unobstructed,  find  its  way  into  our  minds  arid 
hearts. 

We  say,  then,  that  there  never  can  be  virtue  or  vice  in  the 

«/   ' 

breast  of  a  moral  agent,  prior  to  his  own  actings  and  doings. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  insisted  by  Edwards,  that  true  virtue  or 
holiness  was  planted  in  the  bosom  of  the  first  man  by  the  act 
of  creation.  "In  a  moral  agent,"  says  he,  "subject  to  moral 
obligations,  it  is  the  same  thing  to  be  perfectly  innocent,  as  to 
be  perfectly  righteous.  It  must  be  the  same,  because  there 
can  no  more  be  any  medium  between  sin  and  righteousness,  or 
between  being  right  and  being  wrong,  in  a  moral  sense,  than 
there  can  be  a  medium  between  straight  and  crooked  in  a 
natural."*  This  is  applied  to  the  first  man  as  he  came  from 
the  hand  of  the  Creator,  and  is  designed  to  show  that  he  was 
created  with  true  holiness  or  virtue  in  his  heart.  According  to 
this  doctrine,  man  was  made  upright,  not  merely  in  the  sense 
that  he  was  free  from  the  least  bias  to  evil,  or  that  he  possessed 
all  the  powers  requisite  to  moral  agency,  but  in  the  sense  that 
true  virtue  or  moral  goodness  was  planted  in  his  nature  by  the 
act  of  creation.  If  this  be  so,  the  doctrine  of  a  necessary  holi- 
ness must  be  admitted ;  for  surely  nothing  can  be  more  neces- 
sary to  us,  nothing  can  take  place  in  which  we  have  less  to  do, 
than  the  act  by  which  we  are  created. 

This  then  is  the  question   which   we  intend   to  examine : 

0  Original  Sin,  part  ii,  chap,  i,  sec.  i. 


lie  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part   I, 

whether  that  which  is  concreated  with  a  moral  agent,  can  be 
his  virtue  or  his  vice?  Whether,  in  other  words,  the  dispo- 
sitions or  qualities  which  Adam  derived  from  the  hand  of  God, 
partook  of  the  nature  of  true  virtue  or  otherwise?  Edwards 
assumes  the  affirmative.  To  establish  his  position,  he  relios 
upon  two  arguments,  which  we  shall  proceed  to  examine. 

The  first  argument  is  designed  to  show,  that  unless  true  vir- 
tue, or  moral  goodness,  had  been  planted  in  the  nature  of  man 
by  the  finger  of  God,  it  could  never  have  found  its  way  into 
the  world.  To  give  this  argument  in  his  own  words,  he  says  : 
"  It  is  agreeable  to  the  sense  of  men  in  all  nations  and  ages,  not 
only  that  the  fruit  or  effect  of  a  good  choice  is  virtuous,  but  that 
the  good  choice  itself,  from  whence  that  effect  proceeds,  is  so ; 
yea,  also,  tL  j  antecedent  good  disposition,  temper,  or  affection 
of  mind,  from  whence  proceeds  that  good  choice,  is  virtuous. 
Tli  is  is  the  general  notion — not  that  principles  derive  their 
goodness  from  actions,  but  that  actions  derive  their  goodness 
from  the  principles  whence  they  proceed ;  so  that  the  act  of 
choosing  what  is  good  is  no  further  virtuous,  than  it  proceeds 
from  a  good  principle,  or  virtuous  disposition  of  mind ;  which 
supposes  that  a  virtuous  disposition  of  mind  may  be  before  a 
virtuous  act  of  choice  ;  and  that,  therefore,  it  is  not  necessary 
there  should  first  be  thought,  reflection,  and  choice,  before  there 
.can  be  any  virtuous  disposition.  If  the  choice  be  first,  before 
the  existence  of  a  good  disposition  of  heart,  what  is  the  charac- 
ter of  that  choice  ?  There  can,  according  to  our  natural  notions, 
be  no  virtue  in  a  choice  which  proceeds  from  no  virtuous  prin- 
ciple, but  from  mere  self-love,  ambition,  or  some  animal  appe- 
tites ;  therefore,  a  virtuous  temper  of  mind  may  be  before  a 
good  act  of  choice,  as  a  tree  may  be  before  its  fruit,  and  the 
fountain  before  the  stream  which  proceeds  from  it."*  Thus,  he 
argues,  if  there  must  be  choice  before  a  good  disposition,  or 
virtue,  according  to  our  doctrine,  then  virtue  could  not  arise 
at  all,  or  find  its  way  into  the  world.  For  all  men  concede,  says 
he,  that  every  virtuous  choice,  or  act,  must  proceed  from  a  vir- 
tuous disposition  ;  and  if  this  must  also  proceed  from  a  virtuous 
act,  it  is  plain  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  virtue  or  moral 
goodness  at  all.  The  scheme  which  teaches  that  the  act  must 
precede  the  principle,  and  the  principle  the  act,  reduces  the 

0  Original  Sin,  part  ii,  ch.  i,  sec.  i. 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  1 1 7 

very  existence  of  virtue  to  a  plain  impossibility.  He  shows 
virtue  to  be  possible,  and  escapes  the  difficulty,  by  referring  it 
to  the  creative  energy  of  the  Divine  Being,  by  which  the  prin- 
ciple of  virtue,  he  contends,  was  planted  in  the  mind  of  the 
first  man. 

This  argument  is  plausible  ;  but  it  will  not  bear  a  close  exam- 
ination. It  might  be  made  to  give  way,  in  various  directions, 
before  an  analysis  of  the  principle  on  which  it  is  constructed ; 
but  we  intend  to  demolish  it  by  easier  and  more  striking  argu- 
ments. If  we  had  nothing  better  to  oppose  to  it,  we  might 
indeed  neutralize  its  effect  by  a  counter-argument  of  Edwards 
himself,  which  we  find  in  his  celebrated  work  on  the  will. 
He  there  says,  that  the  virtuousness  of  every  virtuous  act  or 
choice  depends  upon  its  own  nature,  and  not  upon  its  origin 
or  cause.  If  we  must  refer  every  virtuous  act,  says  he,  to 
something  in  us  that  is  virtuous  as  its  antecedent,  we  must  like- 
wise refer  that  antecedent  to  some  other  virtuous  origin  or  cause ; 
and  so  on  ad  injmitum.  Thus  we  should  be  compelled  to  trace 
virtue  back  from  step  to  step,  until  we  had  quite  driven  it  out 
of  the  world,  and  excluded  it  from  the  universality  of  things.* 

Now  this  argument  seems  just  as  plausible  as  that  which  we 
have  produced  from  the  same  author,  in  his  work  on  Original 
Sin.  Let  us  lay  them  together,  and  contemplate  the  joint 
result.  According  to  one,  the  character  of  every  virtuous  act 
depends  upon  the  virtuousness  of  the  principle  or  disposition 
whence  it  proceeds ;  according  to  the  other,  it  depends  upon  its 
own  nature,  and  not  at  all  upon  anything  in  its  origin,  or  cause, 
or  antecedent.  According  to  one,  we  must  trace  every  virtuous 
act  to  a  virtuous  principle,  and  the  virtuous  principle  itself  to 
the  necessitating  act  of  God ;  according  to  the  other,  we  must 
look  no  higher  to  determine  the  character  of  an  act  than  its 
own  nature  ;  and  if  we  proceed  to  its  origin  or  cause  to  deter- 
mine its  character,  we  shall  find  no  stopping-place.  We  shall 
not  trace  it  up  to  God,  as  before,  but  we  shall  banish  all  virtue 
quite  out  of  the  world,  and  exclude  it  from  the  universality  of 
things  According  to  one  argument,  there  can  be  no  virtue 
in  the  world,  unless  it  be  caused  to  exist,  in  the  first  place,  by 
the  necessitating,  creative  act  of  the  Almighty  ;  and  according 
to  the  other,  the  virtuousness  of  every  virtuous  act,  depends  upon 

0  Inquiry,  part  iv,  sec.  i. 


118  MORAL   EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

its  own  nature,  and  is  wholly  independent  of  the  question 
respecting  its  origin  or  cause.  The  solution  of  these  incon- 
sistencies and  contradictions,  we  shall  leave  to  the  followers 
and  admirers  of  President  Edwards.* 

But  we  have  something  better,  we  trust,  to  oppose  to  Presi- 
dent Edwards  than  his  own  arguments.  If  his  logic  be  good 
for  anything,  it  will  prove  that  God  is  the  author  of  sin  as  well 
as  of  virtue.  For  it  is  as  much  the  common  notion  of  mankind 
that  every  sinful  act  must  proceed  from  a  sinful  disposition  or 
principle,  as  it  is  that  every  virtuous  act  must  proceed  from  a 
virtuous  disposition  or  principle ;  and  hence,  according  to  the 
logic  of  Edwards,  a  sinful  disposition  or  principle  must  have  pre- 
ceded the  first  sinful  act ;  that  an  antecedent  sinful  disposition 
or  principle  could  not  have  been  introduced  by  the  act  of  the 
creature,  and  consequently  it  must  have  been  planted  in  the 
bosom  of  the  first  man  by  the  act  of  the  Creator.  This  argu- 
ment, we  say,  just  as  clearly  shows  that  sin  is  impossible,  or 
that  it  must  have  been  concreated  with  man,  as  it  shows  the 
same  thing  in  relation  to  virtue.  If  we  maintain  his  argument, 
then,  we  must  either  deny  the  possibility  of  moral  evil  or  make 
God  the  author  of  it. 

After  having  laid  down  principles  from  which  the  impossi- 
bility of  moral  evil  may  be  demonstrated,  it  was  too  late  for 
Edwards  to  undertake  to  account  for  the  origin  of  sin.  Accord- 
ing to  his  philosophy,  it  can  have  no  existence ;  and  hence  we 
are  not  to  look  into  that  philosophy  for  any  very  clear  account 
of  how  it  took  its  rise  in  the  world.  Indeed,  this  point  is  hur- 
ried over  by  Edwards  in  a  most  hasty  and  superficial  manner, 

0  They  are  accustomed  to  boast,  that  no  man  ever  excelled  Edwards  in  the 
reductio  ad  alsurdum.  But  we  believe  no  one  has  produced  a  more  striking  illus- 
tration of  his  ability  in  the  use  of  this  weapon,  than  that  which  we  have  just 
adduced.  For  if  we  contend,  that  every  act  is  to  be  judged  according  to  its  own 
nature,  whether  it  be  good  or  evil,  he  will  demonstrate,  that  we  render  virtue 
impossible,  and  exclude  it  entirely  from  the  world.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we 
shift  our  position,  and  contend  that  no  act  is  to  be  judged  according  to  its  own 
nature,  but  according  to  the  goodness  or  badness  of  its  origin  or  cause,  he  will 
also  reduce  this  position,  diametrically  opposite  though  it  be  to  the  former,  to 
precisely  the  same  absurdity  ;  namely,  that  it  excludes  all  virtue  out  of  the  world, 
and  banishes  it  from  the  universality  of  things  !  Surely,  this  reductio  ad  ab~ 
surdum  is  a  most  formidable  weapon  in  his  hands  ;  since  he  wields  it  with  such 
destructive  fury  against  the  most  opposite  principles,  and  seems  himself  scarcely 
less  exposed  than  others  to  its  force. 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  119 

in  which  lie  seems  conscious  of  no  little  embarrassment.  In  his 
great  work  on  the  will  he  devotes  one  page  and  a  half  to  tin's 
subject;  and  the  greater  part  of  this  small  space  is  filled  up 
with  the  retort  upon  the  Arrninians,  that  their  scheme  is  en- 
cumbered with  as  great  difficulties  as  his  own !  He  lets  the 
truth  drop  in  one  place,  however,  that  "  the  abiding  principle 
and  hatyt  of  sin"  was  "  first  introduced  by  an  evil  act  of  the 
creature."*  Is  it  possible?  How  could  there  be  an  evil  act 
which  did  not  proceed  from  an  antecedent  evil  principle  or  dis- 
position ?  What  becomes  of  the  great  common  notion  of  man- 
kind, on  which  his  demonstration  is  erected  ?  But  we  must  allow 
the  author  to  contradict  himself,  since  he  has  now  come  around 
to  the  truth,  that  an  evil  act  of  the  creature  may  and  must  have 
preceded  the  existence  of  moral  evil  in  the  world.  If  an  intel- 
ligent creature,  however,  as  it  came  from  the  hand  of  God,  can 
introduce  a  "  principle  of  sin  by  a  sinful  act,"  why  should  it  be 
thought  impossible  for  such  a  creature  to  introduce  a  principle 
of  virtue  by  a  virtuous  act? 

The  truth  is,  that  a  virtuous  act  does  not  require  an  antecedent 
virtuous  disposition  or  principle  to  account  for  its  existence ;  nor 
does  a  vicious  act  require  an  antecedent  vicious  principle  to  ac- 
count for  its  existence.  In  relation  to  the  rise  of  good  and  evil 
in  the  world,  the  philosophy  of  Edwards  is  radically  defective ; 
and  no  one  can  discuss  that  subject  on  the  principles  of  his  phi- 
losophy without  finding  himself  involved  in  contradictions  and 
absurdities.  If  his  psychology  had  not  been  false,  he  might 
have  seen  a  clear  and  steady  light  where  he  has  only  beheld 
difficulties  and  confusion.  As  we  have  already  seen,  and  as  we 
shall  still  more  fully  see,  Edwards  confounds  the  power  by  which 
we  act  with  the  susceptibility  through  which  we  feel:  the  will 
with  the  emotive  part  of  our  nature.  Every  one  knows  that  we 
may  feel  without  acting ;  and  yet  feeling  and  acting,  suffering^ 
and  doing,  are  expressly  and  repeatedly  identified  in  his  writ- 
ings. Having  merged  the  will  in  sensibility,  he  regarded  vir- 
tue and  vice  as  phenomena  of  the  latter,  and  as  evolved  from 
its  bosom  by  the  operation  of  necessitating  causes.  Hence  his 
views  in  relation  to  the  nature  of  moral  good  and  evil,  as  well 
as  in  relation  to  their  origin,  became  unavoidably  dark  and 
uonfused. 

0  Inquiry,  part  iv,  sec.  x. 


120  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

If  we  only  bear  in  mind  the  distinction  between  the  will  and 
the  sensibility,  we  may  easily  see  how  either  holiness  or  sin 
might  have  taken  its  rise  in  the  bosom  of  the  first  man,  without 
supposing  that  either  a  holy  or  a  sinful  principle  was  planted 
there  by  the  hand  of  the  Creator.  If  we  will  only  carry  the 
light  of  this  distinction  along  with  us,  it  wrill  be  no  more  diffi- 
cult to  account  for  the  rise  of  the  first  sin  in  the  bo§om  of  a 
spotless  creature  of  God,  than  to  account  for  any  other  volition 
of  the  human  mind.  The  first  man,  by  means  of  his  intelli- 
gence, could  contemplate  the  perfection  of  his  Creator,  and, 
doing  so,  he  could  not  but  feel  an  emotion  of  admiration  and 
delight.  But  this  feeling  was  not  his  virtue.  It  was  the  natural 
and  the  necessary  result  of  the  organization  which  God  had 
given  him.  He  was  also  so  constituted,  that  certain  earthly 
objects  were  agreeable  to  him,  and  excited  his  natural  appetites 
and  desires.  These  appetites  and  desires  were  not  sinful,  nor 
was  the  sensibility  from  whose  bosom  they  were  evolved :  they 
were  the  spontaneous  workings  of  the  nature  which  God  had 
bestowed  upon  him.  But  his  will  was  free.  He  could  turn 
his  mind  to  God,  or  he  could  turn  it  to  earth.  He  did  the  latter, 
and  there  was  no  harm  in  this.  But  he  listened  to  the  voice 
of  the  tempter ;  he  fixed  his  mind  on  the  forbidden  fruit ;  he 
saw  it  was  pleasant  to  the  eye ;  he  imagined  it  was  good  for 
food,  and  greatly  to  be  desired  to  make  one  wise.  Neither 
the  possession  of  the  intellect  by  which  he  perceived  the  beauty 
of  the  fruit,  nor  of  the  sensibility  in  which  it  excited  so  many 
pleasurable  emotions,  wras  the  sin  of  Adam.  They  were  given 
to  him  by  the  Author  of  every  good  and  perfect  gift.  His  will 
was  free.  It  was  not  necessitated  to  act  by  his  desires.  But 
yet,  in  direct  opposition  to  the  known  will  of  God,  he  put  forth 
an  act  of  his  own  free  mind,  his  own  unnecessitated  will,  and 
plucked  the  forbidden  fruit  to  gratify  his  desires.  This  was  his 
sin — this  voluntary  transgression  of  the  known  will  of  God.  On 
the  jther  hand,  if  he  had  resisted  the  temptation,  and  instead 
of  voluntarily  gratifying  his  appetite  and  desire,  had  preserved 
his  allegiance  to  God  by  acting  in  conformity  witl,  his  will, 
this  would  have  been  his  virtue.  He  would  have  acted  in  con- 
formity with  the  rule  of  duty,  and  thereby  gratified  a  feeling 
of  love  to  God,  instead  of  the  lower  feelings  of  his  nature. 

Thus,  by  observing  the  distinction  between  the  will  and  the 


Chapter  IIL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  121 

sensitive  part  of  our  nature,  we  may  easily  see  how  either  holi- 
ness or  sin  might  have  arisen  in  the  bosom  of  the  first  man, 
though  he  had  neither  a  holy  nor  a  sinful  principle  planted  in 
his  nature  by  the  hand  of  the  Creator.  We  may  easily  see 
that  he  had  all  the  powers  requisite  to  moral  agency,  and  that 
1  e  was  really  capable  of  either  a  holy  or  a  sinful  act,  without 
any  antecedent  principle  of  holiness  or  sin  in  his  nature. 

We  have  now  said  enough,  we  think,  to  show  the  fallacy  of 
Edwards'o  first  great  argument  in  favour  of  a  necessary  holiness. 
We  have  seen,  that  we  need  not  suppose  the  existence  of  a 
virtuous  principle  in  the  first  man,  in  order  to  account  for  his 
first  virtuous  act,  or  to  render  virtue  possible.  We  might  point 
out  many  other  errors  and  inconsistencies  in  which  that  argu- 
ment is  involved;  but  to  avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  becoming 
prolix  and  tiresome,  we  shall  proceed  to  consider  his  second 
argument  in  favour  of  a  necessary  or  concreated  holiness. 

•His  second  argument  is  this:  "Human  nature  must  have 
been  created  with  some  dispositions — a  disposition  to  relish 
some  things  as  good  and  amiable,  and  to  be  averse  to  others  as 
odious  and  disagreeable ;  otherwise  it  must  be  without  any 
such  thing  as  inclination  or  will ;  perfectly  indifferent,  without 
preference,  without  choice,  or  aversion,  towards  anything  as 
agreeable  or  disagreeable.  But  if  it  had  any  concreated  dis- 
positions at  all,  they  must  be  either  right  or  wrong,  either 
agreeable  or  disagreeable  to  the  nature  of  things.  If  man  had 
at  first  the  highest  relish  of  things  excellent  and  beautiful,  a 
disposition  to  have  the  quickest  and  highest  delight  in  those 
things  which  were  most  worthy  of  it,  then  his  dispositions  were 
morally  right  and  amiable,  and  never  can  be  excellent  in  a 
higher  sense.  But  if  he  had  a  disposition  to  love  most  those 
things  that  were  inferior  and  less  worthy,  then  his  dispositions 
were  vicious.  And  it  is  evident  there  can  be  no  medium 
between  these." 

It  is  thus  that  Edwards  seeks  and  finds  virtue  in  the  emotion, 
and  not  in  the  voluntary  element  of  man's  nature.  The  natural 
concreated  disposition  of  Adam,  he  supposes,  was  morally  right 
in  the  highest  sense  of  the  word,  because  he  was  so  made  as  to 
relish  and  delight  in  the  glorious  perfections  of  the  divine 
nature.  Our  first  answer  to  this  is,  that  it  is  contradicted  by 
the  reason  and  moral  j  udginent  of  mankind  in  general,  and,  in 


122  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

particular,  by  the  reason  and  moral  judgment  of  Edwards 
himself. 

It  is  agreeable  to  the  voice  of  human  reason,  that  nothing 
can  be  OUT  virtue,  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  which  was 
planted  in  us  by  the  act  of  creation,  and  in  regard  to  the  pro- 
duction of  which  we  possessed  no  knowledge,  exercised  no 
agency,  and  gave  no  consent.  And  if  we  listen  to  the  language 
of  Edwards,  when  the  peculiarities  of  his  system  are  out  of  the 
question,  we  shall  find  that -this  moral  judgment  was  as  agree- 
able to  him  as  it  is  to  the  rest  of  mankind.  For  example : 
human  nature  is  created  with  a  disposition  to  be  grateful  for 
favours  ;  and  this  disposition,  according  to  Edwards,  must  either 
be  agreeable  or  disagreeable  to  the  nature  of  things,  that  is,  it 
must  be  either  morally  right  or  wrong  in  the  highest  sense  of 
the  word.  There  can  be  no  medium  between  these  two — it 
must  partake  of  the  nature  of  virtue  or  of  vice.  Now,  which 
of  the  terms  of  this  alternative  does  Edward?  adopt  \  Does  Ije 
pronounce  this  natural  disposition  our  virtue  or  our  vice  1  We 
do  not  know  what  Edwards  would  have  said,  if  this  question  had 
been  propounded  to  him  in  connexion  with  the  argument  now 
under  consideration  ;  but  we  do  know  what  he  has  said  of  it  in 
other  portions  of  his  works.  This  natural  concreated  disposi- 
tion is,  says  he,  neither  our  virtue  nor  our  vice !  "  That  in- 
gratitude, or  the  want  of  natural  affection, "  says  he,  "  shows  a 
high  degree  of  depravity,  does  not  prove  that  all  gratitude  and 
natural  affection  possesses  the  nature  of  true  virtue  or  saving 
grace."*  "  We  see,  in  innumerable  instances,  that  mere  nature 
is  sufficient  to  excite  gratitude  in  men,  or  to  affect  their  hearts 
with  thankfulness  to  others  for  favours  received."f  "  Gratitude 
being  thus  a  natural  principle,  ingratitude  is  so  much  the  more 
vile  and  heinous ;  because  it  shows  a  dreadful  prevalence  of 
wickedness,  which  even  overbears  and  suppresses  the  bettei 
principles  of  human  nature.  It  is  mentioned  as  a  high  degree 
of  wickedness  in  many  of  the  heathen,  that  they  were  without 
natural  affection.  Rom.  ii,  31.  But  that  the  want  of  gratitude, 
or  natural  affection,  is  evidence  of  a  great  degree  of  vice,  is 
no  argument  that  all  gratitude  and  natural  affection  has  the 
nature  of  virtue  or  saving  grace." 

Here,  as  well  as  in  various  other  places,  Edwards  speaks  of 

0  Religious  Affections,  part  iii,  sec.  ii.  f  Ibid. 


Chapter  IK.1  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  123 

gratitude  and  other  natural  affections  as  the  better  principles 
of  our  nature ;  to  be  destitute  of  which  he  considers  a  horrible 
deformity.  But,  however  amiable  and  lovely,  he  denies  to  these 
natural  affections,  or  dispositions,  the  character  of  virtue ;  be- 
cause they  are  merely  natural  or  concreated  dispositions.  They 
are  innocent ;  that  is,  they  are  neither  our  virtue  nor  our  vice, 
but  a  medium  between  moral  good  and  evil.  Nothing  can  be 
more  reasonable  than  this,  and  nothing  more  inconsistent  with 
the  logic  of  the  author.  Such  is  the  testimony  of  Edwards  him- 
self, when  he  escapes  from  the  shadows  of  a  dark  system,  and 
the  trammels  of  a  false  logic,  and  permits  his  own  individual 
mind,  in  the  clear  open  light  of  nature,  to  work  in  full  unison 
with  the  universal  mind  of  man. 

According  to  the  author's  own  definition  of  "  true  virtue,"  it 
"  is  the  beauty  of  those  qualities  and  acts  of  the  rniiid  that  are 
of  a  moral  nature,  i.  e.,  such  as  are  attended  with  desert  of 
praise  or  blame"  Surely,  Adam  could  have  deserved  no  praise 
for  the  qualities  bestowed  on  him  by  the  act  of  creation ;  and 
hence,  according  to  the  author's  own  definition,  they  could  not 
have  been  his  virtue.  In  regard  to  the  "  new  creation  "  of  the 
soul,  Edwards  contends  that  all  the  praise  is  due  to  God,  and  no 
part  of  it  to  man ;  because  the  whole  work  is  performed  by 
divine  grace,  without  human  cooperation.  Now,  we  admit  that 
if  the  whole  work  of  regeneration  is  performed  by  God,  then 
man  is  not  to  be  praised  for  it ;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  not  his  virtue. 
Here  again  the  author  sets  forth  the  true  principle;  but  how 
does  it  agree  with  his  logic  in  relation  to  the  first  man?  Was 
not  his  creation  wholly  and  exclusively  the  work  of  God  ?  If  so, 
then  all  the  praise  is  due  to  God,  and  no  part  of  it  to  man.  But, 
according  to  the  author's  own  definition,  when  there  is  no  praise- 
worthiness  there  is  no  virtue ;  and  hence,  as  Adam  deserved  no 
praise  on  account  of  what  he  received  at  his  creation,  so  such 
endowments  partook  not  of  the  nature  of  true  virtue. 

But  we  have  a  still  more  fundamental  objection  to  the  argu- 
ment in  question.  It  proceeds  on  the  supposition  that  true  vir- 
tue consists  in  IU\QYQ  feeling.  This  view  of  the  nature  of  virtue 
is  admirably  adapted  to  make  it  agree  and  harmonize  with  the 
scheme  of  necessity ;  but  it  is  not  a  sound  view.  If  an  object 
is  calculated  to  excite  a  certain  feeling  or  emotion  in  the  mind, 
that  feeling  or  emotion  will  necessarily  arise  in  view  of  such 


124  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  IPart  I, 

object.  If  the  glorious  perfections  of  the  divine  nature,  for  ex- 
ample, had  been  presented  to  the  mind  of  Adam,  no  doubt  he 
would  have  been  necessarily  compelled  to  "  love,  relish,  and 
delight  in  them."  But  this  feeling  of  love  and  delight,  thua 
necessarily  evolved  out  of  the  bosom  of  his  natural  disposition, 
however  exquisite  and  enrapturing,  would  not  have  been  his 
virtue  or  holiness.  It  would  have  been  the  spontaneous  and 
irresistible  development  of  the  nature  which  God  had  given  him 
We  may  admire  it  as  the  most  beautiful  unfolding  of  that  na 
'ture,  but  we  cannot  applaud  it  as  the  virtue  or  moral  goodness 
of  Adam.  We  look  upon  it  merely  as  the  excellency  and  glory 
of  the  divine  wrork  of  creation.  We  could  regard  the  glory  of 
the  heavens,  or  the  beauty  of  the  earth,  with  a  sentiment  of 
moral  approbation,  as  easily  as  we  could  ascribe  the  character 
of  moral  goodness  to  the  noble  qualities  with  which  the  Al- 
mighty had  been  pleased  to  adorn  the  nature  of  the  first  man. 

The  beautiful  feeling  or  emotion  of  love  is  merely  the  blossom 
which  precedes  the  formation  of  true  virtue  in  the  heart.  Tin's 
consists,  not  in  holy  feelings,  as  they  are  called,  but  in  holy 
exercises  of  the  will.  It  is  only  when  the  will,  in  its  workings, 
coalesces  with  a  sense  of  right  and  a  feeling  of  love  to  God, 
that  the  blossom  gives  place  to  the  fruit  of  virtue.  A  virtuous 
act  is  not  a  spontaneous  and  irresistible  emotion  of  the  sensi- 
bility ;  it  is  a  voluntary  exercise  and  going  forth  of  the  will  in 
obedience  to  God. 

It  is  a  strange  error  which  makes  virtue  consist  in  "the 
spontaneous  affections,  emotions,  and  desires  that  arise  in  the 
mind  in  view  of  its  appropriate  objects."  If  these  necessarily 
arise  in  us,  "  and  do  not  wait  for  the  bidding  of  the  will,"*  how 
can  they  possibly  be  our  virtue?  how  can  they  form  the  objects 
of  moral  approbation  in  us?  Yet  is  it  confidently  asserted, 
that  the  denial  of  such  a  doctrine  "  stands  in  direct  and  palpa- 
ble opposition  to  the  authority  of  God's  word."f  The  word  of 
God,  we  admit,  says  that  holiness  consists  in  love ;  but  does  it 
assert  that  it  consists  in  the  feeling  of  love  merely  ?  or  in  any 
feeling  which  spontaneously  and  irresistibly  arises  in  the  mind? 
If  the  Scripture  had  been  written  expressly  to  refute  such  a 
moral  heresy,  it  could  not  have  been  more  pointed  or  explicit. 

Holiness  consists  in  love.     But  what  is  the  meaning  of  the 

0  Dr.  Woods.  |  Ibid. 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  125 

term  love,  as  set  forth  in  Scripture?  We  answer,  "This  is  the 
love  of  God,"  that  we  "  keep  his  commandments."  "  Let  us 
not  love  in  word,  neither  in  tongue,  but  in  deed  and  in  truth." 
"  Whosoever  heareth  these  sayings  of  mine  and  doeth  them,  I 
will  liken  him  unto  a  wise  man  who  built  his  house  upon  a  rock." 
"  He  that  hath  my  commandments,  and  keepeth  them,  he  it  is 
that  loveth  me."  Here,  as  well  as  in  innumerable  other  places, 
are  we  told  that  true  love  is  not  a  mere  evanescent  feeling  of 
the  heart,  but  an  inwrought  and  abiding  habit  of  the  will.  It 
is  not  a  suffering,  it  is  a  doing.  The  most  lively  emotions,  the 
most  ecstatic  feelings,  if  they  lead  not  the  will  to  action,  can 
avail  us  nothing;  for  the  tree  will  be  judged,  not  by  its 
blossoms,  but  by  its  fruits. 

If  we  see  our  brother  in  distress,  we  cannot  but  sympathize 
with  him,  unless  our  hearts  have  been  hardened  by  crime. 
The  feeling  of  compassion  will  spontaneously  arise  in  our 
minds,  in  view  of  his  distress ;  but  let  us  not  too  hastily  imag- 
ine therefore  that  we  are  virtuous,  or  even  humane.  We  may 
possess  a  tender  feeling  of  compassion,  and  yet  the  feeling  may 
have  no  corresponding  act.  The  opening  fountain  of  compas- 
sion may  be  shut  up,  or  turned  aside  from  its  natural  course,  by 
a  wrong  habit  of  the  will ;  and  hence,  with  all  our  weeping 
tenderness  of  feeling,  we  may  be  destitute  of  any  true  humanity. 
We  may  be  merely  as  sounding  brass,  or  a  tinkling  cymbal. 
"  Whoso  hath  this  world's  goods,  and  seeth  his  brother  have 
need,  and  shutteth  up  his  bo\vels  of  compassion  from  him,  how 
dwelleth  the  love  of  God  in  him  ?"  It  is  this  loving  in  work, 
and  not  in  feeling  merely,  which  the  word  of  God  requires  of 
us  ;  and  when,  at  the  last  day,  all  nations,  and  kindreds,  and 
tongues,  shall  stand  before  the  throne  of  heaven,  we  shall  be 
judged,  not  according  to  the  feelings  we  have  experienced,  but 
according  to  the  deeds  done  in  the  body.  Hence,  the  doctrine 
which  makes  true  virtue  or  moral  goodness  consist  in  the 
spontaneous  and  irresistible  feelings  of  the  heart,  "  stands  in 
direct  and  palpable  opposition  to  the  authority  of  God's  word/' 

Feeling  is  one  thing ;  obedience  is  another.  This  counter- 
feit virtue  or  moral  goodness,  which  begins  and  terminates  in 
feeling,  is  far  more  common  than  true  virtue  or  holiness.  Whu 
can  reflect,  for  instance,  on  the  infinite  goodness  of  God,  with- 
out an  emotion  or  feeling  of  love  ?  That  man  must  indeed  be 


126  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [.Part  i, 

uncommonly  hard-hearted  and  sullen,  who  can  walk  out  on  a 
fine  day  and  behold  the  wonderful  exhibitions  of  divine  good- 
ness on  all  sides  around  him,  without  being. warmed  into  a  feel- 
ing of  admiration  and  love.  "When  all  nature  is  music  to  the 
ear  and  beauty  to  the  eye,  it  requires  nothing  more  than  a 
freedom  from  the  darker  stains  and  clouds  of  guilt  within,  to 
lead  a  sympathizing  heart  to  the  sunshine  of  external  nature,  as 
it  seems  to  rejoice  in  the  smile  of  Infinite  Beneficence.  The 
heart  may  swell  with  rapture  as  it  looks  abroad  on  a  happy 
universe,  replenished  with  so  many  evidences  of  the  divine 
goodness ;  nay,  the  story  of  a  Saviour's  love,  set  forth  in  elo- 
quent and  touching  language,  may  draw  tears  from  our  eyes, 
and  the  soul  may  rise  in  gratitude  to  the  Author  of  such  bound- 
less compassion  ;  and  yet,  after  all,  we  may  be  mere  sentiment- 
alists in  religion,  whose  wills  and  whose  lives  are  in  direct  oppo- 
sition to  all  laws,  both  human  and  divine.  Infidelity  itself,  in 
such  moments  of  deep  but  transitory  feeling,  may  exclaim  with 
an  emotion  known  but  to  few  Christian  minds,  "Socrates  died 
like  a  philosopher,  but  Jesus  Christ  like  a  God,"  and  its  iron 
nature  still  retain  "  the  unconquerable  will." 

We  may  now  safely  conclude,  we  think,  that  the  mists  raised 
by  the  philosophy  and  logic  of  Edwards  have  not  been  able  to 
obscure  the  lustre  of  the  simple  truth,  that  true  virtue  or  holi- 
ness cannot  be  produced  in  us  by  external  necessitating  causes. 
Whatsoever  is  thus  produced  in  us,  we  say,  cannot  be  our 
virtue,  nor  can  we  deserve  any  praise  for  its  existence.  This 
seems  to  be  a  clear  dictate  of  the  reason  of  man ;  and  it  would 
so  seem,  we  have  no  doubt,  to  all  men,  but  for  certain  devices 
which  to  some  have  obscured  the  light  of  nature.  The  princi- 
pal of  these  devices  we  shall  now  proceed  to  examine. 


SECTION  III. 

Of  the  proposition  that  "  The  essence  of  the  virtue  and  vice  of  dispositions 
of  the  heart  and  acts  of  the  will,  lies  not  in  their  cause,  but  in  their 
nature."® 

For  the  sake  of  greater  distinctness,  we  shall  confine  our 
attention  to  a  single  branch  of  this  complex  proposition ;  namely, 
that  the  essence  of  virtuous  acts  of  the  will  lies  not  in  their 

0  Inquiry  of  President  Edwards,  part  iv,  sec.  1. 


Chapter  IIL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  127 

cause,  but  their  nature.  Our  reasoning  in  relation  to  this  point, 
may  be  easily  applied  to  the  other  branches  of  the  propo- 
sition. 

We  admit,  then,  that  the  essence  of  a  virtuous  act  lies  in  its 
nature.  If  this  means  that  the  nature  of  a  virtuous  act  lies  in 
its  nature,  or  its  essence  lies  in  its  essence,  it  is  certainly  true ; 
and  even  if  the  author  attached  different  ideas  to  the  terms 
essence  and  nature,  we  do  not  care  to  search  out  his  meaning ; 
as  we  may  very  safely  admit  his  proposition,  whatever  may  be 
its  signification.  We  are  told  by  the  editor,  that  the  whole 
proposition  is  very  important  on  account  of  "  the  negative  part," 
namely,  that  "the  essence  of  virtue  and  vice  lies  not  in  their 
cause"  We  are  also  willing  to  admit,  that  the  essence  of  every- 
thing lies  in  its  own  nature,  and  not  in  its  cause.  But  why  is 
this  proposition  brought  forward  ?  What  purpose  is  it  designed 
to  serve  in  the  philosophy  of  the  author  ? 

This  question  is  easily  answered.  He  contends  that  true  vir- 
tue may  be,  and  is,  necessitated  to  exist  by  powers  and  causes 
over  which  we  have  no  control.  If  we  raise  our  eyes  to  such 
a  source  of  virtue,  its  intrinsic  lustre  and  beauty  seem  to  fade 
from  our  view.  The  author,  indeed,  endeavours  to  explain  why 
'.t  is,  that  the  scheme  of  necessity  seems  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  nature  of  true  virtue.  The  main  reason  is,  says  he,  because 
we  imagine  that  the  essence  of  virtue  and  vice  consists,  not  in 
their  nature,  but  in  their  origin  and  cause.  Hence  this  per- 
suasion not  to  busy  ourselves  about  the  origin  or  cause  of  vir- 
tue and  vice,  but  to  estimate  them  according  to  their  nature. 

We  are  fully  persuaded.  If  any  can  be  found  who  will 
assert  "  that  the  virtuousness  of  the  dispositions  or  acts  of  the 
will,  consists  not  in  the  nature  of  these  dispositions  or  acts  of 
the  will,  but  wholly  in  the  origin  or  cause  of  them,"  we  must 
deliver  them  up  to  the  tender  mercies  of  President  Edwards. 
Or  if  any  shall  talk  so  absurdly  as  to  say,  "  that  if  the  dispo- 
sitions of  the  mind,  or  acts  of  the  will,  l>e  never  so  good,  yet  if 
the  cause  of  the  disposition  or  act  be  not  our  virtue,  there  is 
nothing  virtuous  or  praiseworthy  in  it,"  we  have  not  one  word 
to  say  in  his  defence  ;  nor  shall  we  ever  raise  our  voice  in  favour 
of  any  one,  who  shall  maintain,  that  "  if  the  will,  in  its  inclina- 
tions or  acts,  ~be  never  so  Ijad,  yet,  unless  it  arises  from  something 
that  is  our  vice  or  fault,  there  is  nothing  vicious  or  blame- 


128  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

worthy  in  it."  For  we  are  firmly  persuaded,  that  if  the  acts 
of  the  will  be  good,  then  they  are  good ;  and  if  they  be  bad, 
then  they  are  bad ;  whatever  may  have  been  their  origin  or 
cause.  We  shall  have  no  dispute  about  such  truisms  as  these. 

We  insist,  indeed,  that  the  first  virtuous  act  of  the  first  man 
was  so,  because  it  partook  of  the  nature  of  virtue,  and  not 
because  it  had  a  virtuous  origin  or  cause  in  a  preceding  vir- 
tuous disposition  of  the  mind.  But,  in  his  work  on  Original 
Sin,  Edwards  contends  otherwise.  He  there  contends,  that  no 
act  of  Adam  could  have  been  virtuous,  unless  it  had  proceeded 
from  a  virtuous  origin  or  cause  in  the  disposition  of  his  heart ; 
and  that  this  could  have  had  no  existence  in  the  world,  unless 
it  had  proceeded  from  the  power  of  the  Creator.  Thus  he 
looked  beyond  the  nature  of  the  act  itself,  even  to  its  origin 
and  cause,  in  order  to  show  upon  what  its  moral  nature  de- 
pended ;  but  now  he  insists  that  we  should  simply  look  at  its 
own  nature,  and  not  to  its  origin  or  cause,  in  order  to  determine 
this  point.  He  ascends  from  acts  of  the  will  to  their  origin  or 
cause,  in  order  to  show  that  virtue  can  only  consist  with  the 
scheme  of  necessity ;  and  yet  he  denies  to  us  the  privilege  of 
ascending  with  him,  in  order  to  show  that  the  nature  of  virtue 
cannot  at  all  consist  with  the  scheme  of  necessity  ! 

We  admit  that  the  virtuousiiess  of  every  virtuous  act  lies,  not 
in  its  origin  or  cause,  but  in  itself.  But  still  we  insist  that  a 
virtuous  act,  as  well  as  everything  else,  may  be  traced  to  a  false 
origin  or  cause  that  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  its  very  nature. 
A  horse  is  undoubtedly  a  horse,  come  from  whence  it  may ;  but 
yet  if  any  one  should  tell  us  that  horses  grow  up  out  of  the  earth, 
or  drop  down  out  of  the  clouds,  we  should  certainly  understand 
him  to  speak  of  mere  phantoms,  and  no  real  horses,  or  we  should 
think  him  very  greatly  mistaken.  In  like  manner,  when  we  are 
told  that  virtue  may  be,  and  is,  necessitated  to  exist  in  i,s  by 
causes  over  which  we  have  no  control ;  that  we  may  be  to  praise 
for  any  gift  bestowed  upon  us  by  the  divine  power ;  we  are  con- 
strained to  believe  that  he  has  given  a  false  genealogy  of  moral 
goodness,  and  one  that  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  its  nature. 
Nor  can  we  be  made  to  blink  this  truth,  which  so  perfectly  ac- 
cords, as  we  have  seen,  with  the  universal  sentiment  of  mankind, 
by  being  reminded  that  moral  goodness  consists,  not  in  its  origin 
or  cause,  but  in  its  own  nature.  Virtue  is  always  virtue,  we 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  129 


freely  admit,  proceed  from  what  quarter  of  the  universe  it  may ; 
yet  do  we  insist  that  it  can  no  more  be  produced  in  us  by  an 
extraneous  agency  than  it  can  grow  up  out  of  the  earth,  or  drop 
down  out  of  the  clouds  of  heaven.  That  which  is  produced  in 
us  by  such  an  agency,  be  it  what  it  may,  is  not  our  virtue,  nor 
is  any  praise  therefor  due  to  us. .  To  mistake  such  effects  or 
passive  impressions  for  virtue,  is  to  mistake  phantoms  for  things, 
shadows  for  substances,  and  dreams  for  realities. 

SECTION  IV. 

The  scheme  of  necessity  seems  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  reality  of  moral  dis- 
tinctions, not  because  we  confound  natural  and  moral  necessity,  but  because 
it  is  really  inconsistent  therewith. 

Let  us  then  look  at  this  matter,  and  see  if  we  are  really  so 
deplorably  blinded  by  the  ambiguity  of  a  word,  that  we  cannot 
contemplate  the  glory  of  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity  as  it  is 
in  itself.  The  distinction  between  these  two  things,  natural  and 
moral  necessity,  is  certainly  a  clear  and  a  broad  one.  Let  us  see, 
then,  if  we  may  not  find  our  way  along  the  line  of  this  distinc- 
tion, without  that  darkness  and  confusion  by  which  our  judg- 
ment is  supposed  to  be  so  sadly  misled  and  perverted. 

It  is  on  all  sides  conceded,  that  natural  necessity  is  inconsist- 
ent with  the  good  or  ill  desert  of  human  actions.  If  a  man  were 
commanded,  for  example,  to  leap  over  a  mountain,  or  to  lift  the 
earth  from  its  centre,  he  would  be  justly  excusable  for  the  non- 
performance  of  such  things,  because  they  lie  beyond  the  range 
of  his  natural  power.  "  There  is  here  a  limit  to  our  power,"  as 
Dr.  Chalmers  says,  "  beyond  which  we  cannot  do  that  which  we 
please  to  do ;  and  there  are  many  thousand  such  limits."*  This 
is  natural  necessity,  in  one  of  its  branches.  It  circumscribes  and 
binds  our  natural  power.  It  limits  the  external  sphere  beyond 
which  the  effects  or  consequences  of  our  volitions  cannot  be 
projected.  It  reaches  not  to  the  interior  sphere  of  the  will 
itself,  and  has  no  more  to  do  with  its  freedom  than  has  the  in- 
fluence of  the  stars.  "We  may  please  to  do  a  thing,  nay,  we 
may  freely  will  it,  and  yet  a  natural  necessity  may  cut  off  and 
prevent  the  external  consequence  of  the  act. 

Again,  if  by  a  superior  force,  a  man's  limbs  or  external 

*  Institutes  of  Theology,  part  iii,  chap.  i. 
9 


130  MORAL   EVIL   CONSISTENT  (Part  I, 

bodily  organs  should  be  used  as  instruments  of  good  or  evil, 
without  his  concurrence  or  consent,  he  would  be  excusable  for 
the  consequences  of  such  use.  This  is  the  other  branch  of  natu- 
ral necessity.  It  is  evident  that  it  has  no  relation  to  the  freedom 
or  to  the  acts  of  the  will,  but  only  to  the  external  movements 
of  the  body.  It  interferes  merely  with  that  external  freedom 
of  bodily  motion,  about  which  we  heard  so  much  in  the  first 
chapter  of  this  work,  and  which  the  advocates  of  necessity  have, 
for  the  most  part,  so  industriously  laboured  to  pass  off  upon  the 
world  for  the  liberty  of  the  will  itself.  As  this  natural  neces- 
sity, then,  trenches  not  upon  the  interior  sphere  of  the  will,  so 
it  merely  excuses  for  the  performance  or  non-performance  of 
external  actions.  It  leaves  the  great  question  with  respect  to 
man's  accountability  for  the  acts  of  the  will  itself,  from  which 
his  external  actions  proceed,  wholly  untouched  and  undeter- 
mined. 

Far  different  is  the  case  with  respect  to  moral  necessity. 
This  acts  directly  upon  the  will  itself,  and  absolutely  controls 
all  its  movements.  Within  its  own  sphere  it  is  conceded  to  be 
"  as  absolute  as  natural  necessity,"*  and  "  as  sure  as  fatalism."! 
It  absolutely  and  unconditionally  determines  the  will  at  all 
times,  and  in  all  cases.  Yet  we  are  told  that  we  are  accounta- 
ble for  all  the  acts  thus  produced  in  us,  because  they  are  the 
acts  of  our  own  wills !  Nothing  is  done  against  our  wills,  as  in 
the  case  of  natural  necessity ;  (they  should  rather  say,  against 
the  external  effects  of  our  wills ;)  but  our  wills  always  follow, 
and  we  are  accountable  therefor,  though  they  cannot  but  fol- 
low. Moral  necessity  is  not  irresistible,  because  this  implies  re- 
sistance, and  our  wills  never  resist  that  which  makes  us  willing. 
It  is  only  invincible ;  and  invincible  it  is  indeed,  since  with  the 
mighty,  sovereign  power  of  the  Almighty  it  controls  all  the 
thoughts,  and  feelings,  and  volitions  of  the  human  mind.  Now 
we  see  this  scheme  as  it  is  in  itself,  in  all  its  nakedness,  just  as 
it  is  presented  to  us  by  its  own  most  able  and  enlightened  de- 
fenders. And  seeing  it  thus  removed  from  all  contact  with  the 
scheme  of  natural  necessity,  we  ask,  whether  agents  can  be 
justly  held  accountable  for  acts  thus  determined  and  controlled 
by  the  power  of  God,  or  by  those  invincible  causes  which  his 
omnipotence  marshalleth  ? 

0  President  Edwards.  f  Dr.  Chalmers. 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  131 

We  speak  not  of  external  acts ;  and  hence  we  lay  aside  the 
whole  scheme  of  natural  necessity.  We  speak  of  the  acts  of 
the  will ;  and  we  ask,  if  these  be  not  free  from  the  dominion 
of  moral  necessity,  from  necessitating  causes  over  which  we 
have  no  control,  can  we  he  accountable  for  them?  Can  we  be 
to  praise  or  to  blame  for  them  ?  Can  they  be  our  virtue  or  our 
vice  ?  These  questions,  we  think,  we  may  safely  submit  to  the 
impartial  decision  of  every  unbiassed  mind.  And  to  such  minds 
we  shall  leave  it  to  determine,  whether  the  scheme  of  moral 
necessity  has  owed  its  hold  upon  the  reason  of  man  to  a  dark 
confusion  of  words  and  things,  or  whether  its  glory  has  been 
obscured  by  the  misconception  of  its  opponents  ? 

In  conclusion,  we  shall  simply  lay  down,  in  a  few  brief  propo- 
sitions, what  we  trust  has  now  been  seen  in  relation  to  the 
nature  of  virtue  and  vice  : — 1.  No  necessitated  act  of  the  mind 
can  be  its  virtue  or  its  vice.  2.  In  order  that  any  act  of  the 
will  should  partake  of  a  moral  nature,  it  must  be  free  from  the 
dominion  of  causes  over  which  it  has  no  control,  or  from  whose 
influence  it  cannot  depart.  3.  Virtue  and  vice  lie  not  in  the 
passive  state  of  the  sensibility,  nor  in  any  other  necessitated 
states  of  the  mind,  but  in  acts  of  the  will,  and  in  habits  formed 
by  a  repetition  of  such  free  voluntary  acts.  Whatever  else  may 
be  said  in  relation  to  the  nature  of  virtue  and  of  vice,  and  to 
the  distinction  between  them,  these  things  appear  to  be  clearly 
true ;  and  if  so,  then  the  scheme  of  moral  necessity  is  utterly 
'nconsistent  with  their  existence,  and  saps  the  very  foundation 
>f  all  moral  distinctions. 


132  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  JPart  I, 


CHAPTEK  IY. 

THE  MORAL  WORLD  NOT  CONSTITUTED  ACCORDING  TO  THE  SCHEME  OP 
NECESSITY. 

I  made  him  just  and  right ; 
Sufficient  to  have  stood,  though  free  to  fall. 
Such  I  created  all  the  ethereal  powers 
And  spirits,  both  them  who  stood  and  them  who  fail'd ; 
Freely  they  stood  who  stood,  and  fell  who  fell. — MILTON. 

\\TE  have  already  witnessed  the  strange  inconsistencies  into 
which  the  most  learned  and  ingenious  men  have  fallen,  in  their 
attempts  to  reconcile  the  doctrine  of  necessity  with  the  account- 
ability of  man,  and  the  glory  of  God.  Having  involved  them- 
selves in  that  scheme,  on  what  has  appeared  to  them  conclusive 
evidence,  they  have  seemed  to  struggle  in  vain  to  force  their 
way  out  into  the  clear  and  open  light  of  nature.  They  have 
seemed  to  torment  themselves,  and  to  confound  others,  in  their 
gigantic  efforts  to  extricate  themselves  from  a  dark  labyrinth, 
out  of  which  there  is  absolutely  no  escape.  Let  us  see,  then, 
if  we  may  not  refute  the  pretended  demonstration  in  favour  of 
necessity,  and  thereby  restore  the  mind  to  that  internal  satis- 
faction which  it  so  earnestly  desires,  and  which  it  so  constantly 
seeks  in  a  perfect  unity  and  harmony  of  principle. 

SECTION  I. 
The  scheme  of  necessity  is  based  on  a  false  psychology. 

There  are  three  great  leading  faculties  or  attributes  of  the 
human  mind;  namely,  the  intelligence,  the  sensibility,  and  the 
will.  By  means  of  these  wre  think,  ^KQ,  feel,  and  we  act.  Now, 
the  phenomena  of  thinking,  feeling,  and  acting,  will  bo  found, 
on  examination,  to  possess  different  characteristics ;  of  which  wo 
must  form  clear  and  fixed  conceptions,  if  we  would  extricate 
the  philosophy  of  the  will  from  the  obscurity  and  confusion  in 
which  it  has  been  so  long  involved.  Let  us  proceed  then  to 
examine  them,  to  interrogate  our  consciousness  in  relation  to 
them. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  133 

Suppose,  for  example,  that  an  apple  is  placed  before  me.  I 
fix  my  attention  upon  it,  and  consider  its  form:  it  is  round. 
This  judgment,  or  decision  of  the  mind,  in  relation  to  the  form 
of  the  apple,  is  a  state  of  the  intelligence.  It  does  not  depend 
on  any  effort  of  mine,  whether  it  shall  appear  round  to  me  or 
not:  I  could  not  possibly  come  to  any  other  conclusion  if  I 
would  :  I  could  as  soon  think  it  as  large  as  the  globe  as  believe 
it  to  be  square,  or  of  any  other  form  than  round.  Hence  this 
judgment,  this  decision,  this  state  of  the  intelligence,  is  neces- 
sitated. The  same  thing  is  true  of  all  the  other  perceptions  or 
states  of  the  intelligence.  M.  Cousin  has  truly  said  :  "  Undoubt- 
edly different  intellects,  or  the  same  intellect  at  different  periods 
of  its  existence,  may  sometimes  pass  different  judgments  in 
regard  to  the  same  thing.  Sometimes  it  may  be  deceived ;  it 
will  judge  that  which  is  false  to  be  true,  the  good  to  be  bad, 
the  beautiful  to  be  ugly,  and  the  reverse  :  but  at  the  moment 
when  it  judges  that  a  proposition  is  true  or  false,  an  action 
good  or  bad,  a  form  beautiful  or  ugly,  at  that  moment  it  is  not 
in  the  power  of  the  intellect  to  pass  any  other  judgment  than 
that  it  passes.  It  obeys  laws  it  did  not  make.  It  yields  to 
motives  which  determine  it  independent  of  the  will.  In  a  word, 
the  phenomenon  of  intelligence,  comprehending,  judging,  know- 
ing, thinking,  whatever  name  be  given  to  it,  is  marked  with  the 
characteristic  of  necessity."* 

Once  more  I  fix  my  attention  on  the  apple :  an  agreeable 
sensation  arises  in  the  mind;  a  desire  to  eat  it  is  awakened. 
This  desire  or  appetite  is  a  state  of  the  sensibility.  Whether  I 
shall  feel  this  appetite  or  desire,  does  not  depend  upon  any 
effort  or  exertion  of  my  will.  The  mind  is  clearly  passive  in 
relation  to  it ;  the  desire,  then,  is  as  strongly  marked  with  the 
characteristic  of  necessity,  as  are  the  states  of  the  intelligence. 
The  same  is  true  of  all  our  feelings ;  they  are  necessarily  deter- 
mined by  the  objects  in  view  of  the  mind.  There  is  no  con- 
troversy on  these  points ;  it  is  universally  agreed  that  every 
state  of  the  intelligence  and  of  the  sensibility  is  necessarily 
determined  by  the  evidence  and  the  object  in  view  of  the  mind. 
It  is  not,  then,  either  in  the  intelligence  or  in  the  sensibility 
that  we  are  to  look  for  liberty. 

But  once  more  I  fix  my  attention  on  the  apple :  the  desire  is 

0  Psychology,  p.  247. 


134  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

awakened,  and  I  conclude  to  eat  it.  Hitherto  I  have  done 
nothing  except  in  fixing  my  attention  on  the  apple.  I  have 
experienced  the  judgment  that  it  is  round,  and  felt  the  desire 
to  eat  it.  But  now  I  conclude  to  eat  it,  and  I  make  an  effort 
of  the  mind  to  put  forth  my  hand  to  take  the  apple  and  eat  it. 
It  is  done.  Now  here  is  an  entirely  new  phenomenon ;  it  is  an 
effort,  an  exertion,  an  act,  a  volition  of  the  mind.  The  name  is  of 
no  importance ;  the  circumstances  under  which  the  phenomenon 
arises  have  called  attention  to  it,  and  the  precise  thing  intended 
is  seen  in  the  light  of  consciousness.  Let  us  look  at  it  closely, 
and  mark  its  characteristic  well,  being  careful  to  see  neither 
more  nor  less  than  is  presented  by  the  phenomenon  itself. 

We  are  conscious,  then,  of  the  existence  of  an  act,  of  a  voli- 
tion :  everybody  can  see  what  this  is.  We  must  not  say,  as 
the  advocates  of  free-agency  usually  do,  that  when  we  put  forth 
this  act  or  volition  we  are  conscious  of  a  power  to  do  the  con- 
trary ;  for  this  position  may  be  refuted,  and  the  foundation  on 
which  we  intend  to  raise  our  superstructure  undermined.  We 
are  merely  conscious  of  the  existence  of  the  act  itself,  and  not 
even  of  the  power  by  means  of  which  we  act ;  the  existence  of 
the  power  is  necessarily  inferred  from  its  exercise.  This  is  the 
only  way  in  which  we  know  it,  and  not  from  the  direct  testi- 
mony of  consciousness.  Much  less  if  we  had  refused  to  act, 
should  we  have  been  conscious  of  the  power  to  withhold  it; 
much  less  again  are  we  conscious  of  the  power  to  withhold  the 
act,  as  we  do  not  in  the  case  supposed  exercise  this  power.  But 
certainly  we  are  conscious  of  the  act  itself;  all  men  will  con- 
cede this,  and  this  is  all  our  argument  really  demands. 

Here  then  we  are  conscious  of  an  act,  of  an  effort,  of  the 
mind.  Look  at  it  closely.  Is  the  mind  passive  in  this  act? 
No  ;  we  venture  to  answer  for  the  universal  intelligence  of  man. 
If  this  act  had  been  produced  in  us  by  a  necessitating  cause, 
would  not  the  mind  have  been  passive  in  it?  In  other  words, 
would  it  not  have  been  a  passive  impression,  and  not  an  act, 
not  an  effort  of  the  mind  at  all  ?  Yes ;  we  again  venture  to 
answer  for  the  unbiassed  reason  of  man.  But  it  is  not,  we  have 
seen,  a  passive  impression  ;  it  is  an  act  of  the  mind,  and  neiice 
it  is  not  necessitated.  It  is  not  necessitated,  because  it  is  not 
stamped  with  the  characteristic  of  necessity.  The  universal 
reason  of  man  declares  that  the  will  has  not  necessarily  yielded 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE   HOLINESS   OF   GOD.  135 

like  the  intelligence  and  the  sensibility,  to  motives  over  which 
it  had  no  control.  It  does  not  bear  upon  its  face  the  mark  of 
any  such  subjection  "to  the  power  and  action"  of  a  cause.  It 
is  marked  with  the  characteristic,  not  of  necessity,  but  of  liberty. 
We  would  not  say,  with  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  that  "  action  and 
liberty  are  identical  ideas ;"  but  we  will  say,  that  the  idea  of 
action  necessarily  implies  that  of  liberty  ;  for  if  we  duly  reflect 
on  the  nature  of  an  act  we  cannot  conceive  it  as  being  necessi- 
tated. This  consideration  furnishes  an  easy  and  satisfactory 
solution  of  a  problem,  by  which  necessitarians  are  sadly  per- 
plexed. They  endeavour  in  various  ways  to  account  for  the 
fact  that  we  believe  our  volitions  to  be  free,  or  not  necessarily 
caused.  Some  resolve  this  belief  and  feeling  of  liberty  into  a 
deceitful  sense  ;  some  imagine  that  we  are  deceived  by  the 
ambiguities  of  language ;  and  some  resort  to  other  methods  of 
explaining  the  phenomenon.  "It  is  true,"  says  President 
Edwards,  "  I  find  myself  possessed  of  my  volitions  before  I  can 
see  the  effectual  power  of  any  cause  to  produce  them.,  for  the 
power  and  efficacy  of  the  cause  is  not  seen  but  by  the  effect ; 
and  this,  for  aught  1  know,  may  make  some  imagine  that 
volition  has  no  cause,  or  that  it  produces  itself."  But  this  is 
not  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  imagination,  as  he  would  term 
it.  We  also  find  ourselves  possessed  of  our  judgments  and 
feelings  before  we  perceive  the  effectual  power  of  the  cause 
which  produces  them.  Why  then  do  we  refer  these  to  the 
operation  of  a  necessary  cause,  and  not  our  volitions  ?  If  the 
power  and  efficacy  of  the  cause  is  seen  only  by  the  effect  in  the 
one  case,  it  is  only  seen  in  the  same  manner  in  the  other.  Why 
then  do  we  differ  in  our  conclusions  with  respect  to  them? 
Why  do  we  refer  the  judgment  and  the  feeling  to  necessary 
causes,  and  fail  to  do  the  same  in  relation  to  the  volition  ?  The 
reason  is  obvious.  The  mind  is  passive  in  judging  and  feeling, 
and  hence  these  phenomena  necessarily  demand  the  operation 
of  causes  to  account  for  them  ;  but  the  mind  is  active  in  its  voli- 
ti^m,  and  this  necessarily  excludes  the  idea  of  causes  to  pro- 
duce them.  The  mind  clearly  perceives,  by  due  reflection,  and 
at  all  times  sees  dimly,  at  least,  that  an  act  or  volition  is  different 
in  its  nature  from  a  passive  impression  or  a  produced  effect; 
and  hence  it  knows  and  feels  that  it  is  exempt  from  the  power 
and  efficacy  of  a  producing  cause  in  its  volitions.  This  fact  of 


1  30  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

our  consciousness  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  sophistry  wholly  to 
conceal,  nor  in  the  power  of  human  nature  to  evade.  Hence 
we  carry  about  with  us  the  irresistible  conviction  that  we  aie 
free;  that  our  wills  are  not  absolutely  subject  to  the  dominion 
of  causes  over  which  we  have  no  control.  Hence  we  see  and 
know  that  we  are  self-active. 

Having  completed  our  analysis,  in  as  far  as  our  present  pur- 
pose demands,  we  may  proceed  to  show  that  the  system  of 
necessity  is  founded  on  a  false  psychology, — on  a  dark  confusion 
of  the  facts  of  human  nature.  It  is  very  remarkable  that  all  the 
advocates  of  this  system,  from  Hobbes  down  to  Edwards,  will 
allow  the  human  mind  to  possess  only  two  faculties,  the  under- 
standing and  the  will.  The  will  and  the  sensibility  are  expressly 
identified  by  them.  Locke  distinguished  between  will  and  de- 
sire, between  the  faculty  of  willing  and  the  susceptibility  to  feel- 
ing ;  but  Edwards  has  endeavoured  to  show  that  there  is  no  such 
distinction  as  that  for  which  Locke  contends.  We  shall  not 
arrest  the  progress  of  our  remarks  in  order  to  point  out  the 
manner  in  which  Edwards  has  deceived  himself  by  an  appeal 
to  logic  rather  than  to  consciousness,  because  the  threefold  dis- 
tinction for  which  we  contend  is  now  admitted  by  necessitarians 
themselves.  Indeed,  after  the  clear  and  beautiful  analysis  by 
M.  Cousin,  they  could  not  well  do  otherwise  than  recognise  this 
threefold  distinction ;  but  they  have  done  so,  we  think  it  will  be 
found,  without  perceiving  all  the  consequences  of  such  an  ad- 
mission to  their  system.  It  is  an  admission  which,  in  our 
opinion,  will  show  the  scheme  of  necessity  to  be  insecure  in  its 
foundation,  and  disjointed  in  all  its  parts. 

With  the  light  of  this  distinction  in  our  minds,  it  will  be  easy 
to  follow  and  expose  the  sophistries  of  the  necessitarian.  He 
often  declaims  against  the  idea  of  liberty  for  which  we  contend, 
on  the  ground  that  it  would  be,  not  a  perfection,  but  a  very 
great  imperfection  of  our  nature  to  possess  such  a  freedom. 
But  in  every  such  instance  he  confounds  the  will  with  one  of 
the  passive  susceptibilities  of  the  mind.  Thus,  for  example, 
Collins  argues  that  liberty  would  be  a  great  imperfection,  be- 
cause "nothing  can  be  more  irrational  and  absurd  than  to  be 
able  to  refuse  our  assent  to  what  is  evidently  true  to  us,  and  to 
assent  to  what  we  see  to  be  false."  Now,  all  this  is  true,  but  it 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  137 

is  not  to  the  purpose ;  for  no  one  contends  that  the  intelligence 
is  free  in  assenting  to,  or  in  dissenting  from,  the  evidence  in 
view  of  the  mind.  No  rational  being,  we  admit,  could  desire 
en  cli  a  freedom ;  could  desire  to  be  free,  for  example,  from  the 
conviction  that  two  and  two  make  four.  M.  Lamartine,  we  are 
aware,  expresses  a  very  lively  abhorrence  of  the  mathematics, 
because  they  allow  not  a  sufficient  freedom  of  thought — because 
they  exercise  so  great  a  despotism  over  the  intellect.  But  the 
circumstance  which  this  flowery  poet  deems  an  imperfection  in 
the  mathematics,  every  enlightened  friend  of  free-agency  will 
regard  as  their  chief  excellency  and  glory. 

The  same  error  is  committed  by  Spinoza :  "  We  can  consider 
the  soul  under  two  points  of  view,"  says  he,  "  as  thought  and  as 
desire."  Here  the  will  is  made  to  disappear,  and  we  behold 
only  the  two  susceptibilities  of  the  soul,  which  are  stamped  with 
the  characteristic  of  necessity.  Where,  then,  will  Spinoza  find 
the  freedom  of  the  soul  ?  Certainly  not  in  the  will,  for  this  has 
been  blotted  out  from  the  map  of  his  psychology.  Accordingly 
he  says  :  "  The  free  will  is  a  chimera  of  the  species,  flattered  by 
our  pride,  and  founded  upon  our  ignorance."  He  must  find  the 
freedom  of  the  soul  then,  if  he  find  it  at  all,  in  one  of  its  passive 
susceptibilities.  This,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  exactly  what 
he  does ;  he  says  the  soul  is  free  in  the  affirmation  that  two  and 
two  are  four !  Tims  he  finds  the  liberty  of  the  soul,  not  in  the 
exercises  of  its  will,  of  its  active  power,  but  in  the  bosom  of  the 
intelligence,  which  is  absolutely  necessitated  in  all  its  deter- 
minations. 

In  this  particular,  as  well  as  in  most  others,  Spinoza  merely 
reproduces  the  error  of  the  ancient  Stoics.  It  was  a  principle 
with  them,  says  Hitter,  "  that  the  will  and  the  desire  are  one 
with  thought,  and  may  be  resolved  into  it."*  Thus,  by  the  .an- 
cient Stoics,  as  well  as  by  Hobbes,  and  Spinoza,  and  Collins, 
and  Edwards,  the  will  is  merged  in  one  of  the  passive  elements 
of  the  mind,  and  its  real  characteristic  lost  sight  of.  "  By  the 
freedom  of  the  soul,"  says  Hitter,  "  the  Stoics  understood  simply 
that  assent  which  it  gives  to  certain  ideas."f  Tims  the  ancient 
Stoics  endeavoured  to  find  the  freedom  of  the  soul,  where  Spi- 
noza and  so  many  modern  necessitarians  have  sought  to  find  it, 
in  the  passive,  necessitated  states  of  the  intelligence.  This  was 

0  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  vol.  iii,  p.  555.  f  Ibid. 


138  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

indeed  to  impose  upon  themselves  a  mere  shadow  for  a  sub- 
stance,— a  dream  for  a  reality. 

"  By  whatever  name  we  call  the  act  of  the  will,"  says  Fd- 
wards,  "  choosing,  refusing,  approving,  disapproving,  liking, 
disliking,  embracing,  rejecting,  determining,  directing,  com- 
manding, forbidding,  inclining  or  being  averse,  being  pleased  or 
displeased  with — all  may  be  reduced  to  this  of  choosing."* 
Thus,  in  the  vocabulary  and  according  to  the  psychology  of 
this  great  author,  the  phenomena  of  the  sensibility  and  those  of 
the  will  are  identified,  as  well  as  the  faculties  themselves. 
Pleasing  and  willing,  liking  and  acting,  are  all  one  with  him. 
His  psychology  admits  of  no  distinction,  for  example,  between 
the  pleasant  impression  made  by  an  apple  on  the  sensibility, 
and  the  act  of  the  will  by  which  the  hand  is  put  forth  to  take 
it.  "  The  will  and  the  affections  of  the  soul,"  says  he,  "  are  not 
two  faculties  ;  the  affections  are  not  essentially  distinct  from  the 
will,  nor  do  they  differ  from  the  mere  actings  of  the  will  and 
inclination,  but  only  in  the  liveliness  and  sensibility  of  exer- 
cise.'^ And  again,  "  I  humbly  conceive  that  the  affections  of 
the  soul  are  not  properly  distinguished  from  the  will,  as  though 
there  were  two  faculties.":):  And  still  more  explicitly,  "  all  acts 
of  the  will  are  truly  acts  of  the  affections."§  Is  it  not  strange, 
that  one  who  could  exhibit  such  wonderful  discrimination  when 
the  exigences  of  his  system  demanded  the  exercise  of  such  a 
power,  should  have  confounded  things  so  clearly  distinct  in 
their  natures  as  an  act  of  the  will  and  an  agreeable  impression 
made  on  the  sensibility  ? 

It  is  not  possible  for  any  mind,  no  matter  how  great  its 
powers,  to  see  the  nature  of  things  clearly  when  it  comes  to  the 
contemplation  of  them  with  such  a  confusion  of  ideas.  Even 
President  Edwards  is  not  exempt  from  the  common  lot  of  hu- 
manity. His  doctrine  is  necessarily  enveloped  in  obscurity. 
We  can  turn  it  in  no  light  without  being  struck  with  its  incon- 
sistencies or  its  futility.  He  repeatedly  says,  the  will  is  always 
determined  by  the  strongest  affection,  or  appetite,  or  passion ; 
that  is,  by  the  most  agreeable  state  of  the  sensibility.  But 
if  the  wTill  and  the  sensibility  are  identical,  as  his  language 
expressly  makes  them ;  or  if  the  states  of  the  one  are  not  dis- 

y  President  Edwards's  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  16.          f  Id.,  vol.  v,  pp.  10, 11. 
t  Id.,  vol.  iv,  p.  82.  §  Ibid. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  139 

tinguishable  from  the  states  of  the  other,  then  to  say  that  the 
will  is  always  determined  by  the  sensibility,  or  an  act  of  the 
will  by  the  strongest  affection  of  the  sensibility,  is  to  say  that 
a  thing  is  determined  by  itself.  It  is  to  say,  in  fact,  that  the 
will  is  always  determined  by  itself;  a  doctrine  against  which 
he  uniformly  protests.  Kay,  more,  that  an  act  of  the  will  causes 
itself :  a  position  which  he  has  repeatedly  ascribed  to  his  oppo- 
nents, and  held  up  to  the  derision  of  mankind. 

It  is  very  remarkable,  that  Edwards  seems  to  have  been  con- 
scious, at  times,  that  he  laid  himself  open  to  the  charge  of  such 
an  absurdity,  when  he  said  that  the  will  is  determined  by  the 
greatest  apparent  good,  or  by  what  seems  most  agreeable  to  the 
mind.  For  he  says,  "  I  have  chosen  rather  to  express  myself 
thus,  that  the  will  always  is  as  the  greatest  apparent  good,  or 
as  what  appears  most  agreeable,  than  to  say  the  will  is  deter- 
mined by  the  greatest  apparent  good,  or  by  what  seems  most 
agreeable  ;  because  an  appearing  most  agreeable  to  the  mind, 
and  the  mind's  preferring,  seem  scarcely  distinct"  We  have 
taken  the  liberty  to  emphasize  his  words.  Now  here  he  tells 
us  that  the  "  mind's  preferring,"  by  which  word  he  has 
explained  himself  to  mean  willing,*  is  scarcely  distinct  from 
"  an  appearing  most  agreeable  to  the  mind."  Here  he  returns 
to  his  psychology,  and  identifies  the  most  agreeable  impression 
made  on  the  sensibility  with  an  act  of  the  will.  He  does  not 
like  to  say,  that  the  act  of  the  will  is  caused  by  the  most  agree- 
able sensation,  because  this  seems  to  make  a  thing  the  cause 
of  itself. 

In  this  he  does  wisely ;  but  having  shaped  his  doctrine  to 
suit  himself  more  exactly,  in  what  form  is  it  presented  to  us  ? 
Let  us  look  at  it  in  its  new  shape,  and  see  what  it  is.  The  will 
is  not  determined  by  the  greatest  apparent  good,  because  a 
thing  is  not  determined  by  itself;  but  the  will  is  always  as  the 
gi  eatest  apparent  good  !  .  Thus  the  absurdity  of  saying  a  thing 
is  determined  by  itself  is  avoided  ;  but  surely,  if  an  appearing 
most  agreeable  to  the  mind  is  not  distinct  from  the  mind's  act- 
ing, then  to  say  that  the  mind's  acting  is  always  as  that  which 
appears  most  agreeable  to  it  is  merely  to  say,  that  the  mind's 
acting  is  always  as  the  mind's  acting !  or,  in  other  words,  that 
a  thing  is  always  as  itself !  Thus,  his  great  fundamental  propo- 

0  Inquiry,  p.  17. 


140  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

sition  is,  in  one  form,  a  glaring  absurdity ;  and  in  the  other,  it 
is  an  insignificant  truism ;  and  there  is  no  escape  from  this 
dilemma  except  through  a  return  to  a  better  psychology,  to  a 
sounder  analysis  of  the  great  facts  of  human  nature. 

When  Edwards  once  reaches  the  truism  that  a  thing  is  always 
as  itself,  he  feels  perfectly  secure,  and  defies  with  unbounded 
confidence  the  utmost  efforts  of  his  opponents  to  dislodge  him. 
"  As  we  observed  before,"  says  he,  "  nothing  is  more  evident 
than  that,  when  men  act  voluntarily,  and  do  what  they  please, 
then  they  do  what  appears  most  agreeable  to  them  ;  and  to  say 
otherwise,  would  be  as  much  as  to  affirm,  that  men  do  not 
choose  what  appears  to  suit  them  best,  or  what  seems  most 
pleasing  to  them  ;  or  that  they  do  not  choose  what  they  prefer — • 
which  brings  the  matter  to  a  contradiction"  True  ;  this  brings 
the  matter  to  a  contradiction,  as  he  has  repeatedly  told  us ;  for 
choosing,  and  preferring,  or  willing,  are  all  one.  But  if  any 
one  denies  that  a  man  does  what  he  pleases  when  he  does  what 
he  pleases  ;  or  if  he  affirms  that  he  pleases  without  pleasing,  or 
chooses  without  choosing,  or  prefers  without  preferring,  we 
shall  leave  him  to  the  logic  of  the  necessitarian  and  the  phy- 
sician. We  have  no  idea  that  he  will  ever  be  able  to  refute 
the  volumes  that  have  been  written  to  confound  him.  Presi- 
dent Edwards  clearly  has  the  better  of  him  ;  for  he  puts  "  the 
soul  in  a  state  of  choice,"  and  yet  affirms  that  it  "  has  no  choice." 
He  might  as  well  say,  indeed,  that  "  a  body  may  move  while 
it  is  in  a  state  of  rest,"  as  to  say  that "  the  mind  may  choose 
without  choosing,"  or  without  having  a  choice.  He  is  very 
clearly  involved  in  an  absurdity  ;  and  if  he  can  read  the  three 
hundred  pages  of  the  Inquiry,  without  being  convinced  of  his 
error,  his  case  must  indeed  be  truly  hopeless. 

Edwards  is  far  from  being  the  only  necessitarian  who  has 
fallen  into  the  error  of  identifying  the  sensibility  with  the  will ; 
thus  reducing  his  doctrine  to  an  unassailable  truism.  In  his 
famous  controversy  with  Clarke,  Leibnitz  has  done  the  same 
thing.  "  Thus,"  says  he,  "  in  truth,  the  motives  comprehend 
all  the  dispositions  which  the  mind  can  have  to  act  voluntarily  ; 
for  they  include  not  only  reasons,  but  also  the  inclinations  and 
passions,  or  other  preceding  impressions.  Wherefore  if  the 
mind  should  prefer  a' weak  inclination  to  a  strong  one,  it  would 
act  against  itself,  and  otherwise  than  it  is  disposed  to  act" 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  141 

Now  is  it  not  wonderful,  that  so  profound  a  thinker,  and  so 
acute  a  metaphysician,  as  Leibnitz,  should  have  supposed  that 
he  was  engaged  in  a  controversy  to  show  that  the  mind  never 
acts  otherwise  than  it  acts;  that  it  never  acts  against  itself? 
Having  reduced  his  doctrine  to  this  truism,  he  says,  this  "  shows 
that  the  author's  notions,  contrary  to  mine,  are  superficial,  and 
appear  to  have  no  solidity  in  them,  when  they  are  well  con- 
sidered." True,  the  notions  of  Clarke  were  superficial,  and 
worse  than  superficial,  if  he  supposed  that  the  mind  ever  acts 
contrary  to  its  act,  or  otherwise  than  it  really  acts.  But  Clarke 
distinguished  between  the  disposition  and  the  will. 

In  like  manner  Thummig,  the  disciple  of  Leibnitz,  has  the 
following  language,  as  quoted  by  Sir  William  Hamilton :  "  It 
is  to  philosophize  very  crudely  concerning  mind,  and  to  image 
everything  in  a  corporeal  manner,  to  conceive  that  actuating 
reasons  are  something  external,  which  make  an  impression  on 
the  mind,  and  to  distinguish  motives  from  the  active  principle 
itself"  Now  this  language,  it  seems,  is  found  in  Thummig's 
defence  of  the  last  paper  of  Leibnitz  (who  died  before  the  con- 
troversy was  terminated)  against  the  answer  of  Clarke.  But, 
surely,  if  it  is  a  great  mistake,  as  the  author  insists  it  is,  to  dis- 
tinguish motives  from  the  active  principle  itself;  then  to  say 
that  the  active  principle  is  determined  by  motives,  is  to  say 
that  the  active  principle  is  determined  by  itself.  And  having 
reached  this  point,  the  disciple  of  Leibnitz  finds  himself  planted 
precisely  on  the  position  he  had  undertaken  to  overthrow, 
namely,  that  the  will  is  determined  by  itself.  And  again,  if  it 
be  wrong  to  distinguish  the  motive  from  the  active  principle 
itself,  then  to  say  that  the  active  principle  never  departs  from 
the  motive,  is  to  affirm  that  a  thing  is  always  as  itself. 

The  great  service  which  a  false  psychology  has  rendered  to 
the  cause  of  necessity  is  easily  seen.  For  having  identified  an 
act  of  the  will  with  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  which  is  univer- 
sally conceived  to  be  necessitated,  the  necessitarian  is  delivered 
from  more  than  half  his  labours.  By  merging  a  phenomenon 
or  manifestation  of  the  will  in  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  it  seems 
to  lose  its  own  characteristic,  which  is  incompatible  with  the 
scheme  of  necessity,  and  to  assume  the  characteristic  of  feeling, 
which  is  perfectly  reconcilable  with  it;  nay,  which  demands 
the  scheme  of  necessity  to  account  for  its  existence.  Thus,  the 


142  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

system  of  necessity  is  based  on  a  false  psychology,  on  which  it 
has  too  securely  stood  from  the  earliest  times  down  to  the 
present  day.  But  the  stream  of  knowledge,  ever  deepening 
and  widening  in  its  course,  has  been  gradually  undermining  the 
foundations  of  this  dark  system. 

SECTION  II. 
The  scheme  of  necessity  is  directed  against  a  false  issue. 

As  we  have  seen  in  the  last  section,  the  argument  of  the 
necessitarian  is  frequently  directed  against  a  false  issue ;  but  the 
point  is  worthy  of  a  still  more  careful  consideration. 

We  shall  never  cease  to  admire  the  logical  dexterity  with 
which  the  champions  of  necessity  assail  and  worry  their  adver- 
saries. They  have  said,  in  all  ages,  that  "nothing  taketh 
beginning  from  itself;"  but  who  ever  imagined  or  dreamed  of 
so  wild  an  absurdity?  It  is  conceded  by  all  rational  beings. 
Motion  taketh  not  beginning  from  itself,  but  from  action ;  action 
taketh  not  beginning  from  itself,  but  from  mind ;  and  mind 
taketh  not  beginning  from  itself,  but  from  God.  It  is  false, 
however,  to  conclude  that  because  nothing  taketh  beginning 
from  itself,  it  is  brought  to  pass  "  by  the  action  of  some  immediate 
agent  without  itself."  The  motion  of  body,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
produced  by  the  action  of  some  immediate  agent  without  itself; 
but  the  action  of  mind  is  produced,  or  brought  to  pass,  by  no 
action  at  all.  It  taketh  beginning  from  an  agent,  and  not  from 
the  action  of  an  agent.  This  distinction,  though  so  clearly 
founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  is  always  overlooked  by  the 
logic  of  the  necessitarian.  They  might  well  adopt  the  language 
of  Bacon,  that  the  subtilty  of  nature  far  surpasseth  that  of  our 
logic. 

Hobbes  was  content  to  rest  on  a  simple  statement  of  the  fact, 
that  nothing  can  produce  itself;  but  it  is  not  every  logician 
who  is  willing  to  rely  on  the  inherent  strength  of  such  a  posi- 
tion. Ask  a  child,  Did  you  make  yourself?  and  the  child  will 
answer,  No.  Propound  the  same  question  to  the  roving  savage, 
or  to  the  man  of  mere  common  sense,  and  he  will  also  answer, 
No.  Appeal  to  the  universal  reason  of  man,  and  the  same 
emphatic  No,  will  come  up  from  its  profoundest  depths.  But 
your  redoubtable  logicians  are  not  satisfied  to  rely  on  such  testi- 


Chapter  IV.  I  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  143 

mony  alone :  they  dare  not  build  on  such  a  foundation  unless  it 
be  first  secured  and  rendered  firm  by  the  aid  of  the  syllogistic 
process.  I  know  "  I  did  not  make  myself,"  says  Descartes, 
"  for  if  I  had  made  myself,  I  should  have  given  myself  every 
perfection."  Now  this  argument  in  true  syllogistic  form  stands 
thus :  If  I  had  made  myself,  I  should  have  endowed  myself 
with  every  perfection ;  I  am  not  endowed  with  every  perfec- 
tion ;  therefore  I  did  not  make  myself.  Surely,  after  so  clear 
a  process  of  reasoning,  no  one  can  possibly  doubt  the  proposi- 
tion that  Descartes  did  not  make  himself!  In  the  same  way 
we  might  prove  that  he  did  not  make  his  own  logic :  for  if  he 
had  made  his  logic,  he  would  have  endowed  it  with  every  pos- 
sible perfection  ;  but  it  is  not  endowed  with  every  possible  per- 
fection, and  therefore  he  did  not  make  it. 

But  President  Edwards  has  excelled  Descartes,  and  every 
other  adept  in  the  syllogistic  art,  except  Aristotle  in  his  physics, 
in  his  ability  to  render  the  light  of  perfect  day  clearer  by  a  few 
masterly  strokes  of  logic.  He  has  furnished  the  reason  why 
some  persons  imagine  that  volition  has  no  cause  of  its  existence, 
or  "  that  it  produces  itself."  Now,  by  the  way,  would  it  not 
have  been  as  well  if  he  had  first  made  sure  of  the  fact,  before 
he  undertook  to  explain  it  ?  But  to  proceed  :  let  us  see  how  lie 
has  proved  that  volition  does  not  produce  itself, — that  it  does  not 
arise  out  of  nothing  and  bring  itself  into  existence. 

He  does  this  in  true  logical  form,  and  according  to  the  most 
approved  methods  of  demonstration.  He  first  establishes  the 
general  position,  that  no  existence  or  event  whatever  can  give 
rise  to  its  own  being,*  and  he  then  shows  that  this  is  true  of 
volition  in  particular,  f  And  having  reached  the  position,  that 
volition  does  not  arise  out  of  nothing,  but  must  "  have  some 
antecedent"  to  introduce  it  into  being;  he  next  proceeds  to 
prove  that  there  is  a  necessary  connexion  between  volition  and 
the  antecedents  on  which  it  depends  for  existence.  This  com- 
pletes the  chain  of  logic,  and  the  process  is  held  up  by  his  fol- 
lowers to  the  admiration  of  the  world  as  a  perfect  demonstra- 
tion Let  us  look  at  it  a  little  more  closely,  and  examine  the 
nature  and  mechanism  of  its  p'.rts. 

If  the  huge  frame  of  the  earth,  with  all  its  teeming  popula- 
tion and  productions,  could  rise  up  out  of  nothing,  he  argues, 

9  Inquiry,  part  i,  sec.  iii.  f  Id.,  part  i,  sec.  iv. 


144  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

and  bring  itself  into  being  without  any  cause  of  its  existence, 
then  we  could  not  prove  the  being  of  a  God.  All  this  is  very 
true.  For,  as  he  truly  alleges,  if  one  world  could  thus  make 
itself,  so  also  might  another  and  another,  even  unto  millions 
of  millions.  The  universe  might  make  itself,  or  come  IE  to 
existence  without  any  cause  thereof,  and  hence  we  could  never 
know  that  there  is  a  God.  But  surely,  if  any  man  imagined 
that  even  one  world  could  create  itself,  it  is  scarcely  worth 
while  to  reason  with  him.  It  is  not  at  all  likely  that  he 
would  be  frightened  from  his  position  by  such  a  reductio  ad 
absurd um.  We  should  almost  as  soon  suspect  a  sane  man  of 
denying  the  existence  of  God  himself,  as  of  doubting  the  pro- 
position that  "  nothing  taketh  beginning  from  itself." 

Having  settled  it  to  his  entire  satisfaction,  by  this  and  other 
arguments,  that  no  effect  whatever  can  produce  itself,  he  then 
proceeds  to  show  that  this  proposition  is  true  of  volitions  as  well 
as  of  all  other  events  or  occurrences.  "  If  any  should  imagine," 
says  he,  "  there  is  something  in  the  sort  of  event  that  renders 
it  possible  to  come  into  existence  without  a  cause,  and  should 
say  that  the  free  acts  of  the  will  are  existences  of  an  exceeding 
different  nature  from  other  things,  by  reason  of  which  they 
may  come  into  existence  without  previous  ground  or  reason  of 
it,  though  other  things  cannot;  if  they  make  this  objection  in 
good  earnest,  it  wTould  be  an  evidence  of  their  strangely  forget- 
ting themselves;  for  it  would  be  giving  some  account  of  the 
existence  of  a  thing,  when,  at  the  same  time,  they  would  main- 
tain there  is  no  ground  of  its  existence."*  True,  if  any  man 
should  suppose  that  a  volition  rises  up  in  the  world  "  without 
any  ground  or  reason  of  its  existence,"  and  afterward  endeavour 
to  assign  a  ground  or  reason  of  it,  he  would  certainly  be 
strangely  inconsistent  with  himself;  but  we  should  deem  his 
last  position,  that  there  must  be  a  ground  or  reason  of  its  exist- 
ence, to  be  some  evidence  of  his  coming  to  himself,  rather  than 
of  his  having  forgotten  himself.  But  to  proceed  with  the  argu- 
ment. "Therefore  I  would  observe,"  says  he,  "that  the  par- 
ticular nature  of  existence,  be  it  never  so  diverse  from  others, 
can  lay  no  foundation  for  that  tLing  coming  into  existence  with- 
out a  cause ;  because,  to  suppose  this,  would  be  to  suppose  the 
particular  nature  of  existence  to  be  a  thing  prior  to  existence, 

0  Inquiry,  pp.  51.  55. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  145 

without  a  cause  or  reason  of  existence.  But  that  which  in  any 
respect  makes  way  for  a  tiling  coming  into  being,  or  for  any 
manner  or  circumstance  of  its  first  existence,  must  be  prior  to 
existence.  The  distinguished  nature  of  the  effect,  which  is 
something  belonging  to  the  effect,  cannot  have  influence  back- 
ward to  act  before  it  is.  The  peculiar  nature  of  that  thing 
c.illed  volition,  can  do  nothing,  can  have  no  influence,  while  it 
is  not.  A  nd  afterward  it  is  too  late  for  its  influence :  for  then 
the  thing  has  made  sure  of  its  existence  already  without  its 
help."*  After  all  this  reasoning,  and  more  to  the  same  effect, 
we  are  perfectly  satisfied  that  volition,  no  matter  what  its 
nature  may  be,  cannot  produce  itself;  and  that  it  must  have 
some  ground  or  reason  of  its  existence,  some  antecedent  with- 
out which  it  could  not  come  into  being. 

We  shall  not  do  justice  to  this  branch  of  our  subject,  if  we 
leave  it  without  laying  before  the  reader  one  or  two  more  speci- 
mens of  logic  from  the  celebrated  Inquiry  of  President  Edwards, 
lie  is  opposing  "  the  hypothesis,"  he  tells  us,  "of  acts  of  the  will 
coming  to  pass  without  a  cause."  Now,  according  to  his  defini- 
tion of  the  term  cause,  as  laid  down  at  the  beginning  of  the 
section  under  consideration,  it  signifies  any  antecedent  on  which 
a  thing  depends,  in  whole  or  in  part,  for  its  existence,  or  which 
constitutes  the  reason  why  it  is,  rather  than  not.f  His  doctrine 
is,  then,  that  nothing  ever  comes  to  pass  without  some  "  ground 
or  reason  of  its  existence,"  without  some  antecedent  which  is 
necessary  to  account  for  its  coming  into  being.  And  those  who 
deny  it  are  bound  to  maintain  the  strange  thesis,  that  something 
may  come  into  existence  without  any  antecedent  to  account  for 
it ;  that  it  may  rise  from  nothing  and  bring  itself  into  existence. 
It  is  against  this  thesis  that  his  logic  is  directed. 

"  If  it  were  so,"  says  he,  "  that  things  only  of  one  kind,  vL., 
acts  of  the  will,  seemed  to  come  to  pass  of  themselves ;  and  it 
were  an  event  that  was  continual,  and  that  happened  in  a  course 
whenever  were  found  subjects  capable  of  such  events;  this 
very  thing  would  demonstrate  there  was  some  cause  of  them, 
which  made  such  a  difference  between  this  event  and  others. 
For  contingency  is  blind,  and  does  not  pick  and  choose  a  par- 
ticular sort  of  events.  Nothing  has  no  choice.  This  no-cause, 
which  causes  no  existence,  cannot  cause  the  existence  which 

0  Inquiry,  p.  55.  t  Id-»  P-  W. 

10 


146  MORAL  EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

comes  to  pass  to  be  of  one  particular  sort  only,  distinguished 
from  all  others.  Thus,  that  only  one  sort  of  matter  drops  out 
of  heaven,  even  water ;  and  that  this  comes  so  often,  so  con- 
stantly and  plentifully,  all  over  the  world,  in  all  ages,  shows 
that  there  is  some  cause  or  reason  of  the  falling  of  water  out  of 
the  heavens,  and  that  something  besides  mere  contingency 
had  a  hand  in  the  matter."*  We  do  not  intend  to  comment  on 
this  passage ;  we  merely  wish  to  advert  to  the  fact,  that  it  is  a 
laboured  and  logical  effort  to  demolish  the  hypothesis  that  acts 
of  the  will  do  not  bring  themselves  into  existence,  and  to  show 
that  there  must  be  some  antecedent  to  account  for  their  coming 
into  being.  We  shall  only  add,  "it  is  true  that  nothing  has  no 
choice ;"  but  who  ever  pretended  to  believe  that  nothing  puts 
forth  volitions  ?  that  there  is  no  mind,  no  motive,  no  ground  or 
reason  of  volition  ?  Is  it  not  wonderful  that  the  great  metaphy- 
sician of  New-England  should  thus  worry  himself  and  exhaust 
his  powers  in  grappling  with  shadows  and  combatting  dreams, 
which  no  sane  man  ever  seriously  entertained  for  a  moment  ? 

"  If  we  should  suppose  non-entity  to  be  about  to  bring  forth," 
he  continues,  "  and  things  were  coming  into  existence  without 
any  cause  or  antecedent  on  which  the  existence,  or  kind  or 
manner  of  existence  depends,  or  which  could  at  all  determine 
whether  the  things  should  be  stones  or  stems,  or  beasts  or 
angels,  or  human  bodies  or  souls,  or  only  some  new  motion  or 
figure  in  natural  bodies,  or  some  new  sensation  in  animals,  or 
new  idea  in  the  human  understanding,  or  new  volition  in  the 
will,  or  anything  else  of  all  the  infinite  number  of  possibles, — 
then  it  certainly  would  not  be  expected,  although  many  millions 
of  millions  of  things  were  coming  into  existence  in  this  manner 
all  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  that  they  should  all  be  only  of  one 
particular  kind,  and  that  it  should  be  thus  in  all  ages,  and  that 
this  sort  of  existences  should  never  fail  to  come  to  pass  when 
there  is  room  for  them,  or  a  subject  capable  of  them,  and  that 
constantly  whenever  there  is  occasion."f  Now  all  these  wordy 
are  put  together  to  prove  that  non-entity  cannot  bring  forth 
effects,  at  least  such  effects  as  we  see  in  the  world ;  for  if  non- 
entity brought  them  forth,  that  is,  to  come  to  the  point  in  dis- 
pute, if  non-entity  brought  forth  our  volitions,  they  would  not 
be  always  of  one  particular  sort  of  effects.  But  they  are  of  one 

0  Inquiry,  p.  54.  f  Id.,  p.  65. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  147 

particular  sort,  and  hence  there  must  be  some  antecedent  to 
account  for  this  uniformity  in  their  nature,  and  they  could  not 
have  been  brought  forth  by  nonentity !  Surely  if  anything 
can  equal  the  fatuity  of  the  hypothesis  that  nonentity  can  bring 
forth,  or  that  a  thing  can  produce  itself,  it  is  a  serious  attempt 
to  refute  it.  How  often,  while  poring  over  the  works  of  neces- 
sitarians, are  we  lost  in  amazement  at  the  logical  mania  which 
seems  to  have  seized  them,  and  which,  in  its  impetuous  efforts 
to  settle  and  determine  everything  by  reasoning,  leaves  reason 
itself  neither  time  nor  opportunity  to  contemplate  the  nature  of 
things  themselves,  or  listen  to  its  own  most  authoritative  and 
irreversible  mandates. 

But  lest  we  should  be  suspected  of  doing  this  great  metaphy- 
sician injustice,  we  must  point  out  the  means  by  which  he  has 
so  grossly  deceived  himself.  According  to  his  definition  of 
motive,  as  the  younger  Edwards  truly  says,  it  includes  every 
cause  and  condition  of  volition.  If  anything  is  merely  a  condi- 
tion, without  which  a  volition  could  not  come  to  pass,  though 
it  exerts  no  influence,  it  is  called  a  cause  of  that  volition,  and 
placed  in  the  definition  of  motive.  And  if  anything  exerts  a 
positive  influence  to  produce  volition,  this  is  also  a  cause  of  it, 
and  is  included  in  the  same  definition.  In  short,  this  definition 
embraces  every  conceivable  antecedent  on  which  volition  in 
any  manner,  either  in  whole  or  in  part,  either  negatively  or 
positively,  depends.  Thus  the  most  heterogeneous  materials  are 
crowded  together  under  one  and  the  same  term, — the  most  dif- 
ferent ideas  under  one  and  the  same  definition.  Is  it  possible 
to  conceive  of  a  better  method  of  obscuring  a  subject  than  such 
a  course  ?  When  Edwards  merely  means  a  condition,  why  does 
he  not  say  so  ?  and  when  he  means  a  producing  cause,  why  does 
he  not  use  the  right  word  to  express  his  meaning?  If  he  had 
carried  on  the  various  processes  of  his  reasoning  with  some  one 
clear  and  distinct  idea  before  his  mind,  we  might  have  expected 
great  things  from  him ;  but  he  has  not  chosen  to  do  so.  It  is 
with  the  term  cause  that  he  operates,  against  the  ambiguities 
of  which  he  has  not  guarded  himself  or  his  reader. 

"Having  thus  explained  what  I  mean  by  cause,"  says  he, 
"  1  assert  that  nothing  ever  comes  to  pass-  without  a  cause." 
"We  have  seen  his  reasoning  on  this  point.  He  labours  through 
page  after  page  to  establish  his  very  ambiguous  proposition,  in 


148  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  1, 

a  sense  in  which  nobody  ever  denied  it ;  unless  some  one  has 
affirmed  that  a  thing  may  come  into  being  without  any  ground 
or  reason  of  its  existence, — may  arise  out  of  nothing  and  help 
itself  into  existence.  Having  sufficiently  established  his  funda- 
mental proposition  in  this  sense,  he  proceeds  to  show  that  every 
effect  and  volition  in  particular,  is  necessarily  connected  with 
its  cause.  "It  must  be  remembered,"  says  he,  "that  it  has 
been  already  showrn,  that  nothing  can  ever  come  to  pass  with- 
out a  cause  or  a  reason  ;"*  and  he  then  proceeds  to  show,  that 
kC  the  acts  of  the  will  must  be  connected  with  their  cause."  In 
this  part  of  his  argument,  he  employs  his  ambiguous  proposi- 
tion in  a  different  sense  from  that  in  which  he  established  it. 
In  the  establishment  of  it  he  only  insists  that  there  must  be 
some  antecedent  sufficient  to  account  for  every  event ;  and  in 
the  application  of  it  he  contends,  that  the  antecedent  or  cause 
must  produce  the  event.  These  ideas  are  perfectly  distinct. 
There  could  be  no  act  of  the  mind  unless  there  were  a  mind  to 
act,  and  unless  there  were  a  motive  in  view  of  which  it  acts ; 
but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  mind  is  compelled  to  act  by 
motive.  But  let  us  see  how  he  comes  to  this  conclusion. 

"  For  an  event,"  says  he,  "  to  have  a  cause  and  ground  of  its 
existence,  and  yet  not  be  connected  with  its  cause,  is  an  incon- 
sistency. For  if  the  event  be  not  connected  with  its  cause,  it 
is  not  dependent  on  the  cause :  its  existence  is,  as  it  were,  loose 
from  its  influence,  and  may  attend  it  or  may  not"-\  "  Depend- 
ence on  the  influence  of  a  cause  is  the  very  notion  of  an  effect."  J 
Again,  "  to  suppose  there  are  some  events  which  have  a  cause 
and  ground  of  their  existence,  that  yet  are  not  necessarily  con- 
nected with  their  cause,  is  to  suppose  that  they  have  a  cause 
which  is  not  their  cause.  Tims,  if  the  effect  be  not  necessarily 
connected  with  the  cause,  with  its  influence  and  influential  cir- 
cumstances, tli en,  as  I  observed  before,  it  is  a  thing  possible  and 
supposable  that  the  cause  may  sometimes  exert  the  same  influ- 
ence under  the  same  circumstances,  and  yet  the  effect  not  fol- 
low"§  He  has  much  other  similar  reasoning  to  show  that  it  is 
absurd  and  contradictory  to  say  that  motive  is  the  cause  of 
volition,  and  yet  admit  that  volition  may  be  loose  from  the 
nfluence  of  motive,  or  that  "  the  cause  is  not  sufficient  to  pro. 
the  effect."]  In  all  this  he  uses  the  term  in  its  most  nar- 

Inquiry,  p.  77.  f  Ibid.  J  Ibid.  §  Id.,  p.  78.  ||  Id.,  p.  79. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  149 

row  and  restricted  sense.  It  is  no  longer  a  mere  antecedent  or 
antecedents,  which  are  sufficient  to  account  for  the  existence  of 
the  phenomena  of  volition ;  it  is  an  efficient  cause  which  pro- 
duces volitions.  Thus  he  establishes  his  ambiguous  proposition 
in  one  sense,  and  builds  on  it  in  another.  He  explains  the 
term  cause  to  signify  any  antecedent,  in  order,  he  tells  us,  to 
present  objection  to  his  doctrine,  when  he  alleges  that  nothing 
*ever  comes  to  pass  without  some  cause  of  its  existence ;  and 
yet,  when  he  applies  this  fundamental  proposition  to  the  con- 
struction of  his  scheme,  he  returns  to  the  restricted  sense  of  the 
word,  in  which  it  signifies,  "that  which  has  a  positive  efficacy  or 
influence  to  produce  a  thing."  It  is  thus  that  the  great  scheme 
of  President  Edwards  is  made  up  of  mere  words,  having  no  intrin- 
sic coherency  of  parts,  and  appearing  consistent  throughout, 
only  because  its  disjointed  fragments  seem  to  be  united,  and  its 
huge  chasms  concealed  by  means  of  the  ambiguities  of  language. 

SECTION  IIL 

The  scheme  of  necessity  is  supported  l)y  false  logic. 

One  reason  why  the  advocates  of  necessity  deceive  themselves, 
as  well  as  others,  is,  that  there  is  great  want  of  precision  and 
distinctness  in  their  views  and  definitions.  We  are  told  by 
them  that  the  will  is  always  determined  by  the  strongest 
motive ;  that  this  is  invariably  the  cause  of  volition.  But  what 
is  meant  by  the  term  cause  f  We  have  final  causes,  instru- 
mental causes,  occasional  causes,  predisposing  causes,  efficient 
causes,  and  many  others.  Now,  in  which  of  these  senses  is  the 
word  used,  when  we  are  informed  that  motive  is  the  cause  of 
volition?  On  this  point  we  are  not  enlightened.  Neither 
Leibnitz  nor  Edwards  is  sufficiently  explicit.  The  proposition, 
as  left  by  them,  is  vague  and  obscure. 

Leibnitz  inclined  to  the  use  of  the  word  reason,  because  he  car- 
ried on  a  controversy  with  Bayle  and  Hobbes,  who  were  atheists ; 
though  he  frequently  speaks  of  a  chain  of  causes  which  embrace 
human  volitions.*  While  Edwards,  who  opposed  the  Armini- 
ans,  generally  employs  the  more  rigid  term  cause  •  though  he, 
too,  frequently  represents  motive  as  "  the  ground  and  reason  " 
of  volition.  The  one  softens  his  language,  in  places,  as  he  con- 

*  Theodicee. 


i50  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I. 

tends  with  those  who  had  rendered  themselves  obnoxious  to  the 
Christian  world  by  an  advocacy  of  the  doctrine  of  necessity  in 
connexion  with  atheistical  sentiments.  The  other  appears  to 
prefer  the  stronger  expression,  as  he  puts  forth  his  power  against 
antagonists  whose  views  of  liberty  were  deemed  subversive  of 
the  tenets  of  Calvinism.  But  the  law  of  causality,  as  stated  by 
Edwards,  and  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  as  defined 
and  employed  by  Leibnitz,  are  perfectly  identical. 

When  we  are  told  that  motive  is  the  cause  of  volition,  it  is 
evident  we  cannot  determine  whether  to  deny  or  to  assent  to 
the  proposition,  unless  we  know  in  what  sense  the  term  cause 
is  used.  We  might  discuss  this  perplexed  question  forever,  by 
the  use  of  such  vague  and  indefinite  propositions,  without  pro- 
gressing a  single  step  toward  the  end  of  the  controversy.  We 
must  bring  a  more  searching  analysis  to  the  subj  ect,  if  we  hope 
to  accomplish  anything.  We  must  take  the  word  cause  or 
reason,  in  each  of  its  significations,  in  order  to  discover  in  what 
particulars  the  contending  parties  agree,  and  in  what  particu- 
lars they  disagree,  in  order  to  see  how  far  each  party  is  right, 
and  how  far  it  is  wrong.  This  is  the  only  course  that  prom- 
ises the  least  prospect  of  a  satisfactory  result. 

If  we  mean  by  the  cause  of  volition,  that  which  wills  or  exerts 
the  volition,  there  is  no  controversy  ;  for  in  this  sense  the  advo- 
cates of  necessity  admit  that  the  mind  is  the  cause  of  volition. 
Thus  says  Edwards :  "  The  acts  of  my  will  are  my  own ;  i.  e.,  they 
are  acts  of  my  will."*  It  is  universally  conceded  that  it  is  the 
mind  which  wills,  and  nothing  else  in  the  place  of  it ;  and  hence, 
in  this  sense  of  the  word,  there  is  no  question  but  that  the  mind 
is  the  cause  of  volition.  But  the  advocates  of  necessity  cannot 
be  understood  in  this  sense  ;  for  they  deny  that  the  mind  is  the 
cause  of  volition,  and  insist  that  it  is  caused  by  motive. 

The  term  cause  is  very  often  used  to  designate  the  condition 
of  a  thing,  or  that  without  which  it  could  not  happen  or  come 
to  pass.  Thus  we  are  told  by  Edwards,  that  he  sometimes  uses 
"  the  word  cause  to  signify  any  antecedent"  of  an  event, 
"  whether  it  has  any  influence  or  not,"  in  the  production  of  such 
ovent.f  If  this  be  the  meaning,  when  it  is  said  that  motive  is 
the  cause  of  volition,  the  truth  of  the  proposition  is  conceded  by 
the  advocates  of  free-agency.  In  speaking  of  arguments  and 

0  Inquiry,  p.  277.  f  W-»  PP-  50,  51. 


Chapter  IV/1  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  151 

motives,  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke  says :  "  Occasions  indeed  there  may 
be,  and  are,  upon  which  that  substance  in  man,  wherever  the 
self-moving  principle  resides,  freely  exerts  its  active  power."* 
Herein,  then,  there  is  a  perfect  agreement  between  the  con- 
tending parties  The  fact  that  the  mind  requires  certain  con- 
ditions or  occasions,  on  which  to  exercise  its  active  power,  does 
not  at  all  interfere  with  its  freedom ;  and  hence  the  advocates 
:>f  free-agency  have  readily  admitted  that  motives  are  the  occa- 
sional causes  of  volition.  We  must  look  out  for  some  other 
meaning  of  the  term,  then,  if  we  would  clearly  and  distinctly 
fix  our  minds  on  the  point  in  controversy. 

We  say  that  an  antecedent  is  the  cause  of  its  consequent, 
when  the  latter  is  produced  by  the  action  of  the  former.  For 
example,  a  motion  of  the  body  is  said  to  be  caused  by  the  mind ; 
because  it  is  produced  by  an  act  of  the  mind.  This  seems  to  be 
what  is  meant  by  an  "  efficient  cause"  It  is,  no  doubt,  the  most 
proper  sense  of  the  word ;  and  around  this  it  is  that  the  con- 
troversy still  rages,  and  has  for  centuries  raged. 

The  advocates  of  necessity  contend,  not  only  that  volition  is 
the  effect  of  motive,  but  also  that  "  to  be  an  effect  implies  pas- 
siveness,  or  the  being  subject  to  the  power  and  action  of  its 
cause. "f  Such  precisely  is  the  doctrine  of  Edwards,  and  Col- 
lins, and  Hobbes.  In  this  sense  of  the  word  it  is  denied  that 
motive  is  the  cause  of  volition,  and  it  is  affirmed  that  mind  is 
the  cause  thereof.  Thus,  says  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  in  his  reply 
to  Collins,  "  T  is  the  self-moving  principle,  and  not  at  all  the 
reason  or  motive,  which  is  the  physical  or  efficient  cause  of 
action  ;"  by  which  we  understand  him  to  mean  volition,  as  that 
is  the  thing  in  dispute.  Now,  when  the  advocates  of  free- 
agency  insist  that  motive  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  volition, 
and  that  mind  is  the  efficient  cause  thereof,  we  suppose  them 
to  employ  the  expression,  efficient  cause^  in  one  and  the  same 
sense  in  both  branches  of  the  proposition.  This  is  the  only  fair 
way  of  viewing  their  language ;  and  if  they  wished  to  be  undei 
stood  in  any  other  manner,  they  should  have  taken  the  pains 
to  explain  themselves,  and  not  permit  us  to  be  misled  by  an 
ambiguity.  Here  the  precise  point  in  dispute  is  clearly  pre- 
sented ;  and  let  us  hear  the  contending  parties,  before  we  pro- 
ceed to  decide  between  them. 

0  Remarks  upon  Collins's  Philosophical  Inquiry.  f  Inquiry,  p.  198. 


152  MORAL  EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

You  are  in  error,  says  the  necessitarian  to  his  opponents,  in 
denying  that  motive,  and  in  affirming  that  mind,  is  the  efficient 
cause  of  volition.  For  if  an  act  of  the  mind,  or  a  volition,  is 
caused  by  the  mind,  it  must  be  produced  by  a  preceding  act  of 
the  mind,  and  this  act  must  be  produced  by  another  preceding 
act  of  the  mind,  and  so  on  ad  inftnitum •  which  reduces  the  . 
matter  to  a  plain  impossibility.  Now,  if  the  necessitarian  has 
not  been  deceived  by  an  unwarrantable  ambiguity  on  the  part 
of  his  adversary,  he  has  clearly  reduced  his  doctrine  to  the 
absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of  acts  :  that  is  to  say,  if  the  advo- 
cate of  free-agency  does  not  depart  from  the  ordinary  meaning 
of  words,  when  he  affirms  that  mind  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
volition ;  and  if  he  does  not  use  these  terms  "  efficient  cause"  in 
different  senses  in  the  same  sentence,  then  we  feel  bound  to 
say  that  he  is  fairly  caught  in  the  toils  of  his  adversary.  But 
we  are  not  yet  in  condition  to  pass  a  final  judgment  between 
the  parties. 

The  necessitarian  contends  that  "  volition,  or  an  act  of  the 
mind,  is  the  effect  of  motive,  and  that  it  is  subject  to  the  power 
and  action  of  its  cause."*  The  advocate  of  free-will  replies,  If 
we  must  suppose  an  action  of  motive  on  the  mind  to  account 
for  its  act,  we  must  likewise  suppose  another  action  to  account 
for  the  action  of  motive ;  and  so  on  ad  inftnitum.  Thus  the 
necessitarian  seems  to  be  fairly  caught  in  his  own  toils,  and 
entrapped  by  his  own  definition  and  arguments. 

Our  decision  (for  the  correctness  of  which  we  appeal  to  the 
calm  and  impartial  judgment  of  the  reader)  is  as  follows :  If 
the  term  cause  be  understood  in  the  first  or  the  second  seuse 
above  mentioned,  there  is  no  disagreement  between  the  con- 
tending parties ;  and  if  it  be  understood  in  the  third  sense,  then 
both  parties  are  in  error.  If,  in  order  to  account  for  an  act  of 
the  mind,  we  suppose  it  is  caused  by  an  action  of  motive,  we 
are  involved  in  the  absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of  actions ; 
and  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  suppose  it  is  caused  by  a  preced- 
ing act  of  the  mind  itself,  we  are  forced  into  the  same  absurdity. 
Hence,  we  conclude,  that  an  act  of  the  mind,  or  a  volition,  is  not 
produced  by  the  action  of  either  mind  or  motive,  but  takes  its 
rise  in  the  world  without  any  such  efficient  cause  of  its  exist- 
ence. 

0  Edwards 's  Inquiry,  p.  178. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  153 

Each  party  lias  refuted  his  adversary,  and  in  the  enjoyment 
of  his  triumph  he  seems  not  to  have  duly  reflected  on  the  de- 
struction of  his  own  position.  Both  are  in  the  right,  and  both 
are  in  the  wrong  ;  but,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  not  equally  so. 
If  we  adopt  the  argument  of  both  sides,  in  so  far  as  it  is  true, 
we  shall  come  to  the  conclusion  that  action  must  take  its 
rise  somewhere  in  the  universe  without  being  caused  by  pre- 
ceding action.  And  if  so,  where  shall  we  look  for  its  origin  I 
in  that  which  by  nature  is  endowed  with  active  power,  or  in 
that  which  is  purely  and  altogether  passive  ? 

We  lay  it  down,  then,  as  an  established  and  fundamental 
position,  that  the  mind  acts  or  puts  forth  its  volitions  without 
being  efficiently  caused  to  do  so, — without  being  impelled  by  its 
own  prior  action,  or  by  the  prior  action  of  anything  else.  The 
conditions  or  occasions  of  volition  being  supplied,  the  mind 
•itself  acts  in  view  thereof,  without  being  subject  to  the  power 
or  action  of  any  cause  whatever.  All  rational  beings  must,  as 
we  have  seen,  either  admit  this  exemption  of  the  mind  in 
willing  from  the  powrer  and  action  of  any  cause,  or  else  lose 
themselves  in  the  labyrinth  of  an  infinite  series  of  causes.  It 
is  this  exemption  which  constitutes  the  freedom  of  the  human 
soul. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  see,  in  a  clear  light,  the  sophistical 
nature  of  the  pretended  demonstration  of  the  scheme  of  neces- 
sity. "  It  is  impossible  to  consider  occurrences,"  says  Sir  James 
Mackintosh,  otherwise  than  as  bound  together  in  "  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect."  Now  this  relation,  if  we  interpret  it 
according  to  the  nature  of  things,  and  not  according  to  the 
sound  of  words,  is  not  one,  but  two. 

The  motions  of  the  body  are  caused  by  the  mind,  that  is, 
they  are  produced  by  the  action  of  the  mind  ;  this  constitutes 
one  relation :  but  acts  of  the  mind  are  caused,  that  is,  they  are 
produced  by  the  action  of  nothing ;  and  this  is  a  quite  different 
relation  In  other  words,  the  motions  of  body  are  produced  by 
preceding  action,  and  the  acts  of  the  mind  are  not  produced  by 
preceding  action.  Hence,  the  first  are  necessitated,  and  the 
last  are  free :  the  first  come  under  "  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect,"  and  the  last  come  under  a  very  different  relation.  The 
relation  of  cause  and  effect  connects  the  most  remote  conse- 
quences of  volition  with  volition  itself;  but  when  we  reach  voli- 


154  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

tion,  there  a  new  relation  arises :  it  is  the  relation  which  sub- 
sists between  an  agent  and  its  act.  We  may  trace  changes  in 
the  external  world  up  to  the  volitions  or  acts  of  mind,'  and  per- 
ceive no  diversity  in  the  chain  of  dependencies ;  but  precisely 
at  this  point  the  chain  of  cause  and  effect  ceases,  and  agency 
begins.  The  surrounding  circumstances  may  be  conditions, 
may  be  occasional  causes,  may  be  predisposing  causes,  but  they 
are  not,  and  cannot  be,  producing  or  efficient  causes.  Here, 
then,  the  iron  chain  terminates,  and  freedom  commences.  In 
the  ambiguity  which  fails  to  distinguish  between  "  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect,"  and  the  relation  which  volition  bears  to  its 
antecedents,  "  consists  the  strength  of  the  necessitarian  system." 
Let  this  distinction  be  clearly  made  and  firmly  borne  in  mind, 
and  the  great  boasted  adamantine  scheme  of  necessity  will 
resolve  itself  into  an  empty,  ineffectual  sound. 

Hence,  if  we  would  place  the  doctrine  of  liberty  upon  solid 
grounds,  it  becomes  necessary  to  modify  the  categories  of  M. 
Cousin.  All  things,  says  he,  fall  under  the  one  or  the  other  of 
the  two  following  relations:  the  relation  between  subject  and 
attribute,  or  the  relation  between  cause  and  effect.  This  last 
category,  we  think,  should  be  subdivided,  so  as  to  give  two 
relations  ;  one  between  cause  and  effect,  properly  so  called,  and 
the  other  between  agent  and  action.  Until  this  be  done,  it  will 
be  impossible  to  extricate  the  phenomena  of  the  will  from  the 
mechanism  of  cause  and  effect. 

We  think  we  might  here  leave  the  stupendous  sophism  of  the 
necessitarian ;  but  as  it  has  exerted  so  wonderful  an  influence 
over  the  human  mind,  and  obscured,  for  ages,  the  glory  of  the 
moral  government  of  God,  we  may  w^ell  be  permitted  to  pursue 
it  further,  and  to  continue  the  pursuit  so  long  as  a  fragment  or 
a  shadow  of  it  remains  to  be  demolished. 


SECTION  IV. 
The  scheme  of  necessity  is  fortified  by  false  conceptions. 

One  of  the  notions  to  which  the  cause  of  necessity  owes 
much  of  its  strength,  is  a  false  conception  of  liberty,  as  consist- 
ing in  "  a  power  over  the  determinations  of  the  will."  Hence  it 
is  said  that  this  power  over  the  will  can  do  nothing,  can  cause 
no  determination  except  by  acting  to  produce  it.  But  accord 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  155 

ing  to  this  notion  of  liberty,  this  causative  act  cannot  be  free 
unless  it  be  also  caused  by  a  preceding  act;  and  so  on  ad 
infinitutn.  Such  is  one  of  the  favourite  arguments  of  the 
necessitarian.  But  in  truth  the  freedom  of  the  mind  does  not 
consist  in  its  possessing  a  power  over  the  determinations  of  its 
own  will,  for  the  true  notion  of  freedom  is  a  negative  idea,  and 
consists  in  the  absence  of  every  power  over  the  determinations 
of  the  will.  The  mind  is  free  because  it  possesses  a  power  of 
acting,  over  which  there  is  no  controlling  power,  either  within 
or  witinut  itself. 

It  must  be  admitted,  it  seems  to  us,  that  the  advocates  of 
free-agency  have  too  often  sanctioned  this  false  conception  of 
liberty,  and  thereby  strengthened  the  cause  of  their  opponents. 
Cudworth,  Clark,  Stuart,  Coleridge,  and  Reid,  all  speak  of  this 
supposed  power  of  the  mind  over  the  determinations  of  the  will, 
as  that  which  constitutes  its  freedom.  Thus  says  Reid,  for 
example :  "  By  the  liberty  of  a  moral  agent,  I  understand  a 
power  over  the  determinations  of  his  own  will."  Now,  it  is 
not  at  all  strange  that  this  language  should  be  conceived  by 
necessitarians  in  such  a  manner  as  to  involve  the  doctrine  of 
liberty  in  the  absurd  consequence  of  an  infinite  series  of  acts, 
since  it  is  so  understood  by  some  of  the  most  enlightened  advo- 
cates of  free-agency  themselves.  "  A  power  over  the  determi- 
nations of  our  will,"  says  Sir  William  Hamilton,  "  supposes  an 
act  of  the  will  that  our  will  should  determine  so  and  so ;  for  we 
can  only  exert  power  through  a  rational  determination  or  volition. 
This  definition  of  liberty  is  right.  But  the  question  upon  ques- 
tion remains,  (and  this  ad  infinitum) — have  we  a  power  (a  will) 
over  such  anterior  will  ?  and  until  this  question  be  definitively 
answered,  which  it  never  can,  we  must  be  unable  to  conceive 
the  possibility  of  the  fact  of  liberty.  But,  though  inconceivable, 
this  fact  is  not  therefore  false."  True,  we  are  unable  to  con- 
ceive the  possibility  of  the  fact  of  liberty,  if  this  must  be  con- 
ceived as  consisting  in  a  power  over  the  determinations  of  the 
will ;  but,  in  our  humble  opinion,  this  definition  of  liberty  is 
not  right.  It  seems  more  correct  to  say,  that  the  freedom  of 
the  will  consists  in  the  absence  of  a  power  over  its  determina- 
tions, than  in  the  presence  of  such  a  power. 

There  is  another  false  conception  which  has  given  great 
apparent  force  to  the  cause  of  necessity.  It  is  supposed  that 


156  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

the  states  of  the  will,  the  volitions,  are  often  necessitated  by  the 
necessitated  states  of  the  sensibility.  In  other  words,  it  is  sup- 
posed that  the  appetites,  passions,  and  desires,  often  act  upon 
the  will,  and  produce  its  volitions.  But  this  seems  to  be  a 
very  great  mistake,  which  has  arisen  from  viewing  the  subtle 
operations  of  the  mind  through  the  medium  of  those  mechanical 
forms  of  thought  that  have  been  derived  from  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  phenomena  of  the  material  world.  In  truth,  the 
.feelings  do  not  act  at  all,  and  consequently  they  cannot  act 
upon  the  will.  It  is  absurd,  as  Locke  and  Edwards  well  say,  to 
ascribe  power,  which  belongs  to  the  agent  himself,  to  the 
properties  of  an  agent.  Hence,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  our 
feelings,  appetites,  desires,  and  passions,  are  endowed  with 
power,  and  can  act.  They  are  not  agents — they  are  merely  the 
properties  of  an  agent.  It  is  the  mind  itself  which  acts,  and 
not  its  passions.  These  are  but  passive  impressions  made  upon 
the  sensibility ;  and  hence,  "  it  is  to  philosophize  very  crudely 
concerning  mind,  and  to  image  everything  in  a  corporeal  man- 
ner," to  conceive  that  they  act  upon  the  will  and  control  its 
determinations,  just  as  the  motions  of  body  are  caused  and 
controlled  by  the  action  of  mind.* 

This  conception,  however,  is  not  peculiar  to  the  necessitarian. 
It  has  been  most  unfortunately  sanctioned  by  the  greatest  advo- 
cates of  free-agency.  Thus  says  Dr.  Reid,  in  relation  to  the 
appetites  and  passions :  "  Such  motives  are  not  addressed  to  the 
rational  powers.  Their  influence  is  immediately  upon  the  will." 
"  When  a  man  is  acted  upon  by  contrary  motives  of  this  kind, 
he  finds  it  easy  to  yield  to  the  strongest.  They  are  like  two 
forces  pushing  him  in  contrary  directions.  To  yield  to  the 
strongest  he  needs  only  be  passive"  If  this  be  so,  how  can  Dr. 
Eeid  maintain,  as  he  does,  that  "  the  determination  was  made 
by  the  man,  and  not  by  the  motive?"  To  this  assertion  Sir 
WiLiam  Hamilton  replies:  "But  was  the  man  determined  by 
no  motive  to  that  determination?  Was  his  specific  volition  to 
this  or  to  that  without  a  cause  ?  On  the  supposition  that  the 
sum  of  the  influences  (motives,  dispositions,  tendencies)  to  voli- 
tion A  is  equal  to  12,  and  the  sum  of  counter  volition  B, 
equal  to  8 — can  we  conceive  that  the  determination  of  volition 
A  should  not  be  necessary  ?  We  can  only  conceive  the  voli 
0  See  Examination  of  Edwards  on  the  Will. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  157 

tion  B  to  be  determined  by  supposing  that  the  man  creates 
(calls  from  nonexistence  into  existence)  a  certain  supplement 
of  influences.  But  this  creation  as  actual,  or  in  itself,  is  incon- 
ceivable ;  and  even  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  this  inconceiv- 
able act,  we  must  suppose  some  cause  by  which  the  iran  is 
determined  to  exert  it.  We  thus  in  th&ught,  never  escape 
determination  and  necessity.  It  will  be  observed  that  I  do  not 
consider  this  inability  to  notion  any  disproof  of  the  fact  of  free- 
will." 

It  is  true,  that  if  wre  suppose,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  Sir 
William  and  Dr.  Reid,  that  two  counter  influences  act  upon  the 
will,  the  one  being  as  12  and  the  other  as  8,  then  the  first  must 
necessarily  prevail.  But  if  this  supposition  be  correct,  we  are 
not  only  unable  to  conceive  the  fact  of  liberty,  we  are  also  able 
to  conceive  that  it  cannot  be  a  fact  at  all.  There  is  a  great  dif- 
ference, we  have  been  accustomed  to  believe,  between  being 
unable  to  conceive  how  a  thing  is,  and  being  able  to  conceive 
that  it  cannot  be  anyhow  at  all :  the  first  would  leave  it  a  mere 
mystery, — the  last  would  show  it  to  be  an  absurdity.  In  the  one 
case,  the  thing  would  be  above  reason,  and  in  the  other,  con- 
trary to  reason.  Now,  to  which  of  these  categories  does  the 
fact  of  liberty,  as  left  by  Sir  William  Hamilton,  belong?  Is  it 
a  mystery,  or  is  it  an  absurdity  ?  Is  it  an  inconceivable  fact,  or 
is  it  a  conceived  impossibility  ?  It  seems  to  us  that  it  is  the 
latter ;  and  that  if  wre  will  only  take  the  pains  to  view  the 
phenomena  of  mind  as  they  exist  in  consciousness,  and  not 
through  the  medium  of  material  analogies,  we  shall  be  able  to 
untie  the  knot  which  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  found  it  neces- 
sary to  cut. 

The  doctrine  of  liberty,  if  properly  viewed,  is  perfectly  con- 
ceivable. We  can  certainly  conceive  that  the  omnipotence  of 
God  can  put  forth  an  act  without  being  impelled  thereto  by  a 
power  back  of  his  own ;  and  to  suppose  otherwise,  is  to  sup- 
pose a  power  greater  than  God's,  and  upon  which  the  exercise 
of  his  omnipotence  depends.  By  parity  of  reason,  we  should 
he  compelled  to  suppose  another  power  still  back  of  that,  and 
so  on  ad  infinitum.  This  is  not  only  absurd,  but,  as  Calvin 
truly  says,  it  is  impious.  Here,  then,  we  have  upon  the  throne 
of  the  universe  a  clear  and  unequivocal  instance  of  a  self-active 
power, — a  power  whose  goings  forth  are  not  impelled  by  any 


158  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

power  without  itself.  It  goes  forth,  it  is  true,  in  the  light  of 
the  Eternal  Reason,  and  in  pursuit  of  the  ends  of  the  Eternal 
Goodness ;  but  yet  in  itself  it  possesses  an  infinite  fulness,  being 
self-sustained,  self-active,  and  wholly  independent  of  all  other 
powers  and  influences  whatsoever. 

Now,  if  such  a  Being  should  create  at  all,  it  is  not  difficult  to 
conceive  that  he  would  create  subordinate  agents,  bearing  his 
own  image  in  this,  namely,  the  possession  of  a  self-active 
power.  It  is  not  difficult  to  conceive  that  he  should  produce 
spiritual  beings  like  himself,  who  can  act  without  being  neces- 
sitated to  act,  like  the  inanimate  portions  of  creation,  as  well 
as  those  of  an  inferior  nature.  Nor  is  it  more  difficult  to  con- 
ceive that  man,  in  point  of  fact,  possesses  such  a  limited  self- 
active  power,  than  it  is  to  conceive  that  God  possesses  an  infinite 
self-active  power.  Indeed  we  must  and  do  conceive  this,  or 
else  we  should  have  no  type  or  representative  in  this  lower  part 
of  the  world,  by  and  through  which  to  rise  to  a  contemplation 
of  its  universal  Lord  and  Sovereign.  We  should  have  a  temple 
without  a  symbol,  and  a  universe  without  a  God.  But  God 
has  not  thus  left  himself  without  witness  ;  for  he  has  raised  man 
above  the  dust  of  the  earth  in  this,  that  he  is  endowed  with  a 
self-active  power,  from  whence,  as  from  an  humble  platform, 
he  may  rise  to  the  sublime  contemplation  of  the  Universal 
Mover  of  the  heavens  and  the  earth.  But  for  this  ray  of  light, 
shed  abroad  in  our  hearts  by  the  creative  energy  of  God,  the 
nature  of  the  divine  power  itself  would  be  unknown  to  us,  and 
its  eternal,  immutable  glories  shrouded  in  impenetrable  dark- 
ness. The  idea  of  an  omnipotent  power,  moving  in  and  of 
itself  in  obedience  to  the  dictates  of  infinite  wisdom  and  good- 
ness, would  be  forever  merged  and  lost  in  the  dark  scheme  of 
an  irnplexed  series  and  concatenation  of  causes,  binding  all 
things  fast,  God  himself  not  excepted,  in  the  iron  bonds  of 
fate. 

If  liberty  be  a  fact,  as  Sir  William  Hamilton  contends  it  is, 
then  no  such  objections  can  be  urged  against  it  as  those  in 
which  he  supposes  it  to  be  involved.  We  are  aware  of  what 
may  be  said  in  favour  of  such  a  mode  of  viewing  subjects 
of  this  kind,  as  well  as  of  the  nature  of  the  principles  from 
which  it  takes  its  rise.  But  we  cannot  consider  those  principles 
altogether  sound.  They  appear  to  be  too  sceptical,  with  respect 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  159 

to  the  powers  of  the  human  mind,  and  the  destiny  of  human 
knowledge.  The  sentiment  of  Leibnitz  seems  to  rest  upon  a 
more  solid  foundation.  "  It  is  necessary  to  come,"  says  he,  "  to 
the  grand  question  which  M.  Bayle  has  recently  brought  upon 
the  carpet,  to  wit,  whether  a  truth,  and  especially  a  truth  of 
faith,  can  be  subject  to  unanswerable  objections.  That  excel- 
lent author  seems  boldly  to  maintain  the  affirmative  of  this 
question :  he  cites  grave  theologians  on  his  side,  and  even  those 
of  Rome,  who  appear  to  say  what  he  pretends ;  and  he  adduces 
philosophers  who  have  believed  that  there  are  even  philosophi- 
cal truths,  the  defenders  of  which  cannot  reply  to  objections 
made  against  them"  "  For  my  part,"  says  Leibnitz,  " I  avow 
that  I  cannot  be  of  the  sentiment  of  those  who  maintain  that  a 
truth  can  be  liable  to  invincible  objections ;  for  what  is  an 
objection  but  an  argument  of  which  the  conclusion  contradicts 
our  thesis?  and  is  not  an  invincible  argument  a  demonstra- 
tion?" "It  is  always  necessary  to  yield  to  demonstrations, 
whether  they  are  proposed  for  our  adoption,  or  advanced  in  the 
form  of  objections.  And  it  is  unjust  and  useless  to  wish  to 
weaken  the  proofs  of  adversaries,  under  the  pretext  that  they 
are  only  objections;  since  the  adversary  has  the  same  right, 
and  can  reverse  the  denominations,  by  honouring  his  arguments 
with  the  name  of  proofs,  and  lowering  yours  by  the  disparaging 
name  of  objections."* 

There  is  another  false  conception,  by  which  the  necessitarian 
fortifies  himself  in  his  opposition  to  the  freedom  of  the  will.  As 
he  identifies  the  sensibility  and  the  will,  so  when  the  indiffer- 
ence of  the  latter  is  spoken  of,  the  language  is  understood  to 
mean  that  the  mind  is  indifferent,  and  destitute  of  all  feeling  or 
emotion.  But  this  is  to  view  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  not  as  it 
is  held  by  its  advocates,  but  as  it  is  seen  through  the  medium 
of  a  false  psychology.  We  might  adduce  a  hundred  examples 
of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  but  one  or  two  must  suffice.  Thus, 
Collins  supposes  that  the  doctrine  of  liberty  implies,  that  the 
mind  is  "indifferent  to  good  and  evil;"  "indifferent  to  what 
causes  pleasure  or  pain  ;"  "  indifferent  to  all  objects,  and  swaved 
by  no  motives."  Gross  as  this  misrepresentation  of  the  doctrine 
of  free-agency  is,  it  is  frequently  made  by  its  opponents.  It  oc- 
curs repeatedly  in  the  writings  of  President  Edwards  and  Presi- 
0  Discours  de  la  Conformite  de  la  Foi  avec  la  Raison. 


160  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti 

dent  Day.*  The  freedom  of  the  will,  indeed,  no  more  implies 
an  indifference  of  the  sensibility  than  the  power  of  a  bird  to  fly 
implies  the  existence  of  a  vacuum. 

SECTION  V. 
The  scheme  of  necessity  is  recommended  ty  false  analogies. 

It  is  insisted  that  there  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  of  a 
caused  action  or  volition ;  but  this  position  is  illustrated  by  false 
and  deceptive  analogies.  Thus  says  an  advocate  of  necessity : 
"  The  term  passive  is  sometimes  employed  to  express  the  rela- 
tion of  an  effect  to  its  cause.  In  this  sense,  it  is  so  far  from 
being  inconsistent  with  activity,  that  activity  may  be  the  very 
effect  which  is  produced.  A  cannonshot  is  said  to  be  passive, 
with  respect  to  the  charge  of  powder  which  impels  it.  But  is 
there  no  activity  given  to  the  ball  ?  Is  not  the  whirlwind  active 
when  it  tears  up  the  forest  ?"f  Not  at  all,  in  any  sense  pertain- 
ing to  the  present  controversy.  The  tremendous  power,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  which  sets  the  whirlwind  in  motion,  is  active ; 
the  wind  itself  is  perfectly  passive.  The  air  is  acted  on,  and  it 
merely  suffers  a  change  of  place.  If  it  tears  up  the  forest,  this 
is  not  because  it  exercises  an  active  power,  but  because  it  is 
body  coming  into  contact  with  body,  and  .both  cannot  occupy 
the  same  space  at  one  and  the  same  time.  It  tears  up  the 
forest,  not  as  an  agent,  but  as  an  instrument. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  cannonball.  This  does  not  act  j  it 
merely  moves.  It  does  not  put  forth  a  volition,  or  an  exercise 
of  power ;  it  merely  suffers  a  change  of  place.  In  one  word, 
there  is  no  sort  of  resemblance  between  an  act  of  mind  and  the 
motion  of  body.  This  has  no  active  power,  and  cannot  be  made 
to  act :  it  is  passive,  however,  and  may  be  made  to  move.  If 
the  question  were,  Can  a  body  be  made  to  move  ?  these  illustra- 
tions would  be  in  point ;  but  as  it  relates  to  the  possibility  of 
causing  the  mind  to  put  forth  a  volition,  they  are  clearly  irrel- 
evant. And  if  they  were  really  apposite,  they  would  only  show 
that  the  mind  may  be  caused  to  act  like  a  cannonball,  a  whirl- 
wind, a  clock,  or  any  other  piece  of  machinery.  This  is  the 
only  kind  of  action  they  serve  to  prove  may  be  caused ;  and 

0  See  Examination  of  Edwards  on  the  Will,  sec.  ix. 
t  President  Day  on  the  Will,  p.  160. 


'Jhapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  161 

such  action,  as  it  is  called,  has  far  more  to  do  with  machinery 
than  with  human  agency. 

President  Edwards  also  has  recourse  to  false  analogies.  To 
select  only  one  instance :  "  It  is  no  more  a  contradiction,"  says 
he,  "  to  suppose  that  action  may  be  the  effect  of  some  other 
cause  besides  the  agent,  or  being  that  acts,  than  to  suppose  that 
.ife  may  be  the  effect  of  some  other  cause  besides  the  being  that 
li?os."*  Now,  as  we  are  wholly  passive  in  the  reception  of 
lite,  so  it  may  be  wholly  conferred  upon  us  by  the  power  and 
agency  of  God.  The  very  reason  why  we  suppose  an  act  cannot 
be  caused  is,  that  it  is  a  voluntary  exercise  of  our  own  minds ; 
whereas,  if  it  were  caused,  it  would  be  a  necessitated  passive 
impression.  How  can  it  show  the  fallacy  of  this  position,  to  re- 
fer to  the  case  of  a  caused  life,  in  regard  to  which,  by  universal 
consent,  we  do  not  and  cannot  act  at  all  ? 

The  younger  Edwards  asserts,  that  "  to  say  that  an  agent  that 
is  acted  upon  cannot  act,  is  as  groundless  as  to  say  that  a  body 
acted  upon  cannot  move."  Again :  "  My  actions  are  mine  • 
but  in  what  sense  can  they  be  properly  called  mine,  if  I  be  not 
the  efficient  cause  of  them  ? — Answer :  my  thoughts  and  all  my 
perceptions  and  feelings  are  mine  /  yet  it  will  not  be  pretended 
that  I  am  the  efficient  cause  of  them."f  But  in  regard  to  all 
our  thoughts  and  feelings,  we  are,  as  we  have  seen,  altogether 
passive ;  and  these  are  ours,  because  they  afe  necessarily  pro- 
duced in  us.  Is  it  only  in  this  sense  that  our  acts  are  .ours? 
Are  they  ours  only  because  they  are  necessarily  caused  to  exist 
in  our  minds?  If  so,  then  indeed  we  understand  these  writers; 
but  if  they  are  not  merely  passive  impressions,  why  resort  to 
states  of  the  intelligence  and  the  sensibility,  which  are  con- 
ceded to  be  passive,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  reasonableness  of 
their  scheme,  and  to  expose  the  unreasonableness  of  the  oppo- 
site doctrine?  We  admit  that  every  passive  impression  is 
caused;  but  the  question  is,  Can  the  mind  be  caused  to  act? 
As  we  lay  all  the  stress  on  the  nature  of  an  act,  as  seen  in  the 
light  of  consciousness,  what  does  it  signify  to  tell  us  that  another 
thing,  which  possesses  no  such  nature,  may  be  efficiently  caused  ? 
All  such  illustrations  overlook  the  essential  difference  between 
action  and  passion,  between  doing  and  suffering. 

0  Inquiry,  p.  203.  |  Dissertation,  p.  181. 

11 


162  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 


SECTION  VI. 
The  scheme  of  necessity  is  rendered  plausible  ly  a  false  phraseology. 

The  false  psychology,  of  which  we  have  spoken,  has  been 
greatly  strengthened  and  confirmed  in  its  influences  by  the 
phraseology  connected  with  it.  As  Mr.  Locke  distinguished 
between  will  and  desire,  partially  at  least,  so  he  likewise  distin- 
guished a  preference  of  the  mind  from  a  volition.  But  Presi- 
dent Edwards  is  not  satisfied  with  this  distinction.  "  The 
instance  he  mentions"  says  Edwards,  " does  not  prove  there  is 
anything  else  in  willing  but  merely  preferring."*  This  may 
be  very  true ;  but  is  there  nothing  in  willing,  in  acting,  but 
merely  preferring  ?  This  last  term,  however  it  may  be  applied, 
seems  better  adapted  to  express  a  state  of  the  intelligence,  than 
an  act  of  the  will.  Two  objects  are  placed  before  the  mind  : 
one  affects  the  sensibility  in  a  more  agreeable  manner  than  the 
other,  and  therefore  the  intelligence  pronounces  that  one  is 
more  to  be  desired  than  the  other.  This  seems  to  be  precisely 
what  is  meant  by  the  use  of  the  term  preference.  One  prefers 
an  orange  to  an  apple,  for  instance,  because  the  orange  affects 
his  sensibility  more  agreeably  than  the  apple ;  and  the  intelli- 
gence perceiving  this  state  of  the  sensibility,  declares  in  favour 
of  the  orange.  This  decision  of  the  judgment  is  what  is  usually 
meant  by  the  use  of  the  term  preference,  or  choice.  To  prefer, 
is  merely  to  judge,  in  view  of  desire,  which  of  two  objects  is 
more  agreeable.  But  judging  and  desiring  are,  as  we  have 
seen,  both  necessitated  states  of  the  mind.  Why,  then,  apply 
the  term  preference,  or  choice,  to  acts  of  the  will  ?  Why  apply 
a  term,  which  seems  to  express  merely  a  state  of  the  intelli- 
gence, which  all  concede  is  necessitated,  to  an  act  of  the  will  \ 
Is  it  not  evident,  that  by  such  a  use  of  language  the  cause  of 
necessity  gains  great  apparent  strength  ? 

There  is  another  way  in  which  the  language  of  the  necessi- 
tarian deceives.  The- language  he  employs  often  represents  the 
facts  of  nature,  but  not  facts  as  they  would  be,  if  his  system 
were  true.  Hence,  when  this  system  is  attacked,  its  advo- 
cates repel  the  attack  by  the  use  of  words  which  truly  represent 
nature,  but  not  their  errors.  This  gives  great  plausibility 

0  Inquiry  of  Edwards,  p.  222. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  163 

to  their  apologies.  Thus,  when  it  is  objected  that  the  scheme 
of  necesssity  "  makes  men  no  more  than  mere  machines," 
they  are  always  ready  to  reply,  "  that  notwithstanding  this  doc- 
trine, man  is  entirely,  perfectly,  and  unspeakably  different  from 
a  machine." '  But  how  ?  Is  it  because  his  volitions,  as  they  are 
called,  are  not  necessarily  determined  by  causes  ?  No.  Is  it  be- 
cause his  will  may  be  loose  from  the  influence  of  motives?  No. 
Is  it  because  he  may  follow  the  strongest  motive,  or  may  not  fol- 
low it  ?  No.  Nothing  of  the  kind  is  hinted.  How  does  the  man, 
then,  differ  so  entirely  from  a  machine?  Why,  "  in  that  he  has 
reason  and  understanding,  with  a  faculty  of  will,  and  so  is  capa- 
ble of  volition  and  choice."  True,  a  machine  has  no  reason  or 
understanding  ;  but  suppose  it  had,  would  it  be  a  person  ?  By 
no  means.  We  have  seen  that  the  understanding,  or  the  intei 
ligence,  is  necessarily  determined  ;  all  its  states  are  necessitated 
as  completely  as  the  movements  of  a  machine.  This  constitutes 
an  essential  likeness,  and  it  is  what  is  always  meant,  when  it 
is  said  that  necessity  makes  men  mere  machines.  But  it  seems 
that  man  also  has  "  a  faculty  of  will,  and  so  is  capable  of  volition 
or  choice."*  Yes,  he  can  act.  Now  this  language  means 
something  according  to  the  system  of  nature  ;  but  what  does  it 
mean  according  to  the  system  of  necessity  ?  It  merely  means 
that  the  human  mind  is  susceptible  of  being  necessitated  to 
undergo  a  change  by  the  "power  and  action  of  a  cause," 
which  the  advocates  of  that  system  are  pleased  to  call  an  act. 
They  never  hint  that  we  are  not  machines,  because  we  have 
any  power  by  which  we  are  exempt  from  the  most  absolute 
dominion  of  causes.  They  never  hint  that  we  are  not  machines, 
because  our  volitions,  or  acts,  are  not  as  necessarily  produced 
in  us,  as  the  motions  of  a  clock  are  produced  in  it.  Now,  if 
this  scheme  were  true,  there  would  be  no  such  things  as  acts 
or  volitions  in  us :  all  the  phenomena  of  our  minds  would  be 
passive  impressions,  like  our  judgments  and  feelings.  "When 
they  speak  of  tliefwill,  then,  which  is  capable  of  volitions,  or 
acts,  they  deceive  by  using  the  language  of  nature,  and  not  of 
their  false  scheme. 

0  Edwards's  Inquiry,  p.  222. 


J  64  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 


SECTION  VIL 

The  scheme  of  necessity  originates  in  a  false  method,  and  terminates  in  a 

false  religion. 

This  system,  as  we  have  seen,  has  been  built  up,  not  by  an 
analysis  of  the  phenomena  of  the  human  mind,  but  by  means 
of  universal  abstractions  and  truisms.  It  takes  its  rise,  not  from 
the  facts  of  nature,  but  from  the  conceptions  of  the  intellect.  In 
other  words,  instead  of  anatomizing  the  world  which  God  has 
made  so  as  to  exhibit  the  actual  plan  according  to  which  it  has 
been  constituted,  it  sets  out  from  certain  identical  propositions, 
such  as  that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  and  proceeds  to 
inform  us  how  the  world  must  have  been  constituted.  This 
"usual  method  of  discovery  and  proof,"  as  Bacon  says,  "by 
first  establishing  the  most  general  propositions,  then  applying 
and  proving  the  intermediate  axioms  according  to  these,  is  the 
parent  of  error  and  the  calamity  of  every  science."  Nowhere, 
it  is  believed,  can  a  more  striking  illustration  of  the  truth  of 
these  pregnant  words  be  found,  than  in  the  method  adopted  by 
necessitarians.  They  begin  with  the  universal  proposition,  that 
every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  as  a  self-evident  truth,  and  then 
proceed,  not  to  examine  and  discover  how  the  world  is  made, 
but  to  demonstrate  how  it  must  have  been  constructed.  This 
is  not  to  "interpret,"  it  is  to  "anticipate"  nature. 

By  this  high  a  priori  method  the  freedom  of  the  human 
mind  is  demonstrated,  as  we  have  seen,  to  be  an  impossibility 
and  the  accountability  of  man  a  dream.  Man  is  not  respon- 
sible for  sin,  or  rather,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  moral  good 
and  evil  in  the  lower  world ;  since  God,  the  only  efficient  foun- 
tain of  all  things  and  events,  is  the  sole  responsible  author  of 
all  evil  as  well  as  of  all  good.  Such,  as  we  have  seen,  are  the 
inevitable  logical  consequences  of  this  boasted  scheme  of  ne- 
cessity. 

But  we  have  clearly  shown,  we  trust,  that  the  grand  demon- 
tration  of  the  necessitarian  is  a  sophism,  whose  apparent  force 
is  owing  to  a  variety  of  causes : — First,  it  seeks  out,  and  lays 
its  foundation  in,  a  false  psychology ;  identifying  the  feelings, 
or  affections,  and  the  will.  Secondly,  by  viewing  the  opposite 
scheme  through  the  medium  of  this  false  psychology,  it  reduces 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  165 

its  main  position  to  the  pitiful  absurdity  that  a  thing  may  pro- 
duce itself,  or  arise  out  of  nothing,  and  bring  itself  into  exist- 
ence ;  and  then  demolishes  this  absurdity  by  logic  !  Thirdly, 
it  reduces  itself  to  the  truism,  that  a  thing  is  always  as  it  is ; 
and  being  entrenched  in  this  stronghold,  it  gathers  around 
itself  all  the  common  sense  and  all  the  reason  of  mankind,  as 
well  it  may,  and  looks  down  with  sovereign  contempt  on  the 
feeble  attacks  of  its  adversaries.  Fourthly,  it  fortifies  itself  by 
a  multitude  of  false  conceptions,  arising  from  a  hasty  applica- 
tion of  its  universal  truism,  and  not  from  a  severe  inspection 
and  analysis  of  thin^.  Fifthly,  it  decorates  itself  in  false  anal- 
ogies, and  thereby  assumes  the  imposing  appearance  of  truth. 
Sixthly,  it  clothes  itself  in  deceptive  and  ambiguous  phrase- 
ology, by  which  it  speaks  the  language  of  truth  to  the  ear,  but 
not  to  the  sense.  And,  seventhly,  it  takes  its  rise  in  a  false 
method,  and  terminates  in  a  false  religion. 

These  are  some  of  the  hidden  mysteries  of  the  scheme  of 
necessity ;  which  having  been  detected  and  exposed,  we  do  not 
hesitate  to  pronounce  it  a  grand  imposition  on  the  reason  of 
mankind.  As  such,  we  set  aside  this  stupendous  sophism, 
whose  dark  shadow  has  so  long  rested  on  the  beauty  of  the 
world,  obscuring  the  intrinsic  majesty  and  glory  of  the  infinite 
goodness  therein  displayed.  "We  put  away  and  repudiate  this 
vast  assemblage  of  errors,  which  has  so  sadly  perplexed  our 
mental  vision,  and  so  frightfully  distorted  the  real  proportions 
of  the  world,  as  to  lead  philosophers,  such  as  Kant  and  others, 
to  pronounce  a  Theodicy  impossible.  We  put  them  aside  utterly, 
in  order  that  we  may  proceed  to  vindicate  the  glory  of  God,  as 
manifested  in  the  constitution  and  government  of  the  moral 
world. 


-66  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  (Tart  I, 


CHAPTEE  Y. 

THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  THE  HUMAN  WILL  AND  THE  DIVINE  AGENCY. 

Thou  art  the  source  and  centre  of  all  minds, 

Their  only  point  of  rest,  eternal  Word  ! 

From  Thee  departing,  they  are  lost  and  rove 

At  random,  without  honour,  hope,  or  peace. 

From  Thee  is  all  that  soothes  the  lift  of  man,— 

His  high  endeavour  and  his  glad  success, 

His  strength  to  suffer  and  his  will  to  serve. — COWPEB. 

And  God  proclaim'd  from  heaven,  and  by  an  oath 
Confirm'd,  that  each  should  answer  for  himself; 
And  as  his  own  peculiar  work  should  be 
Done  by  his  proper  self,  should  live  or  die. — POLLOK. 

TIIE  evils  of  haste  and  precipitancy  in  the  formation  of  opinions 
are,  perhaps,  nowhere  more  deplorably  exhibited,  than  in  regard 
to  the  relation  between  human  and  divine  agency.  Indeed,  so 
many  rash  judgments  have  been  put  forth  on  this  important 
subject,  that  the  very  act  of  approaching  it  has  come  to  be 
invested,  in  the  minds  of  many  persons,  with  the  character  of 
rashness  and  presumption.  Hence  the  frequent  warnings  to 
turn  our  attention  from  it,  as  a  subject  lying  beyond  the  range 
of  all  sober  speculation,  and  as  unsuited  to  the  investigation  of 
our  finite  minds.  If  this  be  a  wise  conclusion,  it  would  be  well 
to  leave  it  to  support  itself,  instead  of  attempting  to  bolster  it. 
up  with  the  reasons  frequently  given  for  it. 

SECTION  I. 
General  mew  of  the  relation  between  the  divine  and  the  human  power. 

It  is  frequently  said,  for  example,  that  it  is  impossible  to 
reconcile  the  agency  of  God  with  that  of  man  ;  because  we  do 
not  know  how  the  divine  power  operates  upon  the  human  mind. 
But,  if  we  examine  the  subject  closely,  we  shall  find  that  the 
manner  in  which  the  Spirit  of  God  operates,  is  not  what  we 
want  to  know,  in  order  to  remove  the  great  difficulty  in  ques- 
tion. If  such  knowledge  were  possessed  in  the  greatest  possible 
perfection,  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  our  insight  into 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  167 

the  relation  between  the  human  and  the  divine  power  would 
be  at  all  improved.  For  aught  we  can  see,  our  notions  on  this 
point  would  remain  as  dim  and  feeble  as  if  we  possessed  no 
such  knowledge.  If  we  could  ascertain,  however,  precisely 
what  is  done  by  the  power  of  man,  then  we  should  see  whether 
there  be  any  real  inconsistency  or  conflict  between  them  or  not. 
This  is  the  point  on  which  we  need  to  be  enlightened,  in  order 
to  clear  up  the  difficulty  in  question ;  and  on  this  point  the 
most  satisfactory  light  may  be  attained.  If  we  must  wait  to 
understand  the  modus  operandi  of  the  divine  Spirit,  before  we 
can  dispel  the  clouds  and  darkness  which  his  influence  casts 
over  the  free-agency  of  man,  then  must  we  indeed  defer  this 
great  mystery  to  another  state  of  being,  and  perhaps  forever. 
Those  who  have  looked  in  this  direction  for  light,  may  well 
deplore  our  inability  to  see  it.  But  let  us  look  in  the  right 
direction  :  let  us  consider,  not  the  modus  operandi  of  the  divine 
power,  but  the  effects  produced  by  it,  and  then,  perhaps,  we 
may  behold  the  beautiful  harmony  subsisting  between  the 
agency  of  God  and  the  freedom  of  man. 

The  reason  why  the  views  of  most  persons  concerning  this 
relation  are  so  vague  and  indistinct  is,  that  they  do  not  possess 
a  sufficiently  clear  and  perfect  analysis  of  the  human  mind. 
The  powers  and  susceptibilities  of  the  mind,  as  well  as  the  laws 
which  govern  its  phenomena,  seem  blended  together  in  their 
minds  in  one  confused  mass  ;  and  hence  the  relations  they  bear 
to  each  other,  and  to  the  divine  agency,  are  as  dim  and  fluctu- 
ating as  an  ill-remembered  dream.  In  tins  confusion  of  laws 
and  phenomena,  of  powers  and  susceptibilities,  of  facts  and  fan- 
cies, it  is  no  wonder  that  so  many  crude  conceptions  and  vague 
hypotheses  have  sprung  up  and  prevailed  concerning  the  great 
difficulty  under  consideration.  In  the  dim  twilight  of  mental 
science,  which  has  shown  all  things  distorted  and  nothing  in  its 
true  proportions,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  beautiful  order  and 
perspective  of  the  moral  world  should  have  L>een  concealed 
from  our  eyes.  It  was  to  have  been  expected,  that  every 
atlempt  to  delineate  this  order,  would,  under  such  circum- 
stances, prove  premature,  and  aggravate  rather  than  lessen 
the  apparent  disorders  prevailing  in  the  spiritual  world.  Ac- 
cordingly, such  attempts  generally  terminate,  either  in  tho 
denial  of  the  free-agency  of  man,  or  of  the  sovereignty  of  God  ; 


168  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

and  those  who  have  maintained  both  of  these  tenets  in  reality, 
as  well  as  in  name,  have  usually  refused  to  allow  themselves  to 
be  troubled  by  the  apparent  contradictions  in  which  they  are 
involved.  "While  they  recognise  the  two  spheres  of  the  human 
and  of  the  divine  agency,  they  have  left  them  so  shadowy  and 
indistinct,  and  so  distorted  from  their  real  proportions,  that  they 
have  inevitably  seemed  to  clash  with  each  other.  Hence,  to 
describe  these  two  spheres  with  clearness  and  precision,  and 
to  determine  the  precise  point  at  which  they  come  into  contact 
without  intersecting  each  other,  is  still  a  desideratum  in  the 
science  of  theology.  We  shall  endeavour  to  define  the  human 
power  and  the  divine  sovereignty,  and  to  exhibit  the  harmony 
subsisting  between  them,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  supply,  in 
some  small  degree  at  least,  this  great  desideratum  which  has  so 
long  been  the  reproach  of  the  most  sublime  of  all  the  sciences. 

But  this  is  not  to  be  done  by  planting  ourselves  upon  any  one 
particular  platform,  and  dogmatizing  from  thence,  as  if  that  par- 
ticular point  of  view  necessarily  presented  us  with  every  possible 
phase  of  the  truth.  There  has  been,  indeed,  so  much  of  this 
one-sided,  exclusive,  and  dogmatizing  spirit  manifested  in  rela- 
tion to  the  subject  in  question,  as  to  give  a  great  appearance  of 
truth  to  the  assertion  of  an  ingenious  writer,  that  inasmuch  as 
different  minds  contemplate  the  divine  and  human  agency  from 
different  points  of  view,  the  predominant  or  leading  idea  pre- 
sented to  them  can  never  be  the  same ;  and  hence  they  can 
never  agree  in  the  same  representation  of  the  complex  whole. 
The  one,  says  he,  "  necessarily  gives  a  greater  prominence  to  the 
divine  agency,  and  the  other  to  the  scope  and  influence  of  the 
human  will,  and  consequently  they  pronounce  different  judg- 
ments; just  as  a  man  who  views  a  spherical  surface  from  the 
inside  will  forever  affirm  it  to  be  concave,  while  he  who  con- 
templates it  from  the  outside  will  as  obstinately  assert  that  it  is 
convex."  But  although  this  has  been  the  usual  method  of  treat- 
ing the  subject  in  question,  such  weakness  and  dogmatizing  is 
self-imposed,  and  not  an  inevitable  condition  of  the  human 
mind.  We  may  learn  wisdom  from  the  errors  of  the  past,  no 
less  than  from  its  most  triumphant  and  glorious  discoveries. 

In  the  discussion  of  this  subject,  it  is  true  that  opposite  par- 
ties have  confined  themselves  to  first  appearances  too  much,  and 
rested  on  one-sided  views.  But  are  we  necessarily  tied  down  to 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF   GOD.  169 

such  inadequate  conceptions  ?  The  causes  which  separate  men 
in  opinion,  and  the  obstacles  which  keep  them  asunder,  are  in- 
deed powerful ;  but  we  hope  they  do  not  form  an  eternal  bar- 
rier between  the  wise  and  good.  In  regard  to  doctrines  so 
fundamental  and  so  vital  as  the  divine  sovereignty  and  human 
freedom,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  all  good  men  will  some  day  unite, 
and  perfectly  harmonize  with  each  other. 

As  we  are  rational  beings,  so  we  are  not  tied  down  to  that 
appearance  of  things  which  is  presented  to  one  particular  point 
of  view.  If  this  were  the  case,  the  science  of  astronomy  would 
never  have  had  an  existence.  Even  the  phenomena  of  that 
noble  science  are  almost  inconceivably  different  from  those  pre- 
sented to  the  mind  of  man  at  his  particular  point  of  view.  From 
the  small  shining  objects  which  are  brought  to  our  knowledge 
by  the  sense  of  sight,  the  reason  rises  to  the  true  dimensions  of 
those  tremendous  worlds.  And  after  the  human  mind  has  thus 
furnished  itself  with  the  facts  of  the  solar  system,  it  has  pro- 
ceeded but  a  small  way  toward  a  knowledge  of  the  system  itself. 
It  has  also  to  deduce  the  laws  of  the  material  world  from  its  first 
appearances,  and,  armed  with  these,  it  must  transport  itself  from 
the  earth  to  the  true  centre  of  the  system,  from  which  its  won- 
derful order  and  beauty  may  be  contemplated,  and  revealed  to 
the  world.  Then  these  innumerable  twinkling  points  of  light, 
which  sparkle  in  the  heavens  like  so  many  atoms,  become  to 
the  eye  of  reason  the  stupendous  suns  and  centres  of  other 
worlds  and  systems. 

If  we  should  judge  from  first  appearances,  indeed,  if  we 
could  not  emancipate  ourselves  from  phenomena  as  they  are  ex- 
hibited to  us  from  one  particular  point  of  view,  then  should  we 
never  escape  the  conclusion,  that  the  earth  is  the  fixed  centre 
of  the  universe,  around  which  its  countless  myriads  of  worlds 
perform  their  eternal  revolutions.  But,  fortunately,  wre  are 
subject  to  no  such  miserable  bondage.  The  mind  of  man  has 
already  raised  itself  from  the  planet  to  which  his  body  is  con- 
fined, and,  planting  itself  on  the  true  centre  of  the  system,  has 
beheld  the  sublime  scheme  planned  by  the  infinite  reason,  and 
executed  by  the  almighty  power  of  the  Divine  Architect.  Surely 
the  mind  which  can  do,  and  has  done,  all  this,  has  the  capacity 
to  understand,  place  it  where  you  will,  that  although  the  inside 
of  a  sphere  is  concave,  the  outside  may  be  convex ;  as  wrell  as 


170  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

some  other  things  which  may  perhaps  have  been  placed  beyond 
its  power,  without  due  consideration.  But  in  every  attempt  to 
emancipate  ourselves  from  first  appearances,  and  to  reach  a 
knowledge  of  the  truth,  "  not  as  reflected  under  a  single  angle," 
but  as  seen  in  all  its  fulness  and  beauty,  it  is  indispensable  to 
contemplate  it  on  all  sides,  and  to  mark  the  precise  boundaries 
of  all  its  phases. 

Hence  we  shall  not  plant  ourselves  on  the  fact  of  man's 
power  alone,  and,  viewing  the  subject  exclusively  from  thence, 
enlarge  the  sphere  of  human  agency  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
shut  the  divine  agency  quite  out  of  the  intellectual  and  moral 
world.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  shall  we  permit  ourselves  to 
become  so  completely  absorbed  in  the  contemplation  of  the 
majesty  of  God,  to  dwell  so  warmly  on  his  infinite  sovereignty 
and  the  littleness  of  man,  as  to  cause  the  sphere  of  human 
power  to  dwindle  down  to  a  mere  point,  and  entirely  disappear. 
We  shall  endeavour  to  find  the  true  medium  between  these 
two  extreme  opinions.  That  such  a  medium  exists  somewhere, 
will  not  be  denied  by  many  persons.  The  only  question  will 
be,  as  to  where  and  how  the  line  should  be  drawn  to  strike  out 
this  medium.  In  most  systems  of  theology,  this  line  is  not 
drawn  at  all,  but  left  completely  in  the  dark.  "We  are  shown 
some  things  on  both  sides  of  this  line,  but  we  are  not  shown  the 
line  itself.  We  are  made  to  see,  for  example,  the  fact  of  human 
existence  as  something  distinct  from  God,  that  we  may  not  err 
'with  Spinoza,  in  reducing  man  to  a  mere  fugitive  mode  of  the 
Divine  Being,  to  a  mere  shadow  and  a  dream.  And  on  the 
other  side,  we  are  made  to  contemplate  the  omnipotence  of 
God,  that  we  may  not  'call  in  question  his  sovereignty  and 
dominion  over  the  moral  world.  But  between  these  two  posi- 
tions, on  which  the  light  of  truth  has  thus  been  made  to  fall, 
there  is  a  tract  of  dark  and  unexplored  territory,  a  terra  incog- 
nita, which  remains  to  be  completely  surveyed  and  delineated, 
before  we  can  see  the  beauty  of  the  whole  scene.  In  the 
attempt  to  map  out  this  region,  to  define  the  precise  boun- 
dary of  that  imperium  in  imperio,  of  which  Spinoza  and  others 
entertained  so  great  a  horror,  we  should  endeavour  to  follow 
the  wise  maxiin  of  Bacon,  "  to  despise  nothing,  and  to  admire 
nothing." 

In  other  words,  we  should  endeavour  to  "  prove  all  things, 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  171 

and  to  hold  fast  that  which  is  good,"  without  yielding  a  blind 
veneration  to  received  dogmas,  or  a  blind  admiration  to  the 
seductive  charms  of  novelty.  Hence,  we  shall  first  stand  on 
the  same  platform  with  Pelagius,  and  endeavour  to  view  the 
subject  with  his  eyes ;  to  see  all  that  he  saw,  as  well  as  to  cor- 
rect the  errors  of  his  observation.  And  having  done  this,  we 
shall  then  transport  ourselves  to  the  platform  of  Augustine, 
and  contemplate  the  subject  from  his  point  of  view,  so  as  to 
possess  ourselves  of  his  great  truths,  and  also  to  correct  the 
errors  of  his  observation.  Having  finished  these  processes,  it 
will  not  be  found  difficult  to  combine  the  truths  of  these  two 
conflicting  schemes  in  a  complete  and  harmonious  system, 
which  shall  exhibit  both  the  human  and  the  divine  elements  of 
religion  in  their  true  proportions  and  just  relations  to  each 
other. 

SECTION  II. 

The  Pelagian  platform,  or  mew  of  the  relation  between  the  divine  and  the 

human  power. 

The  doctrine  of  Pelagius  was  developed  from  his  own  per- 
sonal experience,  and  moulded,  in  a  great  measure,  by  his  oppo- 
sition to  the  scheme  of  Augustine.  According  to  the  historian, 
Neander,  as  well  as  to  the  testimony  of  Augustine  himself,  the 
life  of  Pelagius  was,  from  beginning  to  end,  one  "  earnest  moral 
effort."  As  his  character  was  gradually  formed  by  his  own 
continued  and  unremitted  exertions,  without  any  sudden  or 
violent  revolution  in  his  views  or  feelings,  so  the  great  fact  of 
human  agency  presented  itself  to  his  individual  consciousness 
with  unclouded  lustre.  This  fact  was  the  great  central  position 
from  which  his  whole  scheme  developed  itself.  And,  as  the 
history  of  his  opinion  shows,  he  was  led  to  give  a  still  greater 
predominance  to  this  fact,  in  consequence  of  his  opposition  to 
the  system  of  Augustine,  by  which  it  seemed  to  him  to  be  su  in- 
verted, and  the  interests  of  morality  threatened. 

The  great  fact  of  free-will,  of  whose  existence  he  was  so  well 
assured  by  his  own  consciousness,  was  so  imperfectly  interpreted 
by  him,  that  he  was  led  to  exclude  other  great  facts  from  his  sys- 
tem, which  might  have  been  perfectly  harmonized  with  his  central 
position.  Thus,  as  Neander  well  says,  he  denied  the  operation  of 


172  MOBAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

the  divine  power  in  the  renovation  of  the  soul,*  because  he 
could  not  reconcile  its  influence  with  the  free-agency  of  man. 
This  was  the  weak  point  in  the  philosophy  of  Pelagius,  as  it  has 
been  in  the  system  of  thousands  who  have  lived  since  his  time. 
To  reject  the  one  of  two  facts,  both  of  which  rest  upon  clear 
and  unequivocal  evidence,  is  an  error  which  has  been  con- 
demned by  Butler  and  Burlamaqui,  as  well  as  by  many  other 
celebrated  philosophers.  But  this  error,  so  far  as  we  know,  has 
been  by  no  one  more  finely  reproved  than  by  Professor  Hodge, 
of  Princeton.  "  If  the  evidence  of  the  constant  revolution  of 
the  earth  round  its  axis,"  says  he,  "  were  presented  to  a  man,  it 
would  certainly  be  unreasonable  in  him  to  deny  the  fact,  merely 
because  he  could  not  reconcile  it  with  the  stability  of  everything 
on  the  earth's  surface.  Or  if  he  saw  two  rays  of  light  made  to 
produce  darkness,  must  he  resist  the  evidence  of  his  senses, 
because  he  knows  that  two  candles  give  more  light  than  one? 
Men  do  not  act  thus  irrationally  in  physical  investigations. 
They  let  each  fact  stand  upon  its  own  evidence.  They  strive 
to  reconcile  them,  and  are  happy  when  they  succeed.  But 
they  do  not  get  rid  of  difficulties  by  denying  facts. 

"If  in  the  department  of  physical  knowledge  we  are  obliged 
to  act  upon  the  principle  of  receiving  every  fact  upon  its  own 
evidence,  even  when  unable  to  reconcile  one  with  another,  it  is 
not  wonderful  that  this  necessity  should  be  imposed  upon  us  in 
those  departments  of  knowledge  which  are  less  within  the 
limits  of  our  powers.  It  is  certainly  irrational  for  a  man  to 
reject  all  the  evidence  of  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  because 
he  cannot  reconcile  this  doctrine  with  the  fact  that  a  disease  of 
the  body  disorders  the  mind.  Must  I  do  violence  to  my  nature 
in  denying  the  proof  of  design  afforded  by  the  numan  body, 
because  I  cannot  account  for  the  occasional  occurrence  of  de- 
formities of  structure  ?  Must  I  harden  my  heart  against  all  the 
evidence  of  the  benevolence  of  God,  which  streams  upon  me  in 
a  flood  of  light  from  all  his  works,  because  I  may  not  know 
how  to  reconcile  that  benevolence  with  the  existence  of  evil  ? 
Must  I  deny  my  free-agency,  the  most  intimate  of  all  convic- 

0  A  different  view  of  the  Pelagian  doctrine  on  this  point  is  given  by  Wiggers, 
and  yet  we  suppose  that  both  authors  are  in  the  right.  The  truth  seems  to  me, 
that  Pelagius,  as  usually  happens  to  those  who  take  one-sided  views  of  the  truth, 
has  asserted  contradictory  positions. 


JkapterV.]  WITH   THE   HOLINESS   OF   GOD  173 

tions,  because  I  cannot  see  the  consistency  between  the  free- 
ness  of  an  act  and  the  frequency  of  its  occurrence  ?  May  I 
deny  that  I  am  a  moral  being,  the  very  glory  of  my  nature, 
because  I  cannot  change  my  character  at  will  ?"* 

If  this  judicious  sentiment  had  been  observed  by  speculatists, 
it  had  been  well  for  philosophy,  and  still  better  for  religion. 
The  heresy  of  Pelagius,  and  the  countless  forms  of  kindred 
errors,  would  not  have  infested  human  thought.  But  this  senti- 
ment, however  just  in  itself,  or  however  elegantly  expressed, 
should  not  be  permitted  to  inspire  our  minds  with  a  feeling 
of  despair.  It  should  teach  us  caution,  but  not  despondency  ; 
it  should  extinguish  presumption,  but  not  hope.  For  if  "  we 
strive  to  reconcile  the  facts"  of  the  natural  world,  "and  are 
happy  when  we  succeed,"  how  much  more  solicitous  should  we 
be  to  succeed  in  such  an  attempt  to  shut  up  and  seal  the  very 
fountains  of  religious  error? 

Nothing  is  more  wonderful  to  my  mind,  than  that  Pelagius 
should  have  such  followers  as  Reimarus  and  Lessing,  not  to 
mention  hundreds  of  others,  who  deny  the  possibility  of  a  divine 
influence,  because  it  seems  to  them  to  conflict  with  the  intel- 
lectual and  moral  nature  of  man.f  To  assert,  as  these  philoso- 
phers do,  that  the  power  of  God  cannot  act  upon  the  human 
mind  without  infringing  upon  its  freedom,  betrays,  as  we 
venture  to  affirm,  a  profound  and  astonishing  ignorance  of  the 
whole  doctrine  of  free-agency.  It  proceeds  on  the  amazing 
supposition  that  the  will  is  the  only  power  of  the  human  mind, 
and  that  volitions  are  the  only  phenomena  ever  manifested 
therein ;  so  that  God  cannot  act  upon  it  at  all,  unless  it  be  to 
produce  volitions.  But  is  it  true,  that  God  must  do  all  things 
within  us,  or  lie  can  do  nothing?  that  if  he  produce  a  change 
in  our  mental  state,  then  he  must  produce  all  conceivable 
changes  therein  ?  In  order  to  refute  so  rash  a  conclusion,  and 
explode  the  wild  supposition  on  which  it  is  based,  it  will  b« 
necessary  to  recur  to  the  threefold  distinction  of  the  intelligence, 
the  sensibility,  and  the  will,  already  referred  to. 

In  the  perception  of  truth,  as  we  have  seen,  the  intelligence 
is  perfectly  passive.  Every  state  of  the  intelligence  is  as  com- 
pletely necessitated  as  is  the  affirmation  that  two  and  two  are 

0  The  Way  of  Life,  chap,  iii,  sec.  ii. 

f  Knapp's  Theology,  vol.  ii,  p.  471.     Note  by  the  translator. 


174  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

equal  to  four.  The  decisions  of  the  intelligence,  then,  are  not 
free  acts ;  indeed,  they  are  not  acts  at  all,  in  the  proper  sense 
of  the  word.  They  are  passive  states  of  the  intellect.  They 
are  usually  called  acts,  it  is  true ;  and  this  use  of  language  is, 
no  doubt,  one  of  the  causes  which  has  given  rise  to  so  many 
errors  and  delusions  in  regard  to  moral  and  accountable  agency. 
With,  every  decision  or  state  of  the  intelligence,  with  every  per 
ception  of  truth  by  it,  there  is  intimately  associated,  it  is  true, 
an  act  of  the  mind,  a  state  of  the  will,  a  volition,  by  which  the 
attention  is  directed  to  the  subject  under  consideration  ;  and  it 
is  this  intimate  association  in  which  the  two  states  or  mental 
phenomena  seem  blended  into  one,  which  has  led  so  many  to 
regard  the  passive  susceptibility,  called  the  intelligence,  as  an 
active  power,  and  its  states  as  free  acts  of  the  mind.  A  more 
correct  analysis,  a  finer  discrimination  of  the  real  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, must  prevail  on  this  subject,  before  light  can  be  let 
in  upon  the  philosophy  of  free  and  accountable  agency.  The 
dividing  knife  must  be  struck  between  the  two  phenomena  in 
question,  between  an  active  state  of  the  will  and  the  passive 
states  of  the  intelligence,  and  the  obstinate  association  be  severed 
in  our  imagination,  before  the  truth  can  be  seen  otherwise  than 
through  distorting  films  of  error. 

As  every  state  of  the  intelligence  is  necessitated,  so  God  may 
act  upon  this  department  of  our  mental  frame  without  infring- 
ing upon  the  nature  of  man  in  the  slightest  possible  degree. 
As  the  law  of  necessity  is  the  law  of  the  intelligence,  so  God 
may  absolutely  necessitate  its  states,  by  the  presentation  of 
truth,  or  by  his  direct  and  irresistible  agency  in  connexion  with 
the  truth,  without  doing  violence  to  the  laws  of  our  intellectual 
and  moral  nature.  Nay,  in  so  acting,  he  proceeds  in  perfect 
conformity  with  those  laws.  Hence,  no  matter  how  deep  a 
human  soul  may  be  sunk  in  ignorance  and  stupidity,  God  may 
flash  the  light  of  truth  into  it,  in  perfect  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  its  nature.  And,  as  has  been  well  said,  "  The  first 
effect  of  the  divine  power  in  the  new,  as  in  the  old  creation,  is 
light." 

This  is  not  all.  Every  state  of  the  sensibility  is  a  passive  im- 
pression, a  necessitated  phenomenon  of  the  human  mind.  No 
matter  what  fact,  or  what  truth,  may  be  present  to  the  mind, 
either  by  its  own  voluntary  attention  or  by  the  agency  of  God, 


Chapter  V.I  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  175 

or  by  the  cooperation  of  both,  the  impression  it  makes  upon  the 
sensibility  is  beyond  the  control  of  the  will,  except  by  refusing 
to  give  the  attention  of  the  mind  to  it.  Hence,  although  truth 
may  be  vividly  impressed  upon  the  intelligence,  although  the 
glories  of  heaven  and  the  terrors  of  hell  may  be  made  to  shine 
into  it,  yet  the  sensibility  may  remain  unaffected  by  them.  It 
may  be  dead.  Hence,  God  may  act  upon  this,  may  cause  it  to 
melt  with  sorrow  or  to  glow  with  love,  without  doing  violence 
to  any  law  of  our  moral  nature.  There  is  no  difficulty,  then,  in 
conceiving  that  the  second  effect  of  the  divine  power  in  the  new 
creation  is  "  a  new  heart." 

Having  done  all  this,  he  may  well  call  on  us  to  "  work  out 
our  salvation  with  fear  and  trembling,  for  God  worketh  in  us  to 
will  and  to  do  of  his  own  good  pleasure."  We  have  seen  that 
the  state  of  the  will,  that  a  volition  is  not  necessitated  by  the  in- 
telligence or  by  the  sensibility ;  and,  hence,  it  may  "  obey  the 
heavenly  vision,"  or  it  may  "  resist  and  do  despite  to  the  Spirit 
of  grace."  If  it  obey,  then  the  vivifying  light  and  genial  shower 
have  not  fallen  upon  the  soul  in  vain.  The  free-will  coalesces 
with  the  renovated  intelligence  and  sensibility,  and  the  man 
"has  root  in  himself."  The  blossom  gradually  yields  to  the 
fruit,  and  the  germ  of  true  holiness  is  formed  in  the  soul.  This 
consists  in  the  voluntary  exercise  of  the  mind,  in  obedience  to 
the  knowledge  and  the  love  of  God,  and  in  the  permanent  habit 
formed  by  the  repetition  of  such  exercises.  Hence,  in  the  great 
theandric  work  of  regeneration,  we  see  the  part  which  is  per- 
formed by  God,  and  the  part  which  proceeds  from  man. 

This  shows  an  absolute  dependence  of  the  soul  upon  the 
agency  of  God.  For  without  knowledge  the  mind  can  no  more 
perform  its  duty  than  the  eye  can  see  without  light;  and  with- 
out a  feeling  of  love  to  God,  it  is  as  impossible  for  it  to  render 
a  spiritual  obedience,  as  it  would  be  for  a  bird  to  fly  in  a  vacu- 
um. Yet  this  dependence,  absolute  as  it  is,  does  not  impair  the 
free-agency  of  man.  For  divine  grace  supplies,  and  must  sup- 
ply, the  indispensable  conditions  of  holiness;  but  it  does  not 
produce  holiness  itself.  It  does  not  produce  holiness  itself,  be- 
cause, as  we  have  seen,  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contradiction 
in  terms. 

Is  it  not  evident,  then,  that  those  who  assert  the  impossibility 
of  a  divine  influence,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  lestroy  the 


176  MORAL  EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

free-agency  of  man,  have  proceeded  on  a  wonderful  confusion 
of  the  phenomena  of  the  human  mind  ?  Is  it  not  evident  that 
they  have  confounded  those  states  of  the  intelligence  and  the 
sensibility,  which  are  marked  over  with  the  characteristics  of 
necessity,  with  those  states  of  the  will  which  inevitably  suggest 
the  ideas  of  freedom  and  accountability  ?  But,  strange  as  it 
may  seem,  the  philosophers  who  thus  shut  the  influence  of  the 
Divine  Being  out  of  the  spiritual  world,  because  they  cannot 
reconcile  it  with  the  moral  agency  of  man,  do  not  always  deny 
the  influence  of  created  beings  over  the  mind.  On  the  contrary, 
it  is  no  uncommon  tiling  to  see  philosophers  and  theologians, 
who  begin  by  denying  the  influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit  upon 
the  human  mind,  in  order  to  save  the  freedom,  of  the  latter,  end 
by  subjecting  it  to  the  most  absolute  dominion  of  facts,  and  cir 
cumstances,  and  motives. 

SECTION  III. 

The  Augustinian  Platform,  or  mew  of  the  relation  "between  the  divine  agency 

and  the  human. 

The  doctrine  of  Augustine,  like  that  of  Pelagius,  was  de- 
veloped from  the  individual  experience  and  consciousness  of  its 
author.  The  difference  between  them  was,  that  the  sensible 
experience  of  the  one  furnished  him  with  only  the  human  ele- 
ment of  religion,  which  was  unduly  magnified  by  him ;  while 
the  divine  element  was  the  great  prominent  fact  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  other,  who  accordingly  rendered  it  too  exclu- 
sive in  the  formation  of  his  views.  The  one  elevated  the  human 
element  of  religion  at  the  expense  of  the  divine ;  the  other  per- 
mitted the  maj  esty  of  the  divine  to  overshadow  the  human,  and 
cause  it  to  disappear. 

The  causes  which  induced  Augustine  to  take  this  sublime  but 
one-sided  view  of  religion  may  be  easily  understood.  In  the 
early  part  of  his  life,  he  abandoned  himself  to  vicious  excesses ; 
being  hurried  away,  to  use  a  metaphor,  by  the  violence  of  his 
appetites  and  passions.  His  conscience,  no  doubt,  often  re- 
proved him  for  such  a  course  of  life,  and  gave  rise  to  many 
resolutions  of  amendment.  But  experience  taught  him  that  he 
could  not  transform  and  mould  his  own  character  at  pleasure. 
He  lacked  those  views  of  truth,  and  those  feelings  of  reverence 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  177 

and  love  to  God,  without  which  true  obedience  is  impossible. 
Hence  he  struggled  in  vain.  He  felt  his  own  impotency.  He 
still  yielded  to  the  importunities  of  appetite  and  passion.  Of  a 
sudden,  however,  he  finds  his  views  of  divine  things  changed, 
and  his  religious  sensibilities  awakened.  He  knows  this  mar- 
vellous transformation  is  not  effected  by  himself.  He  ascribes 
it ,  and  he  truly  ascribes  it,  to  the  power  of  God ;  by  which  he 
has  been  brought  from  a  region  of  darkness  to  light.  Old 
things  had  passed  away,  and  all  things  become  new. 

But  now  observe  the  precise  manner  in  which  the  error  of 
Augustine  takes  its  rise  in  his  mind.  He,  too,  as  well  as  Pela- 
gius,  confounds  the  passive  susceptibility  of  the  heart  with  a 
voluntary  state  of  the  will.  The  intelligence  and  the  sensibility 
are  the  only  elements  in  his  psychology ;  the  states  of  them, 
which  are  necessitated,  constitute  all  the  phenomena  of  the 
human  mind.  Holiness,  according  to  him,  consists  in  a  feeling 
of  love  to  God.  He  knows  this  is  derived  from  the  divine 
agency  ;  and  hence  he  concludes,  that  the  whole  work  of  con- 
version is  due  to  God,  and  no  part  of  it  is  performed  by  himself. 
I  know,  says  he,  that  I  did  not  make  myself  love  God,  by 
which  he  means  a  feeling  of  love  ;  and  this  he  takes  to  be  true 
holiness,  which  has  been  wrought  in  his  heart  by  the  power  of 
God.  "  Love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law ;  but  love  to  God  is 
not  shed  abroad  in  our  hearts  by  the  law,  but  by  the  Holy 
Ghost."  He  is  sure  the  whole  work  is  from  God,  because  he  is 
sure  that  the  intelligence  and  the  sensibility  are  the  whole  of 
man.  How  many  excellent  persons  are  there,  who,  taking  their 
stand  upon  the  same  platform  of  a  false  psychology,  proceed  to 
dogmatize  with  Augustine  as  confidently  as  if  the  only  possible 
ground  of  difference  from  them  was  a  want  of  the  religious 
experience  of  the  Christian  consciousness,  by  which  they  have 
been  so  eminently  blessed.  We  deny  not  the  reality  of  their 
Christian  experience ;  but  we  do  doubt  the  accuracy  of  their 
interpretation  of  it. 

Thus,  the  complex  fact  of  consciousness,  consisting  in  a  state 
of  the  sensibility  and  a  state  of  the  will,  was  viewed  from  oppo- 
site points  by  Pelagius  and  Augustine.  The  voluntary  phase 
of  it  was  seen  by  Pelagius,  and  hence  he  became  an  exclusive 
and  one-sided  advocate  of  free-agency ;  the  passive  side  was 
beheld  by  Augustine,  and  hence  he  became  a  one-sided  and 

12 


178  MORAL   EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  1, 

exclusive  advocate  of  divine  grace.  If  we  would  possess  the 
truth,  and  the  whole  truth,  we  must  view  it  on  all  sides,  and 
give  a  better  interpretation  of  the  natural  consciousness  of  the 
one,  as  well  as  the  supernatural  consciousness  of  the  other,  than 
they  themselves  were  enabled  to  give.  Then  shall  we  not 
instinctively  turn  to  one-sided  views  of  revelation.  Then  shall 
we  not  always  repeat  with  Pelagius,  "  Work  out  your  own  sal- 
vation with  fear  and  trembling,"  nor  always  exclaim  with 
Augustine,  that  "  God  worketh  in  us  to  will  and  to  do  of  his 
good  pleasure ;"  but  we  shall  writh  equal  freedom  and  readiness 
approach  and  appropriate  both  branches  of  the  truth. 

SECTION  IV. 
The  views  of  those  who,  in  later  times,  have  symbolized  with  Augustine. 

Those  divines  who  have  adopted,  in  the  main,  the  same  lead- 
ing views  with  Augustine,  have  generally  admitted  the  fact  of 
free-agency  ;  but,  because  they  could  not  reconcile  it  with  their 
leading  tenet,  they  have,  as  we  have  seen,  explained  it  away. 
The  only  freedom  which  they  allow  to  man,  pertains,  as  we  have 
shown,  not  to  the  will  at  all,  but  only  to  the  external  sphere 
of  the  body.  They  have  maintained  the  great  fact  in  words, 
but  rejected  it  in  substance.  Though  they  have  seen  the  absur- 
dity of  rejecting  one  fact  because  they  could  not  reconcile  it 
with  another,  yet  their  internal  struggle  after  a  unity  and  har- 
mony of  principle  has  induced  them  to  deny,  in  reality,  what 
they  have  seemed  to  themselves  to  preserve  and  maintain. 
We  have  seen,  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  work,  in  what 
manner  this  has  been  done  by  them  ;  it  now  remains  to  take 
a  view  of  the  subject,  in  connexion  with  the  point  under  con- 
sideration. 

The  man  who  confounds  the  sensibility  with  the  will  should, 
indeed,  have  no  difficulty  in  reconciling  the  divine  agency  with 
the  human.  If  the  state  of  the  mind  in  willing  is  purely  passi'  e, 
like  a  state  of  the  mind  in  feeling;  then  to  say  that  it  is 
produced  by  the  power  of  God,  would  create  no  difficulty  what- 
ever. Hence,  the  great  difficulty  of  reconciling  the  human  with 
the  divine  agency,  which  has  puzzled  and  perplexed  so  many, 
should  not  exist  for  one  who  identifies  the  will  with  the  sensi- 
bility ;  and  it  would  exist  for  no  one  holding  this  psychology, 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  179 

if  there  were  not  more  in  the  operations  of  his  nature  than  in 
the  developments  of  his  system.  Perhaps  no  one  ever  more 
completely  lost  sight  of  the  true  characteristic  of  the  manifesta- 
tions of  the  will,  by  thrusting  them  behind  the  phenomena  of 
the  sensibility,  than  President  Edwards ;  and  hence  the  diffi- 
culty in  question  seemed  to  have  no  existence  for  him.  So  far 
from  troubling  himself  about  the  line  which  separates  the  human 
agency  from  the  divine,  he  calmly  and  quietly  speaks  as  if  such 
a  line  had  no  existence.  According  to  his  view,  the  divine 
agency  encircles  all,  and  man  is  merely  the  subject  of  its  influ- 
ence. It  is  true,  he  uses  the  terms  active  and  actions,  as  appli 
cable  to  man  and  his  exertions  ;  but  yet  he  regards  his  very  acts, 
his  volitions,  as  being  produced  by  God.  "  In  efficacious  grace," 
says  he,  "  God  does  all,  and  we  do  all.  God  produces  all,  and 
we  act  all.  For  that  is  what  he  produces ;  namely,  our  own 
acts."  Now  I  think  Edwards  could  not  have  used  such  lan- 
guage, if  he  had  attached  any  other  idea  to  the  term  act,  than 
what  really  belongs  to  it  when  it  is  applied,  as  it  often  is,  to 
the  passive  states  of  the  intelligence  and  the  sensibility.  An 
act  of  the  intellect,  or  an  act  of  the  affections,  may  be  produced 
by  the  power  of  God ;  but  not  an  act  of  the  will.  For,  as  the 
Princeton  Keview  well  says,  "  a  necessary  volition  is  an  ab- 
surdity, a  thing  inconceivable." 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add,  that  in  causing  all  real  human 
agency  to  disappear  before  the  divine  sovereignty,  Edwards 
merely  reproduced  the  opinion  of  Calvin ;  which  he  endeav- 
oured to  establish,  not  by  a  fierce,  unreasoning  dogmatism,  but 
upon  the  principles  of  reason  and  philosophy.  "  The  apostle," 
says  Calvin,  "ascribes  everything  to  the  Lord's  mercy,  and 
leaves  nothing  to  our  wills  or  exertions"*  He  even  contends, 
that  to  "  suppose  man  to  be  a  cooperator  with  God,  so  that  the 
validity  of  election  depends  on  his  consent,"  is  to  make  the 
"  will  of  man  superior  to  the  counsel  of  God  ;"f  as  if  there  were 
no  possible  medium  between  nothing  and  omnipotence. 
0  Institutes,  b.  iii,  ch.  xxiv.  j  Ibid. 


180  MORAL  EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Part  L 


SECTION  V. 

The  danger  of  mistaking  distorted  for  exalted  views  of  the  divine 
sovereignty. 

There  is  no  danger,  it  is  true,  that  we  shall  ever  form  too 
exalted  conceptions  of  the  divine  majesty.  All  notions  must 
fall  infinitely  below  the  sublime  reality.  But  we  may  proceed 
in  the  wrong  direction,  by  making  it  our  immediate  aim  and 
object  to  exalt  the  sovereignty  of  God.  An  object  so  vast  and 
overwhelming  as  the  divine  omnipotence,  cannot  fail  to  trans- 
port the  imagination,  and  to  fill  the  soul  with  wonder.  Hence, 
in  our  passionate,  but  always  feeble,  endeavours  to  grasp  so 
wonderful  an  object,  our  vision  may  be  disturbed  by  our  emo- 
tions, and  the  glory  of  God  badly  reflected  in  our  minds.  Our 
utmost  exertions  may  thus  end,  not  in  exalted,  but  in  distorted 
views  of  the  divine  sovereignty.  Is  it  not  better,  then,  for 
feeble  creatures  like  ourselves,  to  aim  simply  to  acquire  a 
knowledge  of  the  truth,  which,  we  may  depend  upon  it,  will 
not  fail  to  exhibit  the  divine  sovereignty  in  its  most  beautiful 
lights? 

If  such  be  our  object,  we  shall  find,  we  think,  that  God  is  the 
author  of  our  spiritual  views  in  religion,  as  well  as  those  genuine 
feelings  of  reverence  and  love,  without  which  obedience  is 
impossible  ;  and  that  man  himself  is  the  author  of  the  volitions 
by  which  his  obedience  is  consummated.  This  shows  the  pre- 
cise point  at  which  the  divine  agency  ceases,  and  human  agency 
begins ;  the  precise  point  at  which  the  sphere  of  human  power 
comes  into  contact  with  the  sphere  of  omnipotence,  without 
intersecting  it  and  without  being  annihilated  by  it.  It  shows 
at  once  the  absolute  dependence  of  man  upon  God,  without  a 
denial  of  his  free  and  accountable  agency ;  and  it  asserts  the 
latter,  without  excluding  the  Divine  Being  from  the  affairs  of 
the  moral  world.  It  renders  unto  Caesar  the  things  which  arc 
Caesar's,  and  unto  God  the  things  which  are  God's.  At  the 
same  time  that  it  combines  and  harmonizes  these  truths,  it 
shows  the  errors  of  the  opposite  extremes,  and  places  the  doc- 
trines of  human  and  divine  agency  upon  a  solid  and  enduring 
basis,  by  preventing  each  from  excluding  the  other. 

In  all  our  inquiries,  truth,  and  truth  alone,  should  be  oui 
grand  object.  All  bv-ends  and  contracted  purposes,  all  party 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  181 

schemes  and  sectarian  zeal,  will  be  almost  sure  to  defeat  their 
own  objects,  by  seeking  them  with  too  direct  and  exclusive  an 
aim.  These,  even  when  noble  and  praiseworthy,  must  be 
sought  and  reached,  if  reached  at  all,  by  seeking  and  finding 
the  truth.  Thus,  for  instance,  would  we  exalt  the  sovereignty 
oi  God,  then  must  we  not  directly  seek  to  exalt  that  sovereignty, 
but  put  away  from  us  all  the  forced  contrivances  and  factitious 
lights  which  have  been  invented  for  that  purpose.  It  is  the 
light  of  truth  alone,  sought  for  its  own  sake,  and  therefore 
clearly  seen,  that  can  reveal  the  sublime  proportions,  and  the 
intrinsic  moral  loveliness,  of  this  awful  attribute  of  the  Divine 
Being.  On  the  other  hand,  would  we  vindicate  the  freedom 
of  man,  and  break  into  atoms  the  iron  law  of  necessity,  which 
is  supposed  to  bind  him  to  the  dust,  then  again  must  we  seek 
the  truth  without  reference  to  this  particular  aim  or  object. 
We  must  study  the  great  advocates  of  that  law  with  as  great 
earnestness  and  fairness  as  its  adversaries.  For  it  is  by  the 
light  of  truth  alone,  that  the  real  position  man  occupies  in  the 
moral  world,  or  the  orbit  his  power  moves  in,  can  be  clearly 
seen,  free  from  the  manifold  illusions  of  error ;  and  until  it  be 
thus  seen,  the  liberty  of  the  human  mind  can  never  be  suc- 
cessfully and  triumphantly  vindicated.  If  we  would  understand 
these  things,  then,  we  must  struggle  to  rise  above  the  foggy 
atmosphere  and  the  refracted  lights  of  prejudice,  into  the 
bright  region  of  eternal  truth. 


182  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  (.Part  I, 


CHAPTEE   VI. 

THE  EXISTENCE  OF  MORAL  EVIL,  OR  SIN,  RECONCILED  WITH  THE 
HOLINESS  OF  GOD. 

One  doubt  remains, 
That  wrings  me  sorely,  if  I  solve  it  not. 


The  world,  indeed,  is  even  so  forlorn 

Of  all  good,  as  thou  speakest  it,  and  so  swarms 

With  every  evil.     Yet,  beseech  thee,  point 

The  cause  out  to  me,  that  myself  may  see 

And  unto  others  show  it :  for  in  heaven 

One  places  it,  and  one  on  earth  below. — DANTE. 

THEOLOGY  teaches  that  God  is  a  being  of  infinite  perfections 
Hence,  it  is  concluded,  that  if  he  had  so  chosen,  he  might  have 
secured  the  world  against  the  possibility  of  evil ;  and  this 
naturally  gives  rise  to  the  inquiry,  why  he  did  not  thus  secure 
it  ?  "Why  he  did  not  preserve  the  moral  universe,  as  he  had 
created  it,  free  from  the  least  impress  or  overshadowing  of  evil  ? 
Why  he  perhiitted  the  beauty  of  the  world  to  become  dis- 
figured, as  it  has  been,  by  the  dark  invasion  and  ravages  of  sin  ? 
This  great  question  has,  in  all  ages,  agitated  and  disturbed  the 
human  mind,  and  been  a  prolific  source  of  atheistic  doubts 
and  scepticism.  It  has  been,  indeed,  a  dark  and  perplexing 
enigma  to  the  eye  of  faith  itself. 

To  solve  this  great  difficulty,  or  at  least  to  mitigate  the  stu- 
pendous darkness  in  which  it  seems  enveloped,  various  theories 
have  been  employed.  The  most  celebrated  of  these  are  the 
following:  1.  The  hypothesis  of  the  soul's  preexistence ;  2.  The 
hypothesis  of  the  Manicheans;  and,  3.  The  hypothesis  of  opti- 
mism. It  may  not  be  improper  to  bestow  a  few  brief  remaiks 
on  these  different  schemes. 

SECTION  I. 

The  hypothesis  of  the  souTs  preexistence. 

Tin's  was  a  favourite  opinion  with  many  of  the  ancient  phi- 
losophers. In  the  Phsedon  of  Plato,  Socrates  is  introduced  as 
maintaining  it;  and  he  ascribes  it  to  Orpheus  as  its  original 


Chapter  VL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  183 

author.  Leibnitz  supposes  that  it  was  invented  for  the  purpose 
of  explaining  the  origin  of  evil  ;*  but  the  truth  seems  to  be, 
that  it  arose  from  the  difficulty  of  conceiving  how  the  soul 
could  be  created  out  of  nothing,  or  out  of  a  substance  so  differ 
ent  from  itself  as  matter.  The  hypothesis  in  question  was  also 
IT  aintained  by  many  great  philosophers,  because  they  imagined 
tl  at  if  the  past  eternity  of  the  soul  were  denied,  this  would 
eliake  the  philosophical  proof  of  its  future  eternity,  f  There 
can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  after  the  idea  of  the  soul's  pre- 
existence  had  been  conceived  and  entertained,  it  was  very  gen- 
erally employed  to  account  for  the  origin  of  evil. 

But  it  must  be  conceded  that  this  hypothesis  merely  draws 
a  veil  over  the  great  difficulty  it  was  designed  to  solve. 
The  difficulty  arises,  not  from  the  circumstance  that  evil  exists 
in  the  present  state  of  our  being,  but  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
found  to  exist  anywhere,  or  in  any  state,  under  the  moral 
administration  of  a  perfect  God.  It  is  as  difficult  to  conceive 
why  such  a  being  should  have  permitted  the  soul  to  sin  in  a 
former  state  of  existence,  even  if  such  a  state  were  an  estab- 
lished reality,  as  it  is  to  account  for  its  rise  in  the  present  world. 
To  remove  the  difficulty  out  of  sight,  by  transferring  the  origin 
of  evil  beyond  the  sphere  of  visible  things,  is  a  poor  substi- 
tute for  a  solid  and  satisfactory  solution  of  it.  The  great 
problem  of  the  moral  world  is  not  to  be  illuminated  by  any 
such  fictions  of  the  imagination ;  and  we  had  better  let  it  alone 
altogether,  if  we  have  nothing  more  rational  and  solid  to  advance. 


SECTION'  II. 
The  hypothesis  of  the  Manicheans. 

Though  this  doctrine  is  ascribed  to  Manes,  after  whom  it  is 
called,  it  is  of  a  far  more  early  origin.  It  was  taught,  says 
Plutarch,  by  the  Persian  Magi,  whose  views  are  exhibited  by 
him  in  his  celebrated  treatise  of  Isis  and  Osiris.  "Zoroaster," 
guys  he,  "  thought  that  there  are  two  gods,  contrary  to  each 
other  in  their  operations — a  good  and  an  evil  principle.  To  the 
former  he  gave  the  name  of  Oromazes,  and  to  the  latter  that 
of  Arimanius.  The  one  resembles  light  and  truth,  the  other 
darkness  and  ignorance."  We  do  not  allude  to  this  theory  for 

0  Essais  de  Theodicee.  f  Cudworth's  Intellectual  System. 


1 84  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

the  purpose  of  combatting  it ;  we  suppose  it  would  scarcely  find 
a  respectable  advocate  at  the  present  day.  This,  like  many 
other  inventions  of  the  great  intellects  of  antiquity,  has  entirely 
disappeared  before  the  simple  but  sublime  doctrines  of  the 
religion  of  Jesus. 

M.  Bayle,  it  is  true,  has  exhausted  the  resources  of  his  genius, 
as  well  as  the  rich  stores  of  his  learning,  in  order  to  adorn  the 
doctrine  of  Manes,  and  to  render  it  more  plausible,  if  possible, 
than  any  other  which  has  been  employed  to  explain  the  origin 
and  existence  of  evil.  But  this  was  not  because  he  sinceiely 
believed  it  to  be  founded  in  truth.  He  merely  wished  to  show 
its  superiority  to  other  schemes,  in  order  that  by  demolishing 
it  he  might  the  more  effectually  inspire  the  minds  of  men  with 
a  dark  feeling  of  universal  scepticism.  It  was  decorated  by  him, 
not  as  a  system  of  truth,  but  as  a  sacrifice  to  be  offered  up  on 
the  altar  of  atheism.  True  to  the  instincts  of  his  philosophy,  he 
sought  on  this  subject,  as  well  as  on  all  others,  to  extinguish 
the  light  of  science,  and  manifest  the  wonders  of  his  power, 
by  hanging  round  the  wretched  habitation  of  man  the  gloom 
of  eternal  despair. 

Though  this  doctrine  is  now  obsolete  in  the  civilized  world, 
it  was  employed  by  a  large  portion  of  the  ancient  philosophers 
to  account  for  the  origin  of  evil.  This  theory  does  not,  it  is 
true,  relieve  the  difficulty  it  was  designed  to  solve  ;  but  it  shows 
that  there  was  a  difficulty  to  be  solved,  which  would  not  have 
been  the  case  if  evil  could  have  been  ascribed  to  the  Supreme 
God  as  its  author.  If  those  philosophers  could  have  regarded 
him  as  a  Being  of  partial  goodness,  they  would  have  found  no 
difficulty  in  explaining  the  origin  and  existence  of  evil ;  they 
would  simply  have  attributed  the  good  and  the  evil  in  the 
world  to  the  good  and  the  evil  supposed  to  pertain  to  his  nature. 
But  they  could  not  do  this,  inasmuch  as  the  human  mind  no 
sooner  forms  an  idea  of  God,  than  it  regards  him  as  a  being  of 
ui  limited  and  unmixed  goodness.  It  has  shown  a  disposition, 
in  all  ages,  to  adopt  the  most  wild  and  untenable  hypotheses, 
rather  than  entertain  the  imagination  that  evil  could  proceed 
from  the  Father  of  Lights.  The  doctrine  of  Manes,  then,  as 
well  as  the  other  hypotheses  employed  to  explain  the  origin  of 
evil,  demonstrates  how  deep  is  the  conviction  of  the  human 
mind  that  God  is  light,  and  in  him  there  is  no  darkness  at  all. 


Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  185 

• 

In  searching  after  the  fountain  of  evil,  it  turns  from  the  great 
source  of  life  and  light,  and  embraces  the  wildest  extravagancies, 
rather  than  indulge  a  dark  suspicion  respecting  the  goodness 
of  its  Maker. 


SECTION  III. 
The  hypothesis  of  optimism. 

"  The  fundamental  principle  of  the  optimist  is,"  says  Dugald 
Stewart,  "that  all  events  are  ordered  for  the  best;  and  that 
evils  which  we  suffer  are  parts  of  a  great  system  conducted  by 
almighty  power  under  the  direction  of  infinite  wisdom  and 
goodness."  Leibnitz,  who  is  unquestionably  one  of  the  greatest 
philosophers  the  world  has  produced,  has  exerted  all  his  powers 
to  adorn  and  recommend  the  scheme  of  optimism.  We  have, 
in  a  former  chapter,  considered  the  system  of  Leibnitz ;  but  we 
have  not  denied  its  fundamental  principle,  which  is  so  well 
expressed  in  the  above  language  of  Mr.  Stewart.  If  lie  had 
confined  himself  to  that  principle,  without  undertaking  to 
explain  how  it  is  that  God  orders  all  things  for  the  best,  his 
doctrine  would  have  been  free  from  objections,  except  for  a 
want  of  clearness  and  precision. 

Dr.  Chalmers  has  said  that  the  scheme  of  optimism,  as  left 
by  Leibnitz,  is  merely  an  hypothesis.  He  insists,  however,  that 
even  as  an  hypothesis,  it  may  be  made  to  serve  a  highly  im- 
portant purpose  in  theology.  "  If  it  be  not  an  offensive  weapon," 
says  he,  "with  which  we  may  beat  down  and  demolish  the 
strongholds  of  the  sceptic,  it  is,  at  least,  an  armour  of  defence, 
with  which  we  may  cause  all  his  shafts  to  fall  harmless  at  our 
feet."  This  remark  of  Dr.  Chalmers  seems  to  be  well  founded. 
The  objection  of  the  sceptic,  as  we  have  seen,  proceeds  on  the 
supposition  that  if  a  Being  of  infinite  perfections  had  so  chosen, 
he  might  have  made  a  better  universe  than  that  which  actually 
exists.  But  we  have  as  good  reasons  to  make  suppositions  as 
the  sceptic.  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  notwithstanding  the 
evil  which  reigns  in  the  world,  the  universe  is  the  best  possible 
universe  that  even  infinite  wisdom,  and  power,  and  goodness, 
could  have  called  into  existence.  Let  us  suppose  that  this 
would  be  clearly  seen  by  us,  if  we  only  knew  the  whole  of  the 
case ;  if  we  could  only  view  the  present  condition  of  man  in  all 


186  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

• 

its  connexions  and  relations  to  God's  infinite  plans  for  the  uni- 
verse and  for  eternity.  In  other  words,  let  us  suppose,  that  if 
we  were  only  omniscient,  our  difficulty  would  vanish,  and  where 
we  now  see  a  cloud  over  the  divine  perfections,  we  should 
behold  bright  manifestations  of  them.  This  is  a  mere  supposi- 
tion, it  is  true,  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  objection 
in  question  is  based  on  a  mere  supposition.  When  it  is  asked, 
why  God  permitted  evil  if  he  had  both  the  power  and  the  will 
to  prevent  it  ?  it  is  assumed  that  the  prevention  of  evil  is  better, 
on  the  whole,  than  the  permission  of  it,  and  consequently  more 
worthy  of  the  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  ascribed  to  God. 
But  as  this  is  a  mere  supposition,  which  has  never  been  proved 
by  the  sceptic,  we  do  not  see  why  it  may  not  be  sufficiently 
answered  by  a  mere  supposition. 

This  is  an  important  idea.  In  many  a  good  old  writer,  it 
exists  in  the  dark  germ ;  in  Dr.  Chalmers  it  appears  in  the 
expanded  blossom.  Its  value  may  be  shown,  and  its  beauty 
illustrated,  by  a  reference  to  the  aifairs  of  human  life  ;  for  many 
of  the  most  important  concerns  of  society  are  settled  and  deter- 
mined by  the  application  of  this  principle.  If  a  man  were  on 
trial  for  his  life,  for  example,  and  certain  facts  tending  to 
establish  his  guilt  were  in  evidence  against  him,  no  enlightened 
tribunal  would  pronounce  him  guilty,  provided  any  hypothesis 
could  be  framed,  or  any  supposition  made,  by  which  the  facts 
in  evidence  could  be  reconciled  with  his  innocence.  "  Evi- 
dence," says  a  distinguished  legal  writer,  "is  always  insufficient, 
where,  assuming  all  to  be  proved  which  the  evidence  tends  to 
prove,  some  other  hypothesis  may  still  be  true ;  for  it  is  the 
actual  exclusion  of  any  other  hypothesis  which  invests  mere 
circumstances  with  the  force  of  proof."*  This  is  a  settled  prin- 
ciple of  law.  If  any  supposition  can  be  made,  then,  which 
would  reconcile  the  facts  in  evidence  with  a  man's  innocence, 
the  law  directs  that  he  shall  be  acquitted.  Any  other  rule  of 
decision  would  be  manifestly  unjust,  and  inconsistent  with  the 
dictates  of  a  sound  policy. 

This  principle  is  applicable,  whether  the  accused  bear  a  good 
or  a  bad  moral  character.  As,  according  to  the  hypothesis,  he 
might  be  innocent ;  so  no  tribunal  on  earth  could  fairly  deter- 
mine that  he  was  guilty.  The  hardship  of  such  a  conclusion 

0  Starkie  on  Evidence. 


Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD,  187 

would  be  still  more  apparent  in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  a  man 
whose  general  character  is  well  known  to  be  good.  In  such  a 
case,  especially,  should  the  facts  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  ex- 
clude every  favourable  hypothesis,  before  either  truth  or  justice 
would  listen  to  an  unfavourable  decision  and  j  udgment. 

Such  is  the  rule  which  human  wisdom  has  established,  in 
01  der  to  arrive  at  truth,  or  at  least  to  avoid  error,  in  relation  to 
the  acts  and  intentions  of  men.  Hence,  is  it  not  reasonable,  we 
ask,  that  we  should  keep  within  the  same  sacred  bounds,  when 
we  come  to  form  an  estimate  of  the  ways  of  God  ?  No  one  can 
fairly  doubt  that  the  world  is  replete  with  the  evidences  of  his 
goodness.  If  he  had  so  chosen,  he  might  have  made  every 
breath  a  sigh,  every  sensation  a  pang,  and  every  utterance  of 
man's  spirit  a  groan ;  but  how  differently  has  he  constituted  the 
world  within  us,  and  the  glorious  world  around  us !  Instead  of 
swelling  every  sound  with  discord,  and  clothing  every  object 
with  deformity,  he  has  made  all  nature  music  to  the  ear  and 
beauty  to  the  eye.  The  full  tide  of  his  universal  goodness  flows 
within  us,  and  around  us  on  all  sides.  In  its  eternal  rounds,  it 
touches  and  blesses  all  things  living  with  its  power.  We  live, 
and  move,  and  have  our  very  being  in  the  goodness  of  God. 
Surely,  then,  we  should  most  joyfully  cling  to  an  hypothesis 
which  is  favourable  to  the  character  of  such  a  Being.  Hence, 
we  infinitely  prefer  the  warm  and  generous  theory  of  the  opti- 
mist, which  regards  the  actual  universe  as  the  best  possible,  to 
the  dark  and  cold  hypothesis  of  the  sceptic,  which  calls  in  ques- 
tion the  boundless  perfections  of  God. 

In  the  foregoing  remarks,  we  have  concurred  with  Dr.  dial 
mers  in  viewing  the  doctrine  of  Bayle  as  a  mere  unsupported 
hypothesis ;  but  have  we  any  right  to  do  so  ?  It  has  not  been 
proved,  it  is  true ;  but  there  are  some  things  which  require  no 
proof.  Is  not  the  doctrine  of  Bayle  a  tiling  of  this  kind?  It 
certainly  seems  evident  that  if  God  hates  sin  above  all  things, 
and  could  easily  prevent  it,  he  would  not  permit  it  to  appear  in 
his  dominions.  This  view  of  the  subject  recommends  itself 
powerfully  to  the  human  mind,  which  has,  in  all  ages,  been 
worried  and  perplexed  by  it.  It  seems  to  carry  its  own  evi- 
dence along  with  it ;  to  shake  the  mind  with  doubt,  and  over- 
spread it  with  darkness.  Hence,  we  should  either  expose  its 
fallacy  or  else  fairly  acknowledge  its  power. 


188  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

On  the  other  hand,  the  theory  of  Leibnitz,  or  rather  the  great 
fundamental  idea  of  his  theory,  is  more  than  a  mere  hypothesis. 
It  rests  on  the  conviction  of  the  human  mind  that  God  is  in- 
finitely perfect,  and  seems  to  flow  from  it  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence. For  how  natural,  how  irresistible  the  conclusion,  that 
if  God  be  absolutely  perfect,  then  the  world  made  by  him  must 
be  perfect  also !  But  while  these  two  hypotheses  seem  to  be 
sound,  it  is  clear  that  both  cannot  be  so :  there  is  a  real  conflict 
between  them,  and  the  one  or  the  other  must  be  made  to  give 
way  before  our  knowledge  can  assume  a  clearly  harmonious 
and  satisfactory  form. 

The  effects  of  the  hypothesis  of  the  sceptic  may  be  neutralized 
by  opposing  to  it  the  hypothesis  of  the  theist.  But  wre  are  not 
satisfied  to  stop  at  this  point.  We  intend,  not  merely  to  neu- 
tralize, but  to  explode,  the  theory  of  the  sceptic.  We  intend  to 
wrest  from  it  the  element  of  its  strength,  and  grind  it  to  atoms. 
We  intend  to  lay  our  finger  precisely  upon  the  fallacy  which 
lies  so  deeply  concealed  in  its  bosom,  and  from  which  it  derives 
all  its  apparent  force  and  conclusiveness.  We  shall  drag  this 
false  principle  from  its  place  of  concealment  into  the  open  light 
of  day,  and  thereby  expose  the  utter  futility,  the  inherent  ab 
surdity,  of  the  whole  atheistical  hypothesis,  to  which  it  has  so 
long  imparted  its  deceptive  power.  If  Leibnitz  did  not  detect 
this  false  principle,  and  thereby  overthrow  the  theory  of  Bayle, 
it  was  because  he  held  this  principle  in  common  with  him.  We 
must  eliminate  this  error,  common  to  the  scheme  of  the  atheist 
and  to  that  of  the  theist,  if  we  would  organize  the  truths  which 
both  contain,  and  present  them  together  in  one  harmonious  and 
symmetrical  system ;  into  a  system  which  will  enable  us,  not 
merely  to  stand  upon  the  defensive,  and  parry  off  the  attacks  of 
the  sceptic,  but  to  enter  upon  his  own  territory,  and  demolish 
his  strongholds ;  not  merely  to  oppose  his  argument  by  a  counter- 
argument, but  to  explode  his  sophism,  and  exhibit  the  cause  of 
God  in  cloudless  splendour. 

This  false  principle,  this  concealed  fallacy,  of  which  the  athe- 
ist has  been  so  long  allowed  to  avail  himself,  has  been  the  source 
of  many  unsuspected  errors,  and  many  lamentable  evils.  It  has 
not  only  given  power  and  efficacy  to  the  weapons  of  the  sceptic, 
but  to  the  eye  of  faith  itself  has  it  cast  clouds  and  darkness  over 
the  transcendent  glory  of  the  moral  government  of  God.  It  has 


Chapter  VL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  189 

prevented  a  Leibnitz  from  refuting  the  sophism  of  a  Bayle,  and 
induced  a  Kant  to  declare  a  theodicy  impossible.  It  has,  indeed, 
as  we  shall  see,  crept  into  and  corrupted  the  whole  mass  of  re- 
ligious knowledge  ;  converting  the  radiant  and  clearly-defined 
body  of  truth  into  a  dark,  heterogeneous  compound  of  conflicting 
elements.  Hence  we  shall  utterly  demolish  it,  that  neither  a 
fragment  nor  a  shadow  of  it  may  remain  to  darken  and  delude 
the  minds  of  men. 


SECTION  IV. 

The  argument  of  the  atheist — The  reply  of  Leibnitz  and  other  theists — The 
insufficiency  of  this  reply. 

Sin  exists.  This  is  the  astounding  fact  of  which  the  atheist 
avails  himself.  He  has  never  ceased  to  contend,  that  as  God 
has  permitted  sin  to  exist,  he  was  either  unable  or  unwilling  to 
prevent  it.  God  might  easily  have  prevented  sin,  says  he,  if 
he  had  chosen  to  do  so ;  but  he  has  not  chosen  to  do  so,  and 
therefore  his  love  of  virtue  is  not  infinite,  his  holiness  is  not 
unlimited.  Now,  we  deny  this  conclusion,  and  assert  the  infinite 
holiness  of  God. 

This  assertion  may  be  true,  says  Yoltaire,  and  hence  God 
would  have  prevented  all  sin,  if  his  power  had  not  been  limited. 
The  only  conceivable  way,  says  he,  to  reconcile  the  existence 
of  sin  with  the  purity  of  God,  is  "  to  deny  his  omnipotence." 
We  insist,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  power  of  God  is  absolutely 
without  bounds  or  limits.  Though  sin  exists,  we  still  maintain, 
in  opposition  to  every  form  of  atheism,  that  this  fact  implies  no 
limitation  of  any  of  the  perfections  of  God. 

Before  proceeding  to  establish  this  position,  we  shall  consider 
the  usual  reply  of  the  theist  to  the  great  argument  of  the 
atheist.  "  The  greatest  love  which  a  ruler  can  show  for  virtue," 
says  Bayle,  "  is  to  cause  it,  if  he  can,  to  be  always  practised 
without  any  mixture  of  vice.  If  it  is  easy  for  him  to  procure 
this  advantage  to  his  subjects,  and  he  nevertheless  permits  vice 
to  raise  its  head  in  his  dominions,  intending  to  punish  it  after 
having  tolerated  it  for  a  long  time,  his  affection  for  virtue  is  not 
the  greatest  of  which  we  can  conceive ;  it  is  then  not  infinite" 
This  has  been  the  great  standing  argument  of  atheism  in  all 
ages  of  the  world.  This  argument,  as  held  bv  the  atheists  of 


190  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

antiquity,  is  presented  by  Cudworth  in  the  following  words: 
"  Tlie  supposed  Deity  and  Maker  of  the  world  was  either  will- 
ing to  abolish  all  evils,  but  not  able ;  or  he  was  able  but  not 
willing;  or  else,  lastly,  he  was  both  able  and  willing.  This 
latter  is  the  only  thing  that  answers  fully  to  the  notion  of  a  God. 
Now  that  the  supposed  Creator  of  all  things  was  not  thus  both 
able  and  willing  to  abolish  all  evils,  is  plain,  because  then  there 
would  have  been  no  evils  at  all  left.  Wherefore,  since  there 
is  such  a  deluge  of  evils  overflowing  all,  it  must  needs  be  that 
either  lie  was  willing,  and  not  able  to  remove  them,  and  then 
he  was  impotent ;  or  else  he  was  able  and  not  willing,  and  then 
he  was  envious ;  or,  lastly,  he  was  neither  able  nor  willing,  and 
then  he  was  both  impotent  and  envious."  This  argument  is, 
in  substance,  the  same  as  that  presented  by  Bayle,  and  relied 
upon  by  atheists  in  all  subsequent  times. 

To  the  argument  of  Bayle,  the  following  reply  is  given  by 
Leibnitz  :  "  When  we  detach  things  that  are  connected  together, 
— the  parts  from  the  whole,  the  human  race  from  the  universe, 
the  attributes  of  God  from  each  other,  his  power  from  his 
wisdom, — we  are  permitted  to  say  that  God  can  cause  virtue  to 
be  in  the  world  without  any  mixture  of  vice,  and  even  that  he 
may  easily  cause  it  to  le  so."*  But  he  does  not  cause  virtue  to 
exist  without  any  mixture  of  vice,  says  Leibnitz,  because  the 
good  of  the  whole  universe  requires  the  permission  of  moral 
evil.  How  the  good  of  the  universe  requires  the  permission  of 
evil,  he  has  not  shown  us ;  but  he  repeatedly  asserts  this  to  be 
the  fact,  and  insists  that  if  God  were  to  prevent  all  evil,  this 
would  work  a  greater  harm  to  the  whole  than  the  permission 
of  some  evil.  Now,  is  this  a  sufficient  and  satisfactory  reply  to 
the  argument  of  the  atheist  ? 

It  certainly  seems  to  possess  weight,  and  is  entitled  to  serious 
consideration.  Bayle  contends,  that  as  evil  exists,  the  Creator 
and  Governor  of  the  world  cannot  be  absolutely  perfect.  He 
should  have  concluded  with  me,  Leibnitz  truly  says,  that  as 
God  is  absolutely  perfect,  the  existence  of  evil  is  necessary  to 
the  perfection  of  the  universe,  or  is  an  unavoidable  part  of  the 
best  world  that  could  have  been  created.  It  is  thus  that  he 
neutralizes,  without  demolishing,  the  argument  of  the  atheist, 
and  each  person  is  left  to  be  more  deeply  affected  by  the  argu- 

0  Theodicee. 


Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  191 

ment  of  Leibnitz,  or  by  that  of  Bayle,  as  his  faith  in  the 
unlimited  goodness  of  God  is  strong  or  weak.  If  the  theist,  by 
such  means,  should  gain  a  complete  victory,  this  would  be  due 
to  the  faith  of  the  vanquished,  rather  than  to  the  superiority 
of  the  logic  by  which  he  is  subdued. 

To  this  argument  of  Leibnitz  we  may  then  well  apply  his 
own  remarks  upon  another  celebrated  philosopher.  Descartes 
met  the  argument  of  the  necessitarian,  not  by  exposing  its 
fallacy,  but  by  repelling  the  conclusion  of  it  on  extraneous 
grounds.  "This  was  to  cut  the  Gordian  knot,"  says  Leibnitz, 
who  was  himself  a  necessitarian,  "  and  to  reply  to  the  conclu- 
sion of  one  argument,  not  by  resolving  it,  but  by  opposing  to  it 
a  contrary  argument;  which  is  not  conformed  to  the  laws  of 
philosophical  controversy."  The  reply  of  Leibnitz  to  Bayle  is 
clearly  open  to  the  same  objection.  It  does  not  analyze  the 
sophism  of  the  sceptic,  or  resolve  it  into  its  elements,  and  point 
out  its  error ;  it  merely  opposes  its  conclusion  by  the  presenta- 
tion of  a  contrary  argument.  Hence  it  is  not  likely  to  produce 
very  great  effect ;  for,  as  Leibnitz  himself  says,  in  relation  to 
this  mode  of  attacking  sceptics,  "  It  may  arrest  them  a  little, 
but  they  will  always  return  to  their  reasoning,  presented  in  dif- 
ferent forms,  until  we  cause  them  to  comprehend  wherein  the 
defect  of  their  sophism  consists."  Leibnitz  has,  then,  accord- 
ing to  his  own  canons  of  criticism,  merely  cut  the  Gordian  knot 
of  atheism,  which  he  should  have  unravelled.  He  has  merely 
arrested  the  champions  of  scepticism  "  a  little,"  whom  he  should 
have  overthrown  and  demolished. 

His  re^ly  is  not  only  incomplete,  in  that  it  does  not  expose 
the  sophistry  of  the  atheist ;  it  is  also  unsound.  It  carries  in  its 
bosom  the  elements  of  its  own  destruction.  It  is  self-contra- 
dictory, and  consequently  untenable.  It  admits  that  it  is  easy  for 
God  to  cause  virtue  to  exist,  and  yet  contends  that,  in  certain 
cases,  he  fails  to  do  so,  because  the  highest  good  of  the  universe 
requires  the  existence  of  moral  evil.  But  how  is  this  possible  ? 
It  will  be  conceded  that  the  good  of  the  individual  would  be 
promoted,  if  God  should  cause  him  to  be  perfectly  holy  and 
happy.  This  would  be  for  the  good  of  each  and  every  indi- 
vidual moral  agent  in  the  universe.  How,  then,  is  it  possible 
for  such  an  exercise  of  the  divine  power  to  be  for  the  good 
of  all  the  parts,  and  yet  not  for  the  good  of  the  whole? 


192  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

So  far  from  being  able  to  see  liow  these  tilings  can  hang 
together,  it  seems  evident  that  they  are  utterly  repugnant  to 
each  other. 

The  highest  good  of  the  universe,  we  are  told,  requires  the 
permission  of  evil.  What  good  ?  Is  it  the  holiness  of  moral 
agents?  This,  it  is  said,  can  be  produced  by  the  agency  of 
God,  without  the  introduction  of  evil,  and  produced,  too,  in  the 
greatest  conceivable  degree  of  perfection.  Why  should  evil  be 
permitted,  then,  in  order  to  attain  an  end,  which  it  is  conceded 
can  be  perfectly  attained  without  it  ?  Is  there  any  higher  end 
than  the  perfect  moral  purity  of  the  universe,  which  God  seeks 
to  accomplish  by  the  permission  of  sin  ?  It  certainly  is  not  the 
happiness  of  the  moral  universe ;  for  this  can  also  be  secured, 
in  the  highest  possible  degree,  by  the  agency  of  the  Divine 
Being,  without  the  permission  of  moral  evil.  What  good  is 
there,  then,  beside  the  perfect  holiness  and  happiness  of  the 
universe,  to  the  production  of  which  the  existence  of  moral  evil 
is  necessary  ?  There  seems  to  be  no  such  good  in  reality.  It 
appeal^  to  be  a  dream  of  the  imagination,  a  splendid  fiction, 
which  has  been  recommended  to  the  human  mind  by  its  horror 
of  the  cheerless  gloom  of  scepticism. 


SECTION"  V. 

The  sophism  of  the  atheist  exploded,  and  a  perfect  agreement  shown  to  subsist 
between  the  existence  of  sin  and  the  holiness  of  God. 

Supposing  God  to  possess  perfect  holiness,  he  would  certainly 
prevent  all  moral  evil,  says  the  atheist,  unless  his  p'/wer  were 
limited.  This  inference  is  drawn  from  a  false  premiss  ;  namely, 
that  if  God  is  omnipotent,  he  could  easily  prevent  moral  evil, 
and  cause  virtue  to  exist  without  any  mixture  of  vice.  This 
assumption  has  been  incautiously  conceded  to  the  atheist  by  his 
opponent,  and  hence  his  argument  has  not  been  clearly  and 
fully  refuted.  To  refute  this  argument  with  perfect  clearness, 
it  is  necessary  to  show  two  things:  first,  that  it  is  no  limitation 
of  the  divine  omnipotence  to  say  that  it  cannot  wrork  contra- 
dictions ;  and  secondly,  that  if  God  should  cause  virtue  to  exist 
in  the  heart  of  a  moral  agent,  he  would  work  a  contradiction. 
We  shall  endeavour  to  evince  these  two  things,  in  order  to 
refute  the  grand  sophism  of  the  sceptic,  and  lay  a  solid  founda- 


TT>  */"! 

Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GO%  103 

. 

tion  for  a  genuine  scheme  of  optimism,  against  which  no  val 
objection  can  be  urged. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  it  is  not  a  limitation  of  the  divine 
omnipotence  to  say,  that  it  cannot  work  contradictions.  There 
will  be  little  difficulty  in  establishing  this  point.  Indeed,  it 
will  be  readily  conceded  ;  and  if  we  offer  a  few  remarks  upon 
it,  it  is  only  that  we  may  leave  nothing  dark  and  obscure  behind 
tin,  even  to  those  whose  minds  are  not  accustomed  to  such 
speculations. 

As  contradictions  are  impossible  in  themselves,  so  to  say  that 
God  could  perform  them,  would  not  be  to  magnify  his  power, 
but  to  expose  our  own  absurdity.  When  we  affirm,  that  om- 
nipotence cannot  cause  a  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  one  and 
the  same  time,  or  cannot  make  two  and  two  equal  to  five,  we 
do  not  set  limits  to  it ;  we  simply  declare  that  such  things  are 
not  the  objects  of  power.  A  circle  cannot  be  made  to  possess 
the  properties  of  a  square,  nor  a  square  the  properties  of  a 
circle.  Infinite  power  cannot  confer  the  properties  of  the  one 
of  these  figures  upon  the  other,  not  because  it  is  less  than 
infinite  power,  but  because  it  is  not  within  the  nature,  or 
province,  or  dominion  of  power,  to  perform  such  things,  to 
embody  such  inherent  and  immutable  absurdities  in  an  actual 
existence.  In  regard  to  the  doing  of  such  things,  or  rather  of 
such  absurd  and  inconceivable  nothings,  omnipotence  itself  pos- 
sesses no  advantage  over  weakness.  Power,  from  its  very 
nature  and  essence,  is  confined  to  the  accomplishment  of  such 
things  as  are  possible,  or  imply  no  contradiction.  Hence  it  is 
beyond  the  reach  of  almighty  power  itself  to  break  up  and 
confound  the  immutable  foundations  of  reason  and  truth.  God 
possesses  no  such  miserable  power,  no  such  horribly  distorted 
attribute,  no  such  inconceivably  monstrous  imperfection  and 
deformity  of  nature,  as  would  enable  him  to  embody  absurdities 
and  contradictions  in  actual  existence.  It  is  one  of  the  chief 
excellencies  and  glories  of  the  divine  nature,  that  its  infinite 
power  works  within  a  sphere  of  light  and  love,  without  the  least 
tendency  to  break  over  the  sacred  bounds  of  eternal  trutn,  into 
the  outer  darkness  of  chaotic  night  I 

The  truth  of  this  remark,  as  a  general  proposition,  will  be 
readily  admitted.  In  general  terms,  it  is  universally  acknowl- 
edged ;  and  its  application  is  easy  where  the  impossibility  is 

13 


194  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

plain,  or  the  contradiction  glaring.  But  there  are  things  which 
really  imply  a  contradiction,  without  being  suspected  to  do  so. 
We  may  well  ask,  in  relation  to  such  things,  why  God  does  not 
produce  them,  without  being  sensible  of  the  absurdity  of  the 
inquiry.  The  production  of  virtue,  or  true  holiness,  in  the 
breast  of  a  moral  agent,  is  a  thing  of  this  kind.* 

This  conducts  us  to  our  second  position  ;  namely,  that  if  G  od 
should  cause  virtue  to  exist  in  the  breast  of  a  moral  agent,  he 
would  work  a  contradiction.  In  other  words,  the  production 
of  virtue  by  any  extraneous  agency,  is  one  of  those  impossible 
conceits,  those  inherent  absurdities,  which  lie  quite  beyond  the 
sphere  of  light  in  which  the  divine  omnipotence  moves,  and 
has  no  existence  except  in  the  outer  darkness  of  a  lawless 
imagination,  or  in  the  dim  regions  of  error,  in  which  the  true 
nature  of  moral  goodness  has  never  been  seen.  It  is  absurd, 
we  say,  to  suppose  that  moral  agents  can  be  governed  and 
controlled  in  any  other  way  than  by  moral  means.  All  physical 
power  is  here  out  of  the  question.  By  physical  power,  in  con- 
nexion with  wisdom  and  goodness,  a  moral  agent  may  be 
created,  and  endowed  with  the  noblest  attributes.  By  physical 
power,  a  moral  agent  may  be  caused  to  glow  with  a  feeling  of 
love,  and  armed  with  an  uncommon  energy  of  wrill ;  but  such 
effects,  though  produced  by  the  power  of  God,  are  not  the 
virtue  of  the  moral  agent  in  whom  they  are  produced.  This 
consists,  not  in  the  possession  of  moral  powers,  but  in  the  proper 
and  obedient  exercise  of  those  powers. f  If  infinite  wisdom, 
and  goodness,  and  power,  should  muster  all  the  means  and 
appliances  in  the  universe,  and  cause  them  to  bear  with  united 
energy  on  a  single  mind,  the  effect  produced,  however  grand 
and  beautiful,  would  not  be  the  virtue  of  the  agent  in  whom  it 
is  produced.  Nothing  can  be  Lis  virtue  which  is  produced 
by  an  extraneous  agency.  This  is  a  dictate  of  the  universal 
reason  and  consciousness  of  mankind.  It  needs  no  meta- 
physical refinement  for  its  support,  and  no  scholastic  jargon 
for  its  illustration.  On  this  broad  principle,  then,  which  is  so 
clearly  deduced,  not  from  the  confined  darkness  of  the  schools, 
but  the  open  light  of  nature,  we  intend  to  take  our  stand  in 
opposition  to  the  embattled  ranks  of  atheism. 

The  argument  of  the  atheist  assumes,  as  we  have  seen,  that  a 

0  See  chapter  iii.  |  Compare  chap.  iii. 


Chapter  VL]  WITH  THE   HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  105 

Being  of  infinite  power  could  easily  prevent  sin,  and  cause  holi- 
ness to  exist.  It  assumes  that  it  is  possible,  that  it  implies  no 
contradiction,  to  create  an  intelligent  moral  agent,  and  place  it 
beyond  all  liability  to  sin.  But  this  is  a  mistake.  Almighty 
power  itself,  we  may  say  with  the  most  profound  reverence, 
cannot  create  such  a  being,  and  place  it  beyond  the  possibility 
of  sinning  If  it  could  not  sin,  there  would  be  no  merit,  no  vir- 
tue, in  its  obedience.  That  is  to  say,  it  would  not  be  a  moral 
agent  at  all,  but  a  machine  merely.  The  power  to  do  wrong,  as 
well  as  to  do  right,  is  included  in  the  very  idea  of  a  moral  and 
accountable  agent,  and  no  such  agent  can  possibly  exist  without 
being  invested  with  such  a  power.  To  suppose  such  ah  agent 
to  be  created,  and  placed  beyond  all  liability  to  sin,  is  to  suppose 
it  to  be  what  it  is,  and  not  what  it  is,  at  one  and  the  same  time ; 
it  is  to  suppose  a  creature  to  be  endowed  with  a  power  to  do 
wrong,  and  yet  destitute  of  such  a  power,  which  is  a  plain  con- 
tradiction. Hence,  Omnipotence  cannot  create  such  a  being, 
and  deny  to  it  a  power  to  do  evil,  or  secure  it  against  the  possi- 
bility of  sinning. 

We  may,  with  the  atheist,  conceive  of  a  universe  of  such 
beings,  if  we  please,  and  we  may  suppose  them  to  be  at  all 
times  prevented  from  sinning  by  the  omnipotent  and  irresistible 
energy  of  the  Divine  Being ;  and  having  imagined  all  this,  we 
may  be  infinitely  better  pleased  with  this  ideal  creation  of  our 
own  than  with  that  which  God  has  called  into  actual  existence 
around  us.  But  then  we  should  only  prefer  the  absurd  and 
contradictory  model  of  a  universe  engendered  in  our  own  weak 
brains,  to  that  which  infinite  wisdom,  and  power,  and  goodness 
have  actually  projected  into  being.  Such  a  universe,  if  freed 
from  contradictions,  might  be  also  free  from  evil,  nay,  from  the 
very  possibility  of  evil ;  but  only  on  condition  that  it  should 
at  the  same  time  be  free  from  the  very  possibility  of  good.  It 
admits  into  its  dominions  moral  and  accountable  creatures, 
capable  of  knowing  and  serving  God,  and  of  drinking  at  the 
purest  fountain  of  uncreated  bliss,  only  by  being  involved  in  ir- 
reconcilable contradiction.  It  may  appear  more  delightful  to 
the  imagination,  before  it  coines  to  be  narrowly  inspected,  than 
the  universe  of  God ;  and  the  latter,  being  compared  with  it, 
may  seem  less  worthy  of  the  infinite  perfections  of  its  Author; 
but,  after  all,  it  is  but  a  weak  and  crazy  thing,  a  contradictious 


196  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

and  impossible  conceit.  We  may  admire  it,  and  make  it  the 
standard  by  which  to  try  the  work  of  God ;  but,  after  all,  it  is 
but  an  "  idol  of  the  human  mind,"  and  not  "  an  idea  of  the  Di- 
•ine  Mir  d."  It  is  a  little,  distorted  image  of  human  weakness, 
and  not  a  harmonious  manifestation  of  divine  power.  Among 
all  the  possible  models  of  a  universe,  which  lay  open  to  the  in- 
finite mind  and  choice  of  God,  a  thing  so  deformed  had  no 
place ;  and  when  the  sceptic  concludes  that  the  perfections  of 
the  Supreme  Architect  are  limited,  because  he  did  work  after 
such  a  model,  he  only  displays  the  impotency  of  his  own  wis- 
dom, and  the  blindness  of  his  own  presumption. 

Hence,  the  error  of  the  atheist  is  obvious.  He  does  not  con- 
sider that  the  only  way  to  place  all  creatures  beyond  a  liability 
to  sin,  is  to  place  them  below  the  rank  of  intelligent  and  ac- 
countable beings.  He  does  not  consider  that  the  only  way  to 
prevent  "sin  from  raising  its  head"  is  to  prevent  holiness  from 
the  possibility  of  appearing  in  the  universe.  He  does  not  con 
sider  that  among  all  the  ideal  worlds  present  to  the  Divine  Mind, 
there  was  not  one  which,  if  called  into  existence,  would  have 
been  capable  of  serving  and  glorifying  its  Maker,  and  yet  in- 
capable of  throwing  off  his  authority.  Hence,  he  really  finds 
fault  with  the  work  of  the  Almighty,  because  he  has  not  framed 
the  world  according  to  a  model  which  is  involved  in  the  most 
irreconcilable  contradictions.  In  other  words,  he  fancies  that 
God  is  not  perfect,  because  he  has  not  embodied  an  absurdity 
in  the  creature.  If  God,  he  asks,  is  perfect,  why  did  he  not 
render  virtue  possible,  and  vice  impossible?  Why  did  he  not 
create  moral  agents,  and  yet  deny  to  them  the  attributes  of 
moral  agents?  Why  did  he  not  give  his  creatures  the  power  to 
do  evil,  and  yet  withhold  this  power  from  them?  He  might 
just  as  well  have  demanded,  why  he  did  not  create  matter 
without  dimensions,  and  circles  without  the  properties  of  a  circle. 
Poor  man !  he  cannot  see  the  wisdom  and  power  of  God  mani- 
fested in  the  world,  because  it  is  not  filled  with  moral  agents 
which  are  not  moral  agents,  and  writh  glorious  realities  that  are 
mere  empty  shadows ! 

If  the  above  remarks  be  just,  then  the  great  question,  why 
has  God  permitted  sin,  which  has  exercised  the  ingenuity  of  man 
in  all  ages,  is  a  most  idle  and  insignificant  inquiry.  The  only 
real  question  is,  why  lie  created  such  beings  as  men  at  all ;  and 


Chapter  VL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD  107 

not  why  he  created  them,  and  then  permitted  them  to  sin.  The 
first  question  is  easily  answered.  The  second,  though  often  pro- 
pounded, seems  to  be  a  most  unmeaning  question.  It  is  unmean- 
ing, because  it  seeks  to  ascertain  the  reason  why  God  has  per- 
mitted a  thing,  which,  in  reality,  he  has  not  permitted  at  all. 
Having  created  a  world  of  moral  agents,  that  is,  a  world  en- 
dowed with  a  power  to  sin,  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  prevent 
sin,  so  long  as  they  retained  this  power,  or,  in  other  words,  so 
long  as  they  continued  to  exist  as  moral  agents.  A  universe  of 
such  agents  given,  its  liability  to  sin  is  not  a  matter  for  the  will 
of  God  to  permit;  this  is  a  necessary  consequence  from  the 
nature  of  moral  agents.  He  could  no  more  deny  peccability  to 
such  creatures  than  he  could  deny  the  properties  of  the  circle  to 
a  circle ;  and  if  he  could  not  prevent  such  a  thing,  it  is  surely 
very  absurd  to  ask  why  he  permitted  it. 

On  the  supposition  of  such  a  world,  God  did  not  permit  sin 
at  all ;  it  could  not  have  been  prevented.  It  would  be  consid- 
ered a  very  absurd  inquiry,  if  we  should  ask,  why  God  permit- 
ted two  and  two  to  be  equal  to  four,  or  why  he  permitted  the 
three  angles  of  a  triangle  to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles.  But 
all  such  questions,  however  idle  and  absurd,  are  not  more  so 
than'the  great  inquiry  respecting  the  permission  of  moral  evil. 
If  this  does  not  so  appear  to  our  minds,  it  is  because  we  have 
not  sufficiently  reflected  on  the  great  truth,  that  a  necessary 
virtue  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  an  inherent  and  utter  impos- 
sibility. The  full  possession  of  this  truth  will  show  us,  that 
the  cause  of  theism  has  been  encumbered  with  great  difficulties, 
because  its  advocates  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  reason 
why  God  has  permitted  a  thing,  which,  in  point  of  fact,  he  has 
not  permitted.  Having  attempted  to  explain  a  fact  which  has 
no  existence,  it  is  no  wronder  that  they  should  have  involved 
themselves  in  clouds  and  darkness.  Let  us  cease  then,  to  seek 
the  reason  of  that  which  is  not,  in  order  that  we  may  behold 
the  glory  of  that  which  is. 

We  have  seen  that  it  is  impossible  for  Omnipotence  to  create 
inora  agents,  and  yet  prevent  them  from  possessing  an  ability 
to  sin  or  transgress  the  law  of  God.  In  other  words,  that  the 
Almighty  cannot  give  agents  a  power  to  sin,  and  at  the  same 
time  deny  this  power  to  them.  To  expect  such  things  of  him, 
is  to  expect  him  to  work  contradictions ;  to  expect  him  to  cause 


198  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

a  thing  to  be  what  it  is,  and  not  what  it  is,  at  one  and  the 
same  time.  Thus,  although  sin  exists,  we  vindicate  the  charac- 
ter of  God,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  an  inherent  impossibility 
to  exclude  all  evil  from  a  moral  universe.  This  is  the  high, 
impregnable  ground  of  the  true  Christian  theist. 

We  have  already  said,  that  the  only  real  question  is,  not  why- 
God  permitted  evil,  but  why  he  created  beings  capable  of  sin- 
ning. Such  creatures  are,  beyond  all  question,  the  most  noble 
specimens  of  his  workmanship.  St.  Augustine  has  beautifully 
said,  that  the  horse  which  has  gone  astray  is  a  more  noble 
creature  than  a  stone  which  has  no  power  to  go  astray.  In  like 
manner,  we  may  say,  a  moral  agent  that  is  capable  of  knowing, 
and  loving,  and  serving  God,  though  its  very  nature  implies  an 
ability  to  do  otherwise,  is  a  more  glorious  creature  than  any 
being  destitute  of  such  a  capacity.  If  God  had  created  no  such 
beings,  his  work  might  have  represented  him  "  as  a  house  doth 
the  builder,"  but  not  "  as  a  son  doth  his  father."  If  he  had 
created  no  such  beings,  there  would  have  been  no  eye  in  the 
universe,  except  his  own,  to  admire  and  to  love  his  works. 
Traces  of  his  wrisdom  and  goodness  might  have  been  seen  here 
and  there,  scattered  over  his  works,  provided  any  eye  had  been 
lighted  up  with  intelligence  to  see  them  ;  but  nowhere  would 
his  living  and  immortal  image  have  been  seen  in  the  magnifi- 
cent temple  of  the  world.  It  will  be  conceded,  then,  that  there 
is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  why  God  should  have  preferred  a 
universe  of  creatures,  beaming  with  the  glories  of  his  own 
image,  to  one  wholly  destitute  of  the  beauty  of  holiness  and  the 
light  of  intelligence.  But  having  preferred  the  noblest  order 
of  beings,  its  inseparable  incident,  a  liability  to  moral  evil,  could 
not  have  been  excluded. 

Hence  God  is  the  author  of  all  good,  and  of  good  alone ;  and 
evil  proceeds,  not  from  him  nor  from  his  permission,  but  from 
an  abuse  of  those  exalted  and  unshackled  powers,  whose  nature 
and  whose  freedom  constitute  the  glory  of  the  moral  universe. 

This,  then,  is  the  sublime  purpose  of  God,  to  give  and  con- 
tinue existence  to  free  moral  agents,  and  to  govern  them  ibr 
their  good  as  well  as  for  his  own  glory.  This  is  the  decree  of 
the  Almighty,  to  call  forth  from  nothing  into  actual  existence, 
the  universe  which  now  shines  around  us,  and  spread  over  it 
the  dominion  of  his  perfect  moral  law.  He  does  not  cause  sin. 


Chapter  VI.  1  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  199 

He  does  not  permit  sin.  He  sees  that  it  will  raise  its  hideous 
head,  but  he  does  not  say — so  let  it  be.  No!  sin  is  the  thing 
which  God  hates,  and  which  he  is  determined,  by  all  the  means 
within  the  reach  of  his  omnipotence,  utterly  to  root  out  and 
destroy.  The  word  has  gone  forth,  "  Offences  must  needs  come, 
but  woe  unto  the  man  by  whom  they  come  !"  His  omnipotence 
is  pledged  to  wipe  out  the  stain  and  efface  the  shadow  of  evil, 
in  as  far  as  possible,  from  the  glory  of  his  creation.  But  yet, 
so  long  as  the  light  and  glory  of  the  moral  universe  is  permitted 
to  shine,  may  the  dark  shadow  of  evil,  which  moral  agents  cast 
upon  its  brightness  and  its  beauty,  continue  to  exist  and  par- 
tially obscure  its  divine  perfections.  And  would  it  not  be  un- 
worthy of  the  divine  wisdom  and  goodness  to  remove  this  par- 
tial shadow,  by  an  utter  extinction  of  the  universal  light  1 


SECTION  VI. 
The  true  and  only  foundation  of  optimism. 

Though  few  have  been  satisfied  with  the  details  of  the  system 
of  optimism,  yet  has  the  great  fundamental  conception  of  that 
system  been  received  by  the  wise  and  good  in  all  ages.  "  The 
atheist  takes  it  for  granted,"  says  Cudworth,  "  that  whosoever 
asserts  a  God,  or  a  perfect  mind,  to  be  the  original  of  all  things, 
does  therefore  ipso  facto  suppose  all  things  to  be  well  made, 
and  as  they  should  be.  And  this,  doubtless,  was  the  sense  of 
all  the  ancient  theologers,"  &c.*  This  distinguished  philosopher 
himself  maintains,  as  well  as  Leibnitz,  that  the  intellectual 
world  could  not  have  been  made  better  than  it  is,  even  by  a 
being  of  infinite  power  and  goodness.  "To  believe  a  God," 
says  he,  "  is  to  believe  the  existence  of  all  possible  good  and 
perfection  in  the  universe ;  it  is  to  believe  that  things  are  as 
they  should  be,  and  that  the  world  is  so  well  framed  and 
governed,  as  that  the  whole  system  thereof  could  not  possibly 
have  been  better."f 

But  while  this  fundamental  principle  has  been  held  by  philos- 
ophers, both  ancient  and  modern,  it  has  been,  as  we  have 
seen,  connected  with  other  doctrines,  by  which  it  is  contra- 
dicted, and  its  influence  impaired.  The  concession  which  is 
universally  made  to  the  sceptic,  that  if  God  is  omnipotent,  lie 

0  Intellectual  System,  vol.  ii,  p.  328.  f  Id.,  vo1-  «»  P-  149- 


200  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

can  easily  cause  virtue  to  exist  without  any  mixture  of  vice,  is 
fatal  to  the  great  principle  that  lies  at  the  foundation  of  optim- 
ism. It  resolves  the  whole  scheme,  which  regards  the  w .  rid 
as  the  best  that  could  possibly  be  made,  into  a  loose,  vague, 
and  untenable  hypothesis.  It  is  true,  the  good  man  would 
infinitely  prefer  this  hypothesis  to  the  intolerable  gloom  of 
atheism ;  but  yet  our  rational  nature  demands  something  more 
solid  and  clear  on  which  to  repose.  Indeed,  the  warmest  sup- 
porters of  optimism  have  supplied  us  with  the  lofty  sentiments 
of  a  pure  faith,  rather  than  with  substantial  and  satisfactory 
views.  The  writings  of  Plato,  Leibnitz,  Cudworth,  and  Ed- 
wards, all  furnish  illustrations  of  the  justness  of  this  remark. 
But  nowhere  is  its  truth  more  clearly  seen  than  in  the  following 
passage  from  Plotinus :  "  God  made  the  whole  most  beautiful, 
entire,  complete,  and  sufficient,"  says  he  ;  "  all  agreeing  friendly 
with  itself  and  its  parts ;  both  the  nobler  and  the  meaner  of  them 
being  alike  congruous  thereunto.  Whosoever,  therefore,  from 
the  parts  thereof,  will  blame  the  whole,  is  an  absurd  and  unjust 
censurer.  For  we  ought  to  consider  the  parts  not  alone  by 
themselves,  but  in  reference  to  the  whole,  whether  they  be 
harmonious  and  agreeable  to  the  same ;  otherwise  we  shall 
not  blame  the  universe,  but  some  of  its  parts  taken  by  them- 
selves."* 

The  theist,  however,  who  maintains  this  beautiful  sentiment, 
is  accustomed  to  make  concessions  by  which  its  beauty  is 
marred,  and  its  foundation  subverted.  For  if  God  could  easily 
cause  virtue  to  exist  without  any  mixture  of  vice,  it  is  demon- 
strable that  the  universe  might  be  rendered  more  holy  and 
happy  than  it  is,  in  each  and  every  one  of  its  parts ,  and  con- 
sequently in  the  whole.  But  if  we  assume  the  position,  as  in 
truth  we  may,  that  a  necessary  virtue  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms,  then  we  can  vindicate  the  infinite  perfections  of  God,  by 
showing  that  sin  may  enter  into  the  best  possible  world.  This 
great  truth,  then,  that  "  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contradiction 
in  terms,"  which  has  been  so  often  uttered  and  so  seldom  fol- 
lowed out  to  its  consequences,  is  the  precise  point  from  which 
we  should  contemplate  the  world,  if  we  would  behold  the  power 
and  goodness  of  God  therein  manifested.  This  is  the  secret  of 
the  world  by  which  the  dark  enigma  of  e'vil  is  to  be  solved. 

0  Cudworth's  Intellectual  System,  vol.  ii,  p.  338. 


Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  201 

This  is  the  clew,  by  which  we  are  to  be  conducted  from  the 
dark  labyrinth  of  atheistical  doubt  and  scepticism,  into  the  clear 
and  open  light  of  divine  providence.  This  is  the  great  central 
light  which  has  been  wanting  to  the  scheme  of  optimism,  to 
convert  it  from  a  mere  but  magnificent  hypothesis,  into  a  clearly 
manifested  and  glorious  reality. 

God  governs  everything  according  to  the  nature  which  he 
has  given  it.  Indeed,  it  would  be  as  impossible  to  necessitate 
true  and  genuine  obedience  by  the  application  of  power,  as  it 
would  be  to  convert  a  stone  into  a  moral  agent  by  the  appli- 
cation of  motives  and  persuasion.  As  sin  is  possible,  then, 
though  omnipotence  be  pledged  to  prevent  its  existence,  it  is 
clear  that  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  limitation  of  the  divine 
power.  This  cuts  off  the  objection  of  Voltaire,  and  explodes 
the  grand  sophism  on  which  it  is  based.  God  hates  sin  above 
all  things,  and  is  more  than  willing  to  prevent  it ;  and  he  actu- 
ally does  so,  in  so  far  as  this  is  possible  to  infinite  wisdom  and 
power.  This  refutes  the  objection  of  Bayle,  and  leaves  his 
argument  without  the  shadow  of  a  foundation.  God  does  not 
choose  sin,  or  permit  it  as  a  means  of  the  highest  good,  as  if 
there  could  be  any  higher  good  than  absolute  and  universal 
holiness  ;  but  it  comes  to  pass,  because  God  has  created  a  world 
of  moral  agents,  and  they  have  transgressed  his  law.  This 
removes  the  high  and  holy  God  infinitely  above  the  contami- 
nation of  all  evil,  above  all  contact  with  the  sin  of  the  world, 
and  shows  an  impassable  gulf  between  the  purity  of  the  Cre- 
ator and  the  pravity  of  the  creature.  By  revealing  the  true 
connexion  of  sin  with  the  moral  universe,  and  its  relation  to 
God,  it  clearly  shows  that  its  existence  should  not  raise  the 
slightest  cloud  of  suspicion  respecting  his  infinite  goodness  and 
power,  and  thus  reconciles  the  fact  of  sin's  existence  with  the 
adorable  perfections  of  the  Governor  of  the  world. 

Jt  may  be  said,  that  although  God  could  not  cause  holiness 
to  prevail  universally,  by  the  exercise  of  his  power,  yet  he 
might  employ  means  and  influences  sufficient  to  prevent  the 
occurrence  of  sin.  To  tins  there  are  two  satisfactory  answers. 
First,  it  is  a  contradiction  to  admit  that  God  cannot  necessitate 
virtue,  because  such  a  thing  is  impossible ;  and  yet  suppose  that 
he  could,  in  all  cases,  secure  the  existence  of  it,  without  any 
chance  of  failure.  It  both  asserts  and  denies  at  the  same  time, 


202  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

the  idea  of  a  necessary  holiness.  Secondly,  the  objection  in 
question  proceeds  on  the  supposition,  that  there  are  resources 
in  the  stores  of  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,  which  might 
have  been  successfully  employed  for  the  good  of  the  universe, 
and  which  God  has  failed  to  employ.  But  this  is  a  mere  gra- 
tuitous assumption.  It  never  has  been,  and  it  never  can  bo 
proved.  It  has  not  even  the  appearance  of  reason  in  its  favour. 
Let  the  objector  show  wherein  the  Almighty  could  have  done 
more  than  he  has  actually  done  to  prevent  sin,  and  secure  holi- 
ness, without  attempting  violence  to  the  nature  of  man,  and 
then  his  objection  may  have  some  force,  and  be  entitled  to 
some  consideration.  But  if  he  cannot  do  this,  his  objection 
rests  upon  a  mere  unsupported  hypothesis.  It  is  very  easy  to 
conceive  that  more  light  might  have  been  imparted  to  men, 
and  greater  influences  brought  to  bear  on  their  feelings ;  but  it 
will  not  follow  that  such  additional  inducements  to  virtue  would 
have  been  good  for  them.  For  aught  we  know,  it  might  only 
have  added  to  their  awful  responsibilities,  without  at  all  con- 
ducing to  their  good.  For  aught  we  know,  the  means  employed 
by  God  for  the  salvation  of  man  from  sin  and  misery  have,  both 
in  kind  and  degree,  been  precisely  such  as  to  secure  the  maxi- 
mum of  good  and  the  minimum  of  evil. 

Let  the  sceptic  frame  a  more  perfect  moral  law  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  world  than  that  which  God  has  established ;  let 
him  show  where  more  tremendous  sanctions  might  be  found  to 
enforce  that  law ;  let  him  show  how  the  Almighty  might  have 
made  a  more  efficacious  display  of  his  majesty,  and  power,  and 
goodness,  than  he  has  actually  exhibited  to  us ;  let  him  refer 
to  more  powerful  influences,  consistent  with  the  free-agency 
and  accountability  of  man,  than  those  exerted  by  the  Spirit  of 
God ;  let  him  do  all  this,  we  say,  and  then  he  may  have  some 
right  to  object  and  find  fault.  In  one  word,  let  him  meet  the 
demand  of  the  Most  High,  "  what  more  could  have  been  done 
to  my  vineyard,  that  I  have  not  done  in  it,"  and  show  it  to  be 
without  foundation,  and  then  there  will  be  some  appearance  of 
reason  in  his  objection. 


Chapter  VI/|  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  203 


SECTION  VII. 

The  glory  of  God  seen  in  the  creation  of  a  world,  which  he  foresaw  woi»  Id 
fall  under  the  dominion  of  sin. 

It  may  be  said  that  we  have  not  yet  gone  to  the  bottom  of 
Hie  difficulty ;  that  although  omnipotence  could  not  deny  the 
capacity  to  commit  sin  to  a  moral  agent,  yet  God  could  pre- 
vent moral  evil,  by  refusing  to  create  any  being  who  he  fore- 
knew would  transgress  his  law.  As  God  might  have  prevented 
the  rise  of  evil  in  our  world,  by  refusing  to  create  man,  why, 
it  may  be  asked,  did  he  not  do  so  ?  Why  did  he  not,  in  this 
way,  spare  the  universe  that  spectacle  of  crime  and  suffering 
which  has  been  presented  in  the  history  of  our  fallen  race  ?  To 
this  we  answer,  that  God  did  not  choose  to  prevent  sin  in  this 
way,  but  to  create  the  world  exactly  as  he  did,  though  he  fore- 
saw the  fall  and  all  its  consequences ;  because  the  highest  good 
of  the  universe  required  the  creation  of  such  a  world.  We  are 
now  prepared  to  see  this  great  truth  in  its  true  light. 

The  highest  good  of  the  universe  may,  no  doubt,  be  promoted 
in  various  ways  by  the  redemption  of  our  fallen  race,  of  which 
we  have  no  conception  in  our  present  state  of  darkness  and 
ignorance.  But  we  are  furnished  with  some  faint  glimpses  of 
the  true  source  of  that  admiration  and  wonder  with  which  the 
angels  of  God  are  inspired,  as  they  contemplate  the  manifesta- 
tion of  his  glory  in  reconciling  the  world  to  himself.  The 
felicity  of  the  angels,  and  no  doubt  of  all  created  intelligences, 
must  be  found  in  the  enjoyment  of  God.  No  other  object  is 
sufficiently  vast  to  fill  and  satisfy  the  unlimited  desires  of  the 
mind.  And  as  the  character  of  God  must  necessarily  constitute 
the  chief  happiness  of  his  creatures,  so  every  new  manifesta- 
tion of  the  glory  of  that  character  must  add  to  their  supreme 
felicity. 

Now,  if  there  had  been  no  such  thing  as  .sin,  the  compassion 
of  God  would  have  been  forever  concealed  from  the  eyes  of  his 
intelligent  creatures.  They  might  have  adored  his  purity ;  but 
of  that  tender  compassion  which  calls  up  the  deepest  and  most 
pleasurable  emotions  in  the  soul,  they  could  have  known  abso- 
lutely nothing.  They  might  have  witnessed  his  love  to  sinless 
beings ;  but  they  could  never  have  seen  that  love  in  its  omnipo- 


204  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

tent  yearnings  over  the  ruined  and  the  lost.  The  attribute  of 
mercy  or  compassion  would  have  been  forever  locked  up  and 
concealed  in  the  deep  recesses  of  the  Divine  Mind ;  and  the 
blessing,  and  honour,  and  glory,  and  dominion,  which  shall  be 
ascribed  by  the  redeemed  unto  Him  that  sitteth  upon  the  throne, 
and  unto  the  Lamb,  forever  and  ever,  would  not  have  betu 
heard  in  the  universe  of  God.  The  chord  which  now  sends 
forth  the  sweetest  music  in  the  harmony  of  heaven,  filling  its 
inhabitants  with  deep  and  rapturous  emotions  of  sympathy  and 
delight,  would  never  have  been  touched  by  the  finger  of  God. 

How  far  such  a  display  of  the  divine  character  is  necessary 
to  the  ends  of  the  moral  government  of  God  can  be  known  only 
to  himself.  We  are  informed  in  his  word,  that  it  is  by  the 
redemption  of  the  world,  through  Christ,  that  the  ends  of  his 
moral  government  are  secured.  It  pleased  the  Father,  saith 
St.  Paul,  that  in  Christ  all  fulness  should  dwell ;  and  having 
made  peace  through  the  blood  of  his  cross,  by  him  to  reconcile 
all  things  unto  himself,  whether  they  be  things  in  earth,  or 
things  in  heaven.  Thus  we  are  told  that  all  things  in  heaven 
are  reconciled  unto  God,  by  the  blood  of  the  cross.  But  it  may 
be  asked,  How  was  it  possible  to  reconcile  those  beings  unto 
God  who  had  never  sinned  against  him,  nor  been  estranged 
from  him  ?  According  to  the  original,  God  is  not  exactly  said 
to  reconcile,  but  to  keep  together,  all  things,  by  the  mediation 
and  work  of  Christ.  The  angels  fell  from  heaven,  and  man 
sinned  in  paradise ;  but  the  creatures  of  God  are  secured  from 
any  further  defection  from  him,  by  the  all-controlling  display 
of  his  character,  and  by  the  stupendous  system  of  moral  agen- 
cies and  means  which  have  been  called  forth  in  the  great  work 
of  redemption. 

In  this  view  of  the  passage  in  question  we  are  happy  to  find 
that  we  are  confirmed  by  so  enlightened  a  critic  as  Dr.  Mac- 
knight.  In  relation  to  these  words,  "  And  by  him  to  reconcile 
all  things,"  he  says,  "  Though  I  have  translated  the  anonaraXXd^a. 
to  reconcile,  which  is  its  ordinary  meaning,  I  am  clearly  of 
opinion  that  it  signifies  here  to  unite  simply ;  because  the  good 
angels  are  said,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  verse,  to  be  reconciled 
with  Christ,  who  never  were  at  enmity  with  him.  I  therefore 
take  the  apostle's  meaning  to  be  this :  '  It  pleased  the  Father, 
by  Christ,  to  unite  all  things  to  Christ,  namely,  as  their  Head  and 


Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  205 

Governor.'  ;  (Col.  i,  20.)  The  same  sublime  truth  is  revealed  in 
other  portions  of  Scripture,  as  in  the  fifteenth  chapter  of  First  Cor- 
inthians, where  it  is  said,  that  it  is  the  design  of  God  to  subject 
all  things  to  Christ,  and  exception  is  made  only  of  Him  by 
'dinin  this  universal  subjection  and  dominion  is  established. 

The  accomplishment  of  such  an  object,  it  will  be  admitted,  is 
me  of  unspeakable  importance.  For  no  government,  however 
perfect  and  beautiful  in  other  respects,  can  be  of  much  value 
unless  it  be  so  constructed  as  to  secure  its  own  permanency. 
This  grand  object,  revelation  informs  us,  has  been  attained  by 
the  redemption  of  the  world  through  Christ.  But  for  his  work, 
those  blessed  spirits  now  bound  together  in  everlasting  society 
with  God,  by  the  sacred  ties  of  confidence  and  love,  might  have 
fallen  from  him  into  the  outer  darkness,  as  angels  and  arch- 
angels had  fallen  before  them.  The  ministers  of  light,  though 
having  drunk  deeply  of  the  goodness  of  God,  and  rejoiced  in 
his  smile,  were  not  satisfied  with  their  condition,  and,  striving 
to  better  it,  plucked  down  ruin  on  their  heads.  So,  man  in 
paradise,  not  content  with  his  happy  lot,  but  vainly  striving  to 
raise  himself  to  a  god,  forsook  his  allegiance  to  his  Maker,  and 
yielded  himself  a  willing  servant  to  the  powers  of  darkness. 
But  an  apostle,  though  born  in  sin,  having  tasted  the  bitter 
fruits  of  evil,  and  the  sweet  mercies  of  redeeming  love,  felt 
such  confidence  in  God,  that  in  whatsoever  state  he  was,  he 
could  therewith  be  content.  Not  only  in  heaven — not  only  in 
paradise — but  in  a  dungeon,  loaded  with  irons,  and  beaten  with 
stripes,  he  could  rejoice  and  give  glory  to  God.  This  firm  and 
unshaken  allegiance  in  a  weak  and  erring  mortal  to  the  throne 
of  the  Most  High  God,  presents  a  spectacle  of  moral  grandeur 
and  sublimity  to  which  the  annals  of  eternity,  but  for  the  ex- 
istence of  sin,  had  presented  no  parallel. 

It  is  by  the  scheme  of  Christianity  alone  that  the  confidence 
of  the  creature  in  his  God  has  been  rendered  too  strong  for  the 
gates  of  hell  to  prevail  against  him.  But  for  this  scheme,  the 
moral  government  of  God  might  have  presented  scenes  of  mu- 
tability and  change,  infinitely  more  appalling  than  the  partial 
evil  which  we  behold  in  our  present  state.  Or  if  God  had 
chosen  to  prevent  this,  to  render  it  absolutely  impossible,  by 
the  creation  of  no  beings  who  he  foreknew  would  rebel  against 
him,  this  might  have  contracted  his  moral  empire  into  the  most 


206  MOEAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

insignificant  limits.  Tims,  by  the  creation  of  the  world,  God 
has  prepared  the  way  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  his  empire, 
and  to  secure  its  foundations.  Christ  is  the  corner-stone  of  the 
spiritual  universe,  by  which  all  things  in  heaven  and  earth  are 
kept  from  falling  away  from  God,  its  great  centre  of  light  and 
life.  No  wonder,  then,  that  when  this  crowning  event  in  the 
moral  government  of  the  universe  was  about  to  be  accomplished, 
the  heavenly  host  should  have  shouted,  "  Glory  to  God  in  the 
highest !" 

This  view  of  the  subject  of  moral  evil,  derived  from  revela- 
tion, harmonizes  all  the  phenomena  of  the  moral  world  with  the 
perfections  of  God,  as  well  as  warms  and  expands  the  noblest 
feelings  of  the  human  heart.  St.  Paul  ascribes  the  stability  of 
all  things  in  heaven  to  the  manifestation  of  the  divine  character 
in  the  redemption  of  our  fallen  race.  If  this  be  the  case,  then 
those  who  so  confidently  assert  that  God  might  have  preserved 
the  world  in  holiness,  without  impairing  the  free-agency  of  man, 
as  easily  as  he  keeps  the  angels  from  falling,  are  very  much 
mistaken.  This  assertion  is  frequently  made  ;  but,  as  we  con- 
ceive, without  authority  either  from  reason  or  revelation.  It  is 
said  by  a  learned  divine,  "That  God  has  actually  preserved 
some  of  the  angels  from  falling ;  and  that  he  has  promised  to 
preserve,  and  will,  therefore,  certainly  preserve  the  spirits  of 
just  men  made  perfect ;  and  that  this  has  been,  and  will  be, 
done  without  infringing  at  all  on  their  moral  agency.  Of 
course,  he  could  just  as  easily  have  preserved  Adam  from  fall- 
ing, without  infringing  on  his  moral  agency."*  This  argument 
is  pronounced  by  its  author  to  be  conclusive  and  "  unanswer 
able."  But  if  God  preserves  one  portion  of  his  creatures  from 
falling,  by  the  manner  in  which  he  has  dealt  with  those  who 
have  fallen,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  could  just  as  easily  have 
kept  each  and  every  portion  of  them  from  a  defection.  If  a 
ruler  should  prevent  a  part  of  his  subjects  from  rebellion,  by 
the  way  in  which  he  has  dealt  with  those  who  have  rebelled, 
does  it  follow  that  he  might  just  as  easily  have  secured  obedi- 
ence in  the  rebels  ?  It  clearly  does  not ;  and  hence  there  is  a 
radical  defect  in  the  argument  of  these  learned  divines  and  the 
school  to  which  they  belong.  Let  them  show  that  all  things  in 
heaven  are  not  secured  in  their  eternal  allegiance  to  God  by  the 

0  Dwight's  Sermons,  vol.  i,  pp.  25i-4l2.     Dick's  Lee.,  p.  248 


Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE   HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  207 

work  of  Christ,  and  then  they  may  safely  conclude,  that  man 
might  have  been  as  certainly  and  infallibly  secured  against  a 
defection  as  angels  and  just  men  made  perfect.  If  God  binds 
the  spiritual  universe  to  himself,  by  the  display  of  his  un- 
bounded mercy  to  a  fallen  race,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  could, 
by  the  same  means,  have  preserved  that  race  itself,  and  every 
other  order  of  beings,  from  a  defection.  For,  on  this  supposi- 
tion, there  would  have  been  no  fallen  race  to  call  forth  his 
infinite  compassion,  and  send  its  binding  influences  over  angels 
and  the  spirits  of  just  men  made  perfect. 

According  to  the  sublime  idea  of  revelation,  it  is  the  trans 
cendent  glory  of  the  cross  that  it  exerts  moral  influences,  which 
have  bound  the  whole  intelligent  creation  together  in  one  har- 
monious society  with  God,  its  sovereign  and  all-glorious  head. 
For  aught  we  know,  the  stability  of  the  spiritual  universe  could 
not  possibly  have  been  secured  in  any  other  way ;  and  hence, 
if  there  had  been  no  fall,  and  no  redemption,  the  grand  intel- 
lectual system  which  is  now  so  full  of  confidence  and  joy, 
might  have  been  without  a  secure  foundation.  We  have  seen 
that  its  foundation  could  not,  from  the  very  nature  of  things, 
have  been  established  and  fixed  by  mere  power ;  for  this  could 
not  have  kept  a  single  moral  agent  from  the  possibility  of  sin- 
ning, much  less  a  boundless  universe  of  such  beings. 

The  Christian  believer,  then,  labours  under  no  difficulty  in 
regard  to  the  existence  of  evil,  which  should  in  the  least  oppress 
his  mind.  If  he  should  confine  his  attention  too  narrowly  to 
the  nature  of  evil  as  it  is  in  itself,  he  may,  indeed,  perplex  his 
brain  almost  to  distraction ;  but  he  should  take  a  freer  and 
wider  range,  viewing  it  in  all  its  relations,  dependencies,  and 
ultimate  results.  If  he  should  consider  the  origin  of  evil 
exclusively,  he  may  only  meet  with  impenetrable  obscurity  and 
confusion,  as  he  endeavours  to  pry  into  the  dark  enigma  of  the 
world ;  but  all  that  is  painful  in  it  will  soon  vanish,  if  he  will 
only  view  it  in  connexion  with  God's  infinite  plans  for  the  good 
of  the  universe.  He  will  then  see,  that  this  world,  with  all  its 
wickedness  and  woe,  is  but  a  dim  speck  of  vitality  in  a  bound- 
less dominion  of  light,  that  is  necessary  to  the  glory  and  per- 
fection of  the  whole. 

The  believer  should  not,  for  one  moment,  entertain  the  low 
view,  that  the  atonement  confers  its  benefits  on  man  alone. 


208  MOEAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

The  plan  of  redemption  was  not  an  after-thought,  designed  to 
remedy  an  evil  which  the  eye  of  omniscience  had  not  foreseen ; 
it  was  formed  in  the  counsels  of  infinite  wisdom  long  before  the 
foundations  of  the  world  were  laid.  The  atonement  was  made 
for  man,  it  is  true ;  but,  in  a  still  higher  sense,  man  was  made 
for  the  atonement.  All  things  were  made  for  Christ.  God, 
whose  prerogative  it  is  to  bring  good  out  of  evil,  will  turn  the 
short-lived  triumph  of  the  powers  of  darkness  into  a  glorious 
victory,  and  cause  it  to  be  a  universal  song  of  rejoicing  to  his 
great  name  throughout  the  endless  ages  of  eternity. 

Who  would  complain,  then,  that  he  is  subject  to  the  evils  of 
this  life,  since  he  has  been  subjected  in  hope?  Everything 
around  us  is  a  type  and  symbol  of  our  high  destiny.  All  things 
shadow  forth  the  glory  to  be  revealed  in  us.  The  insignificant 
seed  that  rots  in  the  earth  does  not  die.  It  lives,  it  germinates, 
it  grows,  it  springs  up  into  the  stately  plant,  and  is  crowned 
with  beauty.  The  worm  beneath  our  feet,  though  seemingly  so 
dead,  is,  by  the  secret  all-working  power  of  God,  undergoing 
changes  to  fit  it  for  a  higher  life.  In  due  time  it  puts  off  its 
form  of  death,  and  rises,  "  like  a  winged  flower,"  from  the  cojd 
earth  into  a  warm  region  of  life  and  light.  In  like  manner, 
the  bodies  we  inhabit,  wonderfully  and  fearfully  as  they  are 
made,  are  destined  to  moulder  in  the  grave,  and  become  the 
food  of  worms,  before  they  are  raised  like  unto  Christ's  glorified 
body,  clothed  with  power  and  immortality.  Nature  itself,  with 
all  its  teeming  forms  of  beauty,  must  decay,  till  "pale  con- 
cluding winter  comes  at  last,  and  shuts  the  scene."  But  'the 
scene  is  closed,  and  all  its  magnificence  shut  in,  only  that  it 
may  open  out  again,  as  it  were,  into  all  the  wonders  of  a  new 
creation.  Even  so  the  human  soul,  although  it  be  subjected  to 
the  powers  of  darkness  for  a  season,  may  emerge  into  the  light 
and  blessedness  of  eternity.  Such  is  the  destiny  of  man;  and 
upon  himself,  under  God,  it  depends  whether  this  high  des- 
tiny be  fulfilled,  or  his  bright  hopes  blasted.  "  I  call  heaven 
and  earth  this  day  to  witness,"  saith  the  Lord,  "  that  I  have  set 
before  you  life  and  death,  blessing  and  cursing  ;  therefore  choose 


Chapter  VI.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  209 

SECTION  VIII. 
The  little,  caption  spirit  of  Voltaire,  and  other  atheizing  minute  philosophers. 

It  will  be  objected,  no  doubt,  that  in  the  foregoing  vindication 
of  the  divine  holiness,  we  have  taken  for  granted  the  Christian 
scheme  of  redemption  ;  but  it  should  be  remembered,  that  we 
do  not  propose  "  to  justify  the  ways  of  God  to  man"  on  deistical 
principles.  We  are  fully  persuaded,  that  if  God  had  merely 
created  the  world,  and  remained  satisfied  to  look  down  as  an 
idle  spectator  upon  the  evils  it  had  brought  upon  itself,  his 
character  and  glory  would  not  admit  of  vindication ;  and  we 
should  not  have  entered  upon  so  chimerical  an  enterprise.  We 
have  attempted  to  reconcile  the  government  of  the  world,  as  set 
forth  in  the  system  we  maintain,  and  in  no  other,  with  the  per- 
fections of  God ;  and  whoever  objects  that  this  cannot  be  done, 
is  bound,  we  insist,  to  take  the  system  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  not 
as  it  is  mangled  and  distorted  by  its  adversaries.  We  freely 
admit,  that  if  the  Christian  religion  does  not  furnish  the  means 
of  such  a  reconciliation,  then  we  do  not  possess  them,  and  are 
necessarily  devoted  to  despair. 

Here  we  must  notice  a  very  great  inconsistency  of  atheists 
They  insist  that  if  the  world  had  been  created  by  an  infinitely 
perfect  Being,  he  would  not  have  permitted  the  least  sin  or  dis- 
order to  arise  in  his  dominions ;  yet,  when  they  hear  of  any 
interposition  on  his  part  for  the  good  of  the  world,  they  pour 
ridicule  upon  the  idea  of  such  intervention  as  wholly  unworthy 
of  the  majesty  of  so  august  a  Being.  So  weak  and  wravering 
nre  their  notions,  that  it  agrees  equally  well  with  their  creed, 
that  it  becomes  an  infinitely  perfect  Being  to  do  all  things,  and 
that  it  becomes  him  to  do  nothing !  Can  you  believe  that  an 
omnipotent  God  reigns,  says  M.  Voltaire,  since  he  beholds  the 
frightful  evils  of  the  world  without  putting  forth  his  arm  to 
redress  them?  Can  you  believe,  asks  the  same  philosopher, 
that  so  great  a  being,  even  if  he  existed,  would  trouble  himself 
about  the  affairs  of  so  insignificant  a  creature  as  man  ? 

Such  inconsistencies  are  hardly  worthy  of  a  philosopher,  wno 
possesses  a  wisdom  so  sublime,  and  a  penetration  so  profound, 
as  to  authorize  him  to  sit  in  judgment  on  the  order  and  har- 
inony  of  the  universe.  They  are  perfectly  worthy,  however, 

14 


210  MOKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  T. 

of  the  author  of  Candidus.  The  poison  of  this  work  consists, 
not  in  its  argument,  but  in  its  ridicule.  Indeed,  it  is  not  even 
an  attempt  at  argument  or  rational  criticism.  The  sole  aim 
of  the  author  seems  to  be  to  show  the  brilliancy  of  his  wit,  at 
the  expense  of  "  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds ;"  and  it  must 
be  confessed  that  he  has  shown  it,  though  it  be  in  the  worst 
of  all  possible  causes. 

Instead  of  attempting  to  view  the  existence  of  evil  in  the  light 
of  any  principle  whatever,  he  merely  accumulates  evil  upon 
evil ;  and  when  the  mass  has  become  sufficiently  terrific,  with 
the  jeering  mockery  of  a  small  fiend,  he  delights  in  the  con- 
templation of  the  awful  spectacle  as  a  conclusive  demonstration 
that  the  Ruler  of  the  world  is  unequal  to  the  government  of  his 
creatures.  His  book  is  merely  an  appeal  to  the  ignorance  and 
feelings  of  the  reader,  and  can  do  no  mischief,  except  when  it 
may  happen  to  find  a  weak  head  in  union  with  a  corrupt  heart. 
For  what  does  it  signify  that  the  castle  of  the  Baron  Thunder- 
ten-trock  was  not  the  most  perfect  of  all  possible  castles ;  does 
this  disprove  the  skill  of  the  great  Architect  of  the  universe? 
Or  what  does  it  signify  that  Dr.  Pangloss  lost  an  eye  ;  does  this 
extinguish  a  single  ray  of  the  divine  omniscience,  or  depose 
either  of  the  great  lights  which  God  ordained  to  rule  the  world  ? 
Lastly,  what  does  it  signify  that  M.  Yoltaire,  by  a  horrible 
abuse  of  his  powers,  should  have  extinguished  the  light  of 
reason  in  his  soul;  does  this  disprove  the  goodness  of  that 
Being  by  whom  those  powers  were  given  for  a  higher  and  a 
nobler  purpose  ?  A  fracture  in  the  dome  of  St.  Paul's  would, 
no  doubt,  present  as  great  difficulties  to  an  insect  lost  in  its 
depths,  as  the  disorders  of  this  little  world  presented  to  the 
captious  and  fault-finding  spirit  of  M.  Voltaire ;  and  would  as 
completely  shut  out  the  order  and  design  of  the  whole  structure 
from  its  field  of  vision,  as  the  order  and  design  of  the  magnifi- 
cent temple  of  the  world  was  excluded  from  the  mind  of  this 
very  minute  philosopher. 


Chapter  VIL1  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  2U 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OBJECTIONS   CONSIDERED. 

Heaven  seeth  all,  and  therefore  knows  the  sense 

Of  the  whole  beauteous  frame  of  Providence. 

His  judgment  of  God's  kingdom  needs  must  fail, 

Who  knows  no  more  of  it  than  this  dark  jail. — BAXTER. 

One  part,  one  little  part,  we  dimly  scan, 

Through  the  dark  medium  of  life's  feverish  dream ; 

Yet  dare  arraign  the  whole  stupendous  plan, 

If  but  that  little  part  incongruous  seem. — BEATTIE. 

THOUGH  we  have  taken  great  pains  to  obviate  objections  by  the 
manner  in  which  we  have  unfolded  and  presented  our  views, 
yet  we  cannot  but  foresee  that  they  will  have  to  run  the  gaunt- 
let of  adverse  criticism.  Indeed,  we  could  desire  nothing  more 
sincerely  than  such  a  thing,  provided  they  be  subjected  to  the 
test  of  principle,  and  not  of  prejudice.  But  how  can  such  a 
thing  be  hoped  for?  Is  all  theological  prejudice  and  bigotry 
extinct,  that  an  author  may  hope  to  have  a  perfectly  fair  hear- 
ing, and  impartial  decision  ?  Experience  has  taught  us  that  we 
must  expect  to  be  assailed  by  a  great  variety  of  cavils,  and  that 
the  weakest  will  often  produce  as  great  an  effect  as  the  strongest 
upon  the  minds  of  sectarians.  Hence,  we  shall  endeavour  to 
meet  all  such  objections  as  may  occur  to  us,  provided  they  can 
be  supposed  to  exert  any  influence  over  the  mind. 

SECTION  I. 
It  may  ~be  objected  that  the  foregoing  scheme  is  "  new  theology? 

If  nothing  more  were  intended  by  such  an  objection,  than  to 
put  the  reader  on  his  guard  against  the  prejudice  in  favour  of 
novelty,  we  could  not  complain  of  it.  For  surely  every  new 
opinion  which  comes  into  collision  with  received  doctrines, 
should  be  held  suspected,  until  it  is  made  to  undergo  the 
scrutiny  to  which  its  importance  and  appearance  of  truth 
may  entitle  it.  No  reasonable  man  should  complain  of 


312  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

such  a  precaution.  Certainly,  the  present  writer  should  not 
complain  of  such  treatment,  for  it  is  precisely  the  treatment 
which  he  has  received  from  himself.  He  well  remembers, 
that  when  the  great  truths,  as  he  now  conceives  them  to  be, 
first  dawned  upon  his  own  mind,  how  sadly  they  disturbed  and 
perplexed  his  blind  veneration  for  the  past.  As  he  was  him- 
self, then,  so  ready  to  shrink  from  his  own  views  as  "  now 
theology,"  he  surely  cannot  censure  any  one  else  for  so  doing, 
provided  he  will  but  give  them  a  fair  and  impartial  hearing 
before  he  proceeds  to  scout  them  from  his  presence. 

It  is  true,  after  the  writer  had  once  fairly  made  the  discovery 
that  "  old  theology "  is  not  necessarily  true  theology,  he  could 
proceed  with  the  greater  freedom  in  his  inquiries.  He  did  not 
very  particularly  inquire  whether  Ms  or  that  was  old  or  new, 
but  whether  it  was  true.  He  felt  assured,  that  if  he  could  only 
be  so  fortunate  as  to  find  the  truth,  the  defect  of  novelty  would 
be  cured  by  lapse  of  time,  and  he  need  give  himself  no  very 
great  concern  about  it. 

Not  many  centuries  ago,  as  everybody  knows,  Galileo  was 
condemned  and  imprisoned  for  teaching  "  new  theology."  He 
had  the  unbounded  audacity  to  put  forth  the  insufferable  heresy, 
"  directly  against  the  very  word  of  God  itself,"  that  the  sun 
does  not  revolve  around  the  earth.  The  Yatican  thundered, 
and  crushed  Galileo ;  but  it  did  not  shake  the  solar  system. 
This  stood  as  firm  in  its  centre,  and  rolled  on  as  calmly  and  as 
majestically  in  its  course,  as  if  the  Yatican  had  not  uttered  its 
anathema.  Its  thunders  are  all  hushed  now.  Nay,  it  has  even 
reversed  its  former  decree,  and  concluded  to  permit  the  orbs 
of  light  to  roll  on  in  the  paths  appointed  for  them  by  the 
mighty  hand  that  reared  this  beautiful  fabric  of  the  heavens  and 
the  earth.  Even  so  will  it  be,  in  relation  to  all  sound  views 
pertaining  to  the  constitution  and  government  of  the  moral 
world ;  and  those  who  may  deem  them  unsound,  will  have  to 
give  some  more  solid  reason  than  an  odious  epithet,  before 
they  can  resist  their  progress. 

We  do  not  pretend  that  they  have  not,  or  that  they  cannot 
give,  more  solid  reasons  for  this  opposition  to  what  is  called 
;'  new  theology."  We  only  mean,  that  an  objection,  which, 
entirely  overlooking  the  truth  or  the  falsehood  of  an  opinion, 
appeals  to  prejudice  by  the  use  of  an  odious  name,  is  unworthy 


Chapter  VIL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  213 

of  a  serious  and  candid  inquirer  after  truth,  and   therefore 
should  be  laid  aside  by  all  who  aspire  to  such  a  character. 


SECTION  II. 

It  may  be  imagined  that  the  views  herein  set  forth  limit  the  omnipotence  of 

God. 

This  objection  has  already  been  sufficiently  answered  ;  but  it 
may  be  well  to  notice  it  more  distinctly  and  by  itself,  as  it  is 
one  upon  which  great  reliance  wrill  be  placed.  It  is  not  deny- 
ing the  omnipotence  of  God,  as  all  agree,  to  say  that  he  cannot 
work  contradictions ;  but,  as  we  have  seen,  a  necessitated  voli- 
tion is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Hence,  it  does  not  deny  or 
limit  the  divine  omnipotence,  to  say,  it  cannot  produce  or  neces- 
sitate our  volitions.  It  is  absurd  to  say,  that  that  is  a  voluntary 
exercise  of  power,  which  is  produced  in  us  by  the  power  of  God. 
Both  of  these  principles  are  conceded  by  those  who  will  be 
among  the  foremost,  in  all  probability,  to  deny  the  conclusion 
which  necessarily  flows  from  them.  Thus,  the  Princeton 
Review,  for  example,  admits  that  God  cannot  work  contradic- 
tions; and  also  that  "a  necessary  volition  is  an  absurdity,  a 
tiling  inconceivable."  But  will  it  say,  that  God  cannot  work  a 
volition  in  the  human  mind  ?  that  omnipotence  cannot  work  this 
particular  absurdity?  If  that  journal  should  speak  on  this 
subject  at  all,  we  venture  to  predict  it  will  be  seen  that  it  has 
enounced  a  great  truth,  without  perceiving  its  bearing  upon  the 
Princeton  school  of  theology. 

If  this  objection  has  any  solidity,  it  lies  with  equal  force 
against  the  scheme  of  Leibnitz,  Edwards,  and  other  philosophers 
and  divines,  as  well  as  against  the  doctrine  of  the  foregoing 
treatise.  For  they  affirm,  that  God  chooses  sin  as  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good  ;  and  that  he  could  not  exclude  sin 
from  the  universe,  without  causing  a  greater  evil  than  its  per- 
mission. This  sentiment  is  repeatedly  set  forth  in  the  Essais  de 
Theodice'e  of  Leibnitz  ;  and  it  is  also  repeatedly  avowed  by  Ed- 
wards. Now,  here  is  an  inherent  impossibility ;  namely,  the 
prevention  of  sin  without  producing  a  greater  evil  than  its  j  or- 
mission,  which  it  is  assumed  God  cannot  work.  In  other  words, 
when  it  is  asserted,  that  he  chooses  sin  as  the  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good,  it  is  clearly  intended  that  he  cannot  secure 


214  MORAL   EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

the  greatest  good  without  choosing  that  sin  should  exist.  Hence 
if  the  doctrine  of  this  discourse  limits  the  omnipotence  of  God, 
no  less  can  be  said  of  that  to  which  it  is  opposed. 

But  both  schemes  may  be  objected  to  on  this  ground,  and 
lx>th  be  set  aside  as  limiting  the  perfections  of  God.  Indeed, 
it  has  been  objected  against  the  scheme  of  Leibnitz,  "  that  it 
seems  to  make  something  which  I  do  not  know  how  to  express 
otherwise  than  by  the  ancient  stoical  fate,  antecedent  and  supe- 
rior even  to  God  himself.  I  would  therefore  think  it  best  to 
say,  with  the  current  of  orthodox  divines,  that  God  was  per- 
fectly free  in  his  purpose  and  providence,  and  that  there  is  no 
reason  to  be  sought  for  the  one  or  the  other  beyond  himself."* 
W  e  do  not  know  what  reply  Leibnitz  would  have  made  to  such 
an  objection ;  but  we  should  be  at  no  loss  for  an  answer,  were 
it  urged  against  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  preceding 
discourse.  We  should  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  was  a  very 
great  pity  the  author  could  not  find  a  better  way  of  expressing 
his  objection,  "  than  by  the  ancient  stoical  fate,  antecedent  and 
superior  even  to  God  himself."  To  say  that  God  cannot  work 
contradictions,  is  not  to  place  a  stoical  fate,  nor  any  other  kind 
of  fate,  above  him.  And  if  it  is,  this  impiety  is  certainly  prac- 
tised by  "  the  current  of  orthodox  divines,"  even  in  the  author's 
own  sense  of  the  term ;  for  they  all  affirm  that  God  cannot 
work  contradictions. 

If  such  an  objection  has  any  force  against  the  present  treatise, 
it  might  be  much  better  expressed  than  by  an  allusion  to  "  the 
ancient  stoical  fate."  Indeed,  it  is  much  better  expressed  by 
Luther,  in  his  vindication  of  the  doctrine  of  consubstantiation. 
When  it  was  urged  against  that  doctrine,  that  it  is  a  mathe- 
matical impossibility  for  the  same  corporeal  substance  to  be  in 
a  thousand  different  places  at  one  and  the  same  time,  the  great 
reformer  resisted  the  objection  as  an  infringement  of  the  divine 
sovereignty  :  "  God  is  above  mathematics,"  lie  exclaimed :  "  I 
reject  reason,  common-sense,  carnal  arguments,  and  mathe- 
matical proofs."f  There  is  no  doubt  but  the  orthodox  divines 
of  the  present  day  will  be  disposed  to  smile  at  this  specimen 
of  Luther's  pious  zeal  for  the  sovereignty  of  God  ;  and  although 

0  Witherspoon,  as  quoted  in  "New  and  Old  Theology,"  issued  by  the  Presby- 
terian Board  of  Publication. 

f  D'Aubigne's  History  of  the  Reformation,  book  xiii. 


Chapter  VII.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF   GOD.  215 

they  may  not  be  willing  to  admit  that  God  is  above  all  reason  and 
common-sense,  yet  will  they  be  inclined  to  think  that,  in  some 
respects,  Luther  was  a  little  below  them.  But  while  they  smile 
at  Luther,  might  it  not  be  well  to  take  care,  lest  they  should 
display  a  zeal  of  the  same  kind,  and  equally  pleasant  in  the 
estimation  of  posterity  ? 

In  affirming  that  omnipotence  cannot  work  contradictions, 
we  are  certainly  very  far  from  being  sensible  that  we  place  a 
"  stoical  fate  "  above  God,  or  any  other  kind  of  fate.  "We  would 
not  place  mathematics  above  God ;  much  less  would  we  place 
him  below  mathematics.  Nor  would  we  say  anything  which 
would  seem  to  render  him  otherwise  than  "perfectly  free  in 
his  purpose,  or  in  his  providence."  To  say  that  he  cannot  make 
two  and  two  equal  to  five,  is  not,  we  trust,  inconsistent  with 
the  perfection  of  his  freedom.  If  it  would  be  a  great  imper- 
fection in  mortals,  as  all  orthodox  divines  will  admit,  to  be  able 
to  affirm  and  believe  that  two  and  two  are  equal  to  five ;  then 
it  would  be  a  still  greater  imperfection  in  God,  not  only  to  be 
able  to  affirm  such  a  thing,  but  to  embody  it  in  an  actual 
creation.  In  like  manner,  if  it  would  be  an  imperfection  in 
us  to  be  able  to  affirm  so  great  "  an  absurdity,"  a  thing  so 
"  inconceivable  "  as  a  "  necessary  volition  ;"  then  it  could  not 
add  much  to  the  glory  of  the  Divine  Being,  to  suppose  him 
capable  of  producing  such  a  monstrosity  in  the  constitution  and 
government  of  the  world. 

There  is  a  class  of  theologians  who  reject  every  explication 
of  the  origin  of  evil,  on  the  ground  that  they  limit  the  divine 
sovereignty  ;  and  to  the  question  why  evil  is  permitted  to  exist, 
they  reply,  "  We  cannot  tell."  If  God  can,  as  they  insist  he 
can,  easily  cause  holiness  to  shine  forth  with  unclouded,  uni- 
versal splendour,  no  wonder  they  cannot  tell  why  he  does  not 
do  so.  If,  by  a  single  glance  of  his  eye,  he  can  make  hell  itself 
clear  up  and  shine  out  into  a  heaven,  and  fix  the  eternal  glories 
}f  the  moral  universe  upon  an  immovable  foundation,  no  wonder 
they  can  see  no  reason  why  he  refuses  to  do  so.  The  only 
wonder  is  that  they  cannot  see  that,  on  this  principle,  there  is 
no  reason  at  all  for  such  refusal,  and  the  permission  of  moral 
evil.  For  if  God  can  do  all  this,  and  yet  permits  sin  "to  raise 
its  hideous  head  in  his  dominions,"  then  there  is,  and  must  be, 
something  which  he  loves  more  than  holiness,  or  abhors  more 


216  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

than  sin.  And  hence,  the  reason  why  they  cannot  tell  is,  in 
our  humble  opinion,  because  they  have  already  told  too  muck, — 
more  than  they  know.  To  doubt  in  the  right  place,  is  often  the 
best  cure  for  doubt;  and  to  dogmatize  in  the  wrong  place,  is 
often  the  most  certain  road  to  scepticism. 


SECTION  III. 
The  foregoing  scheme,  it  may  le  said,  presents  a  gloomy  view  of  the  universe. 

If  we  say  that  God  cannot  necessitate  our  volitions,  or  neces- 
sarily exclude  all  evil  from  a  moral  system,  it  will  be  objected, 
that,  on  these  principles,  "  we  have  no  certainty  of  the  con- 
tinued obedience  of  holy,  angelic,  and  redeemed  spirits."* 
This  is  true,  if  the  scheme  of  necessity  affords  the  only  ground 
of  certainty  in  the  universe.  But  we  cannot  see  the  justness 
of  this  assumption.  It  is  agreed  on  all  sides,  that  a  fixed  habit 
of  acting,  formed  by  repeated  and  long-continued  acts,  is  a 
pretty  sure  foundation  for  the  certainty  of  action.  Hence,  there 
may  be  some  little  certainty,  some  little  stability  in  the  moral 
world,  without  supposing  all  things  therein  to  be  necessitated. 
Perhaps  there  may  be,  on  this  hypothesis,  as  great  certainty 
therein,  as  is  actually  found  to  exist.  In  the  assertion  so  often 
made,  that  if  all  our  volitions  are  not  controlled  by  the  divine 
power,  but  left  to  ourselves,  then  the  moral  world  will  not  be 
so  well  governed  as  the  natural,  and  disorders  will  be  found 
therein  ;  the  fact  seems  to  be  overlooked,  that  there  is  actually 
disorder  and  confusion  in  the  moral  world.  If  it  were  our  object 
to  find  an  hypothesis  to  overturn  and  refute  the  facts  of  the 
moral  world,  we  know  of  none  better  adapted  to  this  purpose 
than  the  doctrine  of  necessity  ;  but  if  it  be  our  aim,  not  to  deny, 
but  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  the  moral  world,  then  must 
we  adopt  some  other  scheme. 

But  it  has  been  eloquently  said,  that  "if  God  could  not  have 
prevented  sin  in  the  universe,  he  cannot  prevent  believers  from 
falling;  he  cannot  prevent  Gabriel  and  Paul  from  sinking  at 
once  into  devils,  and  heaven  from  turning  into  a  hell.  And 
were  he  to  create  new  races  to  fill  the  vacant  seats,  they  might 
turn  to  devils  as  fast  as  he  created  them,  in  spite  of  anything 
that  he  could  do  short  of  destroying  their  moral  agency.  He 
43  Old  and  New  Theology,  p.  38. 


Chanter  VII.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  217 

is  liable  to  be  defeated  in  all  his  designs,  and  to  be  as  miserable 
as  he  is  benevolent.  This  is  infinitely  the  gloomiest  idea  that 
was  ever  thrown  upon  the  world.  It  is  gloomier  than  hell 
itself.*'  True,  there  might  be  a  gloomier  spectacle  in  the  uni- 
vei'36  than  hell  itself;  and  for  this  very  reason  it  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  that  God  has  ordained  hell  itself,  that  such  gloomier 
spectacle  may  never  appear  in  the  universe  to  darken  its  trans- 
cendent and  eternal  glories.  It  is  on  this  principle  that  we 
reconcile  the  infinite  goodness  of  God  with  the  awful  spectacle 
of  a  world  lying  in  ruins,  and  the  still  more  awful  spectacle  of 
an  eternal  hell  beyond  the  grave. 

It  is  true,  there  might  be  a  gloomier  idea  than  hell  itself; 
there  might  be  two  such  ideas.  Nay,  there  might  be  two  such 
things  ;  but  yet,  so  far  as  we  know,  there  is  only  one.  We  beg 
such  objectors  to  consider,  there  are  some  things  which,  even 
according  to  our  scheme,  will  not  take  place  quite  so  fast  as 
they  may  be  pleased  to  imagine  them.  It  is  true,  for  example, 
that  a  man,  that  a  rational  being,  might  take  a  copper  instead 
of  a  guinea,  if  both  were  presented  for  his  selection ;  but 
although  we  may  conceive  this,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  will 
actually  take  the  copper  and  leave  the  guinea.  It  is  also  true, 
that  a  man  might  throw  himself  down  from  the  brink  of  a 
precipice  into  a  yawning  gulf:  yet  he  may,  perhaps,  refuse  to 
do  so.  This  may  be  merely  a  gloomy  idea,  and  may  never 
become  a  gloomy  fact.  In  like  manner,  as  one  world  fell  away 
from  God,  so  might  another,  and  another.  But  yet  this  imagin- 
ation may  never  be  realized.  Indeed,  the  Supreme  Euler  of 
all  things  has  assured  us  that  it  will  not  be  the  case ;  and  in 
forming  our  views  of  the  universe,  we  feel  more  disposed  to 
look  at  facts  than  at  fancies. 

We  need  not  frighten  ourselves  at  "  gloomy  ideas."  There 
are  gloomy  facts  enough  in  the  universe  to  call  forth  all  our 
feairi.  Indeed,  if  we  should  permit  our  minds  to  be  directed, 
not  by  the  reality  of  things,  but  by  the  relative  gloominess  of 
i< leas,  we  should  altogether  deny  the  eternity  of  future  torments, 
itnd  rejoice  in  the  contemplation  of  the  bright  prospects  of  the 
universal  holiness  and  happiness  of  created  beings.  We  believe, 
however,  that  when  the  truth  is  once  found,  it  will  present  the 
universe  of  God  in  a  more  glorious  point  of  view,  than  it  can 
be  made  to  display  by  any  system  of  error  whatever.  Whether 


218  MORAL   EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

the  foregoing  scheme  possesses  this  characteristic  of  truth  or 
not,  the  reader  can  now  determine  for  himself.  He  can  deter- 
mine whether  it  does  not  present  a  brighter  and  more  lovely 
spectacle  to  contemplate  God,  the  great  fountain  of  all  being 
and  all  light,  as  doing  all  that  is  possible,  in  the  very  nature  of 
things,  for  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  the  universe,  and 
actually  succeeding,  through  and  by  the  cooperation  of  his 
creation,  in  regard  to  all  worlds  but  this ;  than  to  view  him  as 
possessing  the  power  to  shut  out  all  evil  from  the  universe,  for 
time  and  for  eternity,  and  yet  absolutely  refusing  to  do  so. 

But  let  me  insist  upon  it,  that  the  first  and  the  all-important 
inquiry  is,  "  What  is  truth  ?"  This  is  the  only  wise  course  ;  and 
it  is  the  only  safe  course  for  the  necessitarian.  For  no  system, 
when  presented  in  its  true  colours,  is  more  gloomy  and  appalling 
than  his  own.  It  represents  the  great  God,  who  is  seated  upon 
the  throne  of  the  universe,  as  controlling  all  the  volitions  of  his 
rational  creatures  by  the  omnipotence  of  his  will.  The  first 
man  succumbs  to  his  power.  At  this  unavoidable  transgression, 
God  kindles  into  the  most  fearful  wrath,  and  dooms  both  him- 
self and  his  posterity  to  temporal  and  eternal  misery.  If  this 
be  so,  then  let  me  ask  the  reader,  if  the  fact  be  not  infinitely 
"gloomier  than  hell  itself?" 


SECTION  IV. 

It  may  ~be  alleged,  that  in  refusing  to  subject  the  volitions  of  men  to  the 
power  and  control  of  God,  we  undermine  the  sentiments  of  humility  and 
submission. 

This  objection  is  often  made :  it  is,  indeed,  the  great  prac- 
tical ground  on  which  the  scheme  of  necessity  plants  itself. 
The  object  is,  no  doubt,  a  most  laudable  one ;  but  every  laud- 
able object  is  not  always  promoted  by  wise  means.  Let  us 
see,  then,  if  it  be  wise  thus  to  assert  the  doctrine  of  a  necessi- 
tated agency,  in  order  to  abase  the  pride  of  man,  and  teach  him 
a  lesson  of  humility. 

If  we  set  out  from  this  point  of  view,  it  will  be  found  exceed- 
ingly difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  tell  when  and  where  to  slop. 
In  fact,  those  who  rely  upon  this  kind  of  argument,  often  carry 
it  much  too  far;  and  if  we  look  around  us,  we  shall  find  that 
the  only  means  of  escaping  the  charge  of  pride,  is  to  swallow 


Chapter  VII.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  219 

all  the  doctrines  which  the  teachers  of  humility  may  be  pleased 
to  present  to  us.  Thus,  for  example,  Spinoza  would  have  us 
to  believe  that  man  is  not  a  person  at  all,  but  a  mere  fugitive 
mode  of  the  Divine  Being.  Nothing  is  more  ridiculous,  in  his 
eyes,  than  that  so  insignificant  a  thing  as  a  man  should  aspire 
to  the  rank  of  a  distinct,  personal  existence,  and  assume  to  him- 
self the  attribute  of  free-will.  "  The  free-will,"  says  he,  "  is  a 
chimera  of  the  same  kind,  flattered  by  our  pride,  and  in  reality 
founded  upon  our  ignorance."  Now  it  may  not  be  very  hum- 
ble in  us,  but  still  we  beg  leave  to  protest  against  this  entire 
annihilation  of  our  being. 

Even  M.  Comte,  who  in  his  extreme  modesty,  denies  the 
existence  of  a  God,  insists  that  it  is  nothing  but  the  fumes  of 
pride  and  self-conceit,  the  intoxication  of  vanity,  which  induces 
us  to  imagine  that  we  are  free  and  accountable  beings.  No 
doubt  he  would  consider  us  sufficiently  humble  and  submissive, 
provided  we  would  only  forswear  all  the  light  wThich  shines 
within  us  and  around  us,  and  swallow  his  atheistical  dogmas. 
But  there  is  something  more  valuable  in  the  universe,  if  we 
mistake  not,  than  even  a  reputation  for  humility. 

But  no  one  will  expect  us  to  go  so  far  in  self-abasement 
and  humility,  as  to  submit  our  intellects  to  all  sorts  of  dogmas. 
It  wrill  be  amply  sufficient,  if  we  only  go  just  far  enough  to 
receive  the  dogmas  of  his  particular  creed.  Thus,  for  example, 
if  you  assail  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  on  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  Calvinism  erects  itself,  the  Puseyite  will  clasp  his  hands, 
and  cry  out,  "  Well  done  !"  But  if  you  turn  around  and  oppose 
any  of  his  dogmas,  then  what  pride  and  presumption  to  set  up 
your  individual  opinion  against  "  the  decisions  of  the  mother 
Church  !"*  And  he  will  be  sure  to  wind  up  his  lesson  of  humil- 
ity with  that  of  St.  Yincentius  :  "  Quod  ubique,  quod  semper, 
quod  db  omnibus"  Seeing,  then,  that  a  reputation  foi  humility 
is  not  the  greatest  good  in  the  universe,  and  that  the  only  pos- 
sibility of  obtaining  it,  even  from  one  party,  is  by  a  submission 
of  the  intellect  to  its  creed ;  would  it  not  be  as  well  to  leave 
such  a  reputation  to  take  care  of  itself,  and  use  all  exertions  to 
search  out  and  find  the  truth  ? 

Tell  a  carnal,  unregenerate  man,  it  is  said,  that  though 
God  had  physical  power  to  create  him,  he  has  not  moral  power 

0  The  writer  here  speaks  from  personal  experience. 


220  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  I, 

to  govern  him,  and  you  could  not  furnish  his  mind  with  better 
aliment  for  pride  and  rebellion.  Should  you,  after  giving  this 
lesson,  press  upon  him  the  claims  of  Jehovah,  you  might  expect 
1  o  be  answered,  as  Moses  was  by  the  proud  oppressor  of  Israel : 
"  "Who  is  the  Lord,  that  I  should  obey  his  voice  ?  "*  He  must, 
indeed,  be  an  exceedingly  carnal  man,  who  should  draw  such 
an  inference  from  the  doctrine  in  question.  But  we  should  not 
tell  him  that  "  God  had  no  moral  power  to  govern  him."  We 
should  tell  him,  that  God  could  not  control  all  his  volitions ; 
that  he  could  not  govern  him  as  a  machine  is  governed, 
without  destroying  his  free-agency ;  but  we  should  still  insist 
that  he  possessed  the  most  absolute  and  uncontrollable  power 
to  govern  him ;  that  God  can  give  him  a  perfe'ct  moral  law, 
and  power  to  obey  it,  with  the  most  stupendous  motives  for 
obedience ;  and  then,  if  he  persist  in  his  disobedience,  God 
can,  and  wrill,  shut  him  up  in  torments  forever,  that  others, 
seeing  the  awful  consequences  of  rebellion,  may  keep  their 
allegiance  to  him.  Is  this  to  deny  the  power  of  God  to  govern 
his  creatures  ? 

But  is  it  not  wonderful  that  a  Calvinist  should  undertake  to 
test  a  doctrine  by  the  consequences  which  a  "  proud  oppressor," 
or  "  a  carnal  man,"  might  draw  from  it  ?  If  we  should  tell 
such  a  man,  that  God  possesses  the  absolute  power  to  control 
his  volitions,  and  that  nothing  ever  happens  on  earth  but  in 
perfect  accordance  with  his  good  will  and  pleasure,  might  we 
not  expect  him  to  conclude,  that  he  would  then  leave  the  matter 
with  God,  and  give  himself  no  trouble  about  it? 

If  we  may  judge  from  the  practical  effect  of  doctrines,  then 
the  authors  of  the  objection  in  question  do  not  take  the  best 
method  to  inculcate  the  lesson  of  humility.  They  take  the  pre- 
cise course  pursued  by  Melancthon,  and  often  with  the  same 
success.  This  great  reformer,  it  is  well  known,  undertook  to 
frame  his  doctrine  so  as  to  teach  humility  and  submission :  with 
this  view  he  went  so  far  as  to  insist,  that  man  was  so  insignifi- 
cant a  thing,  that  he  could  not  act  at  all,  except  in  so  far  as  he 
was  acted  upon  by  the  Divine  Being.  Having  reached  this 
position,  he  not  only  saw,  but  expressly  adopted  the  conclusion, 
that  God  is  the  author  of  all  the  volitions  of  men ;  that  he  was 
the  author  of  David's  adultery  as  well  as  of  Saul's  conversion. 

0  Old  and  New  Theology,  p.  40. 


Chapter  VII. ]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  221 

Now,  it  is  true,  if  the  human  mind  could  abase  itself  so  low  as 
to  embrace  such  a  doctrine,  it  would  give  a  most  complete,  if 
not  a  most  pleasing  example  of  its  submissiveness.  But  it  can- 
not very  well  do  so.  For  even  amid  the  ruins  of  our  fallen 
nature,  there  are  some  fragments  left,  which  raise  the  intellect 
and  moral  nature  of  man  above  so  blind  and  so  abject  a 
submission  to  the  dominion  of  error.  Hence  it  was,  that 
Melancthon  himself  could  not  long  submit  to  his  own  doctrine  ; 
and  he  who  had  undertaken  to  teach  others  humility,  became 
one  of  the  most  illustrious  of  rebels.  This  suggests  the  profound 
aphorism  of  Pascal :  "  It  is  dangerous  to  make  us  see  too  much 
how  near  man  is  to  the  brutes,  without  showing  him  his  great- 
ness. It  is  also  dangerous  to  make  him  see  his  greatness  witlv- 
out  his  baseness.  It  is  still  more  dangerous  to  leave  him  igno- 
rant of  both.  But  it  is  very  advantageous  to  represent  to  him 
both  the  one  and  the  other."* 

The  fact  is,  that  nothing  can  teach  the  human  intellect  a 
genuine  submission  but  the  light  of  evidence :  this,  and  this 
alone,  can  rivet  upon  our  speculative  faculty  the  chains  of 
inevitable  conviction,  and  bind  it  to  the  truth.  Those  who 
teach  error,  then,  may  preach  humility  with  success  to  the 
blind  and  the  unthinking  ;  but  wherever  men  may  be  disposed 
to  think  for  themselves,  they  must  expect  to  find  rebels.  How 
many  at  the  present  day  have  begun,  like  Melancthon,  by  the 
preaching  of  submission,  and  ended  by  the  practice  of  rebellion 
against  their  own  doctrines.  It  is  wonderful  to  observe  the 
style  of  criticism  usually  adopted  by  the  faithful,  as  one  illus- 
trious rebel  after  another  is  seen  to  depart  from  their  ranks. 
The  moment  he  is  known  to  doubt  a  single  dogma  of  the  estab- 
lished faith,  the  awful  suspicion  is  set  afloat,  "  there  is  no  tell- 
ing where  he  will  end."  Alas !  this  is  but  too  true  ;  for  when 
a  man  has  once  discovered  that  what  he  has  been  taught  all  his 
life  to  regard  and  reverence  as  a  great  mystery,  is  in  reality  an 
absurdity  and  an  imposition  on  his  reason,  there  is  no  telling 
where  he  will  end.  The  reaction  may  be  so  great,  indeed,  as 
to  produce  an  entire  shipwreck  of  his  faith.  But  in  this  case, 
let  us  not  chide  our  poor  lost  brother  with  pride  and  presump- 
tion, as  if  we  ourselves  were  unstained  with  the  same  sin.  Let 
us  remember,  that  the  fault  may  be  partly  our  own,  as  well  as 

0  Pensees,  I.  Partie,  art.  iv,  sec.  vii. 


222  MORAL   EVIL   CONSISTENT 

his.  Let  us  remember,  that  the  sin  of  not  even  every  unwar- 
rantable innovation,  is  exclusively  imputable  to  the  innovator 
himself.  For,  as  Lord  Bacon  says,  "  A  froward  retention  of 
customs  is  a  great  innovator." 

If  those  who,  some  centuries  ago,  formed  the  various  creeds 
of  the  Christian  world,  were  fallible  men,  and  if  they  permitted 
serious  errors  to  creep  into  the  great  mass  of  religious  truth  con- 
tained in  those  creeds,  then  the  best  way  to  prevent  innovation 
is,  not  to  preach  humility  arid  submission,  but  to  bring  those 
formularies  into  a  conformity  with  the  truth.  For,  if  the  "  Old 
Theology"  be  unsound,  the  "New  Theology"  will  have  the 
audacity  to  show  itself.  And  who,  among  the  children  of  men, 
will  set  bounds  to  the  progress  of  the  human  mind,  either  in  the 
direction  of  God's  word  or  his  work,  and  say,  Hitherto  shalt 
thou  come,  and  here  shall  thy  proud  waves  be  stayed?  Who 
will  lash  the  winds  into  submission,  or  bind  the  raging  ocean  at 
his  feet? 

SECTION-  V. 
The  foregoing  treatise  may  l)e  deemed  inconsistent  with  gratitude  to  God. 

u  Such  reflections,"  it  has  been  urged,  "  afford  as  little  ground 
for  gratitude  as  for  submission.  Why  do  we  feel  grateful  to 
God  for  those  favours  which  are  conferred  on  us  by  the  agency 
of  our  fellow-men,  except  on  the  principle  that  they  are  instru- 
ments in  Ms  hand,  who,  without  '  offering  the  least  violence  to 
their  wills,  or  taking  away  the  liberty  or  contingency  of  second 
causes,'  hath  most  sovereign  dominion  over  them,  to  do  by 
them,  and  upon  them,  whatsoever  himself  pleaseth  ?  On  any 
other  ground,  they  would  be  worthy  of  the  principal,  and  He  of 
the  secondary  praise."*  True,  if  men  are  "  only  instruments  in 
Ms  hand"  we  should  give  him  all  the  praise ;  but  we  should 
never  feel  grateful  to  our  earthly  friends  and  benefactors.  As 
we  should  not,  on  this  hypothesis,  be  grateful  for  the  greatest 
benefits  conferred  on  us  by  our  fellow-men ;  so,  in  the  language 
of  Hartley,  and  Belsham,  and  Diderot,  we  should  never  resent, 
nor  censure,  the  greatest  injuries  committed  by  the  greatest 
criminals.  But  on  our  principles,  while  we  have  infinite  ground 
for  gratitude  to  God,  we  also  have  some  little  room  for  grati- 
tude to  our  fellow-men. 

0  Old  and  New  Theology. 


Chapter  VIL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  223 


vi. 

It  may  le  contended,  that  it  is  unfair  to  urge  the  preceding  difficulties  against 
the  scheme  of  necessity  ;  inasmuch  as  the  same,  or  as  great,  difficulties  at- 
tach to  the  system  of  those  by  whom  they  are  urged. 

This  is  the  great  standing  objection  with  all  the  advocates  of 
necessity.  Indeed,  we  sometimes  find  it  conceded  by  the  ad- 
vocates of  free-agency ;  of  which  concessions  the  opposite  party 
are  ever  ready  and  eager  to  avail  themselves.  In  the  statement 
of  this  fact,  I  do  not  mean  to  complain  of  a  zeal  which  all  can- 
did minds  must  acknowledge  to  be  commendable  on  the  part  of 
the  advocates  of  necessity.  It  is  a  fact,  however,  that  the  fol- 
lowing language  of  Archbishop  Whately,  in  relation  to  the 
difficulty  of  accounting  for  the  origin  of  evil,  is  often  quoted  by 
them :  "  Let  it  be  remembered,  that  it  is  not  peculiar  to  any 
one  theological  system :  let  not  therefore  the  Calvinist  or  the 
Arminian  urge  it  as  an  objection  against  their  respective  ad- 
versaries ;  much  less  an  objection  clothed  in  offensive  language, 
which  will  be  found  to  recoil  on  their  own  religious  tenets,  as 
soon  as  it  shall  be  perceived  that  both  parties  are  alike  unable 
to  explain  the  difficulty ;  let  them  not,  to  destroy  an  opponent's 
system,  rashly  kindle  a  fire  which  will  soon  extend  to  the  no 
less  combustible  structure  of  their  own." 

No  one  can  doubt  the  justice  or  wisdom  of  such  a  maxim ; 
and  it  would  be  well  if  it  were  observed  by 'all  who  may  be  dis- 
posed to  assail  an  adversary's  scheme  with  objections.  Every 
such  person  should  first  ask  himself  whether  his  objection 
might  not  be  retorted,  or  the  shaft  be  hurled  back  with  destruc- 
tive force  at  the  assailant.  But  although  tlie  remark  of  Arch- 
bishop Whately  is  both  wise  and  just,  it  is  not  altogether  so  in 
its  application  to  Archbishop  King,  or  to  other  Arminians.  For 
example,  it  is  conceded  by  Dr.  Eeid,  that  he  had  not  found 
the  means  of  reconciling  the  existence  of  moral  evil  with  the 
perfections  of  God  ;  but  is  this  any  reason  why  he  should  not 
shrink  with  abhorrence  from  the  doctrine  of  necessity  which  so 
clearly  appeared  to  him  to  make  God  the  direct  and  proper 
cause  of  moral  evil?  ""We  acknowledge,"  says  he,  "that 
nothing  can  happen  under  the  administration  of  the  Deity 
which  he  does  not  permit.  The  permission  of  natural  and  moral 
evil  is  a  phenomenon  which  cannot  be  disputed.  To  account 


2-24  MORAL   EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Parti, 

for  this  phenomenon  under  the  government  of  a  Being  of  in- 
finite goodness,  has,  in  all  ages,  been  considered  as  difficult  to 
human  reason,  whether  we  embrace  the  system  of  liberty  or 
that  of  necessity."  But  because  he  could  not  solve  this  diffi- 
oilty,  must  he  therefore  embrace,  or  at  least  cease  to  object 
against  every  absurdity  which  may  be  propounded  to  him  ? 
Because  he  cannot  comprehend  why  an  infinitely  good  Being 
should  permit  sin,  does  it  follow  that  he  should  cease  to  protest 
against  making  God  the  proper  cause  and  agent  of  all  moral 
evil  as  well  as  good?  In  his  opinion,  the  scheme  of  necessity 
does  this ;  and  hence  he  very  properly  remarks :  "  This  view  of 
the  divine  nature,  the  only  one  consistent  with  the  scheme  of 
necessity,  appears  to  me  much  more  shocking  than  the  permis- 
sion of  evil  upon  the  scheme  of  liberty.  It  is  said,  that  it  re- 
quires only  strength  of  mind  to  embrace  it :  to  me  it  seems  to 
require  much  strength  of  countenance  to  profess  it."  In  this 
sentiment  of  Dr.  Reid  the  moral  sense  and  reason  of  mankind 
will,  I  have  no  doubt,  perfectly  concur.  For  although  we  may 
not  be  able  to  clear  up  the  stupendous  difficulties  pertaining  to 
the  spiritual  universe,  this  is  no  reason  why  we  may  be  permit- 
ted to  deepen  them  into  absurdities,  and  cause  them  to  bear,  in 
the  harshest  and  most  revolting  form,  upon  the  moral  senti- 
ments of  mankind. 

The  reason  why  Dr.  Reid  and  others  could  not  remove  the 
great  difficulty  concerning  the  origin  of  evil  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
because  they  proceeded  on  the  supposition  that  God  could 
create  a  moral  system,  and  yet  necessarily  exclude  all  sin  from 
it.  This  mistake,  it  seems  to  me,  has  already  been  sufficiently 
refuted,  and  the  existence  of  moral  evil  brought  into  perfect 
accordance  and  harmony  with  the  infinite  holiness  of  God. 

But  it  is  strenuously  insisted,  in  particular,  that  the  divine 
foreknowledge  of  all  future  events  establishes  their  necessity ; 
and  thus  involves  the  advocates  of  that  sublime  attribute  in  all 
the  difficulties  against  which  they  so  loudly  declaim.  As  I 
have  examined  this  argument  in  another  place,*  I  shall  not 
dwell  upon  it  here,  but  content  myself  with  a  few  additioruil 
remarks.  The  whole  strength  of  this  argument  in  favour  of 
necessity  arises  from  the  assumption,  that  if  God  foresees  the 
future  volitions  of  men,  they  must  be  bound  together  with  other 

0  Examination  of  Edwards  on  the  Will. 


Chapter  VIL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  225 

tilings  according  to  the  mechanism  of  cause  and  effect;  that  is  to 
say  that  God  could  not  foresee  the  voluntary  acts  of  men,  unless 
they  should  be  necessitated  by  causes  ultimately  connected  with 
his  own  will.  Accordingly,  this  bold  position  is  usually  as- 
sumed by  the  advocates  of  necessity.  But  to  say  that  God 
could  not  foreknow  future  events,  unless  they  are  indissolubly 
connected  together,  seems  to  be  a  tremendous  flight  for  any 
finite  mind ;  and  especially  for  those  who  are  always  reminding 
us  of  the  melancholy  fact  of  human  blindness  and  presumption. 
Who  shall  set  limits  to  the  modes  of  knowledge  possessed  by  an 
infinite,  all-comprehending  mind?  "Who  shall  tell  how  God 
foresees  future  events  ?  Who  shall  say  it  must  be  in  this  or  that 
particular  way,  or  it  cannot  be  at  all  ? 

Let  the  necessitarian  prove  his  assumption,  let  him  make  it 
clear  that  God  could  not  foreknow  future  events  unless  they  are 
necessitated,  and  he  will  place  in  the  hands  of  the  sceptic  the 
means  of  demonstrating,  with  absolute  and  uncontrollable  cer- 
tainty, that  God  does  not  foreknow  all  future  events  at  all, 
that  he  does  not  foresee  the  free  voluntary  acts  of  the  human 
mind.  For  we  do  know,  as  clearly  as  we  can  possibly  know 
anything,  not  even  excepting  our  own  existence,  or  the  exist- 
ence of  a  God,  that  we  are  free  in  our  volitions,  that  they  are 
not  necessitated ;  and  hence,  according  to  the  assumption  in 
question,  God  could  not  foresee  them.  If  the  sceptic  could  see 
what  the  necessitarian  affirms,  he  might  proceed  from  what  he 
knows,  by  a  direct  and  irresistible  process,  to  a  denial  of  the 
foreknowledge  of  God,  in  relation  to  human  volitions. 

But  fortunately  the  assumption  of  the  necessitarian  is  not 
true.  By  the  fundamental  laws  of  human  belief,  we  know  that 
our  acts  are  not  necessitated  ;  and  hence,  we  infer  that  as  God 
foresees  them  all,  he  may  do  so  without  proceeding  from  cause 
to  effect,  according  to  the  method  of  finite  minds.  We  thus 
reason  from  the  known  to  the  unknown ;  from  the  clear  light  of 
facts  around  us  up  to  the  dark  question  concerning  the  possi- 
bility of  the  modes  in  relation  to  the  divine  prescience.  We 
would  not  first  settle  this  question  of  possibility,  we  would  not 
say  that  God  cannot  foreknow  except  in  one  particular  way, 
and  then  proceed  to  reason  from  such  a  postulate  against  the 
clearest  facts  in  the  universe.  No  logic,  and  especially  no  logic 
based  upon  so  obscure  a  foundation,  shall  ever  be  permitted  to 


226  MORAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1, 

extinguish  for  us  the  light  of  facts,  or  convert  the  universal  intel- 
ligence of  man  into  a  falsehood. 

Those  who  argue  from  foreknowledge  in  favour  of  necessity, 
usually  admit  that  there  is  neither  before  nor  after  with  God. 
This  is  emphatically  the  case  with  the  Edwardses.  Hence,  fore- 
knowledge infers  necessity  in  no  other  sense  than  it  is  inferred 
by  present  or  concomitant  knowledge.  This  is  also  freely  con- 
ceded by  President  Edwards.  In  what  sense,  then,  does  present 
knowledge  infer  necessity  ?  Let  us  see.  I  know  a  man  is  now 
walking  before  me ;  does  this  prove  that  he  could  not  help 
walking?  that  he  is  necessitated  to  walk?  It  is  plain  that  it 
infers  no  such  thing.  It  infers  the  necessary  connexion,  not 
between  the  act  of  the  man  in  walking  and  the  causes  impelling 
him  thereto,  but  between  my  knowledge  of  the  fact  and  the 
existence  of  the  fact  itself.  This  is  a  necessary  connexion 
between  two  ideas,  or  propositions,  and  not  between  two  events. 
This  confusion  is  perpetually  made  in  the  "  great  demonstra- 
tion" from  foreknowledge  in  favour  of  necessity.  It  proves 
nothing,  except  that  the  greatest  minds  may  be  deceived  and 
misled  by  the  ambiguities  of  language. 

This  argument,  we  say,  only  shows  a  necessary  connexion 
between  two  ideas  or  propositions.  This  is  perfectly  evident 
from  the  very  words  in  which  it  is  often  stated  by  the  advocates 
of  necessity.  "  I  freely  allow,"  says  President  Edwards,  "  that 
foreknowledge  does  not  prove  a  tiling  necessary  any  more  than 
after-knowledge  ;  but  the  after-knowledge,  which  is  certain  and 
infallible,  proves  that  it  is  now  become  impossible  but  that  the 
proposition  known  should  be  true."  Now,  here  we  have  a 
necessary  connexion  between  the  certain  and  infallible  knowl- 
edge of  a  thing,  and  the  infallible  certainty  of  its  existence ! 
What  has  this  to  do  with  the  question  about  the  will  ?  If  any 
man  has  ever  undertaken  to  assert  its  freedom,  by  denying  the 
necessary  connexion  between  two  or  more  ideas,  propositions, 
or  truths,  this  argument  may  be  applied  to  him ;  we  have 
nothing  to  do  with  it. 

Again:  "To  suppose  the  future  volitions  of  moral  agents," 
says  President  Edwards,  "  not  to  be  necessary  events ;  or,  which 
is  the  same  thing,  events  which  are  not  impossible  but  that  they 
may  not  come  to  pass ;  and  yet  to  suppose  that  God  certainly 
foreknows  them,  and  knows  all  things,  is  to  suppose  God's 


Chapter  VII.]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  227 

knowledge  to  be  inconsistent  with  itself.  For  to  say,  that  God 
certainly,  and  without  all  conjecture,  knows  that  a  thing  will 
infallibly  be,  which  at  the  same  time  he  knows  to  be  so  ccmtm- 
gent  that  it  may  possibly  not  be,  is  to  suppose  his  knowledge 
inconsistent  with  itself;  or  that  one  thing  he  knows  is  utterly 
inconsistent  with  another  thing  he  knows.  It  is  the  same  thing 
as  to  say,  he  now  knows  a  proposition  to  be  of  certain  infallible 
truth  which  he  knows  to  be  of  contingent  uncertain  truth." 
Now  all  this  is  true.  If  we  affirm  God's  foreknowledge  to  be 
certain  and  al  the  same  time  to  be  uncertain,  we  contradict 
ourselves.  B^t  what  has  this  necessary  connexion  between  the 
elements  of  the  divine  foreknowledge,  or  between  our  proposi- 
tions concerning  them,  to  do  with  the  necessary  connexion 
among  events  ? 

The  question  is  not  whether  all  future  events  will  cer- 
tainly come  to  pass;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  all  future 
events  are  future  events;  for  this  is  a  truism,  which  no  man  in 
his  right  mind  can  possibly  deny.  But  the  question  is,  whether 
all  future  events  will  be  determined  by  necessitating  causes,  or 
whether  they  may  not  be,  in  part,  the  free  unnecessitated  acts 
of  the  human  mind.  This  is  the  question,  and  let  it  not  be  lost 
sight  of  in  a  cloud  of  logomachy.  If  all  future  events  are 
necessitated,  then  all  past  events  are  necessitated.  But  if  we 
know  anything,  we  know  that  all  present  events  are  not  neces- 
sitated, and  hence,  all  future  events  will  not  be  necessitated. 
We  deem  it  always  safer  to  reason  thus  from  the  known  to  tfte 
unknown^  than  to  invert  the  process. 

But  suppose  that  foreknowledge  proves  that  all  human  voli- 
tions are  under  the  influence  of  causes,  in  what  sense  does  it 
leave  them  free  ?  Does  it  leave  them  free  to  depart  from  the 
influence  of  motives  ?  By  no  means.  It  would  be  a  contra- 
diction in  terms,  according  to  this  argument,  to  say  that  thej 
are  certainly  arid  infallibly  foreknown,  and  yet  that  they  may 
possibly  not  come  to  pass.  Hence,  if  the  argument  proves 
anything,  it  proves  the  absolute  fatality  of  all  human  volitions 
It  leaves  not  a  fragment  nor  a  shadow  of  m^ral  liberty  on 
earth. 

If  this  argument  prove  anything  to  the  purpose,  then  Luther 
was  right  in  declaring  that  "the  foreknowledge  of  God  is  a 
thunderbolt  to  dash  the  doctrine  of  free-will  into  atoms ;"  and 


228  MORAL   EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  i, 

Dr.  Dick  is  right  in  affirming,  "that  it  is  as  impossible  to  avoid 
them "  (our  volitions)  "  as  it  is  to  pluck  the  sun  out  of  the 
firmament."*  It  either  proves  all  the  most  absolute  necessi- 
tarian could  desire,  or  it  proves  nothing.  In  our  humble  opinion 
it:  proves  the  latter. 

On  this  point  the  testimony  of  Dr.  Dick  himself  is  explicit : 
"  Whatever  is  the  foundation  of  his  foreknowledge,"  says  ho, 
"  what  he  does  foreknow  will  undoubtedly  take  place.  Hence, 
then,  the  actions  of  men  are  as  unalterably  fixed  from  eternity, 
as  if  they  had  been  the  subject  of  an  immutable  decree"\  But 
to  dispel  this  grand  illusion,  it  should  be  remembered,  that  the 
actions  of  men  will  not  come  to  pass  because  they  are  fore- 
known; but  they  are  foreknown  because  they  will  come  to 
pass.  The  free  actions  of  men  are  clearly  reflected  back  in  the 
mirror  of  the  divine  omniscience — they  are  not  projected  forward 
from  the  engine  of  the  divine  omnipotence. 

Since  the  argument  in  question  proves  so  much,  if  it  proves 
anything,  we  need  not  wonder  that  it  was  employed  by  Cicero 
and  other  ancient  Stoics  to  establish  the  doctrine  of  an  abso- 
lute and  unconditional  fate.  "If  the  will  is  free,"  says  he, 
"  then  fate  does  not  rule  everything,  then  the  order  of  all  causes 
is  not  certain,  and  the  order  of  things  is  no  longer  certain  in 
the  prescience  of  God ;  if  the  order  of  things  is  not  certain  in 
the  prescience  of  God,  then  things  will  not  take  place  as  he 
foresees  them ;  and  if  things  do  not  take  place  as  he  foresees, 
there  is  no  foreknowledge  in  God."  Thus,  by  a  reductio  ad 
absurdum,  he  establishes  the  position  that  the  will  is  not  free, 
but  fate  rules  all  things.  Edwards  and  Dick,  however,  would 
only  apply  this  argument  to  human  volitions.  But  are  not 
the  volitions  of  the  divine  mind  also  foreknown  1  Certainly 
they  are  ;  this  will  not  be  denied.  Hence,  the  very  men  who 
set  out  to  exalt  the  power  of  God  and  abase  the  glory  of  man, 
have,  by  this  argument,  raised  a  dominion,  not  only  over  the 
power  of  man,  but  also  over  the  power  of  God  himself.  In 
other  words,  if  this  argument  proves  that  we  cannot  act  unless 
we  be  first  acted  upon,  and  impelled  to  act,  it  proves  no  less 
in  relation  to  God ;  and  hence,  if  it  show  the  weakness  and 
dependence  of  men,  it  also  shows  the  weakness  and  depend- 
ence of  God.  So  apt  are  men  to  adopt  arguments  which  defeat 

0  Theology,  vol.  i,  p.  358.  f  Ibid. 


Chapter  VIL]  WITH  THE  HOLINESS  OF  GOD.  22'J 

their  own  object,  whenever  they  have  any  other  object  than 
the  discovery  of  truth. 

It  is  frequently  said,  as  we  have  seen,  that  it  is  a  contradic- 
tion to  affirm  that  a  thing  is  foreknown,  or  will  certainly  come 
to  pass,  and  that  it  may  possibly  riot  come  to  -pass.  This  posi- 
tion is  at  least  as  old  as  Aristotle.  But  let  it  be  borne  in  mind, 
tli tit  if  this  be  a  contradiction,  then  future  events  are  placed, 
not  only  beyond  the  power  of  man,  but  also  beyond  the  power 
of  God  itself ;  for  it  is  conceded  on  all  hands,  that  God  cannot 
work  contradictions.  This  famous  argument  entirely  overlooks 
the  question  of  power.  It  simply  declares  the  thing  to  be  a 
contradiction,  and  as  such,  placed  above  all  power.  In  other 
words,  if  it  be  absurd  or  self-contradictory  to  say,  that  a  future 
event  is  foreknown,  and,  at  the  same  time,  might  not  come  to 
pass,  this  proposition  is  true  of  the  volitions  of  the  divine  no 
less  than  of  the  human  mind ;  for  they  are  all  alike  foreknown. 
That  is  to  say,  if  the  argument  from  foreknowledge  proves  that 
the  volitions  of  man  might  not  have  been  otherwise  than  they 
are,  it  proves  precisely  the  same  thing  in  regard  to  the  voli- 
tions of  God.  Thus,  if  this  argument  proves  anything  to  the 
purpose,  it  reaches  the  appalling  position  of  Spinoza,  that  noth- 
ing in  the  universe  could  possibly  be  otherwise  than  it  is.  And 
if  this  be  so,  then  let  the  Calvinist  decide  whether  he  will  join 
with  the  Pantheist  and  fatalist,  or  give  some  little  quarter  to  the 
Arminian.  Let  him  decide  whether  he' will  continue  to  em- 
ploy an  argument  which,  if  it  proves  anything,  demonstrates 
the  dependency  of  the  divine  will  as  well  as  of  the  human; 
and  instead  of  exalting  the  adorable  sovereignty  of  God,  sub- 
jects him  to  the  domini6n  of  fate. 


PAET  II. 


THE  EXISTENCE  OF  NATURAL  EVIL,  OR  SUFFERING, 
CONSISTENT  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD. 


The  path  of  sorrow,  and  that  path  alone, 

Leads  to  the  land  where  sorrow  is  unknown. 

o  o  «  o  o  o 

But  He,  who  knew  what  human  hearts  would  prore, 

How  slow  to  learn  the  dictates  of  his  love, 

That,  hard  by  nature  and  of  stubborn  will, 

A  life  of  ease  would  make  them  harder  still, 

In  pity  to  the  souls  his  grace  design'd 

For  rescue  from  the  ruin  of  mankind, 

Call'd  forth  a  cloud  to  darken  all  their  years, 

And  said,  "  Go,  spend  them  in  the  vale  of  tears/* 

COWPU. 


PART    II. 


CHAPTEK  I. 

GOD  DESIRES  AND  SEEKS  THE  SALVATION  OF  AIL  MEN. 

Love  is  the  root  of  creation, — God's  essence. 

Worlds  without  number 

Lie  in  his  bosom,  like  children :  he  made  them  for  this  purpose  only,— 

Only  to  love,  and  be  loved  again.     He  breathed  forth  his  Spirit 

Into  the  slumbering  dust,  and,  upright  standing,  it  laid  its 

Hand  on  its  heart,  and  felt  it  was  warm  with  a  flame  out  of  heaven. 

TEGNER. 

TUE  attentive  reader  has  perceived  before  this  time,  that  one  of 
the  fundamental  ideas,  one  of  the  great  leading  truths,  of  the 
present  discourse  is,  that  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contradiction 
in  terms, — an  inherent  and  utter  impossibility.  This  truth  has 
shown  us  why  a  Being  of  infinite  purity  does  not  cause  virtue 
to  prevail  everywhere,  and  at  all  times.  If  virtue  could  be 
necessitated  to  exist,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  such  a 
Being  would  cause  it  to  shine  out  in  all  parts  of  his  dominion, 
and  the  blot  of  sin  would  not  be  seen  upon  the  beauty  of  the 
world.  But  although  moral  goodness  cannot  be  necessitated  to 
exist,  yet  God  has  attested  his  abhorrence  of  vice  and  his  appro- 
bation of  virtue,  by  the  dispensation  of  natural  good  and  evil, 
of  pleasure  and  pain.  Having  marked  out  the  path  of  duty  for 
us,  he  has  made  such  a  distribution  of  natural  good  and  evil  as 
is  adapted  to  keep  us  therein.  The  evident  design  of  this  ar- 
rangement is,  as  theologians  and  philosophers  agree,  to  prevent 
the  commission  of  evil,  and  secure  the  practice  of  virtue.  The 
Supreme  Ruler  of  the  world  adopts  this  method  to  promote 
that  moral  goodness  which  cannot  be  produced  by  the  direct 
omnipotency  of  his  power. 

Hence,  it  must  be  evident,  that  although  God  desires  the 
happiness  of  his  rational  and  accountable  creatures,  he  does  not 


234  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  II, 

bestow  happiness  upon  them  without  regard  to  their  moral 
character.  The  great  dispensation  of  his  natural  providence,  as 
well  as  the  express  declaration  of  his  -word,  forbids  the  inference 
that  he  desires  the  happiness  of  those  who  obstinately  persist  in 
their  evil  courses.  If  we  may  rely  upon  such  testimony,  he 
desires  first  the  holiness  of  his  intelligent  creatures,  and  next 
their  happiness.  Hence,  it  is  well  said  by  Bishop  Butler,  thai 
the  "  divine  goodness,  with  which,  if  I  mistake  not,  we  make 
very  free  in  our  speculations,  may  not  be  a  bare,  single  disposi- 
tion to  produce  happiness^  but  a  disposition  to  make  the  g'»od, 
the  faithful,  the  honest  man  happy."* 

He  desires  the  holiness  of  all,  that  all  may  have  life.  This 
great  truth  is  so  clearly  and  so  emphatically  set  forth  in  revela- 
tion, and  it  so  perfectly  harmonizes  with  the  most  pleasing  con- 
ceptions of  the  divine  character,  that  one  is  filled  with  amaze- 
ment to  reflect  how  many  crude  undigested  notions  there  are  in 
the  minds  of  professing  Christians,  which  are  utterly  inconsist- 
ent with  it.  "  As  I  live,  saith  the  Lord  God,  I  have  no  pleasure 
in  the  death  of  the  wicked,  but  that  the  wicked  turn  from  his 
way,  and  live.  Turn  ye,  turn  ye,  for  why  will  ye  die  ?"  This 
solemn  asseveration  that  God  desires  not  the  death  of  the  sinner, 
but  that  he  should  turn  from  his  wickedness  and  live,  one  would 
suppose  should  satisfy  every  mind  which  reposes  confidence  in 
the  divine  origin  of  revelation.  And  yet,  until  the  minds  of 
men  are  purged  from  the  films  of  a  false  philosophy  and  secta- 
rian prejudice,  they  seem  afraid  to  look  at  the  plain,  obvious 
meaning  of  this  and  other  similar  passages  of  Scripture.  They 
will  have  it,  that  God  desires  the  ultimate  holiness  and  happi 
ness  of  only  a  portion  of  mankind,  and  the  destruction  of  all  the 
rest ;  that  upon  some  he  bestows  his  grace,  causing  them  to  be- 
come holy  and  happy,  and  appear  forever  as  the  monuments  of 
his  mercy ;  while  from  some  he  withholds  his  saving  grace,  that 
they  may  become  the  fearful  objects  of  his  indignation  and 
wrath.  Such  a  display  of  the  divine  character  seems  to  be 
ecpally  unknown  to  reason  and  to  revelation. 

0  Butler's  Analogy,  part  i,  chap.  iL 


Chapter!]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF   GOD.  235 


SECTION  I 

The  reason  why  theologians  have  concluded  that  God  designs  the  salxatkn  of 
only  a  part  of  mankind. 

The  reason  why  so  many  theologians  come  to  so  frightful  a 
conclusion  is,  that  they  imagine  God  could  very  easily  cause 
virtue  in  the  breast  of  every  moral  agent,  if  he  would.  Hence 
arises  in  their  minds  the  stupendous  difficulty,  "  How  can  God 
really  desire  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  all,  since  he  refuses 
to  make  all  holy  and  happy  ?  Is  he  really  in  earnest,  in  plead- 
ing with  sinners  to  turn  from  their  wickedness,  since  he  might 
so  easily  turn  them,  and  yet  will  not  do  it?  Is  the  great  God 
really  sincere  in  the  offer  of  salvation  to  all,  and  in  the  grand 
preparations  he  hath  made  to  secure  their  salvation,  since  he 
will  not  put  forth  his  mighty,  irresistible  hand  to  save  them  ?" 
Such  is  the  great  difficulty  which  has  arisen  from  the  imagina- 
tion in  question,  and  confounded  theology  for  ages,  as  well  as 
cast  a  dark  shadow  upon  the  Christian  world.  It  is  only  by 
getting  rid  of  this  unfounded  imagination,  this  false  supposition, 
that  this  stupendous  difficulty  can  be  solved,  and  the  glory  of 
the  divine  government  clearly  vindicated. 

We  have  before  us  Mr.  Symington's  able  and  plausible 
defence  of  a  limited  atonement,  in  which  he  says,  that  "  the 
event  is  the  best  interpreter  of  the  divine  intention."  Hence  he 
infers,  that  as  all  are  not  actually  saved,  it  was  not  the  design 
of  God  that  all  should  be  saved,  and  no  provision  is  really  made 
for  their  salvation.  This  argument  is  plausible.  It  is  often 
employed  by  the  school  of  theologians  to  which  the  author 
belongs,  and  employed  with  great  effect.  But  is  it  sound  ?  No 
doubt  it  has  often  been  shown  to  be  unsound  indirectly }  that 
is,  by  showing  that  the  conclusion  at  which  it  arrives  comes 
into  conflict  with  the  express  declaiations  of  Scripture,  as  well 
as  with  our  notions  of  the  perfections  of  God.  But  this  is  not 
to  analyze  the  argument  itself,  and  show  it  to  be  a  sophism. 
Nor  can  this  be  clone,  so  long  as  the  principle  from  which  the 
conclusion  necessarily  follows  be  admitted.  If  we  admit,  then, 
that  God  could  very  easily  cause  virtue  or  moral  goodness  to 
exist  everywhere,  we  must  conclude  that  "  the  event  is  the  best 
interpreter  of  the  divine  intention  ;"  and  that  the  atonement 


236  JSTATUKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

and  all  other  provisions  for  the  salvation  of  men  are  limited  in 
extent  by  the  design  of  God.  That  is  to  say,  if  we  admit  the 
premiss  assumed  by  Mr.  Symington  and  his  school,  we  cannot 
consistently  deny  their  conclusion. 

Nor  could  we  resist  a  great  many  other  conclusions  which  are 
frightful  in  the  extreme.  For  if  God  could  easily  make  all  men 
l»oly,  as  it  is  contended  he  can,  then  the  event  is  the  best  evi- 
dence of  his  real  intention  and  design.  Hence  he  really  did 
not  design  the  salvation  of  all  men.  When  he  gave  man  a  holy 
law,  he  really  did  not  intend  that  he  should  obey  and  live,  but 
that  he  should  transgress  and  die.  When  he  created  the  world, 
he  really  did  not  intend  that  all  should  reach  the  abodes  of 
eternal  bliss,  but  that  some  should  be  ruined  and  lost  forever. 
Such  are  some  of  the  consequences  which  necessarily  flow  from 
the  principle,  that  holiness  may  be  caused  to  exist  in  the  breast 
of  every  moral  agent.  This  is  not  all.  We  have  before  us 
another  book,  which  insists  that  since  the  world  was  created, 
the  law  of  God  has  never  been  violated,  because  his  will  cannot  be 
resisted.  Hence,  it  is  seriously  urged,  that  if  theft,  or  adultery, 
or  murder,  be  perpetrated,  it  must  be  in  accordance  with  the 
will  of  God,  and  consequently  no  sin  in  his  sight.  "  The  whole 
notion  of  sinning  -against  God,"  this  book  says,  "is  perfectly 
puerile."  Now  all  this  vile  stuff  proceeds  on  the  supposition, 
that  "  the  event  is  the  best  interpreter  of  the  divine  intention  ;" 
and  it  rests  upon  that  supposition  with  just  as  great  security,  as 
does  the  argument  in-  favour  of  a  limited  atonement.  Though 
we  may  well  give  such  stuff  to  the  winds,  or  trample  it  under 
foot  with  infinite  scorn,  as  an  outrage  against  the  moral  senti- 
ments of  mankind  ;  yet  we  cannot  meet  it  on  the  arena  of  logic, 
if  we  concede  that  holiness  may  be  everywhere  caused  to  exist, 
and  universal  obedience  to  the  divine  will  secured. 

The  only  principle,  it  clearly  seems  to  us,  on  which  we  can 
reconcile  such  glaring  discrepancies  between  the  express  will 
of  God  and  the  event,  is,  that  the  event  is  of  such  a  nature  that 
it  is  not  an  object  of  power,  or  cannot  be  caused  to  exist  by  the 
Divine  Omnipotence.  For  his  "  secret  will,"  or  rather  his  exe- 
cutive will,  is  always  in  perfect  harmony  with  his  revealed 
will.  It  is  from  an  inattention  to  the  foregoing  principle,  that 
theologians  have  not  been  able  to  see  and  vindicate  the  sincerity 
of  God,  in  the  offer  of  salvation  to  all  men.  We  have  examined 


Chapter!.]  WITH   THE   GOODNESS   OF  GOD.  237 

their  efforts  to  remove  this  difficulty,  and  been  constrained  to 
agree  with  Dr.  Dick,  that  "  we  may  pronounce  these  attempts 
to  reconcile  the  universal  call  of  the  gospel  with  the  sincerity 
of  God,  to  be  a  faint  struggle  to  extricate  ourselves  from  the 
profundities  of  theology."  But  on  looking  into  those  solutions 
again,  in  which  for  some  years  we  found  a  sort  of  rest,  we  could 
clearly  perceive  why  theology  had  struggled  in  vain  to  deliver 
itself  from  its  profound  embarrassments  on  this  subject,  as  well 
as  on  many  others.  These  solutions  admit  the  very  principle 
which  necessarily  creates  the  difficulty,  and  renders  a  satis- 
factory answer  impossible.  Discard  this  false  principle,  substi- 
tute the  truth  in  its  stead,  and  the  sincerity  of  God  will  come 
out  from  every  obscurity,  and  shine  with  unclouded  splendour. 


SECTION  II. 

The  attempt  of  IToioe  to  reconcile  the  eternal  ruin  of  a  portion  of  mankind 
with  the  sincerity  of  God  in  his  endeavours  to  save  them. 

To  illustrate  the  justness  of  the  remark  just  made,  we  shall 
select  that  solution  of  the  difficulty  in  question  which  has  been 
deemed  the  most  profound  and  satisfactory.  We  mean  the  solu- 
tion of  "the  wonderful  Howe."*  This  celebrated  divine  clearly 
saw  the  impossibility  of  reconciling  the  sincerity  of  God  with  the 
offer  of  salvation  to  all,  on  the  supposition  that  he  does  anything 
to  prevent  the  salvation,  or  promote  the  ruin  of  those  who  are 
finally  lost.  He  rejects  the  scheme  of  necessity,  or  a  concur- 
rence of  the  divine  will,  in  relation  to  the  sinful  volitions  of 
men,  as  aggravating  the  difficulty  which  he  had  undertaken  to 
solve.  This  was  one  great  step  towards  a  solution.  But  it  still 
remained  to  "  reconcile  God's  prescience  of  the  sins  of  men  with 
the  wisdom  and  sincerity  of  his  counsels,  exhortations,  and 
whatsoever  means  he  uses  to  prevent  them."  Let  us  see  how 
he  has  succeeded  in  his  attempt  to  accomplish  this  great  object. 

He  admits  in  this  very  attempt,  "  that  the  universal,  continued 
rectitude  of  all  intelligent  creatures  had,  we  may  be  sure,  been 
willed  with  a  peremptory,  efficacious  will,  if  it  had  been  best." 
He  expressly  says,  that  God  might  have  prevented  sin  from 

°  Robert  Hall,  a  profound  admirer  of  Howe,  has  pronounced  his  attempt  to 
reconcile  the  sincerity  of  God  with  the  universal  offer  of  salvation,  to  be  one  of 
his  great  master-pieces  of  thought  and  reasoning. 


238  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

raising  its  head  in  his  dominions,  if  he  had  chosen  to  do  so. 
"  Nor  was  it  less  easy,"  says  he,  "  by  a  mighty,  irresistible  hand, 
universally  to  expel  sin,  than  to  prevent  it."  Now,  having 
made  this  concession,  was  it  possible  for  him  to  vindicate  the 
sincerity  and  wisdom  of  God  in  the  use  of  means  to  prevent  sin 
which  he  foresaw  must  fail  to  a  very  great  extent? 

After  having  made  such  an  admission,  or  rather  after  having 
assumed  such  a  position,  we  think  it  may  be  clearly  shown  that 
the  author  was  doomed  to  fail ;  and  that  he  has  deceived  him- 
self by  false  analogies  in  his  gigantic  efforts  to  vindicate  the 
character  of  God.  He  says,  for  example :  "  We  will,  for  dis- 
course's sake,  suppose  a  prince  endowed  with  the  gift  or  spirit 
of  prophecy.  This  most  will  acknowledge  a  great  perfection, 
added  to  whatsoever  other  of  his  accomplishments.  And  sup- 
pose this  his  prophetic  ability  to  be  so  large  as  to  extend  to 
most  events  which  fall  out  in  his  dominions.  Is  it  hereby 
become  unfit  for  him  to  govern  his  subjects  by  laws,  or  any 
way  admonish  them  of  their  duty  ?  Hath  this  perfection  so 
much  diminished  him  as  to  depose  him  from  his  government? 
It  is  not,  indeed,  to  be  dissembled,  that  it  were  a  difficulty  to 
determine,  whether  such  foresight  were,  for  himself,  better  or 
worse.  Boundless  knowledge  seems  only  in  a  fit  conjunction 
with  an  unbounded  power.  But  it  is  altogether  unimaginable 
that  it  should  destroy  his  relation  to  his  subjects ;  as  what  of 
it  were  left,  if  it  should  despoil  him  of  his  legislative  power  and 
capacity  of  governing  according  to  laws  made  by  it  ?  And  to 
bring  back  the  matter  to  the  Supreme  Ruler :  let  it  for  the 
present  be  supposed  only,  that  the  blessed  God  hath,  belonging 
to  his  nature,  the  universal  prescience  whereof  we  are  discours- 
ing ;  we  will  surely,  upon  that  supposition,  acknowledge  it  to 
belong  to  him  as  a  perfection.  And  were  it  reasonable  to  affirm, 
that  by  a  perfection  he  is  disabled  from  government  ?  or  wrere 
it  a  good  consequence,  '  He  foreknows  all  things — lie  is  therefore 
unfit  to  govern  the  world?'  r 

This  way  of  representing  the  matter,  it  must  be  confessed,  is 
exceedingly  plausible  and  taking  at  first  view ;  but  yet,  if  we 
examine  it  closely,  we  shall  find  that  it  does  not  touch  the  real 
knot  of  the  difficulty.  The  cases  are  not  parallel.  The  prince 
is  endowed  with  a  foreknowledge  of  offences,  which  it  is  not  in 
his  power  wholly  to  prevent.  Hence  it  may  be  perfectly  con- 


Chapter  I.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  239 

sistent  with  his  wisdom  and  sincerity,  to  use  all  the  means  in 
his  power  to  prevent  them,  though  he  may  see  they  will  fail  in 
some  cases,  while  they  will  succeed  in  others.  But  God,  accord- 
ing to  the  author,  might  prevent  all  sin,  or  exclude  it  all  from 
his  dominions  by  "his  mighty,  irresistible  hand."  Hence  it 
may  not  be  consistent  with  his  wisdom  and  sincerity  to  use 
means  which  he  foresees  will  have  only  partial  success,  when 
he  might  so  easily  obtain  universal  and  perfect  success.  It 
seems  evident,  then,  that  this  is  a  deceptive  analogy.  It  over- 
looks the  root,  and  grapples  with  the  branches  of  the  difficulty. 
Let  it  be  seen,  that  no  power  can  cause  the  universal,  continued 
moral  rectitude  of  intelligent  creatures,  and  then  the  two  cases 
will  be  parallel ;  and  God  may  well  use  all  possible  means  to 
prevent  sin  and  cause  holiness,  though  some  of  his  subjects 
may  resist  and  perish.  Let  this  principle,  which  we  have 
laboured  to  establish,  be  seen,  and  then  may  we  entirely  dispel 
the  cloud  which  has  so  long  seemed  to  hang  over  the  wisdom 
arid  sincerity  of  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  world.  We  might 
offer  strictures  upon  other  passages  of  the  solution  under  con- 
sideration ;  but  as  the  same  error  runs  through  all  of  them,  the 
reader  may  easily  unravel  its  remaining  obscurities  and  embar- 
rassments for  himself. 

If  holiness  cannot  be  caused  by  a  direct  application  of  power, 
it  follows  that  there  is  no  want  of  wisdom  in  the  use  of  indirect 
means,  or  of  sincerity  in  the  use  of  the  most  efficacious  means 
the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit :  but  if  universal  holiness  may 
be  caused  to  exist  by  a  mere  word,  then  indeed  it  seems  to  be 
clearly  inconsistent  with  wisdom  to  resort  to  means  which  must 
fail  to  secure  it,  and  with  sincerity  to  utter  the  most  solemn 
and  vehement  asseverations  that  it  is  the  will  of  God  to  secure 
it;  for  how  obvious  is  the  inquiry,  If  he  so  earnestly  desire  it, 
and  can  so  easily  secure  it,  why  does  he  not  do  it? 

In  rejecting  the  principle  for  which  we  contend,  Howe  has  paid 
the  usual  penalty  of  denying  the  truth  ;  that  is,  he  has  contra- 
dicted himself.  "  It  were  very  unreasonable  to  imagine,"  says 
he,  "  that  God  cannot,  in  any  case,  extraordinarily  oversway 
the  inclinations  and  determine  the  will  of  such  a  creature,  in  a 
way  agreeable  enough  to  its  nature,  (though  we  particularly 
know  not,  and  we  are  not  concerned  to  know,  or  curiously  to 
inquire  in  what  way,)  and  highly  reasonable  to  suppose  that  in 


240  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

many  cases  lie  doth."  Here  he  affirms,  that  onr  wills  may  be 
overruled  and  determined  in  perfect  conformity  to  our  natures, 
in  some  way  or  other,  though  we  know  not  how.  Why,  then, 
does  not  God  so  overrule  our  wills  in  all  cases,  and  secure  the 
existence  of  universal  holiness  ?  Because,  says  he,  "  it  is  mani- 
fest to  any  sober  reason,  that  it  were  very  incongruous  this 
should  be  the  ordinary  course  of  his  conduct  to  mankind,  or  the 
same  persons  at  all  times  ;  that  is,  that  the  whole  order  of  intel- 
ligent creatures  should  be  moved  only  by  inwrard  impulses ; 
that  God' 8  precepts,  promises,  and  com.minations,  whereof  their 
nature  is  capable,  should  be  all  made  impertinences,  through 
his  constant  overpowering  those  that  should  neglect  them  ;  that 
the  faculties,  whereby  men  are  capable  of  moral  government, 
should  be  rendered  to  this  purpose,  useless  and  vain  •  and  that 
they  should  be  tempted  to  expect  to  be  constantly  managed 
as  mere  machines  that  know  not  their  own  use" 

What  strange  confusion  and  self-contradiction!  The  wills 
of  men  may  be,  and  often  are,  swayed  by  the  mighty,  irresist- 
ible hand  of  God,  and  in  a  way  agreeable  to  their  nature  •  and 
yet  this  is  not  done  in  all  cases,  lest  men  should  be  governed 
as  mere  machines  !  The  laws,  promises,  and  threatenings  of 
God,  are  not  to  be  rendered  vain  and  useless  in  all  cases,  but 
only  in  some  cases !  Indeed,  if  we  would  escape  such  incon- 
sistencies and  self-contradictions,  we  must  return  to  the  position 
that  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contradiction  in  terms, — that  no 
power  can  cause  it.  From  this  position  we  may  clearly  see, 
that  the  laws,  promises,  and  comminations ;  the  counsels,  ex- 
hortations, and  influences  of  God,  which  are  employed  to  pre- 
vent sin,  are  not  a  system  of  grand  impertinences, — are  not  a 
vast  and  complicated  machinery  to  accomplish  what  might  be 
more  perfectly,  easily,  and  directly  accomplished  without  them. 
We  may  see,  that  God  really  desires  the  holiness  and  happiness 
of  all  men,  although  some  may  be  finally  lost;  that  he  is  in 
earnest  in  the  great  work  of  salvation  ;  and  when  he  so  solemnly 
declares  that  he  has  no  pleasure  in  the  death  of  the  sinner,  but 
would  rather  he  should  turn  and  live,  he  means  precisely  what 
he  says,  without  the  least  equivocation  or  mental  reservation. 
This  position  it  is,  then,  which  shows  the  goodness  of  God  in 
unclouded  glory,  and  reconciles  his  sincerity  with  the  final 
result  of  his  labours. 


Chapter!.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  241 

But  we  have  not  yet  got  rid  of  every  shade  of  difficulty.  For 
it  may  still  be  asked,  why  God  uses  means  to  save  those  who 
he  foresees  will  be  lost  ?  why  he  should  labour  when  he  foresees 
his  labour  will  be  in  vain?  To  this  we  answer,  that  it  does  not 
follow  his  labour-  will  be  in  vain,  because  some  may  be  pleased 
to  rebel  and  perish.  This  would  be  the  case  in  regard  to  such 
j  ersons,  provided  his  only  object  in  what  he  does  be  to  save 
them  ;  but  although  this  is  one  great  end  and  aim  of  his  agency, 
it  doos  not  follow  that  it  is  his  only  object.  For  if  any  perish, 
it  is  certainly  desirable  that  it  be  from  their  own  fault,  and  not 
from  the  neglect  of  God  to  provide  them  with  the  means  of  sal- 
vation. It  is  his  object,  as  he  tells  us,  to  vindicate  his  own 
character,  and  to  stop  every  mouth  in  regard  to  the  lost,  as  well 
as  to  save  the  greatest  possible  number.  But  this  object  could 
not  be  accomplished,  if  some  should  be  permitted  to  perish 
without  even, a  possibility  of  salvation.  Hence  he  gives  to  all 
the  means,  power,  and  opportunity  to  turn  and  live ;  and  this 
fact  is  nearly  always  alluded  to  in  relation  to  the  finally  impeni- 
tent and  lost.  Thus  says  our  Saviour,  with  tears  of  commiser- 
ation and  pity :  "  O  Jerusalem,  Jerusalem,  how  often  would  I 
have  gathered  thy  children  together,  even  as  a  hen  gathereth 
her  chickens  under  her  wings,  and  ye  would  not!  Behold,  your 
house  is  left  unto  you  desolate."  Now  the  tears  of  the  Redeemer 
thus  wept  over  lost  souls,  and  this  eloquent  vindication  of  his 
own  and  his  Father's  goodness  and  compassion,  would  be  a 
perfect  mockery,  if  salvation  had  never  been  placed  within 
their  reach,  or  if  their  obedience,  their  real  spiritual  obedience 
and  submission,  might  have  been  secured.  But  as  it  is,  there 
is  not  even  the  shadow  of  a  ground  for  suspecting  the  sincerity 
o1  the  Redeemer,  or  his  being  in  earnest  in  the  great  work  of 
saving  souls. 

Again  the  impenitent  are  addressed  in  the  following  awful 
language:  "Turn  ye  at  my  reproof:  behold,  I  will  pour  out 
my  spirit  upon  you,  I  will  make  known  my  words  unto  you. 
Because  I  have  called,  and  ye  refused ;  I  have  stretched  out 
my  hand  and  no  man  regarded ;  but  ye  have  set  at  naught  all 
my  counsel  and  would  none  of  my  reproof:  I  also  will  laugh  at 
your  calamity:  I  will  mock  when  your  fear  cometh."  Thus 
the  proceeding  of  the  Almighty,  in  the  final  rejection  of  the 
impenitent,  is  placed  on  the  ground,  that  they  had  obstinately 

16 


242  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part ill, 

resisted  the  means  employed  for  their  salvation.  This  seems  to 
remove  every  shade  of  difficulty.  But  how  dark  and  enigmati- 
cal, nay,  how  self-contradictory,  would  all  such  language  appear, 
if  they  might  have  been  very  easily  rendered  holy  and  happy  ! 
Thus,  by  bearing  in  mind  that  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contra- 
diction, an  absurd  and  impossible  conceit,  the  goodness  of  God 
is  vindicated  in  regard  to  the  lost,  and  his  sincerity  is  evinced 
in  the  offer  of  salvation  to  all. 


SECTION  III. 

The  mews  of  Luther  and   Calvin  respecting  the  sincerity  of  God  in  his 
endeavours  to  save  tJiose  who  will  finally  perish. 

On  any  other  principle,  we  must  forever  struggle  in  vain  to 
accomplish  so  desirable  and  so  glorious  an  object.  If  we  pro- 
ceed on  the  assumption  that  holiness  may  be  very  easily  caused 
by  an  omnipotent,  extraneous  agency,  we  shall  never  be  able  to 
vindicate  the  sincerity  of  the  Almighty,  in  the  many  solemn 
declarations  put  forth  by  him  that  he  desires  the  salvation  of 
all  men.  The  only  sound,  logical  inference  for  such  premises, 
is  that  drawn  by  Luther,  namely,  that  when  God  exhorts  the 
sinner,  who  he  foresees  will  remain  impenitent,  to  turn  from  his 
wickedness  and  live,  he  does  so  merely  in  the  way  of  mockery 
and  derision;  just  "as  if  a  father  were  to  say  to  his  child, 
'  Come,'  while  he  knows  that  he  cannot  come."* 

The  representation  which  Calvin,  starting  from  the  same 
point  of  view,  gives  of  the  divine  character,  is  not  more  amiable 
or  attractive  than  that  of  Luther.  He  maintains  that  "the 
most  perfect  harmony"  exists  between  these  two  things  :  "God's 
having  appointed  from  eternity  on  whom  he  will  bestow  his 
favour  and  exercise  his  wrath,  and  his  proclaiming  salvation 
indiscriminately  to  all."f  But  how  does  he  maintain  this  posi- 
tion ?  How  does  he  show  this  agreement  ?  "  There  is  more 
apparent  plausibilit}^"  says  he,  "to  the  objection  [against  pre- 
destination] from  the  declaration  of  Peter,  that  i  the  Lord  is  not 
willing  that  any  should  perish,  but  that  all  should  come  to 
repentance.'  But  the  second  clause  furnishes  an  immediate 
solution  of  the  difficulty ;  for  the  willingness  to  come  to  repent 

0  Hagenbach's  History  of  Doctrines,  vol.  ii,  p.  259. 
f  Institutes,  book  iii,  chap,  xxiv,  sec.  xvii. 


Chapter  1.1  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  248 

ance  must  be  understood  in  consistence  with  the  general  tenor  of 
Scripture."*  Now  what  is  the  general  tenor  of  Scripture,  which 
is  to  overrule  this  explicit  declaration  that  "  God  is  not  willing 
that  any  should  perish  ?"  The  reader  will  be  surprised,  perhaps, 
that  it  is  not  Scripture  at  all,  but  the  notion  that  God  might 
easily  convert  the  sinner  if  he  would.  "  Conversion  is  certainly 
in  the  power  of  God ;"  he  adds,  "  let  him  be  asked,  whether  he 
wills  the  conversion  of  all,  when  he  promises  a  few  individuals 
to  give  them  l  a  heart  of  flesh,'  while  he  leaves  them  with  '  a 
heart  of  stone.' "  Thus  the  very  clearest  light  of  the  divine 
word  is  extinguished  by  the  application  of  a  false  metaphysics. 
God  tells  us  that  he  "  is  not  willing  that  any  should  perish :" 
Calvin  tells  us,  that  this  declaration  must,  in  conformity  with 
the  general  tenor  of  Scripture,  be  so  understood  as  to  allow  us 
to  believe  that  he  is  not  only  willing  that  many  should  perish, 
but  also  that  their  destruction  is  preordained  and  forever  fixed 
by  an  eternal  and  immutable  decree  of  God.  Nay,  that  they 
are,  and  were,  created  for  the  express  purpose  of  being  devoted 
to  death,  spiritual  and  eternal.  Is  this  to  interpret,  or  to  refute 
the  divine  word  ? 

The  view  which  Calvin,  from  this  position,  finds  himself 
bound  to  take  of  the  divine  character,  is  truly  horrible,  arid 
makes  one's  blood  run  cold.  The  call  of  the  gospel,  he  admits, 
is  universal — is  directed  to  the  reprobate  as  well  as  to  the  elect ; 
but  to  what  end,  or  with  what  design,  is  it  directed  to  the 
former?  "He  directs  his  voice  to  them,"  if  we  may  believe 
Calvin,  "but  it  is  that  they  may  become  more  deaf;  he 
kindles  a  light,  but  it  is  that  they  may  be  made  more  blind ;  he 
publishes  his  doctrine,  but  it  is  that  they  may  be  more  besotted  ; 
he  applies  a  remedy,  but  it  is  that  they  may  not  be  healed. 
John,  citing  this  prophecy,  declares  that  the  Jews  could  not 
believe,  because  the  curse  of  God  was  upon  them.  Nor  can  it  be 
disputed,  that  to  such  persons  as  God  determines  not  to  enlighten, 
he  delivers  his  doctrine  involved  in  enigmatical  obscurity,  that 
its  only  effect  may  be  to  increase  their  stupidity. "f 

In  conclusion,  we  would  add  that  it  is  this  idea  of  a  necessi- 
tated holiness  which  gives  apparent  solidity  to  the  arguments 
of  the  Calvinist,  and  which  neutralizes  the  attacks  of  their  op- 
ponents. To  select  only  one  instance  out  of  a  thousand:  the 

0  Institutes,  book  iii,  chap,  xxiv,  sec.  xvi.  f  Id.,  sec.  xiii. 


244  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  |Part  IT. 

Calvinist  insists  that  if  God  had  really  intended  the  salvation  of 
all  men,  then  all  would  have  been  saved  ;  since  nothing  lies  be- 
yond the  reach  of  his  omnipotence.  To  this  the  Arminian 
cries  out  with  horror,  that  if  God  does  not  desire  the  salvation 
of  all,  but  is  willing  that  a  portion  should  sin  and  be  eternally 
lost,  then  his  goodness  is  limited,  and  his  glory  obscured.  In 
perfect  conformity  with  these  views,  the  one  contends  for  a 
limited  atonement,  insisting  that  it  is  confined  either  in  its  origi- 
nal design,  or  in  its  application,  to  a  certain,  fixed,  definite  num- 
ber of  mankind :  while  the  other  maintains,  with  equal  earnest- 
ness, that  such  is  the  goodness  of  God  that  he  has  sent  forth 
his  Son  to  make  an  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world. 
To  design  and  prepare  it  for  all,  says  the  Calvinist,  and  then 
apply  it  only  to  a  few,  is  not  consistent  with  either  the  wisdom 
or  goodness  of  God  ;  and  that  he  does  savingly  apply  it  only  to 
a  small  number  of  the  human  race  is  evident  from  the  fact  that 
only  a  small  number  are  actually  saved.  However  the  doctrine 
of  a  limited  atonement,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing  in  effect,  the 
limited  application  of  the  atonement,  may  be  exclaimed  against 
and  denounced  as  dishonourable  to  God,  all  must  and  do  admit 
the  fact,  that  it  is  efficaciously  applied  to  only  a  select  portion 
of  mankind ;  which  is  to  deny  and  to  admit  one  and  the  same 
thing  in  one  and  the  same  breath. 

Now,  in  this  contest  of  arms,  it  is  our  humble  opinion  that 
each  party  gets  the  better  of  the  other.  Each  overthrows  the 
other;  but  neither  perceives  that  he  is  himself  overthrow!. 
Hence,  though  each  demolishes  the  other,  neither  is  convinced, 
and  the  controversy  still  rages.  Nor  can  there  ever  be  an  end 
of  this  wrangling  and  jangling  while  the  arguments  of  the  op- 
posite parties  have  their  roots  in  a  common  error.  Let  the 
work  of  Mr.  Symington,  or  any  other  which  advocates  a  limited 
atonement,  be  taken  up,  its  argument  dissected,  and  let  the 
false  principle,  that  God  could  easily  make  all  men  holy  if  he 
would,  be  eliminated  from  them,  and  we  venture  to  predict 
that  they  will  lose  all  appearance  of  solidity,  and  resolve  them- 
selves into  thin  air.* 

0  We  do  not  intend  to  investigate  the  subject  of  a  limited  atonement  in  the  pres- 
ent work,  because  it  is  merely  a  metaphysical  off-shoot  from  the  doctrine  of  elec- 
tion and  reprobation,  and  must  stand  or  fall  with  the  parent  trunk.  The  strength 
of  this  we  purpose  to  try  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  245 


CHAPTER  H. 

NATURAL  EVIL,  OR  SUFFERING,  AND  ESPECIALLY  THE  SUFFERING  OF  INFANTS 
RECONCILED  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD. 

Sweet  Eden  was  the  arbour  of  delight ; 
Yet  in  his  lovely  flowers  our  poison  blew : 
Sad  Gethsemane,  the  bower  of  baleful  night, 
Where  Christ  a  health  of  poison  for  us  drew  ; 
Yet  all  our  honey  in  that  poison  grew : 
So  we  from  sweetest  flowers  could  suck  our  bane, 
And  Christ,  from  bitter  venom,  could  again 
Extract  life  out  of  death,  and  pleasure  out  of  pain. 

GILES  FLETCHER. 

IF,  as  we  have  endeavoured  to  show,  a  necessary  holiness  is  a 
contradiction  in  terms,  then  the  existence  of  natural  evil  may 
be  easily  reconciled  with  the  divine  goodness,  in  so  far  as  it 
may  be  necessary  to  punish  and  prevent  moral  evil.  Indeed, 
the  divine  goodness  itself  demands  the  punishment  of  moral 
evil,  in  order  to  restrain  its  prevalence,  and  shut  out  the  dis- 
orders it  tends  to  introduce  into  the  moral  universe.  Nor  is  it 
any  impeachment  of  the  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God, 
if  the  evils  inflicted  upon  the  commission  of  sin  be  sufficiently 
great  to  answer  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  intended — that 
is,  to  stay  the  frightful  progress  and  ravages  of  moral  evil. 
Hence  it  was  that  the  sin  of  one  man  brought  "  death  into  the 
world,  and  all  our  woe."  Thus  the  good  providence  of  God,  no 
less  than  his  word,  speaks  this  tremendous  lesson  to  his  intelli- 
gent creatures :  "  Behold  the  awful  spectacle  of  a  world  lying 
in  ruins,  and  tremble  at  the  very  thought  of  sin !  A  thousand 
deaths  are  not  so  terrible  as  one  sin !" 

SECTION  I. 
All  suffering  not  a  punishment  for  sin. 

We  should  not  conclude  from  this,  however,  that  all  suffering 
or  natural  evil  bears  the  characteristic  of  a  punishment  for 
moral  evil.  This  seems  to  be  a  great  mistake  of  certain  theo- 
logians, who  pay  more  attention  to  the  coherency  of  their  system 
than1  to  the  light  of  nature  or  of  revelation.  Thus,  says  Dr. 


246  NATURAL   EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II» 

Dick :  "  If  our  antagonists  will  change  the  meaning  of  words, 
they  cannot  alter  the  nature  of  things.  Pain  and  death  are 
evils,  and  when  inflicted  by  the  hand  of  a  just  God,  must  ~be 
punishments :  for  although  the  innocent  may  "be  harassed  and 
destroyed  by  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  human  power,  none  but 
die  guilty  suffer  under  his  administration.  To  pretend  that, 
although  death  and  other  temporal  evils  have  come  upon  us 
through  the  sin  of  Adam,  yet  these  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  a 
punishment,  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  to  say, — they  mast 
not  be  called  a  punishment,  because  this  would  not  agree  with 
our  system.  If  we  should  concede  that  they  are  a  punishment, 
we  should  be  compelled  to  admit  that  the  sin  of  the  first  man  is 
imputed  to  his  posterity,  and  that  he  was  their  federal  head. 
AYe  deny,  therefore,  that  the  labours  and  sorrows  of  the  present 
life,  the  loss  of  such  joys  as  are  left  to  us  at  its  close,  and  the 
dreadful  agonies  and  terrors  with  which  death  is  often  attended, 
have  the  nature  of  a  penalty.  In  like  manner,  a  man  may  call 
black  white,  and  bitter  sweet,  because  it  will  serve  his  purpose ; 
but  he  would  be  the  veriest  simpleton  who  should  believe 
him." 

Now,  we  do  not  deny  that  the  agonies  and  terrors  of  death 
are  sometimes  a  punishment  for  sin :  this  is  the  case  in  regard 
to  all  those  who  actually  commit  sin,  and  sink  into  the  grave 
amid  the  horrors  of  a  guilty  conscience.  But  the  question  is, 
Do  suffering  and  death  never  fall  upon  the  innocent  under  the 
administration  of  God  ?  We  affirm  that  they  do ;  and  also  that 
they  may  fall  upon  the  innocent,  in  perfect  accordance  with  the 
infinite  goodness  of  God.  In  the  first  place,  we  reply  to  the 
confident  assertions  of  Dr.  Dick,  and  of  the  whole  school  to 
which  he  belongs,  as  follows :  To  pretend  that  death  and  other 
temporal  evils  are  always  punishments,  is  neither  more  nor  less 
than  to  say,  "they  must  be  called  punishments,  because  this 
would  agree  with  our  system.  If  we  should  concede  that  they 
are  not  a  punishment,  we  should  be  compelled  to  admit  that 
the  sin  of  the  first  man  is  not  imputed  to  his  posterity,  and  that 
he  was  not  their  federal  head.  If  our  antagonists,"  &c.  Surely 
it  is  not  very  wise  to  use  language  which  may  be  so  easily 
retorted. 

Secondly,  it  is  true,  the  change  of  a  word  cannot  alter  the 
nature  of  things  ;  but  it  may  alter,  and  very  materially  too,  our 


Chapter  I L]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  247 

view  of  tlie  nature  of  things.  Besides,  if  to  refuse  to  call  suf- 
fering in  certain  cases  a  punishment,  be  merely  to  change  a 
word,  why  should  so  great  an  outcry  be  made  about  it  ?  Why 
may  we  not  use  that  word  which  sounds  the  most  pleasantly  to 
the  ear,  and  sits  the  most  easily  upon  the  heart  ? 

Thirdly,  we  do  not  arbitrarily  and  blindly  reject  the  term 
punishment,  "because  it  does  not  agree  with  our  system." 
We  not  only  reject  the  term,  but  also  the  very  idea  and  the 
thing  for  which  it  stands.  We  mean  to  affirm,  that  the  inno- 
cent do  sometimes  suffer  under  the  administration  of  God ;  and 
that  all  suffering  is  not  a  punishment  for  sin.  The  very  idea  of 
punishment,  according  to  Dr.  Dick  himself,  is,  that  it  is  suffer- 
ing inflicted  on  account  of  sin  in  the  person  upon  whom  it  is 
inflicted ;  and  hence,  wherever  pain  or  death  falls  under  the 
administration  of  God,  we  must  there  find, says  he,  either  actual 
or  imputed  sin.  Now,  in  regard  to  certain  cases,  we  deny  both 
the  name  and  the  thing.  And  we  make  this  denial,  as  it  will 
be  seen,  not  because  it  agrees  with  our  system  merely,  but 
because  it  agrees  with  the  universal  voice  and  reason  of  man 
kind,  except  where  that  voice  has  been  silenced,  and  that  rea- 
son perverted,  by  dark  and  blindly-dogmatizing  schemes  of 
theology. 

Fourthly,  there  is  a  vast  difference,  in  reality,  between  regard- 
ing some  sufferings  as  mere  calamities,  and  all  suffering  as  pun- 
ishment. If  we  regard  all  suffering  as  punishment,  then  we 
need  look  no  higher  and  no  further  in  order  to  vindicate  the 
character  of  God  in  the  infliction  of  them.  For,  according  to 
this  view,  they  are  the  infliction  of  his  retributive  justice, 
merited  by  the  person  upon  whom  they  fall,  and  adapted  to 
prevent  sin  ;  and  consequently  here  our  inquiries  may  termin- 
ate;  just  as  when  we  see  the  criminal  receive  the  penalty  due 
to  his  crimes.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  may  not  view  all  suf- 
fering as  punishment,  then  must  we  seek  for  other  grounds  and 
principles  on  which  to  vindicate  the  goodness  of  God;  then 
must  we  look  for  other  ends,  or  final  causes,  of  suffering  under 
the  wise  economy  of  divine  providence.  And  this  search,  as 
we  shall  see,  will  lead  us  to  behold  the  moral  government  of 
the  world,  not  as  it  is  darkly  distorted  in  certain  systems  of 
theology,  but  as  it  is  in  itself,  replete  with  light  and  ineffable 
beauty. 


'248  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  |Part  II, 

But  before  we  undertake  to  show  this  by  direct  arguments, 
let  vis  pause  and  consider  the  predicament  to  which  the  greatest 
divines  have  reduced  themselves,  by  their  advocacy  of  such  an 
imputation  of  the  sin  of  one  man.  Dr.  Dick  affirms,  as  we  have 
seen,  that  every  evil  brought  upon  man  under  the  good  provi- 
dence of  God,  must  be  a  punishment  for  sin  ;  and  hence,  as 
'nfants  do  not  actually  sin,  they  are  exposed  to  divine  wrath  on 
account  of  the  sin  of  Adam,  which  is  imputed  to  them.  But  is 
not  this  imputation,  which  draws  after  itself  pain  and  death, 
also  an  evil?  How  has  it  happened,  then,  that  in  the  good 
providence  of  God,  this  tremendous  evil,  this  frightful  source  of 
so  many  evils,  has  been  permitted  to  fall  on  the  infant  world  ? 
Must  there  not  be  some  other  sin  imputed  to  justify  the  inflic- 
tion of  such  an  evil,  and  so  on  ad  infinitiim  ?  Will  Dr.  Dick 
carry  out  his  principle  to  this  consequence  ?  Will  he  require,  as 
in  consistency  he  is  bound  to  require,  that  the  tremendous  evil  of 
the  imputation  of  sin  shall  not  fall  upon  any  part  of  God's  cre- 
ation, except  as  a  punishment  for  some  antecedent  guilt  ?  No, 
indeed  :  at  the  very  second  step  his  great  principle,  so  con- 
fidently and  so  dogmatically  asserted,  completely  breaks  down 
under  him.  The  imposition  of  this  evil  is  justified,  not  by  any 
antecedent  guilt,  but  by  the  divine  constitution,  according  to 
which  Adarn  is  the  federal  head  and  representative  of  the 
human  race.  Tims,  after  all,  Dr.  Dick  has  found  some  princi- 
ple or  ground  on  which  to  justify  the  infliction  of  evil,  beside 
the  principle  of  guilt  or  ill-desert.  Might  there  not  possibly  be, 
then,  such  a  divine  constitution  of  things,  as  to  bring  suffering 
upon  the  offspring  of  Adam  in  consequence  of  his  sin,  without 
resorting  to  the  dark  and  enigmatical  fiction  of  the  imputation 
of  his  transgression  ?  If  there  be  a  divine  constitution,  as  Dr 
Dick  contends  there  is,  which  justifies  the  imputation  of  moral 
evil,  with  all  its  frightful  consequences,  both  temporal  and  eter- 
nal death,  may  it  not  be  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  to 
suppose  a  divine  constitution  to  justify  suffering  without  the 
imputation  of  sin  ?  How  can  the  one  of  these  things  be  so 
utterly  repugnant  to  the  divine  character,  and  the  other  so  per- 
fectly agreeable  to  it  ?  Until  this  question  be  answered,  we 
may  suspect  the  author  himself  of  having  assumed  positions 
and  made  confident  assertions,  "  because  they  agree  with  his 
system." 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  249 

"  We  say,  then,"  says  Dr.  Dick,  "  that  by  his  sin  his  posterity 
oecame  liable  to  the  punishment  denounced  against  himself. 
They  became  guilty  through  his  guilt,  which  is  imputed  to  them, 
or  placed  to  their  account ;  so  that  they  are  treated  as  if  they 
had  personally  broken  the  covenant."  Thus  all  the  posterity 
of  Aclam,  not  excepting  infants,  became  justly  obnoxious  to  the 
"penalty  of  the  covenant  of  works, — death,  temporal,  spiritual, 
and  eternal."  Now,  we  would  suppose  that  this  scheme  of 
imputation  is  attended  with  at  least  as  great  a  difficulty  as  the 
doctrine  that  the  innocent  do  sometimes  suffer  under  the  good 
providence  of  God.  Indeed,  the  author  does  not  deny  that  it  is 
attended  wTith  difficulties,  which  have  never  been  answered. 
In  regard  to  the  imputation  of  sin,  he  says :  "  Candour  requires 
me  to  add,  that  we  are  not  competent  fully  to  assign  the  reasons 
of  this  dispensation.  After  the  most  mature  consideration  of 
the  subject,  it  appears  mysterious  that  God  should  have  placed 
our  first  parent  in  such  circumstances,  that,  while  he  might 
insure,  he  might  forfeit,  his  own  happiness  and  that  of  millions 
of  beings  who  were  to  spring  from  his  loins.  We  cannot  tell 
why  he  adopted  this  plan  with  us  and  not  with  angels,  each  of 
whom  wras  left  to  stand  or  fall  for  himself."*  Now,  when  it 
is  affirmed  that  the  innocent  may  suffer  for  wise  and  good  pur- 
poses, why  is  all  this  candour  and  modesty  forgotten  ?  Why  is 
it  not  admitted,  "  It  may  be  so  ;"  "  We  cannot  tell  ?"  Why 
is  the  fact,  of  which  these  writers  so  often  and  so  eloquently 
remind  us,  that  the  human  intellect  is  a  poor,  blind,  weak  thing, 
quite  unfit  to  pry  into  mysteries,  then  sunk  in  utter  oblivion, 
and  a  tone  of  confident  dogmatism  assumed?  Why  not  act 
consistently  with  the  character  of  the  sceptic  or  the  dogmatist, 
and  not  put  on  the  one  or  the  other  by  turns,  according  to  the 
exigencies  of  a  system  ? 

If  we  ask,  why  infants  are  exposed  to  death,  we  are  told,  that 
it  is  a  punishment  for  Adam's  sin  imputed  to  them.  We  are 
told  that  this  must  be  so ;  since  "  none  but  the  guilty  ever 
suffer  under  the  administration  of  God,"  who  is  not  an  arbi- 
trary and  cruel  tyrant  to  cause  the  innocent  to  suffer.  Why 
then,  we  ask,  does  he  impute  sin  to  them?  To  this  it  is  replied, 
"We  cannot  tell."  No  wonder;  for  if  there  must  always  be 
antecedent  guilt  to  justify  God  in  imposing  evil  upon  his  sub- 

9  Lectures  on  Theology,  vol.  i,  p.  458. 


250  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

jects,  then  there  can  be  no  reason  for  such  a  dispensation  for 
imposing  the  tremendous  evil  of  the  imputation  of  sin.  The 
aivocates  of  it  themselves  have  laid  down  a  principle,  which 
shows  it  to  be  without  a  reason.  Hence  they  may  well  say, 
"  We  cannot  tell."  Thus  suffering  is  justified  by  the  imputation 
of  guilt ;  the  imputation  of  guilt  by  the  divine  constitution : 
and  the  divine  constitution,  by  nothing !  If  this  is  all  that  c^n 
be  done,  would  it  not  have  been  just  as  well  to  have  begun,  as 
well  as  ended,  in  the  divine  constitution  of  things  ?  But,  no ! 
even  the  most  humble  of  men  must  have  some  explanation, 
some  little  mitigation  of  their  difficulties,  if  it  be  only  to  place 
the  world  upon  the  back  of  an  elephant,  the  elephant  upon  the 
back  of  a  tortoise,  and  the  tortoise  upon  nothing. 

It  seems  to  be  inconceivably  horrible  to  Dr.  Dick,  and  others 
of  his  school,  that  the  innocent  should  ever  be  made  to  suffer 
under  the  providence  of  God ;  but  yet  they  earnestly  insist  that 
the  same  good  providence  plunges  the  whole  human  race — in- 
fants and  all — into  unavoidable  guilt,  and  then  punishes  them 
for  it !  To  say  that  the  innocent  may  be  made  to  suffer  is  mon- 
strous injustice — is  horrible  ;  but  to  say  that  they  are  made  sin- 
ners, and  then  punished,  is  all  right  and  proper!  To  say  that 
the  innocent  can  suffer  under  the  administration  of  God,  is  to 
shock  our  sense  of  justice,  and  put  out  the  light  of  the  divine 
goodness  ;  but  it  is  all  well  if  we  only  say  that  the  punishment 
due  to  Adam's  sin  is  made,  by  the  same  good  administration,  to 
fall  upon  all  his  posterity  in  the  form  of  moral  evil,  and  that 
then  they  are  justly  punished  for  this  punishment !  Ala?,  that 
the  minds  of  the  great  and  the  good,  born  to  reflect  the  light  of 
the  glorious  gospel  of  God  upon  a  darkened  world,  should  be  so 
sad.1  y  warped,  so  awfully  distorted,  by  the  inexorable  necessities 
of  a  despotic  system ! 

SECTION  II. 
The  imputation  of  sin  not  consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God. 

This  point  has  been  already  indirectly  considered,  but  it  is 
worthy  of  a  more  direct  and  complete  examination.  It  is  very 
remarkable  that  although  Dr.  Dick  admits  he  cannot  reconcile 
the  scheme  of  imputation  with  the  character  of  God,  or  remove 
its  seeming  hardships,  not  to  say  cruelty,  lie  yet  positively 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  251 

affirms  that  "  it  is  a  proof  of  the  goodness  of  God."*  Surely,  if 
the  covenant  of  works,  involving  the  imputation  of  sin,  as  ex- 
plained by  Dr.  Dick,  be  a  "proof  of  the  divine  goodness,"  it 
cannot  but  appear  to  be  too  severe.  But  as  this  point,  on  which 
lie  scarcely  dwells  at  all,  is  more  elaborately  and  fully  discussed 
by  President  Edwards,  we  shall  direct  our  attention  to  him. 

"It  is  objected,"  says  Edwards,  "that  appointing  Adam  to 
stand  in  this  great  affair  as  the  moral  head  of  his  posterity,  and 
so  treating  them  as  one  with  him,  is  injurious  to  them."  "To 
which,"  says  he,  "  I  answer,  it  is  demonstrably  otherwise ;  that 
such  a  constitution  was  so  far  from  being  injurious  to  Adam's 
posterity  any  more  than  if  every  one  had  been  appointed  to 
stand  for  himself  personally,  that  it  was,  in  itself  considered, 
attended  with  a  more  eligible  probability  of  a  happy  issue  than 
the  latter  would  have  been ;  and  so  is  a  constitution  that  truly 
expresses  the  goodness  of  its  Author."  Now,  let  us  see  how  this 
is  demonstrated. 

"  There  is  a  greater  tendency  to  a  happy  issue  in  such  an  ap- 
pointment," says  he,  "  than  if  every  one  had  been  appointed  to 
stand  for  himself ;  especially  on  these  accounts :  (1.)  That  Adam 
had  stronger  motives  to  watchfulness  than  his  posterity  wrould 
have  had  ;  in  that,  not  only  his  own  eternal  welfare  lay  at  stake, 
but  also  that  of  all  his  posterity.  (2.)  Adam  was  in  a  state  of 
complete  manhood  when  his  trial  began. "f  In  the  first  place, 
then,  the  constitution  for  which  Edwards  contends  is  "  an  ex- 
pression of  the  divine  goodness,"  because  it  presented  stronger 
motives  to  obedience  than  if  it  had  merely  suspended  the  eternal 
destiny  of  Adam  alone  upon  his  conduct.  The  eternal  welfare 
of  his  posterity  was  staked  upon  his  obedience ;  and,  having 
this  stupendous  motive  before  him,  he  would  be  more  likely  to 
preserve  his  allegiance  than  if  the  motive  had  been  less  power- 
ful. The  magnitude  of  the  motive,  says  Edwards,  is  the  grand 
circumstance  which  evinces  the  goodness  of  God  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  such  a  constitution.  If  this  be  true,  it  is  very  easy  to 
see  how  the  Almighty  might  have  made  a  vast  improvement  in 
his  own  constitution  for  the  government  of  the  world.  He 
might  have  made  the  motive  still  stronger,  and  thereby  made 
the  appointment  or  covenant  still  better :  instead  of  suspending 
merely  the  eternal  destiny  of  the  human  race  upon  the  conduct 

0  Lectures  on  Theology,  p.  453.  f  Edwards's  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  548. 


252  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  H, 

of  Adam,  he  might  have  staked  the  eternal  fate  of  the  universe 
upon  it.  According  to  the  argument  of  Edwards,  what  a  vast, 
what  a  wonderful  improvement  would  this  have  been  in  the 
divine  constitution  for  the  government  of  the  world,  and  how 
much  more  conspicuously  would  it  have  displayed  the  goodness 
of  its  Divine  Author! 

Again,  the  scheme  of  Edwards  is  condemned  out  of  his  own 
mouth.  If  this  scheme  be  better  than  another,  because  its  mo- 
tives are  stronger,  why  did  not  God  render  it  still  more  worthy 
of  his  goodness,  by  rendering  its  motives  still  more  powerful 
and  efficacious?  Edwards  admits,  nay,  he  insists,  that  God 
might  easily  have  rendered  the  motives  of  his  moral  govern- 
ment perfectly  efficacious  and  successful.  He  repeatedly  de- 
clares that  God  could  have  prevented  all  sin,  "  by  giving  such 
influences  of  his  Spirit  as  would  have  been  absolutely  effectual 
to  hinder  it."  If  the  goodness  of  a  constitution,  then,  is  to  be 
determined  by  the  strength  of  its  motives,  as  the  argument  of 
Edwards  supposes,  then  we  are  bound,  according  to  his  princi- 
ples, to  pronounce  that  for  which  he  contends  unworthy  of  the 
goodness  of  God,  as  being  radically  unsound  and  defective. 
This  is  emphatically  the  case,  as  the  Governor  of  the  world 
might  have  strengthened  the  motives  to  obedience  indefinitely, 
not  by  augmenting  the  danger,  but  by  increasing  the  security 
of  his  subjects;  that  is  to  say,  not  by  making  the  penalty  more 
terrific,  but  by  giving  a  greater  disposition  to  obedience. 

The  same  thing  may  be  clearly  seen  from  another  point  of 
view.  Let  us  suppose,  for  instance,  that  God  had  established 
the  constitution  or  covenant,  that  if  Adam  had  persevered  in 
obedience,  then  all  his  posterity  should  be  confirmed  in  holi- 
ness and  happiness;  and  that  if  he  fell,  he  should  fall  for  him- 
self alone.  Would  not  such  an  appointment,  we  ask,  have  been 
more  likely  to  have  been  attended  with  a  happy  issue  than 
that  for  which  Edwards  contends?  Let  us  suppose  again,  that 
after  such  a  constitution  had  been  established,  its  Divine  Author 
had  really  secured  the  obedience  of  Adam ;  wrould  not  this 
have  made  a  "  happy  issue  "  perfectly  certain  ?  Why  then  was 
not  such  a  constitution  established?  It  would  most  assuredly 
have  been  an  infinitely  clearer  and  more  beautiful  expression 
of  the  divine  goodness  than  that  of  Edwards.  Hence,  the  phi- 
losophy of  Edwards  easily  furnishes  an  unspeakably  better  con- 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  253 

stitution  for  the  government  of  the  world,  than  that  which  haa 
been  established  by  the  wisdom  of  God !  Is  it  not  evident,  that 
the  advocates  of  such  a  scheme  should  never  venture  before  the 
tribunal  of  reason  at  all  ?  Is  it  not  evident,  that  their  only  safe 
policy  is  to  insist,  as  they  sometimes  do,  that  we  do  not  know 
what  is  consistent,  or  inconsistent,  with  the  attributes  of  God, 
in  his  arrangements  for  the  government  of  the  world  ?  Is  it 
not  evident,  that  their  truest  wisdom  is  to  be  found  in  habitually 
dwelling  on  the  littleness,  weakness,  misery,  and  darkness  of 
the  human  mind,  and  in  rebuking  its  arrogance  for  presuming 
to  pry  into  the  mysteries  of  their  system  ? 

The  vindication  of  the  divine  goodness  by  Edwards,  is,  we 
think  it  must  be  conceded,  exceedingly  weak.  All  it  amounts 
to  is  this, — that  this  scheme  is  an  expression  of  the  goodness  of 
God,  because,  in  certain  respects,  it  is  better  than  a  scheme 
which  might  have  been  established.  So  far  from  showing  it  to 
be  the  best  possible  scheme,  his  philosophy  shows  it  might  be 
greatly  improved  in  the  very  respects  in  which  its  excellency  is 
supposed  to  consist.  In  other  words,  he  contends  that  God  has 
displayed  his  goodness  in  the  appointment  of  such  a  constitu- 
tion, on  the  ground  that  he  might  have  made  a  worse ;  though, 
according  to  his  own  principles,  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  he 
might  have  made  a  better !  Is  this  to  express,  or  to  deny,  the 
absolute,  infinite  goodness  of  God  ?  Is  it  to  manifest  the  glory 
of  that  goodness  to  the  eye  of  man,  or  to  shroud  it  in  clouds  and 
darkness  ? 

Edwards  also  says,  that  "  the  goodness  of  God  in  such  a  con- 
stitution with  Adam  appears  in  this :  that  if  there  had  been  no 
sovereign,  gracious  establishment  at  all,  but  God  had  proceeded 
on  the  basis  of  mere  justice,  and  had  gone  no  farther  than  this 
required,  he  might  have  demanded  of  Adam  and  all  his  pos- 
terity, that  they  should  have  performed  perfect,  perpetual  obedi- 
ence" The  italics  are  all  his  own.  On  this  passage,  we  have 
to  remark,  that  it  is  built  upon  unfounded  assumptions.  It  is 
frequently  sa'd,  we  are  aware,  that  if  it  had  not  been  for  the 
redemption  of  the  world  by  a  "sovereign,  gracious"  dispensation, 
the  whole  race  of  man  might  have  been  justly  exposed  to  the 
torments  of  hell  forever.  But  where  is  the  proof?  Is  it  found 
in  the  word  of  God  ?  This  tells  us  what  is,  what  has  been,  and 
what  will  l>e  •  but  it  is  not  given  to  speculate  upon  what  might 


254  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

be.  For  aught  we  know,  if  there  had  been  no  salvation  through 
Christ,  as  a  part  of  the  actual  constitution  and  system  of  the 
world,  then  there  would  have  been  no  other  part  of  that  system 
whatever.  We  are  not  told,  and  we  do  not  know,  what  it  would 
have  been  consistent  with  the  justice  of  God  to  do  in  relation 
to  the  world,  if  there  had  been  no  remedy  provided  for  its 
restoration.  Perhaps  it  might  never  have  been  created  at  all. 
The  work  of  Christ  is  the  great  sun  and  centre  of  the  system  as 
it  is  •  and  if  this  had  never  been  a  part  of  the  original  grand 
design,  we  do  not  know  that  the  planets  would  have  been  created 
to  wander  in  eternal  darkness.  We  do  not  know  that  even  the 
justice  of  God  would  have  created  man,  and  permitted  him  to 
fall,  wandering  everlastingly  amid  the  horrors  of  death,  with- 
out hope  and  without  remedy.  We  find  nothing  of  the  kind  in 
the  word  of  God ;  and  in  our  nature  it  meets  with  no  response, 
except  a  wail  of  unutterable  horror.  We  like  not,  we  confess, 
those  vindications  of  God's  goodness,  which  consist  in  drawing 
hideous,  black  pictures  of  his  justice,  and  then  telling  us  that  it 
is  not  so  dark  as  these.  We  want  not  to  know  whether  there 
might  not  be  darker  things  in  the  universe  than  God's  love ;  we 
only  want  to  know  if  there  could  be  anything  brighter,  or 
better,  or  more  beautiful. 

The  most  astounding  feature  of  this  vindication  of  the  divine 
goodness  still  remains  to  be  noticed.  We  are  told  that  the  con- 
stitution in  question  is  good,  because  it  was  so  likely  to  have 
had  a  "  happy  issue."  And  when  this  constitution  was  estab- 
lished by  the  sovereign  will  and  pleasure  of  God,  the  conduct 
of  Adam,  it  is  conceded,  was  perfectly  foreseen  by  him.  At 
the  very  time  this  constitution  was  established,  its  Divine  Author 
foresaw  with  perfect  absolute  certainty  what  would  be  the  issue. 
He  knew  that  the  great  federal  head,  so  appointed  by  him, 
would  transgress  the  covenant,  and  bring  down  the  curse  of 
"  death,  temporal,  spiritual,  and  eternal,"  upon  all  his  posterity. 
O,  wonderful  goodness !  to  promise  eternal  life  to  the  human 
race  on  a  condition  which  he  certainly  foreknew  would  not  be 
performed!  Amazing  grace!  to  threaten  eternal  death  to  all 
mankind,  on  a  condition  which  he  certainly  foreknew  would  be 
fulfilled ! 

This  cannot  be  evaded,  by  asserting  that  the  same  difficulty 
attaches  to  the  fact,  that  God  created  Adam  foreseeing  he 


Chapter  II. J  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  255 

would  fall.  His  foreknowledge  did  not  necessitate  the  fall  of 
Adam.  It  left  him  free  as  God  had  created  him.  Life  and 
death  were  set  before  him,  and  he  had  the  power  to  stand,  as 
well  as  the  power  to  fall.  He  had  no  right  to  complain  of  God, 
then,  if,  under  such  circumstances,  he  chose  to  rebel,  and  incur 
the  penalty.  But  if  the  scheme  of  Edwards  be  true,  the 
descendants  of  Adam  did  not  have  their  fate  in  their  own 
hands.  It  did  not  depend  on  their  own  choice.  It  was  necessi 
tatud,  even  prior  to  their  existence,  by  the  divine  constitution 
which  had  indissolubly  connected  their  awful  destiny,  their 
temporal  and  eternal  ruin,  with  an  event  already  foreseen. 
And  the  constitution  binding  such  awful  consequences  to  an 
event  already  foreseen,  is  called  an  expression  of  the  goodness 
of  God ! 

Suppose,  for  example,  that  a  great  prince  should  promise  his 
subjects  that  on  the  happening  of  a  certain  event,  over  which 
they  had  no  control,  he  would  confer  unspeakable  favours  upon 
them.  Suppose  also,  that  at  the  same  time  he  should  declare 
to  them,  that  if  the  event  should  not  happen,  he  would  load 
them  with  irons,  cast  them  into  prison,  and  inflict  the  greatest 
imaginable  punishments  upon  them  during  the  remainder  of 
their  lives.  Suppose  again,  that  at  the  very  time  he  thus  made 
known  his  gracious  intentions  to  them,-  he  knew  perfectly  well 
that  the  event  on  which  his  favour  was  suspended  would  not 
happen.  Then,  according  to  his  certain  foreknowledge,  the 
event  fails,  and  the  penalty  of  the  covenant  or  appointment  is 
inflicted  upon  his  subjects  : — they  are  cast  into  prison  ;  they  are 
bound  in  chains,  and  perpetually  tormented  with  the  greatest 
of  all  imaginable  evils : — not  because  they  had  transgressed  the 
appointment  or  sovereign  constitution,  but  because  an  event 
had  taken  place  over  which  they  had  no  control.  Now,  who 
would  call  such  a  ruler  a  good  prince?  Who  could  conceive, 
indeed,  of  a  more  cruel  or  deceitful  tyrant  ?  But  we  submit  it 
to  the  candid  reader,  if  he  be  not  more  like  the  prince  of  pre- 
destination, than  the  great  God  of  heaven  and  earth  ? 

Tins  scheme  of  imputation,  so  far  from  being  an  expression 
of  infinite  goodness,  were  indeed  an  exhibition  of  the  most 
frightful  cruelty  and  injustice.  It  would  be  a  useful,  as  well  as 
a  most  curious  inquiry,  to  examine  the  various  contrivances  of 
ingenious  men,  in  order  to  bring  the  doctrine  of  imputation 


256  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  jPart  II, 

into  harmony  with  the  justice  of  God.  We  shall  briefly  allude 
to  only  two  of  these  wonderful  inventions, — those  of  Augustine 
and  Edwards.  Neither  of  these  celebrated  divines  supposed 
that  a  foreign  sin,  properly  so  called,  is  ever  imputed  to  any 
one  ;  but  that  the  sin  of  Adam,  which  is  imputed  to  his  descend- 
ants, is  their  own  sin,  as  well  as  his.*  But  here  the  question 
arises,  How  could  they  make  Adam's  sin  to  be  the  sin  of  his 
descendants,  many  of  whom  were  born  thousands  of  years  after 
it  was  committed  ? 

Augustine,  as  is  well  known,  maintained  the  startling  paradox, 
that  all  mankind  were  present  in  Adam,  and  sinned  in  him. 
In  this  way,  he  supposed  that  all  men  became  partakers  in  the 
guilt  of  Adam's  sin,  and  consequently  justly  liable  to  the 
penalty  due  to  his  transgression.  Augustine  was  quite  too 
good  a  logician  not  to  perceive,  that  if  all  men  are  responsible 
for  Adam's  sin,  because  they  were  in  him  when  he  transgressed, 
then,  it  follows,  that  we  are  also  responsible  for  the  sins  of  all 
our  ancestors,  from  whom  we  are  more  immediately  descended. 
This  follows  from  that  maxim  of  jurisprudence,  from  that  dic- 
tate of  common-sense,  that  a  rule  of  law  is  coextensive  with  the 
reason  upon  which  it  is  based.  Hence,  as  Wiggers  remarks : 
"  Augustine  thought  it  not  improbable  that  the  sins  of  ancestors 
universally  are  imputed  to  their  descendants."!  This  conclu- 
sion is  clearly  set  forth  in  the  extracts  made  by  the  translator 
of  Wiggers4  If  this  scheme  be  true,  we  know  indeed  that  we 
are  all  guilty  of  Adam's  sin ;  but  who,  or  how  many  of  the 
human  race,  were  the  perpetrators  of  Cain's  murder  beside  him- 
self, we  cannot  determine.  Indeed,  if  this  frightful  hypothesis 
be  well  founded,  if  it  form  a  part  of  the  moral  constitution  of 
the  world,  no  man  can  possibly  tell  how  many  thefts,  murders, 
or  treasons,  he  may  have  committed  in  his  ancestors.  One 
thing  is  certain,  however,  and  that  is,  that  the  man  who  is  born 
later  in  the  course  of  time,  will  have  the  more  sins  to  answer 
for,  and  the  more  fearful  will  be  the  accumulation  of  his  guilt ; 
as  all  the  transgressions  of  all  his  ancestors,  from  Adam  down 
to  his  immediate  parents,  will  be  laid  upon  his  head. 

Clearly  as  this  consequence  is  involved  in  the  fundamental  prin- 

0  Edwards  on  Original  Sin,  part  iv,  chap,  iii,  p.  543. 

f  Encheir.,  c.  46,  47.     See  also  remarks  by  the  American  editor  and  translator. 

J  See  p.  284. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  257 

ciple  of  Augustine's  theory,  the  good  father  could  not  but  reel 
and  stagger  under  it.  "  Respecting  the  sins  of  the  other  parents," 
says  he,  "  the  progenitors  from  Adam  down  to  one's  own  imme- 
diate father,  it  may  not  improperly  be  debated,  whether  the 
child  is  implicated  in  the  evil  acts  and  multiplied  original  faults 
of  all,  so  that  each  one  is  the  worse  in  proportion  as  he  is  later ; 
or  that,  iii  respect  to  the  sins  of  their  parents,  God  threatens 
posterity  to  the  third  and  fourth  generation,  because,  by  tJie 
moderation  of  his  compassion,  he  does  not  further  extend  his 
anger  in  respect  to  the  faults  of  progenitors,  lest  those  on  wrhom 
the  grace  of  regeneration  is  not  conferred,  should  be  pressed 
with  too  heavy  a  burden  in  their  own  eternal  damnation,  if 
they  were  compelled  to  contract  by  way  of  origin  (originaliter) 
the  sins  of  all  their  preceding  parents  from  the  commence- 
ment of  the  human  race,  and  to  suffer  the  punishment  due  to 
them.*  Whether,  on  so  great  a  subject,  anything  else  can  or 
cannot  be  found,  by  a  more  diligent  reading  and  scrutiny  of  the 
Scriptures,  I  dare  not  hastily  affirm. "f 

Thus  does  the  sturdy  logician,  notwithstanding  his  almost  in- 
domitable hardihood,  seem  to  stand  appalled  before  the  conse- 
quences to  which  his  principles  would  inevitably  conduct  him. 
Having  followed  those  principles  but  a  little  way,  the  scene 
becomes  so  dark  with  his  representations  of  the  divine  justice, 
that  he  feels  constrained  to  retrace  his  steps,  and  arbitrarily  in- 
troduce the  divine  mercy,  in  order  to  mitigate  the  indescribable 
horrors  which  continually  thicken  around  him.  Such  hesitation, 
such  wavering  and  inconsistency,  is  the  natural  result  of  every 
scheme  which  places  the  decisions  of  the  head  in  violent  con- 
flict with  the  indestructible  feelings  of  the  heart. 

In  his  attempt  to  reconcile  the  scheme  of  imputation  with  the 
justice  of  God,  Edwards  has  met  with  as  little  success  as  Augus- 
tine. For  this  purpose,  he  supposed  that  God  had  constituted 
an  identity  between  Adam  and  all  his  posterity,  whereby  the 
latter  became  partakers  of  his  rebellion.  "  i  think  it  would  go 

0  If  God,  out  of  tne  abundance  of  his  compassion,  imputes  the  sins  of  parents 
only  to  the  third  or  fourth  generation,  how  has  it  happened  that  Adam's  trans- 
gression is  imputed  to  all  his  posterity,  and  punished  throughout  all  generations? 
Is  there  any  consistency,  or  harmony,  in  such  views  respecting  the  government 
Of  the  world  ? 

1  VViggers's  Presentation,  note  by  translator,  p.  285. 

17 


258  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

far  toward  directing  us  to  the  more  clear  conception  and  right 
statement  of  this  affair,"  says  he,  in  reference  to  imputation, 
"  were  we  steadily  to  bear  this  in  mind,  that  God,  in  every  step 
of  his  proceedings  with  Adam,  in  relation  to  the  covenant  or 
constitution  established  with  him,  looked  on  his  posterity  as 
being  one  with  him.  And  though  he  dealt  more  immediately 
with  Adam,  it  yet  was  as  the  head  of  the  whole  body,  and  the 
root  of  the  whole  tree ;  and  in  his  proceedings  with  him,  he 
dealt  with  all  the  branches  as  if  they  had  been  then  existing  in 
their  root.  From  which  it  will  follow,  that  both  guilt,  or  ex- 
posedness  to  punishment,  and  also  depravity  of  heart,  came 
upon  Adam's  posterity  just  as  they  came  upon  him,  as  much  as 
if  he  and  they  had  all  coexisted,  like  a  tree  with  many  branches ; 
allowing  only  for  the  difference  necessarily  resulting  from  the 
place  Adam  stood  in  as  head  or  root  of  the  whole.  Otherwise, 
it  is  as  if,  in  every  step  of  proceeding,  every  alteration  in  the 
root  had  been  attended  at  the  same  instant  with  the  same  altera- 
tion throughout  the  whole  tree,  in  each  individual  branch.  I 
think  this  will  naturally  follow  on  the  supposition  of  their  being 
a  constituted  oneness  or  identity  of  Adam  and  his  posterity  in 
this  affair."*  As  the  sap  of  a  tree,  Edwards  has  said,  spreads 
from  the  root  of  a  tree  to  all  its  branches,  so  the  original  sin  of 
Adam  descends  from  him  through  the  generations  of  men. 

In  the  serious  promulgation  of  such  sentiments,  it  is  only  for- 
gotten that  sin  is  not  the  sap  of  a  tree,  and  that  the  whole 
human  race  is  not  really  one  and  the  same  person.  Such  an 
idea  of  personal  identity  is  as  utterly  unintelligible  as  the  nature 
of  the  sin  and  the  responsibility  with  which  it  is  so  intimately 
associated.  Surely  these  are  the  dark  dreams  of  men,  not  the 
bright  and  shining  lights  of  eternal  truth. 

Before  we  lake  leave  of  President  Edwards,  we  would  re- 
mark, that  he  proceeds  on  the  same  supposition  with  Calvin,f 
Bates,;);  Dwight,§  Dick,  and  a  host  of  others,  that  suffering  is 
always  a  punishment  of  sin,  and  of  "sin  in  them  who  suffer."] 
"  The  light  of  nature,"  says  Edwards,  "  or  tradition  from  ancient 
revelation,  led  the  heathen  to  conceive  of  death  as  in  a  peculiar 
manner  an  evidence  of  divine  vengeance.  Thus  we  have  au 

0  Edwards  on  Original  Sin,  part  iv,  ch.  iii.          f  Institutes,  book  ii,  ch.  i. 

1  Divine  Attributes.  §  Sermon  on  Original  Sin. 
||  Original  Sin,  part  i,  ch.  ii. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF   GOD.  259 

account,  that  when  the  barbarians  saw  the  venomous  beast 
hang  on  Paul's  hand,  they  said  among  themselves,  '  ~No  doubt, 
this  man  is  a  murderer,  whom,  though  he  hath  escaped  the 
seas,  yet  vengeance  suffereth  not  to  live.'  "*  We  think  that 
the  barbarians  concluded  rashly :  it  is  certain  that  St.  Paul  was 
neither  a  murderer  nor  a  god.  Nor,  indeed,  if  the  venomous 
beast  had  taken  his  life,  would  this  have  proved  him  to  be  a 
murderer,  any  more  than  its  falling  off  into  the  fire  proved  him 
to  be  a  god,  according  to  the  rash  judgment  of  the  barbarians. 
Tli ere  is  a  better  source  of  philosophy,  if  we  mistake  not,  than 
the  rash,  hasty,  foolish  judgments  of  barbarians. 

SECTION  III. 

The  imputation  of  sin  not  consistent  with  human,  much  less  with  the  divine 

goodness. 

There  are  few  persons  whose  feelings  will  allow  them  to  be 
consistent  advocates  of  the  doctrine  of  the  imputation  of  Adam's 
sin.  "  To  many  other  divines,"  says  Bishop  Burnet,  "  this  seems 
a  harsh  and  inconceivable  opinion :  it  seems  repugnant  to  the 
justice  and  goodness  of  God  to  reckon  men  guilty  of  sin  which 
they  never  committed,  and  to  punish  them  in  their  souls  eter- 
nally for  that  which  is  no  act  of  theirs."f  It  certainly  "  seems 
very  hard,"  as  the  author  says,  "  to  apprehend  how  persons  who 
have  never  sinned,  but  are  only  unhappily  descended,  should  be, 
in  consequence  of  that,  under  so  great  a  misery,"  But  how  to 
escape  the  pressure  of  this  stupendous  difficulty  is  the  question. 
There  are  many  who  cannot  endure  it ;  or  rather,  there  are  very 
few  who  can  endure  it ;  but,  as  Bishop  Burnet  says,  they  find 
no  difficulty  in  the  idea  of  temporal  punishment  on  account  of 
Adam's  sin.  "This,  they  think,  is  easily  enough  reconcilable 
with  the  notions  of  justice  and  goodness,  since  this  is  only  a 
temporary  punishment  relating  to  men's  persons.''^.  But  do 
they  not  sacrifice  their  logic  to  their  feelings?  Let  us  see. 

This  view  of  a  limited  imputation,  and  a  limited  punishment, 
i&  not  confined  to  the  Church  of  England.  It  prevails  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent  in  all  denominations.  But  President 
Edwards  has,  we  think,  unanswerably  exposed  the  inconsistency 

0  Original  Sin,  part  i,  ch.  ii. 

j  Exposition  of  the  Thirty-nine  Articles,  article  ix,  J  Ibid. 


200  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

of  its  advocates.  "  One  of  them  supposes,"  says  he,  "  that  this 
sin,  though  truly  imputed  to  INFANTS,  so  that  thereby  they  are 
exposed  to  a  proper  punishment,  yet  is  not  imputed  to  them  in 
such  a  degree,  as  that  upon  this  account  they  should  be  liable 
to  eternal  punishment,  as  Adam  himself  was,  but  only  to  tem- 
poral death,  or  annihilation;  Adam  himself,  the  immediate 
actor,  being  made  infinitely  more  guilty  of  it  than  his  posterity. 
On  which  I  would  observe,  that  to  suppose  God  imputes,  not 
all  the  guilt  of  Adam,  but  only  some  little  part  of  it,  relieves 
nothing  but  his  imagination.  To  think  of  poor  little  infants 
bearing  such  torments  for  Adam's  sin,  as  they  sometimes  do  in 
this  world,  and  these  torments  ending  in  death  and  annihila- 
tion, may  sit  easier  on  the  imagination,  than  to  conceive  of  their 
suffering  eternal  misery  for  it ;  but  it  does  not  at  all  relieve 
one's  reason.  There  is  no  rule  of  reason  that  can  be  supposed 
to  lie  against  imputing  a  sin  in  the  whole  of  it,  which  was  com- 
mitted by  one,  to  another  who  did  not  personally  commit  it, 
but  will  also  lie  against  its  being  so  imputed  and  punished  in 
part /  for  all  the  reasons  (if  there  be  any)  lie  against  the  impu- 
tation, not  the  quality  or  degree  of  what  is  imputed.  If  there 
be  any  rule  of  reason  that  is  strong  and  good,  lying  against  a 
proper  derivation  or  communication  of  guilt  from  one  that 
acted  to  another  that  did  not  act,  then  it  lies  against  all  that 
is  of  that  nature  ....  If  these  reasons  are  good,  all  the  differ- 
ence is  this :  that  to  bring  a  great  punishment  on  infants  for 
Adam's  sin,  is  a  great  act  of  injustice,  and  to  bring  a  compara- 
tively smaller  punishment  is  a  smaller  act  of  injustice  ;  but  not, 
that  this  is  not  as  truly  and  demonstrably  an  act  of  injustice  as 
the  other."* 

"We  hold  this  to  be  a  solid  and  unanswerable  argument ;  and 
we  hold  also,  that  God  can  no  more  commit  a  small  act  of 
injustice  than  a  great  one.  Hence,  in  the  eye  of  reason,  there 
is  no  medium  between  rejecting  the  whole  of  the  imputation  of 
Adam's  sin,  and  ceasing  to  object  against  the  imputation  of  tho 
whole  of  it,  as  inconsistent  with  the  justice  and  goodness  of  God. 
"We  may  arbitrarily  wipe  out  a  portion  of  it  in  order  to  relievo 
our  imagination;  but  this  brings  no  relief  to  the  calm  and 
passionless  reason.  It  may  still  the  wild  tumults  of  emotion, 
but  it  cannot  silence  the  voice  of  the  intellect.  "Why  not  relieve 

0  Edwards  cm  Original  Sin,  part  iv,  ch.  iii. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF   GOD.  2«1 

both  the  imagination  and  the  reason  ?  Why  not  wipe  out  the 
whole  dark  film  of  imputation,  and  permit  the  glad  eye  to  open 
on  the  bright  glory  of  God's  infinite  goodness  ? 

The  wonder  is,  that  when  Edwards  had  carried  out  his  logic 
to  such  a  conclusion,  he  did  not  regard  his  argument  as  a  per- 
fect rcductio  ad  absurdum.  The  wonder  is,  that  when  he  had 
carried  out  his  logic  to  the  position,  that  it  might  well  consist 
with  the  justice  of  God  to  impute  the  whole  of  Adam's  sin  to 
"  poor  little  infants,"  as  he  calls  them,  and  then  cause  them  to 
endure  "  eternal  torments  for  it,"  his  whole  nature  did  not 
recoil  from  such  a  conclusion  with  indescribable  horror.  For 
our  part,  highly  as  we  value  logical  consistency,  we  should 
prefer  a  little  incoherency  in  our  reasoning,  a  little  flexibility  in 
our  logic,  rather  than  bear  even  one  "  poor  little  infant"  on  the 
hard,  unyielding  point  of  it  into  the  torments  of  hell  forever. 

St.  Augustine  was  the  great  founder  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
imputation  of  sin.  But  although  he  did  more  than  any  other 
person  to  give  this  doctrine  a  hold  upon  the  mind  of  the  Chris- 
tian world,  it  never  had  a  perfect  hold  upon  his  own  mind.  So 
far  from  being  able  to  reconcile  it  with  the  divine  goodness,  he 
could  not  reconcile  it  with  his  own  goodness.  For  this  purpose, 
he  employed  the  theory  that  all  the  posterity  of  Adam  were,  in 
the  most  literal  sense,  already  in  him,  and  sinned  in  him — in 
his  person  ;  and  that  Adam's  sin  is  therefore  justly  imputed  to 
all  his  posterity.*  He  also  appeals  to  revelation.  "St.  Au- 
gustine," as  Father  Almeyda  truly  says,  "  and  the  fathers  who 
follow  him,  take  the  fundamental  principle  of  their  doctrine 
(which  affirms  that  infants  without  baptism  will  endure  eternal 
pain)  from  the  sentence  which  the  Supreme  Judge  is  to  pro- 
nounce at  the  last  day.  We  know  that  the  Lord,  dividing  the 
human  race  into  two  portions,  will  put  the  elect  on  the  right 
hand,  and  the  reprobate  on  the  left ;  and  he  will  say  to  those  on 
the  left,  Depart  into  eternal  fire.  St.  Augustine  then  argues, 
that  infants  will  not  be  on  the  right,  because  Jesus  Christ  has 
p  ^sitively  excluded  all  those  who  shall  not  "be  lorn  again  of 
water  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit :  then  they  will  be  on  the  lett ; 
and  thus  they  will  be  comprehended  in  the*  damnation  of  eter- 
nal fire,  which  the  Lord  will  pronounce  against  those  who  shall 

0  See  Knapp's  Theology,  vol.  ii,  art.  ix,  sec.  76 ;  also  Wiggers's  Presentation 
of  Augustinisni  and  Pelagianism,  chap,  xix,  p.  268. 


262  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

be  on  the  left  side :  for  having  no  more  than  two  hands,  and 
only  two  places  and  two  sentences,  since,  then,  there  are  infants 
which  God  does  not  favour,  it  follows  that  they  will  be  com- 
prehended in  the  sentence  of  the  reprobate,  which  is  not  only 
a  privation  of  the  sight  of  God,  but  also  the  pain  of  fire."* 
Such  is  the  ground,  and  such  the  logic,  on  which  St.  Augustiue 
and  his  followers  erected  that  portentous  scheme,  that  awful 
speculation,  which  has  so  long  cast  a  dark  cloud  over  the  glory 
of  the  Christian  world,  and  prevented  it  from  reflecting  the 
bright,  cheering  beams  of  the  divine  goodness. 

But,  what !  could  St.  Augustine  find  rest  in  his  own  views, — • 
in  his  own  logic?  Did  he  really  banish  all  non-elect  infants 
into  the  region  of  penal  fire  and  everlasting  woe  ?  If  he  adhered 
to  the  literal  meaning  of  the  words  of  revelation,  as  he  under- 
stood them,  he  was  certainly  bound  to  do  so ;  but  did  he  really 
and  consistently  do  it  ?  Did  he  really  bind  the  "  poor  little  " 
reprobate,  because  it  had  sinned  in  Adam,  in  chains  of  adamant, 
and  leave  it  to  writhe  beneath  the  fierce  inquisitorial  fury  of  the 
everlasting  flames?  Did  he  really  extract  the  vials  of  such 
exquisite  and  unprovoked  wrath  from  the  essence  of  infinite 
goodness  itself?  No:  this  was  reserved  for  the  superior  logic 
and  the  sterner  consistency  of  an  iron  age.  But  since  it  has 
been  extracted,  we  may  devoutly  thank  Almighty  God,  that  it 
is  now  excluded  from  the  hearts  of  men  calling  themselves 

O 

Christians,  and  kept  safely  bottled  up  in  their  creeds  and  con- 
fessions. 

St  Augustine  could  not  endure  the  insufferable  consequences 
of  his  own  doctrine.  Hence,  in  writing  to  his  great  friend,  St. 
Jerome,  he  said,  "  in  all  sincerity :  when  I  come  to  treat  of  the 
punishment  of  infants,  believe  that  I  find  myself  in  great 
embarrassment,  and  I  absolutely  know  not  what  to  reply" 
Writing  against  Julian,  he  adds:  " I  do  not  say  that  those  who 
die  without  baptism  will  ~be  punished  with  a  torment  such  that 
It  would  be  better  for  them  if  they  had  never  been  born"  And 
again :  "  Those  who,  besides  original  sin  which  they  have  con- 
tracted, have  not  committed  any  other,  will  be  subjected  to  a 
pain  the  most  mild  of  all."f  Thus  by  adopting  a  wrong  inter- 
pretation, the  principles  of  which  were  but  little  understood  in 
his  time,  St.  Augustine  banished  all  unbaptized  infants  from  the 
0  Harmonie  de  la  Raison  et  de  la  Religion.  f  Ibid.,  Almeida. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  263 

kingdom  of  light ;  but  yet  he  could  hardly  find  it  in  his  heart 
to  condemn  them  to  the  outer  darkness.  He  had  too  great  a 
regard  for  the  word  of  God,  as  he  understood  it,  to  permit  non- 
elect  infants  to  reign  with  Christ  in  heaven ;  and,  on  the  other 
ban  3,  he  was  too  severely  pressed  by  the  generous  impulses  of 
liis  nature,  nay,  by  the  eternal  dictates  of  truth  and  goodness, 
to  permit  him  to  consign  them  really  to  the  "fire  prepared 
for  the  devil  and  his  angels."  Hence,  although  Christ  knew 
of  "  but  two  places,"  he  fitted  up  a  third,  to  see  them  in  which, 
was,  as  Edwards  would  say,  "more  agreeable  to  his  imagin- 
ation." 

It  was  the  sublime  but  unsteady  genius  of  St.  Augustine  that 
caused  this  doctrine  of  the  damnation  of  infants  to  be  received 
into  the  Christian  world,  and  find  its  way  into  the  council  of 
Trent.  That  celebrated  council  not  only  adopted  the  views  of 
St.  Augustine  on  this  subject,  but  also  most  perfectly  reilected 
all  his  hesitation  and  inconsistency.  Widely  as  its  members 
differed  on  other  points,  they  all  agreed  that  unbaptized  infants 
should  be  excluded  from  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  There  was 
but  little  unanimity  however,  as  to  the  best  method  of  disposing 
of  them.  The  Dominicans  fitted  up  a  dark,  subterraneous 
cavern  for  them,  in  which  there  is  no  fire,  at  least  none  such  as 
that  of  the  infernal  regions,  and  in  which  they  might  be  at  least 
as  happy  as  monks.  This  place  was  called  Lirnbo — which,  we 
suppose,  is  to  Purgatory,  about  what  the  varioloid  is  to  the 
smallpox.  The  Franciscans,  more  humane  in  their  doctrine, 
determined  that  "  dear  little  infants,"  though  they  had  never 
felt  the  sanctifying  influences  of  holy  water,  should  yet  reside, 
not  in  dark  caverns  and  holes  of  the  earth,  but  in  the  sweet 
light  and  pure  air  of  the  upper  world.  Well  done,  noble  Fran- 
ciscan !  we  honour  thee  for  thy  sweet  fancy !  Surely  thou 
wert  not,  like  other  monks,  made  so  altogether  fierce  by  dark 
keeping,  that  thou  couldest  not  delight  to  see  in  God's  blessed, 
beautiful  world,  a  smiling  infant! 

Others  insisted,  that  unbaptized  infants  would  be  condemned 
to  become  philosophers,  and  turn  out  the  authors  of  great  dis- 
coveries. This  may  seem  a  terrible  damnation  to  some  persons ; 
but,  for  our  part,  if  we  had  been  of  that  famous  council,  it  is 
likely  we  should  have  been  in  favour  of  this  decree.  As  the 
most  agreeable  punishment  we  could  imagine,  we  should  have 


264  NATUKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

been  for  condemning  them,  like  the  fallen  angels  of  Paradise 
Lost,  to  torment  themselves  with  reasonings  high, — 

•'  Of  providence,  foreknowledge,  will,  and  fate, 
Fix'd  fate,  free-will,  foreknowledge  absolute." 

And  if  any  of  them  had  been  found  to  possess  no  very  great 
aptitude  for  such  speculations,  then,  rather  than  they  should  find 
u  no  end  in  wandering  mazes  lost,"  we  should  have  condemned 
them  to  turn  poets  and  "  build  the  lofty  rhyme." 

So  completely  did  the  spirit  of  a  blind  exegesis  triumph  over 
the  light  of  reason  in  the  time  of  Augustine,  that  even  Pelagius 
and  his  followers  excluded  unbaptized  infants  from  the  king- 
dom of  heaven,  because  our  Saviour  had  declared  that  a  man 
could  not  enter  therein,  except  he  be  born  of  water  and  of  the 
Spirit.  It  is  true,  they  did  not  banish  them  into  "  the  fire  pre- 
pared for  the  devil  and  his  angels,"  nor  into  Limbo,  nor  into 
dark  holes  of  the  earth ;  on  the  contrary,  they  admitted  them 
to  the  joys  of  eternal  life,  but  not  into  the  kingdom  of  heaven.* 
Thus,  the  Pelagians  brought  "  poor  little  infants  "  as  near  to  the 
kingdom  of  heaven  as  possible,  without  doing  too  great  violence 
to  the  universal  orthodoxy  of  their  time. 

But  as  we  cannot,  like  the  Church  of  Rome,  determine  the 
fate  of  infants  by  a  decree,  we  must  take  some  little  pains  to 
ascertain  how  it  has  been  determined  by  the  Supreme  Ruler  of 
the  world.  For  this  purpose  we  shall  first  show,  that  there  is 
suffering  in  the  world  which  is  not  a  punishment  for  sin,  and 
then  declare  the  great  ends,  or  final  causes,  of  all  natural  evil. 

SECTION  IV. 
The  true  ends,  or  final  causes,  of  natural  evil. 

We  have  often  wondered  that  grave  divines  should  declaro 
that  there  could  be  no  natural  evil,  or  suffering,  under  the 
administration  of  God,  except  such  as  is  a  punishment  for  sin 
in  the  person  upon  whom  it  is  inflicted.  We  have  wondered, 
that  in  declaring  none  but  a  tyrant  could  ever  permit  the  inno- 
cent to  suffer,  they  have  entertained  no  fears  lest  they  might 
strengthen  the  cause  of  atheism.  For  if  it  be  impossible  to 
justify  the  character  of  God,  except  on  the  principle  that  all 

0  Wiggers's  Presentation  of  Augustinism  and  Pelagianism,  cliap.  iv. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  205 

suffering  is  merited  on  account  of  sin  in  the  object  of  it,  then 
it  is  easy  to  see,  that  the  atheistical  argument  against  the  good- 
ness of  God  is  unanswerable.  The  atheist  might  well  say :  "  Do 
we  not  see  and  know  that  the  whole  animal  creation  suffers? 
Now  for  what  sin  are  they  punished  ?  The  inferior  animals, 
you  will  admit,  are  not  capable  of  committing  actual  sin,  any 
more  than  infants  are;  and  Adam  was  not  their  federal  head 
arid  representative.  Hence,  unless  you  can  show  for  what  sin 
they  are  punished,  you  must  admit  that,  according  to  your  own 
principles,  God  is  a  tyrant."  How  Dr.  Dick,  or  Dr.  Dwight,  or 
President  Edwards,  or  Calvin,  would  have  answered  such  an 
argument,  we  cannot  determine.  For  although  they  all  assume 
that  there  can  be  no  suffering  under  the  good  providence  of 
God,  except  it  be  a  punishment  for  sin  in  the  object  of  it,  yet, 
so  far  as  we  know,  they  have  not  made  the  most  distant  allu- 
sion to  the  suffering  of  the  inferior  animals.  Indeed,  they  seem 
to  be  so  intently  bent  on  maintaining  the  doctrine  of  the  impu- 
tation of  sin  to  infants,  that  they  pay  no  attention,  in  the  assump- 
tion of  the  above  position,  either  to  the  word  of  God,  or  to  the 
great  volume  of  nature  spread  out  before  them. 

But  we  find  the  difficulty  noticed  in  a  prize  essay  of  three 
hundred  pages,  on  the  subject  of  native  depravity,  by  Dr.  Woods. 
The  author  assumes  the  same  ground  with  Edwards,  that  all 
suffering  must  be  justified  on  the  ground  of  justice  ;  and  hence 
he  finds  a  real  and  proper  sin  in  infants,  in  order  to  reconcile 
their  sufferings  with  the  character  of  God.  This  is  the  only 
ground,  according  to  Dr.  Woods,  on  which  suffering  can  be 
vindicated  under  the  administration  of  a  perfect  God.  Where, 
then,  is  the  real  and  proper  sin  in  the  inferior 'animals  to  justify 
their  sufferings?  This  difficulty  occurs  to  the  distinguished 
author,  and  he  endeavours  to  meet  it.  Let  us  see  his  reply.  It 
is  a  reply  which  we  have  long  been  solicitous  to  see,  and  we 
now  have  it  from  one  of  the  most  celebrated  theologians  of  the 
present  day. 

"  Some  suppose,"  says  he,  "  that  infants  suffer  as  irrational 
animals  do,  without  reference  to  a  moral  law  or  the  principles 
of  a  moral  government.  A  strange  supposition  indeed,  that 
hv,man  'beings  should  for  a  time  be  ranked  with  beings  which 
are  not  human,  that  is,  mere  animals."  He  is  evidently  shocked 
at  such  an  insult  offered  to  poor  little  infants.  He  will  not 


266  NATUKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Tart  II, 

i 

allow  us,  for  one  moment,  to  take  the  whole  race  of  man, 
"  during  the  interesting  period  of  infancy,  cut  them  off  from 
their  relation  to  Adam,  degrade  them  from  the  dignity  of  hu- 
man beings,  and  put  them  in  the  rank  of  brute  animals, — and 

then  say,  they  suffer  as  the  brutes  do This  would  be  the 

worst  of  all  theories, — the  farthest  off  from  Scripture  and  rea- 
son, and  the  most  revolting  to  all  the  noble  sensibilities  of 
man." 

Now,  it  is  really  refreshing  to  find  these  allusions  to  "  the 
dignity  of  human  beings "  in  a  writer  of  this  school ;  and 
especially  in  Dr.  Woods,  who  has  so  often  rebuked  others  for 
their  pride,  when  they  have  imagined  that  they  were  only  en- 
gaged in  the  laudable  enterprise  of  asserting  this  very  dignity, 
by  raising  men  from  the  rank  of  mere  machines.  It  is  so  refresh- 
ing, indeed,  to  find  such  allusions  in  Dr.  Woods,  that  we  could 
almost  forgive  a  little  special  pleading  and  bad  logic  in  his  at- 
tempt to  vindicate  the  "  dignity  of  human  beings,"  which  should 
have  been  an  attempt  to  vindicate  the  goodness  of  God. 

We  do  not  place  human  beings  and  brutes  in  the  same  rank, 
except  in  so  far  as  both  are  sensitive  creatures,  and  consequently 
susceptible  of  pleasure  and  pain.  In  this  particular,  the  Crea- 
tor himself  has,  to  a  certain  extent,  placed  them  in  the  same 
rank,  and  it  is  useless  to  cry  out  against  his  appointment.  He 
will  not  listen  to  our  talk  about  "  the  dignity  of  human  beings." 
He  will  still  leave  us,  in  so  far  as  bodily  pain  and  death  are 
concerned,  in  the  same  rank  with  mere  animals.  This  single 
point  of  resemblance  between  animals  and  human  beings  is  all 
that  our  argument  requires  ;  and  the  fact  that  animals  do  suffer 
pain  and  death  cannot  be  denied,  or  swept  away  by  declama- 
tion. Let  this  fact  be  fairly  and  openly  met,  and  not  merely 
evaded.  Let  it  be  shown  how  the  suffering  of  mere  animals 
may  be  reconciled  with  the  infinite  goodness  of  God,  and  we 
will  undertake  to  show  how  the  suffering  of  guiltless  "  human 
beings  "  may  be  reconciled  with  it.  Nay,  we  will  undertake  to 
show  that  the  suffering  of  infants  may  be  reconciled  with  tho 
divine  goodness,  on  the  same,  and  also  on  still  higher,  grounds. 
We  will  place  their  sufferings  on  a  more  solid  and  a  more  defi- 
nite foundation,  than  upon  such  vague  and  misty  assertions  as 
that  they  "  suffer  with  reference  to  a  moral  law." 

We  do  not  cut  off  infants  from  their  relation  to  Adam ;  nor 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  267 

could  we,  if  we  desired  to  do  so,  cut  them  off  from  their  relation 
to  the  animal  nature  which  God  has  given  them.  It  may  be  a 
very  humiliating  thought,  it  is  true,  that  human  beings  should 
ever  eat  like  mere  animals,  or  sleep  like  mere  animals,  or  suffer 
like  mere  animals ;  but  yet  we  cannot  see  how  any  rebellion 
against  so  humiliating  a  thought  can  possibly  alter  the  fact. 
We  do  not  deny,  indeed,  that  a  theologian  may  eat,  and  sleep, 
and  suffer  on  higher  principles  than  mere  animals  do ;  but  we 
seriously  doubt  if  infants  ever  eat,  or  sleep,  or  suffer  on  any 
higher  principles.  It  may  shock  the  "noble  sensibilities"  of 
man  that  dear  little  infants  should  suffer  as  brutes  do,  especially 
when  the  term  Imites  is  so  strongly  emphasized;  but  how  it 
can  relieve  the  case  to  have  the  poor  little  creatures  arraigned 
at  the  bar  of  divine  justice,  and  condemned  to  suffer  as  male- 
factors and  criminals  do,  is  more  than  we  can  possibly  compre- 
hend. To  have  them  thus  arraigned,  condemned,  and  punished 
as  criminals,  may  dignify  their  sufferings,  and  render  them 
more  worthy  of  the  rank  of  human  beings ;  but  this  is  a  dignity 
to  which,  we  trust,  they  will  never  aspire. 

If  we  are  not  mistaken,  then,  the  theory  for  which  we  con- 
tend is  "  not  the  worst  of  all  theories,"  nor  "  the  most  revolting 
to  the  noblest  sensibilities  of  man."  It  is  a  worse  theory  to  sup- 
pose, with  Edwards,  that  they  may  be  arraigned  and  banished 
into  "  eternal  misery "  for  a  sin  they  have  not  committed,  or 
the  possession  of  a  nature  they  could  not  possibly  have  avoided 
possessing.  It  is  better,  we  say,  to  rank  the  human  race  "  for 
a  time,"  "  during  the  interesting  period  of  infancy,"  even  with 
mere  animals,  than  to  rank  them  writh  the  devil  and  his  angels. 
But,  in  truth,  we  rank  them  with  neither ;  we  simply  leave  them 
where  God  hath  placed  them,  as  a  connecting  link  between  the 
animal  and  the  angelic  natures. 

But  we  may  produce  many  instances  of  suffering  among  hu- 
man beings,  which  are  not  a  punishment  for  sin.  We  might 
refer  to  the  feeling  of  compassion,  which  is  always  painful,  and 
sometimes  wTrings  the  heart  with  the  most  exquisite  agony  ;  and 
yet  this  was  not  planted  in  our  bosom  as  a  punishment  for  sin, 
but,  as  Bishop  Butler  has  shown,*  it  was  ordained  by  a  God  of 
mercy,  to  teach  us  a  lesson  of  mercy,  and  lead  us  to  mitigate 
the  manifold  miseries  of  man's  estate.  We  might  also  refer  to 

0  Sermon  on  Compassion. 


268  NATUKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  IL 

an  indignation  against  crime,  which,  as  the  same  profound 
thinker  has  shown  in  his  sermon  on  resentment,  was  planted  in 
our  natures,  not  to  punish  the  subject  of  it,  but  to  insure  the 
punishment  of  others,  that  is,  of  criminals ;  and  thereby  to  pre- 
serve the  good  order  and  well-being  of  the  world.  This  sense 
of  wrong,  of  injustice,  of  outrage,  by  which  the  soul  is  so  often 
tortured,  is  not  designed  to  punish  the  subject  of  it,  but  to  pro- 
mote the  happiness  and  virtue  of  mankind.  We  might  refer  to 
these,  and  many  other  things  of  the  same  kind,  but  it  is  not 
necessary  to  dwell  upon  particular  instances  ;  for  the  principle 
against  which  we  contend  may  be  more  directly  refuted  by  an 
appeal  to  reason,  and  to  the  very  authors  by  whom  it  is  advo- 
cated ;  for,  although  it  is  adopted  by  them,  and  seems  plausible 
at  first  view,  it  is  often  lost  sight  of  when  they  lose  sight  of 
their  system,  and  they  give  utterance  to  another  principle  more 
in  accordance  with  the  voice  of  nature. 

It  is  evident,  that  if  the  government  of  God  requires  that  no 
suffering  should  be  inflicted,  except  as  a  punishment  for  sin, 
then  his  perfect  moral  government  requires  that  the  punish- 
ment should,  in  all  cases,  be  exactly  proportioned  to  the  demerit 
of  those  upon  whom  it  falls. 

For,  as  Butler  truly  says,  "Moral  government  consists  in 
rewarding  the  righteous  and  punishing  the  wicked ;  in  rendering 
to  men  according  to  their  actions,  considered  as  good  or  evil. 
And  the  perfection  of  moral  government  consists  in  doing  this, 
with  regard  to  all  intelligent  creatures,  in  exact  proportion  to 
their  personal  merits  and  demerits."*  This  will  not  be  denied. 
Hence,  if  suffering  is  distributed  by  God  as  a  punishment  for 
sin  in  all  cases,  as  Calvin  and  his  followers  assert,  then  it  mus(,, 
on  the  same  principle,  be  distributed  according  to  the  demerit 
of  men.  But  is  this  the  case  ?  Does  this  necessary  consequen  ce 
of  this  principle  agree  with  fact  ?  If  so,  then  every  vile  deed, 
every  wicked  outrage,  committed  by  man,  should  be  regarded 
as  an  instrument  of  divine  justice,  and  deserved  by  those  upon 
whom  they  fall.  The  inquisition  itself,  with  all  its  unutterecl 
and  unutterable  horrors,  shouid  be  regarded,  not  merely  as  an 
exhibition  of  human  wickedness  and  wrath,  but  also  as  an 
engine  of  divine  justice,  to  crush  the  martyr  on  its  wheels, 
because  he  refuses  to  lie  to  his  own  soul  and  to  his  God !  Na- 

0  Butler's  Analogy,  part  i,  chap.  iii. 


Chapter  11.1  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  269 

tare  itself  recoils  from  such  a  conclusion.  Not  one  of  the 
writers  in  question  would  adopt  it.  Hence,  they  should  not 
advocate  a  principle  from  wThich  it  necessarily  flows. 

Indeed,  they  all  argue  the  necessity  of  a  future  state  of  retri- 
bution, from  the  unequal  distribution  of  natural  good  and  evil 
m  this  life.  But  Lord  Bolingbroke  has  refuted  this  argument 
b}  reasoning  from  their  own  principles.  He  insists  that  such  is 
the  justice  of  God,  that  there  can  be  no  suffering  or  natural  evil 
in  this  life,  except  such  as  is  proportioned  to  the  demerits  of 
men ;  and  hence  he  rejects  the  argument  from  the  apparent 
unequal  distribution  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  this  world  in  favour 
of  the  reality  of  a  future  judgment.  He  resents  the  imputation 
that  God  could  ever  permit  any  suffering  which  is  not  deserved, 
as  warmly  as  it  is  resented  by  Dr.  Dick  himself,  and  proclaims 
it  to  be  dishonourable  to  God.  All  rewards  and  punishments, 
says  he,  are  equal  and  just  in  this  life ;  and  to  say  otherwise,  is 
to  take  an  atheistical  view  of  the  divine  character.  Learned 
divines  proceed  on  the  same  principle,  as  we  have  seen,  wThen 
they  contend  for  the  imputation  of  sin  ;  but  they  forget  and 
overlook  it,  when  they  come  to  prove  the  future  judgment  to 
the  infidel.  Thus,  in  their  zeal  to  establish  their  own  peculiar 
dogmas,  they  place  themselves  and  their  cause  in  the  power  of 
the  infidel. 

But  if  suffering  be  not  always  inflicted,  under  the  admin- 
istration of  God,  as  a  punishment  for  sin,  for  what  other  end  is 
it  inflicted  ?  We  answer,  it  is  inflicted  for  these  ends :  1.  Even 
when  it  is  inflicted  as  a  punishment  for  sin,  this  is  not  the  only 
end,  or  final  cause  of  its  infliction.  It  is  also  intended  to  deter 
others  from  the  commission  of  evil,  and  preserve  the  order  of 
the  world.  2.  In  some  instances,  nay,  in  very  many  instances, 
it  is  intended  to  discipline  and  form  the  mind  to  virtue.  As 
Bishop  Butler  well  says,  even  while  vindicating  the  moral 
government  of  the  wrorld :  "  It  is  not  pretended  but  that,  in 
the  natural  course  of  things,  happiness  and  misery  appear  to 
be  distributed  by  other  rules,  than  only  the  personal  merit  and 
demerit  of  character.  They  may  sometimes  be  distributed  by 
way  of  mere  discipline.  And  in  his  profound  chapter  on  a 
"  State  of  probation,  as  intended  for  moral  discipline  and  im- 
provement," he  shows  that  they  are  actually  distributed  for  this 
purpose.  3.  The  unavoidable  evils  of  this  life,  which  are  not 


NATURAL  EYTL  CONSISTENT  \?*rt  n, 

brought  upon  us  by  our  faults,  are  intended  to  serve  as  a  foil  to 
set  off  the  blessedness  of  eternity.  Our  present  light  afflictions 
are  intended,  not  merely  to  work  out  for  us  an  exceeding  and 
eternal  weight  of  glory,  but  also  to  heighten  our  sense  and 
enjoyment  of  it  by  a  recollection  of  the  miseries  experienced  in 
this  life.  They  are  intended  to  form  but  a  short  and  discordant 
prelude  to  an  everlasting  harmony.  K  they  should  not  prove 
so  in  fact,  the  fault  will  be  our  own,  without  the  least  im  peacli- 
ment  of  the  beneficent  design  of  the  great  Author  and  Ruler 
of  the  universe. 

On  these  grounds,  especially  on  the  first  two,  we  must  justify 
all  the  natural  evil  in  the  world.  In  regard  to  the  second, 
Bishop  Butler  says :  "  Allurements  to  what  is  wrong ;  difficulties 
in  the  discharge  of  our  duties ;  our  not  being  able  to  act  a  uni- 
form right  part  without  some  thought  and  care ;  and  the  oppor- 
tunities we  have,  or  imagine  we  have,  of  avoiding  what  we 
dislike,  or  obtaining  what  we  desire,  by  unlawful  means,  when 
we  either  cannot  do  it  at  all,  or  at  least  not  so  easily,  by  lawful 
ones ;  these  things,  that  is,  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice, 
are  what  render  the  present  world  peculiarly  ft  to  oe  a  state  of 
discipline  to  those  who  will  preserve  their  integrity  ;  because 
they  render  being  upon  our  guard,  resolution,  and  the  denial 
of  our  passions,  necessary  to  that  end."  Urns,  the  temptations 
by  which  we  are  surrounded,  the  allurements  of  those  passions 
by  which  vice  is  rendered  so  bewitching,  are  the  appointed 
means  of  moral  discipline  and  improvement  in  virtue. 

The  habit  of  virtue  thus  formed,  he  truly  observes,  will  be 
firm  and  fixed  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  temptation  we 
nave  gradually  overcome  in  its  formation.  "Though  actions 
materially  virtuous,"  says  he,  u  which  have  no  sort  of  difficulty, 
but  are  perfectly  agreeable  to  our  particular  inclinations,  may 
possibly  be  done  only  from  those  particular  inclinations,  and  so 
may  not  be  any  exercise  of  the  principle  of  virtue,  L  e.,  not  t  e 
virtuous  actions  at  all ;  yet,  on  the  contrary,  they  may  l»e  an 
exercise  of  that  principle,  and,  when  they  are,  they  havo  a  ten- 
dency to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of  virtue.  But  when  the  exei- 
cise  of  the  virtuous  principle  is  more  continued,  oftener  repeated, 
and  more  intense,  as  it  must  be  in  circumstances  of  danger, 
temptation,  and  difficulty  of  any  kind,  and  in  any  degree,  this 
tendency  is  increased  proportionably,  and  a  more  confirmed 


Chapter  IL]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  271 

habit  is  the  consequence."*  The  greater  the  temptation,  then, 
the  more  fixed  will  be  the  habit  of  virtue,  by  which  it  is  gradu- 
ally overcome  and  subdued. 

This  habit  may  become  so  fixed,  by  a  struggle  with  tempta- 
tions and  difficulties,  as  to  raise  the  soul  above  the  dangers  to 
which  moral  agents  are  exposed.  a  Virtuous  self-government 
is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but  also  improves  the  inward  consti- 
tution or  character ;  and  may  improve  it  to  such  a  degree,  that 
though  we  should  suppose  it  impossible  for  particular  affections 
tc  be  absolutely  co-incident  with  the  moral  principle,  and  con- 
sequently should  allow,  that  «//*A  creatures  as  have  ken  above 
supposed  would  forever  remain  defectMe  ;  yet  their  danger  of 
actually  demoting  from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely  lessened, 
and  they  fully  fortifad  against  what  remains  of  it;  if  that 
may  be  called  danger ',  against  which  there  is  an  adequate  effec- 
tual security"^ 

"These  several  observations,"  says  he,  "concerning  the  active 
principle  of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  commands  are  appli- 
cable to  passive  submission  or  resignation  to  his  win,  which  is 
another  essential  part  of  a  right  character,  connected  with  the 
former,  and  very  much  in  our  power  to  form  ourselves  to."* 
This,  then,  is  the  view  which  we  think  should  be  entertained 
with  respect  to  the  natural  evils  of  this  life :  they  are  intended 
by  the  infinitely  wise  and  good  Ruler  of  the  world  to  detach 
us  from  the  fleeting  things  of  time  and  sense,  by  the  gradual 
formation  of  a  habit  of  moral  goodness,  arising  from  a  resist- 
ance against  the  influence  of  such  things  and  firm  adherence  to 
the  will  of  God,  and  to  form  our  character  for  a  state  of  fixed 
eternal  blessedness.  Such  is  the  beneficent  design  of  God  in 
relation  to  the  human  race  itself.  His  design  in  relation  to  the 
more  magnificent  scheme  of  the  moral  universe,  in  thus  plant- 
ing the  human  race  and  striving  to  train  it  up  to  virtue  and 
happiness,  we  have  already  considered.* 

We  say,  then,  that  it  is  a  principle  of  the  divine  government 
of  the  world  to  impose  natural  evfl  or  suffering  as  a  means  of 
good.  It  is  objected  against  this  principle,  that  it  is  to  do  evil 
diat  good  may  come.  "To  say  that  Christ  was  subjected  to 
sufferings?  says  Dr.  Dick,  "  for  the  benevolent  purpose  of  con- 
ferring important  benefits  upon  mankind,  is  to  give  the  highest 

0  Analogy,  chap,  T.  f  W,  «***•  *•  *  ™  |  P*rt  i,  ckafL  Ti. 


272  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  11, 

sanction  to  the  principle  which  is  so  strongly  reprobated  in  the 
Scriptures,  that  evil  may  be  done  that  good  may  come."  The 
theology  of  Dr.  Dick,  and  of  his  school,  does  not  sufficiently 
distinguish  between  natural  and  moral  evil.  We  are  nowheie 
told  in  Scripture,  that  it  is  wrong  to  do  natural  evil,  or  mflict 
suffering,  that  good  may  come.  Every  good  man  acts  upon 
this  principle  every  day  of  his  life.  Every  act  of  self-denial, 
and  every  infliction  of  parental  discipline,  are  proofs  of  the  just- 
ness of  this  remark.  The  surgeon  who  amputates  a  limb,  in 
order  to  save  the  life  of  his  patient,  acts  upon  the  same  principle. 
But  who  ever  thought  of  condemning  such  conduct  ?  Who  ever 
reminded  him  that  he  should  not  do  evil  that  good  may  come  ? 
It  is  plain,  that  neither  "  the  sufferings  "  of  Christ,  nor  any  other 
sufferings  imposed  for  the  real  good  of  the  world,  are  liable  to  any 
such  objection,  or  come  under  the  condemnation  of  any  such 
maxim.  This  objection  lies,  as  we  have  seen,*  against  the  doc- 
trine of  Edwards  and  his  followers,  that  moral  evil,  that  sin, 
may  be  chosen  as  the  means  of  good.  The  high  and  holy  God 
never  commits,  or  causes  others  to  commit,  moral  evil  that  good 
may  come ;  but  he  not  only  may,  but  actually  does,  inflict 
natural  evil  in  order  to  promote  the  good  of  his  creatures. 
Thus,  by  applying  the  language  of  Scripture  to  natural  evil 
instead  of  to  moral,  Dr.  Dick  has  just  exactly  inverted  the  order 
of  things  as  they  actually  exist  in  the  constitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  moral  world. 


SECTION  V. 
The  importance  of  harmonizing  reason  and  revelation. 

For  these  reasons,  we  refuse  to  justify  the  sufferings  of  infants, 
on  the  ground  that  the  sin  of  Adam  was  imputed  to  them.  A 
sentiment  so  dark  and  appalling  but  ill  accords  with  the  snblime 
and  beautiful  spirit  of  the  gospel.  It  partakes  more  of  the 
weakness  and  infirmity  of  human  nature  than  of  the  divine 
nature  of  Him  who  "spake  as  never  man  spake."  The  test 
account  which  Plato  could  give  of  the  sufferings  of  infants  was 
that  they  had  sinned  in  some  former  state  of  existence,  for  which 
they  are  punished  in  this.  St.  Augustine  and  his  followers, 
rejecting  such  a  view,  and  relying  on  the  literal  sense  of  the 

0  Part  i.  chap.  ii. 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  273 

words  of  reveiation,  advanced  the  hypothesis  that  infants  sinned, 
not  in  a  preexistent  state,  but  in  Adam ;  for  which  they  are 
justly  exposed  to  pain  and  death.  Others  again,  not  being 
able  to  conceive  how  infants  could  be  really  and  personally  in 
Adam  many  thousand  years  before  they  were  born,  so  as  to  sin 
with  him,  adopted  the  hypothesis,  that  if  they  had  been  in  his 
place  they  would  have  sinned,  and  are  therefore  justly  exposed 
to  the  penalty  due  to  his  transgression ;  according  to  which 
theory  each  soul  might  be  made  liable  to  the  guilt  of  infinitely 
more  sin  than  any  finite  being  could  possibly  commit.  Another 
age,  rising  above  such  dark  notions  respecting  the  nature  of  sin 
and  the  justice  of  God,  maintained  the  hypothesis  that  Adam's 
sin  was  imputed  to  all  his  posterity,  by  which  the  fearful 
penalty  due  to  his  sin  might  be  justly  inflicted  upon  them. 
According  to  a  fifth  theory,  it  is  clear  that  "  nothing  under  the 
empire  of  Jehovah  "  can  be  sin,  except  a  known  transgression 
of  the  law ;  and  infants  are  punished,  because,  as  soon  as  they 
come  into  the  world,  they  knowingly  transgress  the  law  of  God. 
They  cannot  knowingly  sin,  says  a  sixth  theory ;  but  still  they 
really  transgress  the  law  of  God  by  those  little  bubbling  emo- 
tions of  anger,  and  so  forth,  as  soon  as  they  come  into  exist- 
ence ;  and  hence,  the  penalty  of  sin  is  inflicted  upon  them. 
Such  are  some  of  the  hypotheses  which  have  been  adopted  by 
Christian  theologians  to  reconcile  the  suffering  of  infants  with 
the  justice  and  goodness  of  God.  The  more  we  look  into  them, 
the  more  we  are  amazed  that  the  great  lights  of  the  world 
should  have  indulged  in  reveries  so  wild  and  so  wonderful ; 
and  the  more  are  we  convinced,  that  the  speculations  of  men  on 
these  subjects,  and  the  whole  theological  literature  of  the  world 
in  relation  to  it,  form  one  of  the  darkest  chapters  in  the  history 
of  the  human  mind. 

How  unlike  are  such  views  respecting  the  origin  and  exist- 
ence of  natural  evil  to  the  divine  simplicity  and  beauty  of  the 
gospel !  "  Who  did  sin,  this  man  or  his  parents,"  said  the  dis- 
ciples to  our  Saviour,  "that  he  was  born  blind?"  They  made 
no  doubt  but  that  the  great  evil  of  natural  blindness  must  haA  e 
been  the  punishment  of  some  sin ;  and  merely  wished  to  know 
whether  it  were  his  own  sin,  committed  in  some  former  state 
of  existence,  or  ,he  sin  of  his  parents.  Their  minds  seem  to 
ha7e  hung  in  a  state  of  vacillation  between  the  theory  of  Plato 

18 


274  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

and  that  of  imputation.  But  our  Saviour  replied  :  "  Neither 
did  this  man  sin,  nor  his  parents,"  that  he  was  born  blind ;  but 
"  that  the  work  of  God  might  be  made  manifest  in  him."  We 
thank  thee,  O  blessed  Master,  for  that  sweet  word !  How 
delightful  is  it,  after  passing  through  the  dark  labyrinths  of 
human  folly  to  sit  at  thy  feet  and  drink  in  the  lessons  of  heav- 
enly wisdom !  How  pleasant  to  the  soul — how  inexpressibly 
cheering  is  it — to  turn  from  the  harsh  and  revolting  systems 
of  men,  and  listen  to  the  sweet  accents  of  mercy  as  they  fall 
from  thy  lips ! 

The  groat  law  of  suffering,  then,  is  that  it  is  intended  for  the 
benefit  of  intelligent  creatures.  This  is  the  case,  even  when  it 
assumes  the  character  of  punishment ;  for  then  it  is  designed 
to  prevent  moral  evil.  Such  a  view  of  natural  evil,  or  suffering, 
does  not  give  that  horrid  picture  of  the  world  which  arises 
from  the  sentiment  that  all  pain  and  death  must  be  a  punish- 
ment for  sin.  This  causes  us  to  see  the  black  scourge  of  retri- 
butive justice  everywhere,  and  the  hand  of  fatherly  correction 
nowhere.  It  places  us,  not  in  a  school  or  state  of  probation,  to 
train  us  up  for  a  better  and  brighter  world,  but  in  the  midst  of 
inquisitorial  fires  and  penal  woe.  It  teaches  that  all  mankind 
became  guilty  by  the  act  of  one  man ;  and  that  for  one  deed, 
millions  upon  millions  of  human  beings  are  justly  obnoxious, 
not  only  to  temporal  and  spiritual,  but  also  to  eternal  death. 

We  are  perfectly  aware  of  all  the  arguments  which  have 
been  drawn  from  Scripture  in  support  of  such  a  doctrine ;  and 
we  are  also  perfectly  satisfied  that  they  may  be  most  easily  arid 
triumphantly  refuted.  But  at  present  we  do  not  mean  to  touch 
this  argument ;  we  shall  reserve  it  for  another  work.  In  the 
mean  time,  we  must  be  permitted  to  express  the  sentiment,  that 
a  system  of  theology,  so  profoundly  unphilosophical,  so  utterly 
repugnant  to  the  moral  sentiments  of  mankind,  can  never  fulfil 
the  sublime  mission  of  true  religion  on  earth.  It  may  possess 
the  principle  of  life  within,  but  it  is  destitute  of  the  form  of  life 
without.  It  may  convert  the  individual  soul,  and  lead  it  up  to 
heaven ;  but  it  has  not  the  radiant  form  and  power  of  truth,  to 
command  the  admiration  and  conquer  the  intellect  of  the  world. 
It  may  elevate  and  purify  the  affections,  even  while  it  depresses 
and  confounds  the  understanding ;  but  it  cannot  transfigure 
the  whole  mind,  and  change  it  into  its  own  divine  image.  Noth- 


Chapter  II.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  275 

ing  but  the  most  fixed  and  rooted  faith,  or  the  most  blind  and 
unquestioning  submission,  can  withstand  the  fearful  blasts  and 
dark  impulses  of  such  a  system. 

No  wonder,  then,  that  under  a  system  so  deplorably  deficient 
in  some  of  the  most  sublime  features  of  Christianity,  infidelity 
and  Pelagianism  should  so  often  have  sprung  up.  If  we  write 
libels  on  the  divine  government,  we  must  expect  rebellions  and 
insurrections.  This  is  the  natural  consequence  of  the  great 
fundamental  heresy  which  places  reason  and  revelation  in 
opposition  to  each  other.  Orthodoxy,  as  she  proudly  styles 
herself,  may  denounce  such  rebellions  ;  but  she  herself  is  partly 
responsible  for  the  fatal  consequences  of  them.  Reason  and 
revelation  can  never  be  dissevered,  can  never  be  placed  in 
violent  conflict,  without  a  frightful  injury  to  both,  and  to  the 
best  interests  of  mankind.  Reason  must  find  its  own  internal 
power  and  life  in  revelation,  and  revelation  must  find  its  own 
external  form  and  beauty  in  reason.  The  perfection  and  glory 
of  each  consists  in  the  living  union  and  consentaneous  develop- 
ment of  both. 

If  we  teach  absurdity,  it  is  worse  than  idle  to  enforce  sub- 
mission by  arrogant  and  lordly  denunciations  of  human  pride, 
or  of  "  carnal  reason."  And  we  shall  always  find,  indeed,  that 
when  a  theologian  or  a  philosopher  begins  by  abusing  and  vili- 
fying human  reason,  he  either  has  some  absurdity  which  he 
wishes  us  to  swallow,  or  he  wishes  to  be  excused  from  believing 
anything  in  particular.  Thus,  the  dogmatism  of  the  one  and 
the  scepticism  of  the  other  unite  in  trampling  human  reason 
under  foot ;  the  one,  to  erect  an  empire  of  absurdity,  and  the 
other,  to  erect  an  empire  of  darkness  upon  its  ruins.  It  should 
be  the  great  object  of  all  our  labours  to  effect  a  reunion  and 
harmony  between  revelation  and  reason,  whose  "inauspicious 
repudiations  and  divorces  "  have  so  long  "  disturbed  everything 
in  the  great  family  of  mankind."* 

0  This  language  of  Bacon  is  applied  by  him  to  the  empirical  and  rational 
faculties  of  the  human  mind. 


276  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  I  Part  D, 


CHAPTEK  III. 

THE  SUFFERINGS  OF  CHRIST  RECONCILED  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD. 

0  blessed  Well  of  Love !    0  Flower  of  Grace ! 

0  glorious  Morning  Starre  !    0  Lampe  of  Light ! 

Most  lively  Image  of  thy  Father's  face, 

Eternal  King  of  Glorie,  Lord  of  Might, 

Meeke  Lambe  of  God,  before  all  worlds  behight, 

How  can  we  thee  requite  for  all  this  good  ? 

Or  who  can  prize  that  thy  most  precious  blood  ? — SPENSER. 

IN  the  preceding  chapter  we  have  endeavoured  to  show  that 
natural  evil  or  suffering  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  goodness 
of  God.  "We  were  there  led  to  see  that  God,  although  he  never 
chooses  moral  evil,  often  imposes  natural  evil,  or  suffering,  in 
order  to  secure  the  well-being  of  the  world.  Of  this  general 
principle,  the  sufferings  and  death  of  Christ  are  a  particular 
instance  ;  they  are  not  anomalous,  but  a  striking  manifestation 
of  a  great  principle  which  pervades  the  whole  economy  of 
divine  providence.  These  sufferings,  so  far  from  being  incon- 
sistent with  the  goodness  of  God,  are  a  stupendous  display  of 
that  sublime  mercy  which  is  over  all  his  works.  To  illustrate 
this  position,  and  clear  it  of  sceptical  cavils  and  objections,  is 
the  main  object  of  the  present  chapter. 

SECTION  I 
The  sufferings  of  Christ  not  unnecessary. 

Because  the  necessity  of  Christ's  death  and  sufferings  is  not 
manifest  at  first  view,  or  because  the  utility  of  them  is  not  seen, 
it  is  concluded  by  some  that  they  were  wholly  useless,  and  con- 
sequently inconsistent  with  the  infinite  goodness  ascribed  to  the 
Ruler  of  the  world.  We  shall  content  ourselves  with  disposing 
of  this  objection  in  the  words  of  Bishop  Butler.  "To  object 
against  the  expediency  or  usefulness  of  particular  things  revealed 
to  have  been  done  or  suffered  by  him,"  says  he,  "  because  we 
do  not  see  how  they  were  conducive  to  those  ends,  is  highly 
absurd.  Yet  nothing  is  more  common  to  be  met  with  than  this 


Chapter  HI.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  277 

absurdity.  But  if  it  be  acknowledged  beforehand,  that  we  are 
not  judges  in  this  case,  it  is  evident  that  no  objection  can,  with 
any  shad  DW  of  reason,  be  urged  against  any  particular  part  of 
Christ's  mediatorial  office  revealed  in  Scripture,  till  it  can  be 
shown  positively,  not  to  be  requisite,  or  conducive,  to  the  ends 
proposed  to  be  accomplished ;  or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreason- 
able."* 

Again :  "  It  is  indeed,"  says  he,  "  a  matter  of  great  patience  to 
reasonable  men  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner ;  objecting 
against  the  credibility  of  such  particular  things  revealed  in 
Scripture,  that  they  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  expediency  of 
them.  For,  though  it  is  highly  right,  and  the  most  pious  exer- 
cise of  our  understanding,  to  inquire  with  due  reverence  into  the 
ends  and  reasons  of  God's  dispensations ;  yet,  when  those  reasons 
are  concealed,  to  argue  from  our  ignorance,  that  such  dispensa- 
tions cannot  be  from  God,  is  infinitely  absurd.  The  presumption 
of  this  kind  of  objection  seems  almost  lost  in  the  folly  of  them. 
And  the  folly  of  them  is  yet  greater,  when  they  are  urged,  as 
usually  they  are,  against  things  in  Christianity  analogous,  or 
like  to  those  natural  dispensations  of  Providence  which  are 
matters  of  experience.  Let  reason  be  kept  to,  and  if  any  part 
of  the  Scripture  account  of  the  redemption  of  the  world  by 
Christ  can  be  shown  to  be  really  contrary  to  it,  let  the  Scrip- 
ture, in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up :  but  let  not  such  poor 
creatures  as  we  go  on  objecting  against  an  infinite  scheme, 
that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  usefulness  of  all  its  parts, 
and  call  this  reasoning ;  and  what  heightens  the  absurdity  in 
the  present  case,  parts  which  we  are  not  actively  concerned  in."f 

This  reply  is  amply  sufficient  for  such  an  objection.  But 
although  the  concession  is  made,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  it  is 
not  true,  that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  usefulness  of  the 
sufferings  of  Christ.  For,  as  the  author  well  says :  "  What  has 
been  often  alleged  in  justification  of  this  doctrine,  even  from 
the  apparent  natural  tendency  of  this  method  of  our  redemp- 
tion— its  tendency  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's  laws,  and 
deter  his  creatures  from  sin  :  this  has  never  been  answered,  and 
is,  I  think,  plainly  unanswerable  ;  though  I  am  far  from  think- 
.ng  it  an  account  of  the  whole  of  the  case."  J 

It  is  true,  we  believe,  that  the  position  that  the  great  work 

°  Butler's  Analogy,  part  ii,  chap.  v.  |  Analogy.  J  Ibid. 


278  NATUKAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  H, 

of  Christ  was  necessary  to  maintain  the  authority  of  God's  law, 
and  to  deter  his  creatures  from  sin,  never  has  been,  and  never 
can  be  refuted.  Yet  nearly  all  of  the  commonly  received  sys- 
tems of  theology  furnish  a  principle,  a  false  principle,  on  which 
this  position  may  be  overthrown,  and  the  sufferings  of  ClHst 
shown  to  be  unnecessary.  For  if  a  necessary  holiness  be  not  a 
contradiction  in  terms,  if  God  can,  as  is  usually  asserted,  cause 
holiness  universally  to  prevail  by  the  mere  word  of  his  power, 
then  the  work  and  sufferings  of  Christ  are  not  necessary  to 
maintain  the  authority  of  his  law,  and  deter  his  creatures  from 
sin.  In  other  words,  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  "  not  requi- 
site to  the  ends  proposed  to  be  accomplished,"  because,  on  such 
a  supposition,  they  might  have  been  far  more  easily  and  com- 
pletely accomplished  without  them. 

Those  who  maintain,  then,  as  most  theologians  do,  that  God 
could  easily  cause  virtue  to  exist  everywhere  if  he  would,  really 
set  forth  a  principle  which,  if  true,  would  demonstrate  the  suf- 
ferings of  Christ  to  be  unnecessary,  and  consequently  inconsist- 
ent with  the  goodness  of  God.  We  must  strike  at  this  false 
principle,  and  restore  the  truth  that  a  necessary  holiness  is  a 
contradiction  in  terms,  an  inherent  and  impossible  conceit,  if 
we  would  behold  the  sublime  significancy  and  beauty  of  the 
stupendous  sacrifice  of  the  cross.  We  shall  then  behold  the 
necessity  of  that  sacrifice,  and  see  the  omnipotent  yearnings  of 
the  divine  love  in  its  efforts  to  overcome  an  obstacle,  which 
could  not  be  otherwise  surmounted. 

It  is  often  said,  we  are  well  aware,  that  God  might  have 
saved  us  by  a  mere  word ;  but  he  chose  not  to  do  so,  preferring 
to  give  up  his  Son  to  death  in  order  to  show  his  love.  But 
how  can  such  a  position  be  maintained  ?  If  God  could  save  us 
by  a  word,  how  can  it  display  his  love  to  require  such  immense 
sufferings  in  order  to  save  us?  If  he  could  accomplish  the 
salvation  of  all  men  by  a  mere  word,  how  does  it  show  his  love 
to  make  such  wonderful  preparations  for  their  salvation ;  and, 
after  all,  permit  so  large  a  portion  of  them  to  be  eternally  lost  ? 
If  we  could  save  the  life  of  a  fellow-being  by  merely  putting 
forth  a  hand,  would  it  display  our  love  for  him  if  we  should 
choose  to  travel  all  around  the  earth,  and  incur  incredible  hard- 
ships and  sufferings  in  order  to  save  him  ?  .Would  this  display 
our  love,  we  ask,  or  our  folly  ?  Is  it  not  evident,  then,  that  the 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  279 

principle  that  virtue  or  holiness  might  be  easily  caused  to  exist 
everywhere,  is  utterly  repugnant  to  the  glory  of  revelation  ?  Is 
it  not  evident  that  it  causes  the  transcendent  glory  of  the  cross 
to  disappear,  and  reduces  the  whole  complicated  system  of 
means  and  appliances  for  the  salvation  of  the  world  to  a  mere 
idle  mockery  of  the  miseries  of  man's  estate  ?  Does  it  not 
show  the  whole  plan  of  salvation,  as  conceived  and  executed  by 
the  infinite  wisdom  of  God,  to  be  an  awkward  and  bungling 
attempt  to  accomplish  an  end,  which  might  have  been  far  more 
easily  and  perfectly  accomplished?  And  if  so,  does  it  not  be- 
come all  Christian  theologians  to  expunge  this  false  principle 
from  their  systems,  and  eradicate  it  from  their  thoughts  ? 

SECTION  II. 
The  sufferings  of  Clirist  a  bright  manifestation  of  the  goodness  of  God. 

The  reason  why  the  love  of  God  does  not  appear  to  all  men  in 
the  sacrifice  of  his  Son  is,  that  it  is  often  viewed,  riot  as  it  is  in 
itself,  but  through  the  distorting  medium  of  false  analogies,  or 
of  a  vague  and  ill-defined  phraseology.  Hence  it  is  that  the 
melancholy  spectacle  is  everywhere  presented  of  men,  of  rational 
and  immortal  beings,  living  and  dying  in  a  determined  opposi- 
tion to  a  doctrine  which  they  have  not  taken  the  pains  to  under- 
stand, and  of  whose  intrinsic  grandeur  and  glory  they  have  not 
enjoyed  the  most  remote  glimpse.  So  far  from  beholding  the 
love  of  God,  which  shines  forth  so  conspicuously  in  the  cross  of 
Christ,  they  see  in  it  only  an  act  of  inj  ustice  and  cruelty  on  the 
part  of  God. 

One  source  of  this  error,  we  have  no  doubt,  is  to  be  found  in 
the  use,  or  rather  in  the  abuse,  of  the  term  punishment.  In  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  it  is  not  only  unjust,  but  impossible,  for 
God  to  punish  the  innocent.  The  very  idea  of  punishment,  ac- 
cording to  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  implies  the  notion  of 
guilt  or  ill-desert  in  the  person  upon  whom  it  is  inflicted.  It  is 
Buffering  inflicted  on  an  offender,  on  account  of  his  real  or  sup- 
posed personal  guilt.  Hence,  as  God  regards  all  things  just  as 
they  are  in  themselves,  he  cannot  possibly  look  upon  the  inno- 
cent as  guilty ;  and  consequently  he  cannot,  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word,  inflict  punishment  upon  them.  And  when  we 
speak  of  the  punishment  of  Christ,  we  merely  mean,  or  should 


280  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  II, 

merely  mean,  to  convey  the  idea  that  he  suffered,  in  order  to 
release  us  from  the  punishment  due  to  our  sins.  It  would  be 
well,  perhaps,  if  this  could  always  be  borne  in  mind ;  for  most 
men  are  more  under  the  influence  and  power  of  words  than 
they  are  apt  to  see,  or  willing  to  acknowledge.  The  mere  ex- 
pression, the  punishment  of  the  innocent,  is  apt  to  awaken 
associations  in  the  mind  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  dictates 
of  justice;  but  which  the  idea  of  the  atonement  would  never 
have  suggested,  if  clearly  and  distinctly  viewed  in  its  own  clear 
light,  and  not  through  the  dark  medium  of  an  ill-defined 
phraseology. 

Another  source  of  the  error  in  question  is  to  be  found  in  the 
ambiguity  of  the  term  justice.  It  is  frequently  said  that  the 
atonement  is  a  satisfaction  to  divine  justice ;  to  which  it  is 
replied,  that  justice  requires  the  punishment  of  the  very  indi- 
vidual who  offends,  and  not  of  another  person  in  his  place.  Let 
us  consider  this  subject. 

The  term  justice  has  two  distinct  significations,  which  1 
shall  designate  by  the  epithets  retributive  and  administrative. 
By  retributive  justice,  I  mean  that  attribute  which  inclines 
Him  to  punish  an  offender  merely  on  account  of  the  intrinsic 
demerit  and  hatefulness  of  his  offence  ;  and  which  animadverts 
upon  the  evil  conduct  of  a  moral  agent,  considered  as  an  indi- 
vidual, and  not  as  a  member  of  the  great  family  of  intelligent 
beings.  This  attribute  seeks  to  punish  sin  merely  because  it 
deserves  punishment,  and  not  because  its  punishment  is  neces- 
sary to  secure  the  ends  of  government ;  and,  supposing  sin  to 
exist,  it  would  have  its  object,  even  if  there  were  only  one  ac- 
countable creature  in  the  universe. 

The  object  of  public  or  administrative  justice  is  quite  differ- 
ent. It  inflicts  punishment,  not  because  it  is  deserved,  but  in 
order  to  prevent  transgression,  and  to  secure  the  general  good, 
by  securing  the  ends  of  wise  and  good  government.  In  the 
moral  government  of  God,  one  of  the  highest  objects  of  this 
kind  of  justice,  or,  if  you  please,  of  this  phase  or  manifestation 
of  the  divine  justice,  is  to  secure  in  the  hearts  of  its  subjects  a 
cordial  approbation  of  the  principles  according  to  which  they 
are  governed.  This  is  indispensable  to  the  very  existence  of 
moral  government.  The  dominion  of  force,  or  of  power,  may 
be  maintained,  in  many  cases,  notwithstanding  the  aversion  of 


Chapter  EL]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  281 

those  who  are  subject  to  it;  but  it  is  impossible  to  govern  the 
heart  by  love  while  it  disapproves  and  hates  the  principles  to 
which  it  is  required  to  submit,  or  the  character  of  the  ruler  by 
whom  those  principles  are  enforced. 

Now,  it  is  very  true,  that  Christ  has  made  a  satisfaction  to 
divine  justice.  This  is  frequently  asserted ;  but  it  is  seldom 
considered,  we  apprehend,  with  any  very  great  degree  of  dis- 
tinctness, in  what  sense  the  term  justice  should  always  be 
understood  in  this  proposition.  It  cannot  properly  refer  to  the 
retributive  justice  of  God.  This  requires  the  punishment  of 
the  offender,  and  of  no  one  else.  It  accepts  of  no  substitute. 
And  hence,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  that  it  can  be  satisfied, 
except  by  the  punishment  of  the  offender  himself.  The  object 
of  this  sort  of  justice,  as  I  have  said,  is  personal  guilt;  and 
hence,  as  our  Saviour  did  not  become  personally  guilty,  when 
he  assumed  our  place  and  consented  to  die  for  us,  so  it  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  that  he  became  liable  to  the  infliction  of  the 
retributive  justice  of  God.  And  we  suppose  it  is  this  idea,  at 
which  the  Socinian  vaguely  and  obscurely  aims,  when  he  says, 
that  the  justice  of  God  requires  the  punishment  of  the  trans- 
gressor alone ;  and  that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  it  can  be  satisfied 
by  the  substitution  of  the  innocent  in  his  stead.  He  denies  the 
whole  doctrine  of  satisfaction,  because  he  sees  and  feels  that  it 
is  not  true  according  to  one  meaning  of  the  terms  in  which  it  is 
expressed. 

In  truth  and  in  deed,  the  sinner  is  just  as  guilty  after  the 
atonement  as  he  was  before  ;  and  he  is  just  as  obnoxious  to  the 
inflictions  of  the  retributive  justice  of  God.  He  may  be  most 
justly  punished ;  for  as  the  claims  of  retributive  justice  have 
not  been  satisfied,  so  they  may  be  demanded  of  him  without 
being  a  second  time  exacted.  He  really  deserves  the  wrath  of 
God  on  account  of  his  sins,  although  administrative  justice  has 
been  satisfied ;  and  hence,  when  he  truly  repents  and  believes, 
all  his  sins  are  freely  and  graciously  remitted.  No  satisi action 
is  made  to  retributive  justice. 

It  is  the  administrative  justice  of  God  that  has  been  satisfied 
by  the  atonement.  This  merely  enforces  the  punishment  of  the 
sinner,  as  I  have  said,  in  order  to  secure  the  ends  of  good 
government ;  and  hence,  it  is  capable  of  yielding  and  giving 
place  to  any  expedient  by  which  those  ends  may  be  secured. 


282  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

In  other  words,  it  is  capable  of  being  satisfied  by  whatever 
method  God  may  be  pleased  to  adopt  in  order  to  secure  the 
ends  of  good  government,  and  to  accomplish  his  own  glorious 
designs,  without  the  punishment  of  the  sinner.  All  this,  as  \ve 
shall  see  hereafter,  has  been  most  gloriously  accomplished  by 
the  death  and  sufferings  of  Christ.  God  can  now  be  just,  and 
yet  the  justifier  of  him  that  believes.  The  great  obstacles  which 
the  administrative  justice  of  God  interposes  to  the  forgiveness 
of  sin,  having  been  taken  out  of  the  way  and  nailed  to  the 
cross,  that  unbounded  mercy  from  which  the  provision  of  such 
a  Saviour  proceeded,  can  now  flow  down  upon  a  lost  and 
ruined  world  in  all  the  fulness  and  plenitude  of  its  pardoning 
and  sanctifying  power. 

As  a  general  thing,  those  who  undertake  to  vindicate  the 
sufferings  of  Christ  against  objections,  rest  their  defence  on  the 
ground  that  they  are  a  satisfaction  to  the  administrative  justice 
of  God.  This  is  seen,  not  from  their  express  declarations,  but 
from  the  nature  of  their  arguments  and  defence ;  as  if  they 
unconsciously  turned  to  this  position  as  to  their  stronghold. 
On  the  other  hand,  those  who  assail  the  sacrifice  of  Christ, 
almost  invariably  treat  it  as  if  it  were  a  satisfaction  to  the 
retributive  justice  of  God.  Both  sides  seem  to  be  right,  and 
both  wrong.  The  whole  idea  of  satisfaction  to  divine  justice 
by  a  substitute  is  not  absurd,  because  the  idea  of  satisfaction 
to  retributive  justice  is  so  ;  nor  is  the  whole  justice  of  God,  or 
the  justice  of  God  in  every  sense  of  the  word,  to  be  conceived 
of  as  satisfied  by  the  atonement,  because  his  administrative 
justice  is  thus  satisfied.  When  it  is  thus  asserted,  then,  that 
the  justice  of  God  is  satisfied  by  the  atonement ;  we  should  be 
careful,  we  think,  to  observe  in  what  precise  sense  this  propo- 
sition is  true,  and  in  what  sense  it  is  false  ;  in  order  that  we 
may  pursue  the  clear  and  shining  light  of  truth,  neither  dis- 
tracted by  the  clamour  of  words  nor  enveloped  in  clouds  of 
logomachy. 

There  is  a  class  of  theologians,  we  are  aware,  and  a  very 
large  class,  who  regard  the  sufferings  of  Christ  as  a  satisfaction 
to  the  retributive  justice  of  God.  J3ut  this  forms  no  part  of  the 
doctrine  which  we  have  undertaken  to  defend ;  and,  indeed, 
we  think  the  defence  of  such  a  view  of  the  atonement  clearly 
impossible.  It  is  placed  on  the  ground,  that  the  sins  of  the 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  283 

world,  or  of  those  for  whom  Christ  died,  have  been  imputed  to 
him  ;  and  hence  he  really  suffers  the  inflictions  of  the  retri- 
butive justice  of  God.  The  objections  to  this  scheme,  which 
seek  to  remove  the  apparent  hardships  and  injustice  of  the 
sufferings  of  the  innocent,  by  the  fiction  of  the  imputation  of 
the  sins  of  the  guilty,  wre  shall  not  dwell  upon  here ;  as  we  so 
fully  considered  them  in  the  preceding  chapter.  To  our  mind 
they  are  plainly  unanswerable.  We  would  vindicate  the  suf- 
ferings of  Christ  no  more  than  those  of  infants,  on  the  ground 
that  sin  was  imputed  to  him,  so  as  to  render  them  just.  On 
the  contrary,  we  hold  them  to  have  been  wholly  undeserved ; 
and  instead  of  vindicating  them  on  the  ground  of  stern  justice, 
we  vindicate  them  on  the  ground  of  the  infinite,  unbounded, 
and  overflowing  goodness  of  God. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  such  a  view  of  the  atonement  does  not 
in  the  least  degree  conflict  with  the  justice  of  God.  It  merely 
teaches,  that  God  has  provided  for  the  salvation  of  the  world  by 
the  sufferings  of  Jesus  Christ,  who  was  without  spot  or  blemish. 
Surely  we  cannot  find  it  in  our  hearts  to  object,  that  the  suffer- 
ings of  Christ  for  such  a  purpose  are  not  consistent  with  the 
j  ustice  of  God,  if  wre  will  only  read  a  single  page  in  the  great 
volume  of  nature  and  of  providence.  It  has  been  said  by 
Bishop  Butler,  that  such  an  objection  "  concludes  altogether  as 
much  against  God's  whole  original  constitution  of  nature,  and 
the  whole  daily  course  of  divine  providence,  in  the  government 
of  the  world,  i.  e.,  against  the  whole  scheme  of  theism  and  the 
whole  notion  of  religion,  as  against  Christianity.  For  the  world 
is  a  constitution,  or  system,  wrhose  parts  have  a  mutual  refer- 
ence to  each  other ;  and  there  is  a  scheme  of  things  gradually 
carrying  on,  called  the  course  of  nature,  to  the  carrying  on  of 
which  God  has  appointed  us,  in  various  ways,  to  contribute. 
And  when,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  providence,  it  is 
appointed  that  innocent  people  should  suffer  for  the  faults  of 
the  guilty,  this  is  liable  to  the  very  same  objection  as  the 
instance  we  are  considering.  The  infinitely  greater  importance 
of  that  appointment  of  Christianity  which  is  objected  against, 
does  not  hinder  but  that  it  may  be,  as  it  plainly  is,  an  appoint- 
ment of  the  very  same  kind  with  what  the  world  affords  us 
daily  examples  of.  Nay,  if  there  were  any  force  at  all  in  the 
objection,  it  would  be  stronger,  in  one  respect,  against  natural 


1284  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

providence,  than  against  Christianity ;  because,  under  the 
former,  we  are  in  many  cases  commanded,  and  even  necessi- 
tated, whether  we  will  or  no,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others, 
whereas  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  voluntary." 

Now,  how  very  unreasonable  is  it  in  the  theist,  to  object 
against  Christianity,  that  it  represents  God  as  having  acted  upon 
a  particular  principle,  i.  e.,  as  having  appointed  the  innocent  to 
suffer  for  the  good  of  the  guilty,  when  we  see  that  he  has 
everywhere  recognised  and  adopted  the  very  same  principle  in 
the  government  of  the  world  ?  However  remote  this  principle 
may  appear  from  the  conceptions  of  man,  it  is  not  only  found 
in  the  volume  of  inspiration ;  it  is  deeply  engraven  by  the 
finger  of  God  himself  upon  every  page  of  the  volume  of  natu- 
ral providence.  And  to  question  the  divine  original  of  revela- 
tion, because  it  contains  such  a  principle  or  appointment,  while 
we  admit  that  God  created  and  governs  the  world,  is  about  as 
unreasonable  as  it  would  be  to  deny  that  a  letter  came  from  a 
particular  person,  because  it  was  clearly  written  in  his  hand- 
writing, and  bore  evident  traces  of  his  peculiarities  of  style  and 
thought. 

Let  us  view  this  general  principle  in  a  particular  instance. 
This  will  set  it  in  a  clear  and  striking  light,  and  seem  to  vindi- 
cate the  constitution  of  the  world,  as  well  as  the  doctrine  of  the 
atonement.  The  principle  of  compassion  has  been  planted  in 
our  bosom  by  the  finger  of  God.  And  thus  the  necessity  is  laid 
upon  us,  by  a  law  of  our  nature,  to  suffer  on  account  of  the 
distresses  which  our  fellow-men  bring  upon  themselves  by  their 
own  crimes  and  vices  ;  and  we  are  impelled  in  various  ways  to 
undergo  inconvenience  and  loss,  and  self-denial  and  suffering, 
in  order  to  avert  from  them  the  consequences  of  their  own  mis- 
conduct. But  have  we  any  reason  to  complain  of  this  appoint- 
ment of  God  ?  Certainly  not :  for  if  we  obey  the  indications 
of  his  will,  as  seen  in  this  part  of  the  constitution  of  our  nature, 
by  doing  all  in  our  power  to  relieve  the  distresses  of  our  fellow- 
men,  we  shall  be  infinitely  more  than  repaid  for  all  that  we 
may  undergo  and  suffer.  However  painful  may  be  the  feeling 
of  compassion,  we  only  have  to  obey  its  dictates  by  relieving 
the  distressed  to  the  utmost  of  our  ability,  and  we  shall  be  more 
than  repaid  by  the  satisfaction  and  delight  which  never  fail  to 
result  from  such  a  course  of  life  ;  to  say  nothing  of  those  infinite 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  285 

rewards  which  God  has  prepared  for  those  who  sincerely  love 
and  serve  him. 

Just  so  it  is  in  relation  to  the  sufferings  of  Christ.  Pie  was 
led  by  his  boundless  compassion  to  avert  from  us  the  awful 
consequences  of  sin,  by  the  agony,  and  the  sufferings,  and  the 
death,  which  he  endured  upon  the  cross.  And,  according  to 
the  doctrine  of  atonement,  he  is  infinitely  more  than  repaid  for 
all  this.  Though  lie  suffered  in  the  flesh,  and  was  made  a  spec- 
tacle to  men  and  angels,  yet  he  despised  the  shame,  seeing  the 
joy  that  was  set  before  him.  We  do  confess  that  we  can  see 
no  insufferable  hardship  in  all  this,  nor  the  least  shadow  of 
injustice.  One  thing  is  certain,  if  injustice  is  exhibited  here, 
it  is  exhibited  everywhere  in  the  providence  of  God ;  and  if  the 
doctrine  of  the  atonement  were  stricken  from  the  scheme  of 
Christianity,  the  injustice  which  is  supposed  to  attend  it  would 
still  continue  to  overhang  and  cloud  the  moral  government  of 
God.  And  hence,  if  the  deist  or  the  Socinian  would  escape 
from  this  frightful  spectre  of  his  own  imagination,  he  must  bury 
himself  in  the  most  profound  depths  and  most  cheerless  gloom 
of  atheism. 

The  doctrine  in  question  is  frequently  misrepresented,  and 
made  to  appear  inconsistent  with  the  justice  of  God,  by  means 
of  false  analogies.  The  Socinian  frequently  speaks  of  it,  as  if  it 
were  parallel  with  the  proceeding  of  a  human  government  that 
should  doom  the  innocent  to  suffer  in  place  of  the  guilty.  Thus 
the  feeling  of  indignation  that  is  aroused  in  the  human  bosom 
at  the  idea  of  a  virtuous  man's  being  sentenced  to  suffer  the 
punishment  due  to  the  criminal  is  sought  to  be  directed  against 
the  doctrine  of  the  atonement.  But  in  vain  will  such  rhetoric 
be  employed  to  excite  indignation  and  horror  against  the  doc- 
trine of  the  cross,  in  the  mind  of  any  person  by  whom  it  is  at 
all  understood. 

The  cases  are  not  at  all  parallel.  In  the  first  place,  no  human 
government  has  a  right  to  doom  a  virtuous  man  to  bear  the 
punishment  due  to  the  criminal ;  and  if  he  were  willing  to  suf- 
fer in  the  place  of  the  culprit,  no  government  on  earth  has  a 
right  to  accept  of  such  a  substitute.  The  life  of  the  virtuous 
citizen  is  the  gift  of  God,  and  no  earthly  power  has  the  author- 
ity to  take  it  for  any  such  purpose.  It  would  be  a  violation  of 
the  will  of  God  for  any  human  government  to  admit  of  such  a 


286  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

substitution.  On  the  contrary,  Christ  had  the  power  to  lay 
down  his  life ;  and  he  did  so,  in  perfect  accordance  with 
the  appointment  of  God.  In  submitting  to  the  death  of  the 
cross,  he  did  not  subvert,  he  fulfilled  the  end  of  his  earthly 
existence. 

Secondly,  it  would  overthrow  the  ends  of  public  justice  for 
any  human  government  to  permit  a  good  man,  the  ornament 
and  blessing  of  society,  to  die  in  the  room  of  the  criminal,  its 
scourge  and  plague.  The  sufferings  of  the  good  citizen  in  such 
a  case  would  be  pure  and  unmitigated  evil.  While  they  would 
deprive  society  of  his  services,  they  would  throw  back  upon  it 
the  burden  of  one  who  deserved  to  die.  They  would  tend  to 
render  the  punishment  of  crime  uncertain ;  they  would  shock 
the  moral  sentiments  of  mankind,  and  cover  with  odium  and 
disgrace  the  government  that  could  tolerate  such  a  proceeding. 
But  not  so  in  relation  to  the  sufferings  of  Christ.  He  assumed, 
his  human  nature  for  the  express  purpose  of  dying  upon  the 
cross.  He  died,  not  to  deliver  an  individual  and  turn  him  loose 
to  commit  further  depredations  upon  society,  but  to  effect  the 
salvation  of  the  world  itself,  and  to  deliver  it  from  all  the  evils 
under  which  it  groans  and  travails  in  pain.  He  died  for  sin- 
ners, not  that  they  might  continue  in  their  sins,  but  in  order  to 
redeem  unto  himself  a  peculiar  people  zealous  of  good  works. 

In  the  third  and  last  place,  the  death  of  a  good  man  is  the 
end  of  his  existence,  the  entire  extinction  of  his  being,  in  so 
far  as  all  human  government  is  concerned  ;  whereas  the  death 
of  Christ,  in  relation  to  the  government  of  God,  wras  but  the 
beginning  of  his  exaltation  and  glory.  He  endured  the  cross, 
despising  the  shame,  in  view  of  the  unbounded  joy  that  \vas 
set  before  him.  The  temporal  evils  which  he  endured,  unut- 
terably great  as  they  were,  if  viewed  merely  in  relation  to 
himself,  were  infinitely  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  eter- 
nal satisfaction  and  delight  that  resulted  from  them. 


SECTION  IIL 

The  objections  of  Dr.  Channing,  and  other  Unitarians,  against  the  doctrine 
of  the  atonement. 

It  is  likewise  objected  against  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement, 
that  it  obscures  the  freeness  and  glory  of  the  divine  mercy.     It 


Chapter  III.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  287 

is  supposed  to  interfere  with  the  freeness  of  the  favour  of  God, 
inasmuch  as  it  requires  a  sacrifice  to  procure  the  remission  of 
sin.  This  point,  no  less  than  the  former,  the  Socinian  endeavours 
to  establish  by  means  of  analogies  drawn  from  the  ordinary 
transactions  of  life.  "  I  know  it  is  said,"  says  Dr.  Channing, 
"that  Trmitarianism  magnifies  God's  mercy,  because  it  teaches 
that  he  himself  provided  the  substitute  for  the  guilty.  But  I 
reply,  that  the  work  here  ascribed  to  mercy  is  not  the  most 
appropriate,  nor  the  most  fitted  to  manifest  it  and  impress  it  on 
the  heart.  This  may  be  made  apparent  by  familiar  illustration. 
Suppose  that  a  creditor,  through  compassion  to  certain  debtors, 
should  persuade  a  benevolent  and  opulent  man  to  pay  him  in 
their  stead;  would  not  the  debtors  see  a  greater  mercy,  and 
feel  a  weightier  obligation,  if  they  were  to  receive  a  free, 
gratuitous  release  ?  And  will  not  their  chief  gratitude  stray 
beyond  the  creditor  to  their  benevolent  substitute  ?  Or  sup- 
pose that  a  parent,  unwilling  to  inflict  a  penalty  on  a  disobedient 
but  feeble  child,  should  persuade  a  stronger  child  to  bear  it ; 
would  not  the  offender  see  a  more  touching  mercy  in  a  free 
forgiveness,  springing  immediately  from  a  parent's  heart,  than 
in  this  circuitous  remission'?" 

If  there  were  any  force  in  such  analogies,  they  would  con- 
clude quite  as  much  against  the  scheme  of  Dr.  Channing  as 
against  ours.  For  he  maintains  that  the  sinner  can  obtain  for- 
giveness only  by  a  sincere  repentance  of  his  sins.  He  teaches 
that  God  requires  the  sinner  to  humble  himself,  and  take  up  his 
cross  and  follow  Christ.  Now  to  return  to  the  case  of  the 
debtor.  Would  he  not  see  a  greater  kindness,  "and  feel  a 
weightier  obligation,"  if  he  were  to  receive  a  free  release,  with- 
out any  conditions  being  imposed  upon  him,  than  if  it  was 
accompanied  by  any  terms  or  conditions  ? 

But  the  analogy  is  false.  However  well  it  might  serve  some 
purposes,  it  is  misapplied  by  Dr.  Channing.  If  a  creditor  is 
known  to  love  money,  as  most  men  are,  and  he  should  never- 
theless release  his  debtors ;  this  would  undoubtedly  be  an 
exhibition  of  his  kindness.  And  we  might  measure  the  extent 
of  his  kindness  by  the  amount  of  the  indebtedness  which  he  had 
forgiven.  But  although  the  creditor,  who  is  the  most  easily 
moved  by  the  necessities  of  his  debtor,  may  be  the  most  com 
passionate  man,  it  does  not  follo\v  that  the  governor,  who  under 


288  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

all  circumstances,  makes  the  most  free  and  unrestrained  use  of 
the  pardoning  power,  is  the  best  ruler.  The  creditor  has  a 
perfect  right  to  release  his  debtor ;  and  in  so  doing,  he  affects 
the  interest  of  no  one  but  himself:  whereas,  by  the  pardon  of 
offences  against  public  law,  the  most  sacred  rights  of  the  com- 
munity may  be  disregarded,  the  protection  of  law  may  be 
removed,  and  the  general  good  invaded.  The  penalty  of  the 
law  does  not  belong  to  the  supreme  executive,  as  a  debt  belongs 
to  the  creditor  to  whom  it  is  due ;  and  hence  it  cannot  always 
be  abandoned  at  his  pleasure.  It  is  ordained,  not  merely  for 
the  ruler,  but  for  the  benefit  and  protection  of  all  who  are  sub- 
ject to  its  control.  And  hence,  although  a  creditor  may  show 
his  mercy  by  releasing  his  necessitous  debtors ;  yet  the  ruler 
who  undertakes  to  display  his  mercy  by  a  free  use  of  the  par- 
doning power,  may  only  betray  a  weak  and  yielding  compassion 
for  the  individual,  instead  of  manifesting  that  calm  and  enlight- 
ened benevolence  which  labours  to  secure  the  foundations  of 
wise  and  good  government,  and  thereby  to  promote  the  order 
and  happiness  of  the  governed. 

This  leads  me  to  remark,  that  the  hope  and  the  theology  of 
the  Socinian  is  built  upon  the  most  inadequate  conceptions  of 
the  divine  mercy.  This  is  not  a  weak  and  yielding  thing,  as 
men  are  so  fondly  prone  to  imagine ;  it  is  a  universal  and 
inflexible  law.  The  most  perfect  harmony  exists  among  all  the 
attributes  of  God  ;  and  as  his  justice  demands  the  punishment 
of  the  sinner,  so  also  doth  his  mercy.  The  bosom  of  God  is  not, 
like  that  of  frail  mortals,  torn  and  distracted  by  conflicting 
principles.  Even  to  the  maintenance  of  his  law,  that  bright 
transcript  of  his  eternal  justice,  his  mercy  is  inviolably  pledged. 
Heaven  and  earth  shall  sooner  pass  away,  than  his  mercy  shall 
withdraw  from  the  support  of  one  jot  or  one  tittle  of  it.  It  is 
not  only  just  and  holy,  and  therefore  will  be  maintained  with 
almighty  power ;  but  it  is  also  good,  and  therefore  its  immutable 
foundations  are  laid  in  the  everlasting  and  unchanging  mercy 
of  God. 

For  the  universal  good,  it  will  be  inexorably  enforced  against 
the  individual  transgressor.  God  is  not  slack  concerning  his 
promises.  He  is  free  from  all  human  weakness.  His  mind  is 
not  limited,  like  that  of  man,  to  be  more  affected  by  partial 
suffering  than  by  that  universal  disorder  and  ruin  which  must 


Chapt«r  m.l  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GODv  ' 

If  TJiN : 

inevitably  result  from  the  unrequited  violation  of  his  law.  The 
mind  of  man  is  unduly  affected  by  the  present  and  the  proxi- 
mate :  but  to  God  there  is  neither  remote  nor  future.  And 
when,  in  wisdom  and  in  goodness,  he  first  established  and  or- 
dained the  lawr  unto  life,  he  saw  the  end  from  the  beginning ; 
and  lie  can  never  sacrifice  the  universal  good  by  setting  aside 
that  law  in  order  to  avoid  partial  evil.  His  mercy  to  the  whole 
creation  makes  the  same  demand  as  his  justice.  The  execution 
of  divine  justice  is,  indeed,  but  a  manifestation  of  that  mercy 
which  is  over  all  his  works ;  and  which  labours,  with  omnipo- 
tent energy,  to  secure  the  good  of  all,  by  vindicating  the  majesty 
and  glory  of  that  law,  upon  the  preservation  of  which  inviolate 
the  good  of  all  depends.  The  fire  that  is  not  quenched  is 
kindled  by  the  boundless  love  of  God  no  less  than  by  his  justice ; 
and  the  very  fierceness  of  its  burning  is,  that  it  is  the  "  wrath 
of  the  Lamb."  Let  us  not  be  deceived  by  the  vain  fancies  and 
the  idle  dreams  which  our  fond  wishes  and  narrow-minded  in- 
firmities are  so  apt  to  beget  in  us.  Let  us  remember  that  the 
mercy  of  God  is  united  with  omniscience ;  and  that  it  is  to  be 
found  only  in  the  bosom  of  Him  whose  empire  extends  to  the 
utmost  bounds  of  the  universe,  as  well  as  throughout  the  end- 
less ages  of  eternity. 

In  the  genuine  spirit  of  Socinian  theology,  Dr.  Channing,  in 
his  illustration,  has  set  before  us  the  mercy  of  God  alone ;  and 
that,  too,  merely  in  relation  to  the  sinner,  and  not  in  relation  to 
his  law  and  government.  He  entirely  overlooks  the  fact,  that 
it  is  impossible  to  exhibit  either  the  justice  or  the  mercy  of 
God  in  the  most  affecting  manner,  except  in  union  with  each 
other.  It  is  frequently  said,  we  are  aware,  that  if  God  had 
pardoned  the  sinner  without  enforcing  the  demands  of  the  law, 
he  would  have  displayed  his  mercy  alone,  and  not  his  justice; 
but  in  fact  this  would  have  been  a  very  equivocal  display  of 
mercy.  It  would  have  shown  only  one  of  two  things :  either 
that  God  regarded  the  sinner  with  an  eye  of  compassion,  or  that 
he  did  not  regard  his  sin :  either  that  he  was  merciful,  or  that 
he  had  no  great  abhorrence  of  sin :  either  that  he  loved  the 
transgressor,  or  that  he  did  not  hate  the  transgression. 

To  illustrate  this  point,  let  us  take  the  case  of  Zaleucus,  the 
king  of  the  Locrians.  He  passed  a  certain  law,  with  the  penalty 
that  every  transgressor  of  it  should  lose  both  his  eyes.  It  so 

19 


200  NATURAL  EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Part  IT, 

happened  that  his  own  son  was  the  first  by  whom  it  was  vio- 
lated. Now,  any  one  can  see,  that  although  Zaleucus  had 
been  a  hard-hearted  and  unfeeling  tyrant,  he  might  have  par- 
doned his  son,  just  because  he  had  no  regard  to  the  demands 
of  public  justice ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  that  he  might  have 
inflicted  the  penalty  of  the  law  upon  his  son  to  the  uttermost, 
not  out  of  a  supreme  regard  to  the  law,  but  because  he  was 
destitute  of  mercy  and  natural  affection.  Neither  by  remitting 
the  whole  punishment,  nor  by  inflicting  it  with  rigour,  could  he 
have  made  such  a  display  of  his  justice  and  mercy  as  to  make 
a  deep  moral  impression  upon  his  subjects.  In  other  words,  if 
either  of  these  attributes  had  been  left  out  in  the  manifestation, 
the  display  of  the  other  must  have  been  exceedingly  feeble  and 
equivocal.  Both  must  be  seen  in  union,  or  neither  can  be  seen 
in  the  fulness  of  its  glory. 

How,  then,  could  Zaleucus  have  displayed  both  of  these  at- 
tributes in  the  most  perfect  and  affecting  manner?  By  doing 
precisely  that  which  he  is  said  to  have  done.  He  directed  that 
one  of  his  own  eyes  should  be  put  out,  and  one  of  his  son's. 
Whose  heart  is  not  touched  by  this  most  affecting  display  of  the 
tender  pity  of  the  father,  in  union  with  the  stern  justice  of  the 
iaw-giver?  His  pity  would  not  allow  him  to  inflict  the  whole 
penalty  upon  his  beloved  son ;  and  his  high  regard  for  the  de- 
mands of  public  justice  would  not  permit  him  to  set  at  naught 
the  authority  of  the  law :  and  but  for  the  possession  and  mani- 
festation of  this  last  trait  of  character,  the  mighty  strugglings 
and  yearnings  of  the  first  could  not  have  burst  forth  and  ap- 
peared with  such  overwhelming  power  and  transcendent  lustre. 
Hence,  every  system  of  redemption  which,  like  that  of  the 
Socinian,  leaves  out  of  view  the  administrative  justice  of  God, 
does  not  admit  of  any  very  impressive  display  of  his  goodness 
and  his  mercy. 

All  such  illustrations  must  be  imperfect,  in  some  respects, 
but  the  one  above  given  conveys  a  far  more  adequate  view  of 
the  atonement  than  that  presented  by  Dr.  Channing.  The 
application  of  it  is  easy.  Such  was  the  mercy  of  God,  that  he 
could  not  leave  his  poor  fallen  creatures  to  endure  the  awful 
penalty  of  the  law ;  and  such  was  his  regard  for  the  purity  and 
happiness  of  the  universe,  that  he  could  not  permit  his  law  to 
be  violated  with  impunity.  If  his  administrative  justice  had 


Chapter  IH/|  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  291 

not  stood  in  the  way,  the  offer  of  pardon  to  the  sinner  would 
have  cost  him  merely  a  word.  And  hence  the  length,  the 
breadth,  and  the  depth  of  his  love  could  not  have  been  mani- 
fested. But  he  was  the  Ruler  of  the  universe,  and  as  such  his 
law  stood  in  the  way.  He  owed  it  to  himself  not  to  permit  this 
to  be  trampled  under  foot  with  impunity,  nor  its  violation  to  be 
forgive.!,  until  he  had  provided  some  way  in  order  to  secure 
the  high  and  holy  ends  for  which  it  had  been  established. 
Hence,  as  it  was  not  possible  for  God  to  deny  himself,  he  sent 
forth  his  beloved  Son,  who  had  been  the  companion  of  his 
bosom  and  his  blessedness  from  all  eternity,  to  take  upon  him- 
self the  form  of  a  servant,  and  by  his  teaching,  and  obedience, 
and  sufferings,  and  death,  to  vindicate  the  majesty  of  the  law, 
and  to  render  it  honourable  in  the  sight  of  the  universe.  And 
it  is  this  wonderful  union  of  the  goodness  and  the  severity,  of 
the  mercy  and  the  j  ustice  of  God,  which  constitutes  the  grand 
moral  tendency  and  glory  of  the  cross. 

The  bourse  pursued  by  the  king  of  the  Locrians,  in  relation 
to  the  crime  of  his  son,  secured  the  ends  of  the  law  in  a  much 
greater  degree  than  they  could  have  been  secured  by  a  rigor- 
ous execution  of  its  penalty  upon  the  person  of  his  son.  It 
evinced  a  deep  and  settled  abhorrence  of  crime,  and  an  inflexi- 
ble determination  to  punish  it.  It  cut  off  all  hope  from  his 
subjects  that  crime  would  be  permitted  to  escape  with  impunity. 
An3  hence,  after  such  a  manifestation  of  his  character  as  a 
king,  he  could  permit  his  son  to  enjoy  the  unspeakable  blessings 
of  sight,  without  holding  out  the  least  encouragement  to  the 
commission  of  crime. 

So,  likewise,  in  relation  to  the  sufferings  of  Christ.  These 
were  not,  in  strictness,  the  penalty  of  the  law.  This  was  eternal 
death  ;  whereas  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  inconceivably  great  as 
they  were,  were  but  temporal ;  and  there  can  be  no  proportion 
between  sufferings  which  know  a  period,  and  those  which  are 
without  end.  Hence,  as  we  have  already  said,  he  did  not 
satisfy  the  punitive  justice  of  God.  But  the  sacrifice  of  Christ 
answered  all  the  purposes  that  could  have  been  answered  by 
the  rigorous  execution  of  the  law  ;  and  it  answered  them  in  an 
infinitely  greater  degree,  than  if  the  human  race  had  been  per- 
mitted to  endure  it  without  remedy. 

God's  love  to  his  Son  was  inconceivably  greater  than  that 


292  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

which  any  creature  ever  bore  to  himself  or  to  any  other ;  and, 
consequently,  by  offering  him  up  as  a  substitute  for  guilty 
mortals,  in  order  that  he  might  save  them  without  doing 
violence  to  his  administrative  justice,  he  manifested  the  infinite 
energy  of  his  determination  to  destroy  sin.  No  account  of  the 
indescribable  odiousness  and  deformity  of  evil,  nor  of  the  incon- 
ceivable holiness  of  God,  could  have  made  so  deep  an  impres- 
sion of  his  implacable  abhorrence  of  sin,  as  is  made  by  the  cross 
upon  which  his  Son  was  permitted  to  expire  amid  the  scorn  and 
contempt  of  his  enemies.  The  human  imagination  has  no  power 
to  conceive  of  a  more  impressive  and  appalling  enforcement  of 
the  great  lesson,  "  Stand  in  awe,  and  sin  not,"  than  that  which  is 
presented  to  an  astonished  universe  in  the  cross  and  passion  of 
the  Son  of  God. 

And  besides,  it  possesses  this  other  unspeakable  advantage, 
that  while  it  manifests  an  infinite  abhorrence  of  sin,  it  displays 
the  most  heart-subduing  love  of  the  sinner.  If  Zaleucus  had 
exhausted  the  penalty  of  the  law  upon  his  son,  this  would  have 
had  little  or  no  tendency  to  reform  his  heart,  or  to  induce  him 
to  acquiesce  in  the  justness  of  the  law.  It  would  have  been 
more  apt  to  lead  him  to  regard  the  king  as  an  unfeeling  father. 
But  when  he  was  made  to  see,  by  the  manner  in  which  the 
king  had  dispensed  the  law,  that  he  cherished  the  warmest 
feelings  of  affection  for  him,  there  was  no  cause  left  for  a  mur- 
mur on  the  part  of  any,  but  for  the  highest  admiration  on  the 
part  of  all. 

Just  so  in  relation  to  the  sufferings  and  death  of  Christ.  If 
God  had  exhausted  the  fearful  penalty  of  the  law  upon  poor, 
suffering,  and  degraded  humanity,  this  would  have  been  well 
calculated  to  inspire  his  creatures  with  a  servile  and  trembling 
awe  of  him.  From  their  limited  and  imperfect  views  of  the 
evil  of  sin,  and  of  the  reasons  why  it  should  be  punished,  they 
would  not  have  been  prepared  to  acquiesce  in  such  tremendous 
severity.  Thus,  one  of  the  great  ends  of  God's  moral  govern- 
ment would  have  been  subverted :  the  affections  of  his  creatures 
would  have  been  estranged  from  him,  through  a  distrust  of  his 
goodness  and  a  dread  of  his  power,  instead  of  having  been 
drawn  to  him  by  the  sweet  and  sacred  ties  of  confidence  and 
love.  But  how  different  is  the  case  now !  Having  given  for 
us  his  -beloved  Son,  who  is  greater  than  all  things,  while  we 


Chapter  IH."]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF   GOD.  293 

were  yet  enemies,  now  that  we  are  reconciled  to  him,  we  are 
most  firmly  persuaded  that  he  will  freely  give  us  all  things  that 
can  possibly  conduce  to  our  good.  Surely,  after  such  a  display 
of  his  love,  it  were  highly  criminal  in  us,  to  permit  the  least 
shadow  of  suspicion  or  distrust  to  intercept  the  sweet,  and 
cheering,  and  purifying  beams  of  his  reconciled  countenance. 
Whatever  may  be  his  severity  against  sin,  and  whatever  terror 
it  may  strike  into  the  conscience  of  evil-doers,  we  can  most 
cordially  acquiesce  in  its  justness :  for  we  most  clearly  perceive, 
that  the  penalty  of  the  law  was  not  established  to  gratify  any 
private  appetite  for  revenge,  but  to  uphold  and  secure  the  highest 
happiness  of  the  moral  universe. 


294  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  I  Part  II, 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  ETERNAL  PUNISHMENT  OF  THE  WICKED  RECONCILED  WITH  THE 
GOODNESS  OF  GOD. 

And  thus, 

Transfigured,  with  a  meek  and  dreadless  awe, 
A  solemn  hush  of  spirit,  he  beholds 
All  things  of  terrible  seeming :  yea,  unmoved 
Views  e'en  the  immitigable  ministers, 
That  shower  down  vengeance  on  these  latter  days. 
For  even  these  on  wings  of  healing  come, 
Yea,  kindling  with  intenser  Deity ; 
From  the  celestial  mercy-seat  they  speed, 
And  at  the  renovating  wells  of  love, 
Have  fill'd  their  vials  with  salutary  wrath. — COLE.HIDGE. 

HAVING  considered  the  sufferings  of  the  innocent,  it  no\v 
becomes  necessary  to  contemplate  the  punishment  of  the  guilty, 
in  connexion  with  the  infinite  goodness  of  God.  This  conducts 
us  to  the  consideration  of  the  most  awful  subject  that  ever 
engaged  the  attention  of  a  rational  being, — the  never-ending 
torments  of  the  wicked  in  another  world.  Though  plausible 
arguments  and  objections  have  been  urged  against  this  doctrine, 
we  are  perfectly  satisfied  they  will  not  bear  the  test  of  a  close 
examination.  They  have  derived  all  their  apparent  force  and 
conclusiveness,  it  seems  to  us,  from  two  distinct  sources,  namely : 
from  the  circumstance  that  this  appalling  doctrine  has  been  too 
often  placed,  by  its  advocates,  upon  insecure  and  untenable 
grounds ;  and  from  the  fact,  that  the  supporters  of  this  doctrine 
have  too  often  maintained  principles  from  which  its  fallacy  may 
be  clearly  inferred.  In  the  defence  of  this  doctrine,  then,  we 
shall  endeavour  to  point  out,  first,  the  false  grounds  upon  which 
it  has  been  placed  ;  secondly,  the  unsound  principles  from 
which  its  fallacy  may  be  inferred ;  and,  thirdly,  we  shall  en- 
deavour to  show  the  means  by  which  it  may  be  clearly  and 
satisfactorily  reconciled  with  the  goodness  of  the  Supreme 
Ruler  of  the  world. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  295 


SECTION  L 

The  false  grounds  upon  which  the  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of  future 
ment  has  been  placed. 

Nothing  could  be  more  untenable,  it  seems  to  us,  than  the 
usual  argument  in  favour  of  future  punishments,  which  seeks 
to  justify  their  eternity  on  the  ground  that  every  sinful  act, 
because  it  is  committed  against  an  infinite  being,  is  infinite,  and 
therefore  deserves  to  be  visited  with  endless  torments.  This 
argument,  which  seems  but  little  better  than  a  play  on  the 
term  infinite,  is  perhaps  calculated  to  make  no  impression  upon 
any  mind,  which  is  not  already  fully  persuaded  of  the  truth  of 
the  doctrine  in  question.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  so 
easily  refuted  by  a  multitude  of  considerations,  that  it  exposes 
the  doctrine,  in  one  of  its  defences,  to  the  triumphant  attacks  of 
its  adversaries.  We  shall  not  exhaust  the  patience  of  the  reader 
by  dwelling  upon  the  refutation  which  may  be  given  of  such 
an  argument.  We  shall  dismiss  it  with  a  single  reply,  and  that 
we  shall  give  in  the  language  of  John  Foster. 

"  A  common  argument  has  been  that  sin  is  an  infinite  evil, 
that  is,  of  infinite  demerit,  as  an  offence  against  an  infinite 
being ;  and  that,  since  a  finite  creature  cannot  suffer  infinitely 
in  measure,  he  must  in  duration.  But,  surely  in  all  reason,  the 
limited,  and  in  the  present  instance,  diminutive  nature  of  the 
criminal,  must  be  an  essential  part  of  the  case  for  judgment. 
Every  act  must,  for  one  of  its  proportions,  be  measured  by  the 
nature  and  condition  of  the  agent :  and  it  would  seem  that 
one  principle  in  that  rule  of  proportion  should  be,  that  the 
offending  agent  should  be  capable  of  being  aware  of  the  magni- 
tude (the  amount,  if  we  might  use  such  a  word,)  of  the  offence 
he  commits,  by  being  capable  of  something  like  an  adequate 
conception  of  the  being  against  whom  it  is  committed.  A  per- 
verse child,  committing  an  offence  against  a  great  monarch,  of 
whose  dignity  it  had  some,  but  a  vastly  inadequate  apprehen- 
sion, would  not  be  punished  in  the  same  manner  as  an  offender 
of  high  endowments  and  responsibility,  and  fully  aware  of  the 
digiiity  of  the  personage  offended.  The  one  would  justly  be 
sharply  chastised;  the  other  might  as  justly  be  condemned  to 
death.  In  the  present  case,  the  offender  does  or  may  know  that 


296  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

the  Being  offended  against  is  of  awful  majesty,  and  therefore 
the  offence  is  one  of  great  aggravation,  ani  he  will  justly  be 
punished  with  great  severity ;  but  by  his  extremely  contracted 
and  feeble  faculties,  as  the  lowest  in  the  scale  of  strictly  rational 
and  accountable  creatures  in  the  whole  creation,  he  is  infinitely 
incapable  of  any  adequate  conception  of  the  greatness  of  the 
Being  offended  against.  He  is  then,  according  to  the  argument, 
obnoxious  to  a  punishment  not  in  any  proportion  to  his  own 
nature,  but  alone  to  that  infinity  of  the  supreme  nature,  which 
is  to  him  infinitely  inconceivable  and  unknown."* 

This  answer  alone,  though  perhaps  not  the  best  which  might 
be  made,  we  deem  amply  sufficient.  Indeed,  does  not  the  posi- 
tion, that  a  man,  a  poor,  weak,  fallible  creature,  deserves  an 
infinite  punishment,  an  eternity  of  torments,  for  each  evil 
thought  or  word,  carry  its  own  refutation  along  with  it  ?  And 
if  not,  what  are  we  to  think  of  that  attribute, of  justice,  which 
demands  an  eternity  to  inflict  the  infinite  pangs  due  to  a  single 
sin  ?  Is  it  a  quality  to  inspire  the  soul  with  a  rational  worship, 
or  to  fill  it  with  a  horror  which  casteth  out  love  ? 

Another  argument  to  show  the  infinite  ill-desert  of  some  men, 
is  drawn  from  the  scientia  media  Dei.  It  is  said,  that  if  God 
foresaw  that  if  they  had  been  placed  in  various  other  circum- 
stances, and  surrounded  by  other  temptations,  their  dispositions 
and  character  would  have  induced  them  to  commit  other  sins ; 
for  which  they  are,  therefore,  as  really  responsible  as  if  they 
had  actually  committed  them.  If  this  be  a  correct  principle,  it 
is  easy,  we  must  admit,  to  render  each  individual  of  the  human 
race  responsible  for  a  greater  number  of  sins  than  have  ever 
been  committed,  or  than  could  ever  have  been  committed  by 
all  the  actual  dwellers  upon  the  face  of  the  earth.  Nay,  by 
such  a  process  of  multiplication,  it  would  be  easy  to  spread  the 
guilt  of  a  single  soul  over  every  point  of  infinite  space,  and 
every  moment  of  eternal  duration.  But  such  a  principle  is 
more  than  questionable.  To  say  nothing  of  its  intrinsic  deform- 
ity, it  is  refuted  by  the  consequences  to  which  it  leads.  "We 
want  arguments  on  this  subject,  that  will  give  the  mind,  not 
horrid  caricatures  of  the  divine  justice,  but  such  views  of  that 
sublime  attribute  as  will  inspire  us  with  sentiments  of  admira- 
tion and  love,  as  well  as  with  a  godly  fear  and  wholesome  awe. 

c  Letter  on  the  Duration  of  Future  Punishment,  pp.  19,  20. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  29V 


SECTION  IL 

The  unsound  principles  from  which,  if  true,  the  fallacy  of  the  eternity  of 
future  punishments  may  ~be  clearly  inferred. 

It  is  a  doctrine  maintained  by  Augustine,  Calvin,  and  Luther, 
as  well  as  by  many  of  their  followers,  that,  in  his  fallen  state, 
man  "  is  free  to  evil  only."  He  can  do  nothing  good  without 
the  aid  of  divine  grace ;  and  this,  in  point  of  fact,  is  given  to 
but  a  very  small  number  of  the  human  race  ;  at  least,  efficacious 
grace  is  given  to  but  few,  so  that  the  greater  part  of  mankind 
cannot  acquire  or  possess  that  holiness  without  which  no  man 
shall  see  the  Lord.  Now,  if  we  take  our  stand  upon  this  plat- 
form of  doctrine,  it  will  be  found  utterly  impossible,  we  think, 
to  defend  the  eternity  of  future  punishments. 

It  was  upon  this  platform  that  John  Foster  erected  his  tre- 
mendous battery  against  the  doctrine  in  question;  and  it  is 
believed,  that  the  more  closely  the  argument  is  examined,  the 
more  clearly  it  will  be  seen,  that  he  has  either  demolished  the 
doctrine  which  was  so  obnoxious  to  his  feelings,  or  else  the 
platform  which  constituted  so  essential  a  part  of  his  own  creed. 
In  our  humble  opinion,  "  the  moral  argument,"  as  he  calls  it, 
"  pressed  irresistibly  upon  his  mind ;"  because  it  was  drawn 
from  false  premises,  of  whose  correctness  he  seems  not  to  have 
entertained  the  shadow  of  a  doubt.  He  clung  to  the  conclu- 
sion, when  he  should  have  abandoned  the  premises.  But  we 
shall  give  his  own  words,  and  permit  the  reader  to  judge  for 
himself. 

After  having  endeavoured  to  impress  our  feeble  powers  with 
"  the  stupendous  idea  of  eternity,"  he  adds  :  "  Now  think  of  an 
infliction  of  misery  protracted  through  such  a  period,  and  at  the 
end  of  it  being  only  commenced, — not  one  smallest  step  nearer  a 
conclusion, — the  case  just  the  same  if  that  sum  of  figures  were 
multiplied  by  itself;  and  then  think  of  man, — his  nature,  his 
situation,  the  circumstances  of  his  brief  sojourn  and  trial  on 
earth.  Far  be  it  from  us  to  make  light  of  the  demerit  of  sin, 
and  to  remonstrate  with  the  Supreme  Judge  against  a  severe 
chastisement,  of  whatever  moral  nature  we  may  regard  the 
infliction  to  be.  But  still,  what  is  man  ?  He  comes  into  the 
world  with  a  nature  fatally  corrupt,  and  powerfully  tending  to 


298  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  H, 

actual  evil.  He  comes  among  a  crowd  of  temptations  adapted 
to  his  innate  evil  propensities.  He  grows  up  (incomparably 
the  greater  portion  of  the  race)  in  great  ignorance,  his  judg- 
ment weak,  and  under  numberless  beguilements  into  error; 
while  his  passions  and  appetites  are  strong,  his  conscience 
unequally  matched  against  their  power, — in  the  majority  of 
men,  but  feebly  and  rudely  constituted.  The  influence  of  what- 
ever good  instructions  he  may  receive,  is  counteracted  by  a 
combination  of  opposite  influences  almost  constantly  acting  on 
him.  He  is  essentially  and  inevitably  unapt  to  be  powerfully 
acted  on  by  what  is  invisible  and  future.  In  addition  to  all 
which,  there  is  the  intervention  and  activity  of  the  great  tempter 
and  destroyer.  In  short,  his  condition  is  such  that  there  is  no 
hope  of  him,  but  from  a  direct,  special  operation  on  him,  of 
what  we  denominate  grace.  Is  it  not  so  ?  Are  we  not  con 
vinced  ?  Is  it  not  the  plain  doctrine  of  Scripture  ?  76'  there 
not  irresistible  evidence,  from  a  view  of  the  actual  condition 
of  the  human  world,  that  no  man  can  become  good  in  the 
Christian  sense, — can  become  fit  for  a  holy  and  happy  place 
hereafter, — but  by  this  operation  ab  extra?  But  this  is  arbi- 
trary and  discriminative  on  the  part  of  the  sovereign  Agent, 
and  independent  of  the  will  of  man.  And  how  awfully  evident 
is  it,  that  this  indispensable '  operation  takes  place  only  on  a 
comparatively  small  proportion  of  the  collective  race ! 

"  Now  this  creature,  thus  constituted  and  circumstanced, 
passes  a  few  fleeting  years  on  earth,  a  short,  sinful  course,  in 
which  he  does  often  what,  notwithstanding  his  ignorance  and 
ill-disciplined  judgment  and  conscience,  he  knows  to  be  wrong, 
and  neglects  what  he  knows  to  be  his  duty  ;  and,  consequently, 
for  a  greater  or  less  measure  of  guilt,  widely  different  in  dif- 
ferent offenders,  deserves  punishment.  But  ENDLESS  PUNISH- 
MENT !  HOPELESS  MISERY,  through  a  duration  to  which  tfie 
enormous  terms  above  imagined  will  be  absolutely  NOTHING  ! 
I  acknowledge  my  inability  (I  would  say  it  reverently)  to  admit 
this  belief,  together  with  a  belief  in  the  divine  goodness, — th  *. 
belief  that  '  God  is  love,'  that  his  tender  mercies  are  over  all 
his  wrorks.  Goodness,  benevolence,  charity,  as  ascribed  in 
supreme  perfection  to  him,  cannot  mean  a  quality  foreign  to  all 
human  conceptions  of  goodness :  it  must  be  something  analo- 
gous in  principle  to  what  himself  has  defined  and  required  as 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  299 

goodness  in  his  moral  creatures ;  that,  in  adoring  the  divine 
goodness,  we  may  not  be  worshipping  an  i  unknown  God.' 
But,  if  so,  how  would  all  our  ideas  be  confounded,  while  con- 
templating him  bringing,  of  his  own  sovereign  will,  a  race  of 
creatures  into  existence,  in  such  a  condition  that  they  certainly 
will  and  must — must  by  their  nature  and  circumstances — go 
wrong,  and  be  miserable,  unless  prevented  by  especial  grace, 
which  is  the  privilege  of  only  a  small  proportion  of  them,  and 
at  the  same  time  affixing  on  their  delinquency  a  doom  of  which 
it  is  infinitely  leyond  the  highest  archangel's  faculty  to  appre- 
hend a  thousandth  part  of  the  horror  /"* 

Now,  granting  the  premises,  we  hold  this  argument  to  be  un- 
answerable and  conclusive.  But  is  it  not  wonderful  that  it  did 
not  occur  to  so  acute  a  mind  as  Foster's,  that  the  same  premises 
\vould  furnish  a  valid  argument  against  the  justice  of  all  pun- 
ishment, as  well  as  against  the  justice  of  eternal  punishments? 
Surely,  if  the  utter  inability  of  man  to  do  good  without  divine 
grace  is  any  extenuation,  wrhen  such  grace  is  not  given,  it  is  an 
entire  and  perfect  exoneration.  It  is  either  this,  or  it  is  nothing. 
Such  are  the  inevitable  inconsistencies  of  the  best  thinkers, 
when  the  feelings  of  the  heart  are  at  war  with  the  notions  of  the 
head.  Instead  of  analyzing  this  awful  subject,  and  tracing  it 
down  to  its  fundamental  principles,  upon  which  his  reason 
might  have  reposed  with  a  calm  and  immovable  satisfaction, 
Foster  seems  to  have  permitted  his  great  mind  to  take  root  in 
a  creed  of  man's  devising,  and  then  to  be  swayed  by  the  gusts 
and  counter-blasts  of  passion.  Believing  that  man  "must  go 
wrong,"  that  nature  and  circumstances  impose  this  dire  neces- 
sity upon  him,  his  benevolence  could  not  contemplate  an  eter- 
nity of  torments  as  due  to  such  inevitable  sin.  It  was  repelled 
by  "  the  infinite  horror  of  the  tenet."  On  the  other  hand,  his 
abhorrence  of  evil,  and  sense  of  justice,  shrank  with  equal  vio- 
lence from  the  idea  that  all  punishment  is  unjust;  andhencehe 
could  say,  "  Far  be  it  from  us  to  make  light  of  the  demerit  of 
sin,  and  to  remonstrate  with  the  Supreme  Judge  against  a 
severe  chastisement"  Thus  did  his  great  mind,  instead  of  rest- 
ing upon  truth,  perpetually  hang  in  a  state  of  suspense  and 
vacillation  between  the  noblest  feelings  of  his  heart  and  the 
darkest  errors  of  his  creed. 

0  Letter,  &c.,  pp.  15-18. 


300  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  IL 

Others,  who  have  adopted  the  same  creed,  have  endeavoured 
to  extricate  themselves  from  the  dilemma  in  which  Foster  found 
himself,  not  by  denying  the  eternity  of  future  punishments,  but 
by  inventing  a  very  nice  distinction  between  the  natural  and 
moral  inability  of  man.  "  He  can  obey  the  law,"  say  they, 
"if  he  will ;"  all  that  " he  wants  is  the  will."  All  his  natural 
faculties  are  complete ;  only  let  him  will  aright,  and  he  is  safe. 
But,  after  all,  the  question  still  remains,  How  is  he  to  get  the 
will, — the  good  will, — in  order  to  render  him  acceptable  to 
God  ?  Does  he  get  it  from  nature — is  it  a  part  of  his  birth- 
right? No:  from  this  he  derives  a  depraved  will,  "free  to 
evil  only."  Is  it  vouchsafed  to  him  from  above?  Is  it  a  gift 
from  God  ?  Alas !  to  those  who  are  lost,  and  perish  eternally 
in  their  sins,  the  grace  of  God  is  never  given !  "What  does  it 
signify  thus  to  tell  them,  or  to  tell  the  world,  that  they  have  the 
natural  ability  to  obey ;  that  none  of  their  natural  faculties  are 
lost;  that  they  still  have  understandings,  and  affections,  and 
wills?  What  can  all  these  avail  them?  Is  it  not  the  merest 
mockery  to  assure  them  that  they  really  have  hearts,  and  wills, 
and  feelings,  if  they  "  must  go  wrong,"  if  they  must  put  forth 
the  volitions  for  which  they  shall  be  tormented  forever  ? 

Upon  this  distinction  we  shall  not  dwell,  as  we  have  fully 
considered  it  in  our  "  Examination  of  Edwards  on  the  Will." 
We  shall  merely  add,  that  it  is  not  an  invention  of  modern 
times.*  It  is  at  least  as  old  as  the  age  of  Augustine.  "  The 
Pelagians  think,"  says  he,  "  they  know  some  great  thing,  when 
they  say,  c  God  would  not  command  what  he  knew  could  not  1)6 
done  ly  man?  Who  does  not  know  this?  But  he  commands 
what  we  cannot  do,  whereby  we  know  what  we  ought  to  ask  of 
him.  For  it  is  faith  which  obtains  by  prayer  what  the  law 
commands.  For  true  it  is  that  we  keep  the  commandments  if 
we  will,  (si  volumus  ;)  but  as  the  will  is  prepared  of  the  Lord, 
we  must  seek  of  him  that  we  may  will  as  much  as  is  sufficient, 
in  order  to  our  doing  by  volition,  (ut  volendofaciamus")  Truly, 
we  can  keep  the  commandments  if  we  will  to  do  so ;  for,  as 
Augustine  immediately  says,  "  certain  it  is,  that  we  will  when 
we  will."f  But  no  man  can  put  forth  a  volition  in  conformity 

0  Robert  Hall  supposes  that  Edwards  must  have  found  it  in  Owen.  He  might 
have  found  it  in  a  hundred  earlier  writers. 

|  Wiggers's  Presentation,  p.  210 — Note  by  Translator. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  C01 

wfth  the  commandments,  unless  it  be  given  him  of  God,  who 
"  causes  us  to  will  good  ;"*  and  this  is  never  given  to  the  repro- 
bate. How,  then,  can  they  be  justly  consigned  to  eternal  tor- 
ments? How  can  they  be  eternally  punished  for  that  wrhich 
they  could  not  possibly  avoid?  It  is  no  wonder  that  a  Fostei 
should  have  shrunk  from  "the  infinite  horrors  of  such  a  tenet," 
as  seen  from  this  point  of  view ;  the  only  wonder  is,  that  any 
one  can  be  found  who  can  possibly  endure  them. 

The  same  distinction,  as  we  have  already  said,  is  relied  upon 
by  Edwards  in  order  to  show  that  man  has  an  ability  to  obey 
the  law  of  God.f 

Thus  we  are  gravely  taught  that  we  are  able  to  obey  the 
law  of  God ;  because  if  we  will  to  do  so,  the  external  act  will 
follow ;  and  because  it  is  certain  that  if  we  will  we  do  really 
will.  But  how  to  will  is  the  question.  Can  we  put  forth  the 
requisite  volitions  ?  No  one  doubts  that  if  we  put  forth  the 
volition  which  the  law  of  God  requires,  we  then  obey  him, 
whether  the  external  act  follow  or  not;  nor  that  if  we  will, 
then  we  do  really  will.  But  all  this  leaves  the  great  question 
untouched,  Can  we  put  forth  the  requisite  volitions  without 
divine  aid?  And  after  this  question  has  been  answered  in  the 
negative,  and  we  have  been  told  that  such  aid  is  not  given  to 
the  reprobate,  all  this  talk  about  a  natural  ability,  which  must 
forever  prove  unavailing,  is  the  merest  mockery  that  ever  en- 
tered into  the  imagination  or  the  metaphysics  of  man.  How- 
ever the  fact  may  be  disguised  by  verbal  niceties,  it  as  really 
places  eternal  life  beyond  the  reach  of  the  reprobate,  as  is  the 
very  sun  in  the  firmament  of  heaven,  and  makes  eternal  death 
as  inevitable  to  them  as  is  the  rising  and  the  setting  thereof. 

SECTION  III. 
The  eternity  of  future  punishments  an  expression  of  the  divine  goodness. 

"We  have  seen  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  part  of  the  present 
work,  that  God  really  and  sincerely  intended  the  salvation  of 
all  men ;  and  that  if  any  are  lost,  it  is  because  it  is  impossible 
in  the  nature  of  things  to  necessitate  holiness;  and  that  the 
impenitent,  in  spite  of  all  the  means  employed  by  infinite 
wisdom  and  goodness  for  their  salvation,  do  obstinately  work 

p  Wiggers's  Presentation,  p.  210— Note  by  Trans,    f  Freedom  of  the  Will,  p.  38. 


302  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  LPart  H, 

out  their  own  ruin  and  destruction.  Omnipotence  cannot  CO*Q- 
fer  holiness  upon  them ;  they  do  not  choose  to  acquire  it ;  and 
hence,  they  are  compelled  to  endure  the  awful  wages  of  sin. 
To  those  who  reject  this  view  of  the  nature  of  holiness,  the 
world  in  which  we  live  must  forever  remain  an  inexplicable 
enigma ;  and  that  to  which  we  are  hastening  must  present  still 
more  terrific  subjects  of  contemplation.  To  their  minds  the 
eternal  agonies  of  the  lost  can  never  be  made  to  harmonize  with 
the  infinite  perfections  of  God,  by  whom  the  second  death  is 
appointed.  "How  self-evident  the  proposition,"  says  Foster, 
"  that  if  the  Sovereign  Arbiter  had  intended  the  salvation  of 
the  race,  it  must  have  been  accomplished."  Having  so  sum- 
marily settled  this  position,  that  God  did  not  intend  the  salva- 
tion of  the  race,  the  question  which  admits  of  no  answer,  Why 
did  he  not  intend  it  ?  might  well  spread  a  mysterious  darkness 
over  the  whole  economy  of  divine  providence.  It  was  that 
darkness,  that  perplexing  and  confounding  darkness,  by  which 
the  mighty  soul  of  Foster  was  oppressed  with  so  many  gloomy 
thoughts,  and  filled  with  so  many  frightful  imaginations. 

For  our  part,  if  we  could  believe  that  God  could  easily  work 
holiness  in  the  heart  of  every  creature,  and  that  he  does  not  do 
so  simply  because  he  does  not  intend  their  salvation,  we  should 
not  have  attempted  to  vindicate  his  perfections.  We  should 
have  believed  in  them,  it  is  true  ;  but  we  should  have  been  con- 
strained to  confess,  that  they  are  veiled  in  impenetrable  clouds 
and  darkness.  Hence,  if  we  had  not  confessed  ignorance  and 
inability  for  all  minds  and  all  ages,  as  so  many  others  have 
done,  we  should,  at  least,  have  confessed  these  things  for  our- 
selves, and  supinely  waited  for  the  light  of  eternity  to  dispel 
the  awful  and  perplexing  enigmas  of  time.  But  we  hold  no 
such  doctrine ;  we  entertain  no  such  sentiment.  We  believe 
that  God,  in  his  infinite,  overflowing  goodness  desires,  and  from 
all  eternity  has  desired,  the  salvation  of  all  men.  We  believe 
that  salvation  is  impossible  to  some,  because  a  necessary  holi- 
ness is  impossible,  and  they  do  not  choose  to  work  out  for 
themselves  what  cannot  be  worked  out  for  them,  even  by 
omnipotence.  It  was  the  bright  and  cheering  light  which  this 
truth  seemed  to  cast  upon  the  dark  places  of  the  universe,  that 
first  inspired  us  with  the  thought  and  determination  to  produce 
a  theodicy.  And  it  is  in  the  light  of  this  truth,  if  we  mistake 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  308 

not,  that  the  infinite  love  of  God  may  be  seen  beaming  from 
the  eye  of  hell,  as  well  as  from  the  bright  regions  of  eternal 
blessedness.  This  conclusion  we  shall  endeavour  methodically 
1 3  unfold,  and  to  set  in  a  clear  light. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  to  begin  with  our  fundamental  posi 
tion,  the  Creator  could  not  necessitate  the  holiness  of  the  crea- 
ture. Hence  this  holiness,  after  all  the  means  and  the  ability 
were  given  to  him,  must  be  left  to  the  will  of  the  creature  him- 
self. All  that  could  be  done  in  such  a  case  was,  for  God  to  set 
life  and  death  before  us,  accompanied  by  the  greatest  of  all  con- 
ceivable motives  to  pursue  the  one,  and  to  fly  from  the  other ; 
and  then  say,  "  choose  ye  :"  and  all  this  has  God  actually 
done  for  the  salvation  of  all  men.  Hence,  though  some  should 
be  finally  lost,  his  infinite  goodness  will  be  clear.  Let  us  see 
what  objections  may  be  urged  against  this  conclusion. 

Supposing  it  granted,  that  a  necessitated  virtue  is  a  contra- 
diction in  terms,  and  that  it  is  indispensably  requisite  to  ordain 
rewards  and  punishments  in  order  to  prevent  sin  and  secure 
holiness ;  it  may  still  be  said  that  the  penalty  of  eternal  death 
is  too  severe  for  that  purpose,  and  is  therefore  inconsistent  with 
the  goodness  of  God.  Indeed,  after  such  a  concession,  this  is 
the  only  position  which  can  be  taken  in  opposition  to  the  doc- 
trine in  question.  Let  us  then  look  at  it,  and  examine  the 
assumption  upon  which  it  rests  for  support. 

If  such  punishments  be  too  severe,  it  must  be  for  one  of  these 
two  reasons:  either  because  no  object  can  justify  the  infliction 
of  them,  or  because  the  end  proposed  by  the  Supreme  Ruler  is 
not  sufficiently  great  for  that  purpose. 

Let  us  suppose,  then,  in  the  first  place,  the  position  to  be 
assumed,  that  no  object  can  possibly  justify  the  infliction  of 
such  awful  punishments.  Such  would  be  the  case,  we  admit, 
if  such  punishments  were  unjust — were  not  deserved  by  the  per- 
son upon  whom  they  are  inflicted.  Hence,  it  becomes  indis- 
pensable, in  order  to  vindicate  the  divine  benevolence,  to  show 
that  eternal  sufferings  are  deserved  by  those  upon  whom  they 
fall.  Otherwise  they  would  be  unjust,  and  consequently  un- 
justifiable ;  as  the  end  could  never  justify  the  means. 

We  say,  then,  that  eternal  sufferings  are  deserved  by  the 
finally  impenitent,  not  because  every  sinful  act  carries  along 
with  it  an  infinite  guilt,  nor  because  every  sinner  may  be 


304  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

imagined  to  have  committed  an  infinite  number  of  sins,  but 
because  they  will  continue  to  sin  forever.  It  will  be  conceded, 
that  if  punishment  be  admissible  at  all,  it  is  right  and  proper 
that  so  long  as  acts  of  rebellion  are  persisted  in,  the  rewards  of 
iniquity  should  attend  them.  It  will  be  conceded,  that  if  the 
finally  impenitent  should  continue  to  sin  forever,  then  they  for* 
ever  deserve  to  reap  the  rewards  of  sin.  But  this  is  one  part 
of  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  future  punishments,  that  those  who 
endure  them  will  never  cease  to  sin  and  rebel  against  the 
authority  of  God's  law. 

Foster  has  attempted  a  reply  to  this  defence  of  the  doctrine 
in  question,  but  without  success.  "  It  is  usually  alleged,"  says 
he,  "  that  there  will  be  an  endless  continuance  of  sinning  .... 
and  therefore  the  punishment  must  be  endless."  But  "  the 
allegation,"  he  replies,  "  is  of  no  avail  in  vindication  of  the 
doctrine,  because  the  first  consignment  to  this  dreadful  state 
necessitates  a  continuance  of  the  criminality  /  the  doctrine 
teaching  that  it  is  of  the  essence,  and  is  an  awful  aggravation 
of  the  original  consignment,  that  it  dooms  the  condemned  to 
maintain  the  criminal  spirit  unchanged  forever.  The  doom  to 
sin  as  well  as  to  suffer,  and,  according  to  the  argument,  to  sin 
in  order  to  suffer,  is  inflicted  as  the  punishment  of  the  sin 
committed  in  the  mortal  state.  Virtually,  therefore,  the  eter- 
nal punishment  is  the  punishment  of  the  sins  of  time."* 

Even  according  to  the  principles  of  Foster  himself,  the  argu- 
ment is  wholly  untenable.  For  he  admits,  that  such  is  the  evil 
nature  of  man,  such  the  circumstances  around  him,  and  such 
the  influences  of  the  great  tempter,  he  must  inevitably  go 
wrong;  and  yet  he  holds  that  he  may  be  justly  punished  for 
such  transgressions.  Now,  if  every  man  who  comes  into  the 
world  be  doomed  to  sin,  as  this  author  insists  he  is,  and  may 
be  justly  punished  for  sins  committed  in  this  life,  why  should 
he  be  excused  for  the  sins  committed  in  another  state,  because 
he  is  doomed  to  commit  them  ?  But  this  argumentum  ad 
hominem  is  merely  by  the  way,  and  has  more  to  do  with  the 
consistency  of  the  author,  than  with  the  validity  of  his  position. 
We  shall  proceed  to  subject  this  to  a  more  searching  and  a 
more  satisfactory  test. 

His  argument  assumes,  that  "  it  is  of  the   essence  of  the 

0  Letter,  pp.  21,  22. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  305 

original  consignment,  that  it  dooms  the  condemned  to  maintain 
the  criminal  spirit  unchanged  forever."  This  is  an  unwarrant- 
able assumption.  We  nowhere  learn,  and  we  are  nowhere 
required  to  believe,  that  the  guilty  are  doomed  to  sin  forever, 
because  they  have  voluntarily  sinned  in  this  life ;  much  less 
that  they  are  necessitated  to  sin  in  order  to  suffer !  The  doc- 
trine of  the  eternity  of  future  punishments  is  not  necessarily 
encumbered  with  any  such  ridiculous  appendage  ;  and  if  any 
one  can  be  found  to  entertain  so  absurd  a  view  of  the  doctrine, 
we  must  lea^e  him  to  vindicate  the  creation  of  his  own 
imagination. 

We  do  not  suppose  that  the  soul  of  the  guilty  will  continue 
to  sin  forever,  because  it  will  be  consigned  to  the  regions  of  the 
lost ;  bu*  we  suppose  it  will  be  consigned  to  the  regions  of  the 
lost,  because,  by  its  own  repeated  acts  of  transgression,  it  has 
made  sure  of  its  eternal  continuance  in  sinning.  God  dooms 
no  man  to  sin — neither  by  his  power  nor  by  his  providence. 
But  it  is  a  fact,  against  which  there  will  be  no  dispute,  that  if 
a  man  commit  a  sin  once,  he  will  be  still  more  apt  to  commit 
the  same  sin  again,  under  the  same  or  similar  circumstances. 
The  same  thing  will  be  true  of  each  and  every  succeeding  repe- 
tition of  the  offence ;  until  the  habit  of  sinning  may  be  so 
completely  wrought  into  the  soul,  and  so  firmly  fixed  there, 
that  nothing  can  check  it  in  its  career  of  guilt.  Neither  the 
glories  of  heaven,  nor  the  terrors  of  hell,  may  be  sufficient  to 
change  its  course.  No  amount  of  influence  brought  to  bear 
upon  its  feelings,  may  be  sufficient  to  transform  its  will.  "  There 
is  a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  misbehaviour,"  says  But- 
ler, "  which  being  transgressed,  there  remains  no  place  for 
repentance  in  the  natural  course  of  things."  And  may  we  not 
also  add,  nor  in  the  supernatural  course  of  things  either ;  and 
there  only  remains  a  certain  fearful  looking-for  of  judgment? 
As  this  may  be  the  case,  for  aught  we  know,  nay,  as  it  seenu*  so 
probable  that  this  is  the  case,  no  one  is  authorized  to  pronounce 
endless  sufferings  unjust,  unless  he  can  first  show  that  the  object 
of  them  has  not  brought  upon  himself  an  eternal  continuance 
in  the  practice  of  sin.  In  other  words,  unless  he  can  first  show 
that  the  sinner  does  not  doom  himself  to  an  eternity  of  sinning, 
he  cannot  reasonably  complain  that  his  Creator  and  Judge 
dooms  him  to  an  eternity  of  suffering. 

20 


306  NATURAL  EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  although  the  sinner  may  deserve  to 
suffer  forever,  because  he  continues  to  sin  forever ;  yet  it  were 
more  worthy  the  infinite  goodness  of  God,  to  release  him  from 
so  awful  a  calamity.  If  the  sinner  deserves  such  punishment, 
it  is  not  only  just  to  inflict  it  upon  him,  it  is  a  demand  of  infinite 
goodness  itself  that  it  should  be  inflicted  upon  him,  provided 
a  sufficiently  great  good  may  be  attained  by  such  a  manifesta- 
tion of  justice.  This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  our 
second  point,  namely :  Is  the  object  proposed  to  be  accom- 
plished by  the  infliction  of  eternal  misery  sufficiently  great  to 
justify  the  infliction  of  so  severe  a  penalty?  In  other  words, 
Is  such  a  penalty  disproportioned  to  the  exigencies  of  the  case  ? 

In  his  attempt  to  show,  that  the  infliction  of  eternal  misery 
is  too  severe  to  consist  with  the  goodness  of  God,  Mr.  Foster 
does  not  at  all  consider  the  great  ends,  or  final  causes,  of  penal 
enactments.  He  merely  dwells  upon  the  terrors  of  the  punish- 
ment, and  brings  these  into  vivid  contrast  with  the  weakness 
and  impotency  of  man  in  his  mortal  state.  This,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed, is  a  most  one-sided  and  partial  view  of  so  profound  a  sub- 
ject ;  much  better  adapted  to  work  upon  the  feelings  than  to 
enlighten  the  j  udgment.  All  that  he  seems  to  have  seen  in  the 
case,  is  a  poor,  weak  creature,  utterly  unable  to  do  any  good, 
subjected  to  eternal  torments  for  the  sins  of  "  a  few  fleeting 
years  on  earth."  Hence  it  was,  that  "  the  moral  argument," 
which  "  pressed  so  irresistibly  on  his  mind,"  came  in  u  the  stu- 
pendous idea  of  eternity." 

Indeed,  according  to  his  theology,  there  could  be  no  object 
sufficiently  vast,  no  necessity  sufficiently  imperious,  to  justify 
eternal  punishments.  The  prevention  of  sin,  and  the  promotion 
of  universal  holiness,  could  not  form  such  an  object  or  constitute 
such  a  necessity  ;  for,  according  to  his  creed,  all  this  might  have 
been  most  perfectly  attained  by  a  word.  Hence,  he  was  puz- 
zled and  confounded  in  the  contemplation  of  what  appeared  to 
him  so  much  unnecessary  evil.  "  I  acknowledge  my  inability^ 
said  he,  "  to  admit  the  belief,  (the  belief  in  endless  punishment,) 
together  with  the  belief  in  the  divine  goodness — the  belief  that 
4  God  is  love,'  that  c  his  tender  mercies  are  over  all  his  works/  " 

As  we  have  already  seen  from  another  point  of  view,  we  must 
come  out  from  his  theology  if  we  would  see  the  harmony  and 
agreement  between  these  beliefs.  We  must  take  our  stand  on 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  307 

the  position,  that  Omnipotence  cannot  necessitate  holiness,  ami 
must  have  recourse  to  rewards  and  punishments  to  secure  it. 
Otherwise  all  evil  and  all  suffering  will  remain  an  inexplicable 
enigma ;  all  rewards  and  punishments  awkward  and  clumsy 
CDiitriv  inces  to  attain  an  end,  which  might  be  much  better  at- 
tained without  them. 

On  this  high  and  impregnable  ground  the  moral  argument 
of  Foster  loses  all  its  irresistible  force,  and  "the  stupendous 
idea  of  eternity"  presses  with  all  its  weight  in  favour  of  endless 
punishment.  If  temporal  punishments  are  justified  on  the 
ground  that  they  are  necessary  to  meet  the  exigencies  and  up- 
hold the  interests  of  temporal  governments,  surely  eternal  pun^ 
ir>hments  may  be  justified  on  the  same  ground  in  relation  to  an 
eternal  government.  The  "stupendous  idea  of  eternity"  at- 
taches  to  the  whole,  as  well  as  to  the  part ;  and  hence  nothing 
can  be  gained  to  the  cause  of  Universalism  by  the  introduction 
of  this  idea,  except  in  the  minds  of  those  who  take  only  a  one- 
sided and  partial  view  of  the  subject. 

The  spectacle  of  punishment  for  a  single  day,  it  will  be  ad- 
mitted, would  be  justified  on  the  ground  that  it  was  necessary 
to  support  for  a  single  day  a  government ;  especially  if  that 
government  were  vast  in  extent  and  involved  stupendous  in- 
terests. But  if  suffering  for  a  single  day  may  be  justified  on 
such  a  ground,  then  the  exigencies  of  such  a  government  for 
twro  days  would  justify  a  punishment  for  two  days;  and  so  on 
ad,  infinitum.  Hence,  the  doctrine  of  eternal  punishments  in 
common  with  the  eternal  moral  government  of  God,  is  not 
a  greater  anomaly  than  temporal  punishments  in  relation  to 
temporal  governments.  If  we  reject  the  one,  we  must  also 
reject  the  other.  Indeed,  when  we  consider  not  only  the  eter- 
nal duration,  but  also  t/ie  universal  extent,  of  the  divine  govern.- 
ment,  the  argument  in  question,  if  good  for  anything,  presses 
'with  greater  force  against  the  little,  insignificant  governments 
of  men,  than  against  the  moral  government  of  God.  One 
reason  why  Foster  was  "repelled  into  doubt  by  the  infinite 
horrors  of  the  tenet "  is,  that  he  merely  contemplated  the  suffer- 
ings of  the  guilty,  and  saw  not  how  those  sufferings  were  con- 
nected with  the  majesty  and  glory  of  God's  universal  and  eternal 
empire.  It  is  as  if  an  insect  should  undertake  to  set  bounds  to 
the  punishments  which  human  beings  have  found  necessary 


208  NATURAL  EYiL  CONSISTENT  [Part  n, 

to  meet  the  exigencies  and  uphold  the  interests  of  human 
society. 

We  are  told  by  writers  on  jurisprudence,  that  penalties  should 
be  proportioned  to  offences ;  but,  as  has  been  truly  said,  how 
this  proportion  is  to  be  ascertained,  or  on  what  principles  it  is 
to  be  adjusted,  we  are  seldom  informed.  We  are  usually  left 
to  vague  generalities,  which  convey  no  definite  information,  and 
furnish  no  satisfactory  guidance  to  our  minds.  If  we  can  ascer- 
tain the  precise  conditions  according  to  which  this  principle 
should  be  adjusted,  even  by  goodness  itself,  we  shall  then  be 
the  better  able  to  determine  whether  the  eternal  suffering  of  the 
guilty  and  impenitent  is  not  a  manifestation  of  the  love  of  God, 
— of  that  tender  mercy  which  is  over  all  his  works. 

It  is  a  maxim  that  punishment  should  be  sufficient  to  accom- 
plish the  great  end  for  which  it  is  imposed,  namely,  the  preven- 
tion of  offences.  Otherwise,  if  it  failed  to  accomplish  this  object, 
"  it  would  be  so  much  suffering  in  waste."*  Now,  who  can 
say  that  the  penalty  of  eternal  death  is  not  necessary  to  this  end 
in  the  moral  government  of  the  universe,  or  that  it  is  greater 
than  is  necessary  for  its  accomplishment?  Who  can  say  that  a 
punishment  for  a  limited  period  would  have  answered  that  end 
in  a  greater  or  more  desirable  degree  ?  Who  can  say  that  there 
would  have  been  more  holiness  and  happiness,  with  less  sin  and 
misery,  in  the  universe,  if  the  punishment  of  those  whom  nothing 
could  reclaim  had  not  been  eternal  ?  Who  can  say  that  it  would 
be  better  for  the  universe,  on  the  whole,  if  the  punishment  of 
sin  were  limited  than  if  it  were  eternal  ?  Until  this  question, 
which  so  evidently  lies  beyond  the  range  of  our  narrow  facul- 
ties, be  answered,  it  is  presumption  to  object  that  eternal  pun- 
ishment is  inconsistent  with  the  goodness  of  God.  For  aught 
the  objector  knows,  this  very  penalty  is  demanded  by  infinite 
goodness  itself,  in  order  to  stay  the  universal  ravages  of  sin,  and 
preserve  the  glory  of  the  moral  empire  of  Jehovah.  For  aught 
he  knows,  the  very  sufferings  of  the  lost  forever  may  be,  n  >t 
only  a  manifestation  of  the  justice  of  God,  but  also  a  profound 
expression  of  that  tender  mercy  which  is  over  all  his  works. 
For  aught  he  knows,  this  very  appointment,  at  which  he  takes 
so  great  offence,  may  be  one  of  the  main  pillars  in  the  structure 
of  the  intellectual  system  of  the  universe  ;  without  which  its  in- 

0  Jeremy  Bentham. 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  309 

ternal  constitution  would  be  radically  defective,  and  its  moral 
government  impossible.  In  short,  for  aught  he  knows,  his  ob- 
jection may  arise,  not  from  any  undue  or  unnecessary  severity 
of  the  punishment  in  question,  but  from  his  own  utter  inca- 
pacity to  decide  such  a  point  in  relation  to  the  universal  and 
eternal  government  of  God. 

It  may  be  said  that  this  is  an  appeal  to  human  ignorance, 
rather  than  a  reply  to  the  argument  of  the  Universalist.  Surely, 
it  is  good  to  be  reminded  of  our  ignorance,  when  we  undertake 
to  base  objections  against  the  doctrines  of  religion  upon  assump- 
tions about  the  truth  of  which  we  know,  and,  from  the  nature  of 
the  case,  must  know,  absolutely  nothing.  If  the  doctrine  in 
question  involved  any  inherent  contradictions,  or  were  it  clearly 
at  war  with  the  dictates  of  justice,  or  mercy,  or  truth,  there 
might  be  some  reason  in  our  opposition ;  but  to  oppose  it  be- 
cause we  cannot  see  how  it  subserves  the  highest  interests  of  the 
universe,  seems  to  be  an  exceedingly  rash  and  hasty  decision ; 
especially  as  we  see  that  such  a  penalty  must  powerfully  tend 
to  restrain  the  wickedness  of  men,  as  well  as  to  preserve  un- 
fallen  creatures  in  their  obedience. 

It  is  not  at  all  strange  that  beings  with  such  faculties  as  we 
possess,  limited  on  all  sides,  and  far  more  influenced  by  feeling 
than  by  reason,  should  be  oppressed  by  the  stupendous  idea  of 
eternal  torments.  It  absolutely  overwhelms  the  imagination 
of  poor,  short-sighted  creatures  like  ourselves.  But  God,  in  his 
plans  for  the  universe  and  for  eternity,  takes  no  counsel  of  hu- 
man weakness ;  and  that  which  seems  so  terrible  to  our  feeble 
intellects  may,  to  his  all-seeing  eye,  appear  no  more  than  a  dark 
speck  in  a  boundless  realm  of  light.  Surely,  if  there  ever  was, 
or  ever  could  be,  a  question  which  should  be  reduced  to  the 
simple  inquiry,  "  What  saith  the  Scripture  ?"  it  is  that  respecting 
the  future  condition  of  the  wicked. 

It  is  truly  amazing  that  a  mind  like  Foster's  should  have  put 
this  inquiry  so  easily  aside,  and  relied  with  so  much  confidence 
upon  what  he  was  pleased  to  call  "  the  moral  argument."  This 
argument,  as  we  have  seen,  is  altogether  unsound  and  sophisti- 
cal. It  bases  itself  upon  the  prejudices  of  a  creed,  and  termi- 
nates in  dark  conjectures  merely.  He  hopes,  or  rather  he 
"  would  wish  to  indulge  the  hope,  founded  upon  the  divine  at- 
tribute of  infinite  benevolence,  that  there  will  be  a  period  some- 


310  NATURAL  EVIL   CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

where  in  the  endless  futurity,  when  all  God's  sinning  creatures 
will  be  restored  by  him  to  rectitude  and  happiness."  Vain 
hope !  delusive  wish !  How  can  they  be  made  holy  without 
their  own  consent  and  cooperation?  And  if  they  could  be 
restored  to  rectitude  and  happiness,  how  can  we  hope  that  God 
would  restore  them,  since  he  has  not  been  pleased  to  preserve 
them  in  their  original  state  of  rectitude  and  happiness  ? 

But  perhaps,  says  he,  there  will  be,  not  a  restoration  of  all 
God's  sinning  creatures  to  rectitude  and  happiness,  but  an  anni- 
hilation of  their  existence.  Even  this  conjecture,  if  true,  "  would 
be  a  prodigious  relief;"  for  "the  grand  object  of  interest  is  a 
negation  of  the  perpetuity  of  misery."  Suppose,  then,  that  the 
universe  had  been  planned  according  to  this  benevolent  wish  of 
Mr.  Foster,  and  that  those  who  could  not  be  reclaimed  should, 
after  a  very  protracted  period  of  suffering,  be  forever  anni- 
hilated; would  this  promote  the  order  and  well-being  of  the 
whole  creation?  How  did  Mr.  Foster  know  but  that  such  a 
provision  in  the  government  of  the  universe  would  oppose  so 
feeble  a  barrier  to  the  progress  of  sin,  that  scenes  of  mutability, 
and  change,  and  ruin,  would  be  introduced  into  the  empire  of 
God,  from  which  his  benevolence  would  shrink  with  infinite 
abhorrence?  How  did  Mr.  Foster  know  but  that  the  Divine 
Benevolence  itself  would  prefer  a  hell  in  one  part  of  his  domin- 
ions, to  the  universal  disorder,  confusion,  and  moral  desolation 
which  such  a  provision  might  introduce  into  the  government  of 
God?  Such  a  conjecture  might,  it  is  true,  bring  a  "prodigious 
relief"  to  our  imagination ;  but  the  government  of  God  is  in- 
tended for  the  relief  of  the  universe,  and  not  for  the  relief  of 


our  imagination. 


Others  besides  the  author  in  question  have  sought  relief  for 
their  minds -on  this  subject,  by  indulging  in  vague  conjectures 
respecting  the  real  design  of  the  Supreme  Ruler  and  Judge. 
Archbishop  Tillotson,  for  example,  supposes  that  although  God 
acl  tially  threatened  to  punish  the  wicked  eternally,  he  does  not 
intend,  and  is  not  bound,  to  carry  this  threat  into  execution. 
This  penalty,  he  supposes,  is  merely  set  forth  as  a  terror  to  evil- 
doers, in  order  to  promote  the  good  order  and  well-being  of  tho 
world ;  and  after  it  has  subserved  this  purpose,  the  Lawgiver 
will  graciously  remit  a  portion  of  the  threatened  penalty,  and 
restore  all  his  sinning  creatures  to  purity  and  bliss.  In  reply  to 


Chapter  IV.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  311 

this  extraordinary  position,  we  shall  only  say  that  if  the  Al- 
mighty really  undertook  to  deceive  the  world  for  its  own  good, 
it  is  a  pity  he  did  not  take  the  precaution  to  prevent  the  arch- 
bishop from  detecting  the  cheat.  It  is  a  pity,  we  say,  that  he 
did  not  deceive  the  archbishop  as  well  as  the  rest  of  men ;  and 
not  suffer  his  secret  to  get  into  the  possession  of  one  who  has  so 
indiscreetly  published  it  to  the  whole  world. 

Nothing  seems  more  amazing  to  us  than  the  haste  and  pre- 
cipitancy with  which  most  men  dispose  of  subjects  so  awful  as 
that  of  the  eternity  of  future  punishments.  One  would  suppose 
that  if  any  subject  in  the  whole  range  of  human  thought  should 
engage  our  most  serious  attention,  and  call  forth  the  utmost 
exertion  of  our  power  of  investigation,  it  would  be  the  dura- 
tion of  punishment  in  a  future  life.  If  that  punishment  be 
eternal,  it  is  certainly  the  most  momentous  question  which  ever 
engaged  the  attention  of  man,  and  is  to  be  lightly  disposed  of 
only  by  madmen.* 

*  On  one  point  we  fully  concur  with  Mr.  Foster,  (see  Letter,  p.  27 :)  "  As  to 
religious  teachers,  if  this  tremendous  doctrine  be  true,  surely  it  ought  to  be  almost 
continually  proclaimed  as  with  the  blast  of  a  trumpet,  inculcated  and  reiterated, 
with  ardent  passion,  in  every  possible  form  of  terrible  illustration  ;  no  remission 
of  the  alarm  to  thoughtless  spirits." 

But  if  it  be  so  incumbent  on  religious  teachers,  who  believe  this  awful  tenet, 
thus  to  proclaim  it  to  a  perishing  world,  is  it  not  equally  incumbent  on  them  not 
to  speak  on  such  a  subject  at  all  until  they  have  taken  the  utmost  pains  to  form 
a  correct  opinion  concerning  it?  If  the  man  who  merely  proclaims  this  doctrine 
in  the  usual  quiet  way  of  preachers,  while  he  sees  his  fellow-men  perishing  around, 
is  guilty  of  criminal  neglect,  what  shall  we  say  of  the  religious  teacher  who, 
without  having  devoted  much  time  to  the  investigation  of  the  subject,  exerts  his 
powers  and  his  influence  to  persuade  his  fellow-men  that  it  is  all  a  delusion,  and 
that  the  idea  of  endless  misery  is  utterly  inconsistent  with  the  goodness  of  God? 
How  many  feeble  outcries  and  warnings  of  those  who  are  so  terribly  rebuked  by 
Mr.  Foster,  may  be  silenced  and  forever  laid  to  rest  by  his  eloquent  declamation 
against  the  doctrine  in  question,  and  how  many  souls  may  be  thereby  betrayed 
^and  led  on  to  their  own  eternal  ruin !  Yet,  wonderful  as  it  may  seem,  Mr.  Fos- 
ter tells  us  that  his  opinion  on  this  awful  subject  has  not  been  the  result  of  "  a 
protracted  inquiry."  In  the  very  letter  from  which  we  have  so  frequently  quoted, 
he  says  :  "  I  have  perhaps  been  too  content  to  let  an  opinion  (or  impression)  ad- 
mitted in  early  life  dispense  with  protracted  inquiry  and  various  reading."  Now, 
is  this  the  way  in  which  a  question  of  this  kind  should  be  decided, — a  question 
which  involves  the  eternal  destiny  of  millions  of  human  beings  ?  Is  it  to  be  de- 
cided, not  by  protracted  inquiry,  but  under  the  influence  of  an  "  impression  ad- 
mitted in  early  life  ?" 


312  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  TI, 


CHAPTER  Y. 

THE  DISPENSATION  OF  THE  DIYINE  FAVOURS  RECONCILED  WITH  THE  GOODNESS 

OF  GOD. 

0  God,  whose  thunder  shakes  the  sky, 

Whose  eye  this  atom  globe  surveys, 
^o  thee,  my  only  rock,  I  fly  ; 

Thy  mercy  in  thy  justice  praise. 


Then  why,  my  soul,  dost  thou  complain  ? 

Why  drooping  seek  the  dark  recess? 
*hake  off  the  melancholy  chain, 

For  God  created  all  to  bless. — CHATTEKTON. 

INT  the  preceding  part,  we  considered  the  doctrine  of  predesti- 
nation, under  the  name  of  necessity,  in  its  relation  to  the  origin 
of  evil.  We  there  endeavoured  to  show  that  it  denies  the  re- 
sponsibility of  man,  and  makes  God  the  author  of  sin.  In  the 
present  part,  it  remains  for  us  to  examine  the  same  doctrine  in 
relation  to  the  equality  of  the  divine  goodness.  If  we  mistake 
not,  the  scheme  of  predestination,  or  rather  the  doctrine  of 
election,  which  lies  at  its  foundation,  is,  when  rightly  under- 
stood, perfectly  consistent  with  the  impartiality  and  glory  of 
the  goodness  of  God.  On  this  subject  we  shall  now  proceed  to 
unfold  our  views  in  as  orderly  and  perspicuous  a  manner  as 
possible. 

SECTION  I. 

The  unequal  distribution  of  favours,  which  obtains  in  the  economy  of  natural 
providejice,  consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God. 

It  has  been  thought  that  if  the  goodness  of  God  were  un- 
limited and  impartial,  the  light  and  blessings  of  revelation 
would  be  universal.  But  before  we  should  attach  any  weight 
to  such  an  objection,  we  should  first  consider  and  determine 
two  things. 

First,  we  should  consider  and  determine  how  far  the  unequal 
diffusion  of  the  light  of  revelation  has  resulted  from  the  agency 
of  man,  and  how  far  from  the  agency  of  God.  For,  if  this  in- 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  813 

equality  in  the  spread  of  a  divine  blessing  has  sprung  in  any 
degree  from  the  abuse  which  free,  subordinate  agents  have  made 
of  their  powers,  either  by  active  opposition,  or  passive  neglect, 
it  is  in  so  far  no  more  imputable  to  a  want  of  goodness  in  the 
Divine  Being  than  is  any  other  evil  or  disorder  which  the  crea- 
ture has  introduced  into  the  world.  In  so  far,  the  glory  of  God 
is  clear,  and  man  alone  is  to  blame.  It  is  incumbent  upon 
those,  then,  who  urge  this  objection  against  the  goodness  of 
God  to  show  that  the  evil  in  question  has  not  resulted  from 
the  agency  of  man.  This  position,  we  imagine,  the  objector 
will  not  find  it  very  easy  to  establish ;  and  yet,  until  he  does 
so,  his  objection  very  clearly  rests  upon  a  mere  unsupported 
hypothesis. 

Secondly,  before  we  can  fairly  rely  upon  the  objection  in 
question,  we  should  be  able  to  show,  that  the  agency  of  God 
might  have  been  so  exerted  as  to  spread  the  light  of  revelation 
further  than  it  now  extends,  without  on  the  whole  causing 
greater  evil  than  good.  Light  or  knowledge,  it  should  be 
remembered,  is  not  in  itself  a  blessing.  It  may  be  so,  or  it 
may  not ;  and  whether  it  be  a  blessing  or  a  curse  depends,  not 
upon  the  beneficence  of  the  giver,  but  upon  the  disposition  and 
character  of  the  recipient.  Before  we  should  presume  to 
indulge  the  least  complaint,  then,  against  the  goodness  of  divine 
providence,  we  should  be  able  to  produce  the  nation,  whose 
character  for  moral  goodness  and  virtue  would,  on  the  whole, 
and  in  relation  to  its  circumstances,  have  been  improved  by  the 
interposition  of  God  in  causing  the  light  of  truth  to  shine  in 
the  midst  of  its  corruptions.  But  we  are  manifestly  incompe- 
tent to  deal  with  a  question  of  such  a  nature.  Its  infinite  com- 
plication, as  well  as  its  stupendous  magnitude,  places  it  entirely 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  human  mind.  So  manifold  and  so 
multiform  are  the  hidden  causes  upon  which  its  solution  de- 
pends, that  general  principles  cannot  be  brought  to  bear  upon 
it ;  and  its  infinite  variety  and  complication  of  detail  must  for- 
ever baffle  the  intellect  of  man.  Hence,  an  objection  which 
pioceeds  on  the  supposition  that  this  question  has  been  solved 
and  determined,  is  worth  nothing. 

But,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  let  us  suppose  that  the  unequal 
diffusion  of  religious  knowledge  has  proceeded  directly  from 
the  agency  of  God.  Still  the  objection  against  his  goodness,  in 


314  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  1^ 

regard  to  the  dispensation  of  light,  would  be  no  greater  tlian 
in  relation  to  all  the  dispensations  of  his  favour.  All  the  gifts 
of  Heaven — health,  riches,  honour,  intelligence,  and  whatever 
else  comes  down  from  above — are  scattered  among  the  children 
of  men  with  the  most  promiscuous  variety.  Hence,  the  unequal 
distribution  of  the  blessings  of  the  gospel,  or  rather  of  its  exter- 
nal advantages,  is  so  far  from  being  inconsistent  with  the  charac- 
ter of  God,  that  it  is  of  a  piece  with  all  his  other  dispensations : 
it  is  so  far  from  standing  out  as  an  anomaly  in  the  proceedings 
of  the  Divine  Being,  that  it  falls  in  with  the  whole  analogy  of 
nature  and  of  providence.  Hence,  there  is  no  resting-place 
between  the  abandonment  of  this  objection,  and  downright 
atheism. 

Let  us  see,  then,  what  force  there  is  in  this  objection,  when 
urged,  as  it  is  by  the  atheist,  against  the  whole  constitution  and 
management  of  the  world.  It  proceeds  on  the  supposition,  that 
if  light  and  knowledge,  or  any  other  natural  advantage,  were 
bestowed  upon  one  person,  it  would  be  bestowed  upon  all 
others,  and  upon  all  in  precisely  the  same  degree.  According 
to  his  view,  there  should  be  no  such  thing  as  degrees  in  knowl- 
edge, and  consequently  no  such  thing  as  self-development  and 
progress.  To  select  only  one  instance  out  of  many  :  the  atheist 
objects,  that  it  is  not  worthy  of  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness 
to  provide  us  with  so  complicated  an  instrument  as  the  eye,  as 
a  means  of  obtaining  light  and  knowlege.  Why  could  not  this 
end  be  attained  by  a  more  simple  and  direct  method  ?  Why 
leave  us,  for  so  great  a  portion  of  earthly  existence,  in  com- 
parative ignorance,  to  grope  out  our  way  into  regions  of  light  ? 

In  the  eye  of  reason,  there  is  no  end  to  this  kind  of  object- 
ing ;  and  it  only  stops  where  the  shallow  conceit,  or  wayward 
fancy,  of  the  objector  is  pleased  to  terminate.  It  is  very  easy 
to  ask,  Why  a  Being  of  infinite  goodness  did  not  confer  light 
and  knowledge  upon  us  directly  and  at  once,  without  leaving 
us  to  acquire  them  by  the  tedious  use  of  the  complicated  means 
provided  by  his  natural  providence.  But  the  inquiry  does  not 
stop  here.  He  might  just  as  well  ask,  Why  such  a  Being  was 
pleased  to  confer  so  small  an  amount  of  light  upon  us,  and  leave 
us  to  acquire  more  for  ourselves  ?  Why  not  confer  it  upon  us 
without  measure  and  without  exertion  on  our  part?  The  same 
interrogation,  it  is  evident,  may  be  applied  to  every  other  bless- 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  315 

ing,  as  well  as  to  knowledge;  and  hence  the  objection  of  the 
atheist,  when  carried  out,  terminates  in  the  great  difficulty, 
why  God  did  not  make  all  creatures  alike,  and  each  equal  to 
himself.  On  the  principle  of  this  objection,  the  insect  should 
complain  that  it  is  not  a  man  ;  the  man  that  he  is  not  an  angel ; 
and  the  angel  that  he  is  not  a  god.  Hence,  such  a  principle 
would  exclude  from  the  system  of  the  world  everything  like  a 
diversity  and  subordination  of  parts;  and  would  reduce  the 
whole  universe,  as  a  system,  to  as  inconceivable  a  nonentity  as 
would  be  a  watch,  all  of  whose  parts  should  be  made  of  exactly 
the  same  materials,  and  possessing  precisely  the  same  force 
and  properties. 

In  every  system,  whether  of  nature  or  of  art,  there  must  be 
a  variety  and  subordination  of  parts.  Hence,  to  object  that 
each  part  is  not  perfect  in  itself,  without  considering  its  rela- 
tions and  adaptation  to  the  whole,  is  little  short  of  madness. 
And  what  heightens  the  absurdity  in  the  present  case  is,  that 
the  parts  which  fall  under  observation  may,  for  aught  we  know, 
possess  the  greatest  perfection  which  is  consistent  with  the 
highest  good  and  beauty  of  the  whole. 

If  God  has  endowed  man  with  the  attributes  of  reason  and 
speech ;  if  he  has  scattered  around  him,  with  a  liberal  hand, 
the  multiplied  blessings  of  life ;  if,  above  all,  he  has  made  him 
capable  of  eternal  blessedness,  and  of  an  endless  progress  in 
glory ;  this  should  warm  his  heart  with  the  most  glowing  grati- 
tude, and  tune  his  tongue  to  the  most  exalted  praise.  And  the 
man,  the  rational  and  immortal  being,  whose  high  endowments 
should  lead  him  to  murmur  and  repine  at  the  unequal  dispen- 
sations of  the  divine  bounty,  because  God  has  created  beings 
of  a  higher  order  than  himself,  and  placed  them  in  a  world 
where  no  cloud  is  ever  seen,  and  where  no  sigh  is  ever  heard, 
would  certainly,  to  say  the  very  least,  be  guilty  of  the  most 
criminal  jngratitude.  Reason  and  conscience  might  well  cry 
out,  Shall  the  thing  formed  say  to  Him  who  formed  it,  Why 
hast  tliQu  made  me  thus  ?  And  God  himself  might  well  demand, 
Is  thine  eye  evil,  because  I  am  good  ? 

The  case  is  not  altered,  if  we  suppose  that  the  divine  favour 
is  unequally  bestowed  upon  different  individuals  of  the  same 
species,  instead  of  the  different  orders  of  created  beings.  The 
Banie  principle  o*  .risdom  and  goodness,  as  Butler  remarks, 


316  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  |I>arfc  II, 

whatever  it  may  be,  which  led  God  to  make  a  difference 
between  men  and  angels,  may  be  the  same  which  induces  him 
to  make  a  difference  between  one  portion  of  the  human  family 
and  another — to  leave  one  portion  for  a  season  to  the  dim  twi- 
light of  nature,  while  upon  another  he  pours  out  the  light  of 
revelation.  The  same  principle,  it  may  also  be.  arlrich  gives 
rise  to  the  endless  diversity  of  natural  gifts  among  the  different 
individuals  of  the  same  community,  as  well  as  to  the  different 
situations  of  the  same  individual,  in  regard  to  his  temporal  and 
eternal  interests,  during  the  various  stages  of  his  earthly  exist- 
ence. And  if  this  be  so,  we  should  either  cease  to  object  against 
the  goodness  of  God,  because  the  same  powers  and  advantages 
are  not  bestowed  upon  all,  or  we  should  adopt  the  atheistical 
principle,  in  its  fullest  extent,  which  has  now  been  shown  to  be 
so  full  of  absurdity. 

But  although  we  cannot  see  the  particular  reasons  of  such  a 
diversity  of  gifts,  or  how  each  is  subservient  to  the  good  of  the 
whole  ;  yet  every  shadow  of  injustice  will  disappear,  if  we  con- 
sider that  God  deals  with  every  one,  to  use  the  language  of 
Scripture,  "  according  to  what  he  hath,  and  not  according  to 
what  he  hath  not."  His  bounty  overflows,  in  various  degrees, 
upon  his  creatures;  but  his  justice  equalizes  all,  by  requiring 
every  one  to  give  an  account  of  just  exactly  as  many  talents  as 
have  been  committed  to  his  charge,  and  no  more. 

In  this  respect,  all  the  dispensations  of  divine  providence  are 
clearly  and  broadly  distinguished  from  the  Calvinistic  scheme 
of  election  and  reprobation.  According  to  this  scheme,  the 
reprobate,  or  those  who  are  not  objects  of  the  divine  mercy, 
have  not,  and  never  had,  the  ability  to  obey  the  law  of  God ; 
and  yet  they  are  'condemned  to  eternal  death  for  their  failure  to 
obey  it.  This  is  to  deal  with  them,  not  according  to  what  they 
have,  but  according  to  what  they  have  not,  and  what  they 
could  not  possibly  have.  Hence,  to  reason  from  one  of  these 
cases  to  the  other,  from  the  inequality  of  gifts  and  talents 
ordained  by  God  to  a  scheme  of  election  and  reprobation,  as 
Calvinists  uniformly  do,  is  to  confound  all  our  notions  of  just 
dealing,  and  to  convert  the  rightful  sovereignty  of  God  into 
frightful  tyranny.  The  perfect  justice  of  this  remark  will,  we 
trust,  be  made  to  appear  the  more  clearly  and  fully  in  the 
course  of  the  following  section  of  the  present  work. 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  317 


SECTION  II. 

TJit  Scripture  doctrine  of  election  consistent  with  the  impartiality  of  the 

divine  goodness. 

We  have  seen  that  the  election  of  a  nation  to  the  enjoym^t 
of  certain  external  advantages,  or  the  bestowment  of  superior 
gifts  upon  some  individuals,  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  divine  goodness.  Beyond  the  distinctions  thus  indi- 
cated, and  which  so  clearly  obtain  in  the  natural  providence  of 
God,  it  is  believed  that  the  Scriptural  scheme  of  election  does 
not  go;  and  that  the  more  rigid  features  of  the  Calvinistic 
scheme  of  election  and  reprobation  can  be  deduced  from  revela- 
tion only  by  a  violent  wresting  and  straining  of  the  clear  word 
of  God.  Let  us  see  if  this  assertion  may  not  be  fully  estab- 
lished. 

The  ninth  chapter  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  it  is  well 
known,  is  the  portion  of  Scripture  upon  which  the  advocates  of 
that  scheme  have  chiefly  relied,  from  Augustine  down  to  Cal- 
vin, and  from  Calvin  down  to  the  present  day.  But,  to  any 
impartial  mind,  we  believe,  this  chapter  will  not  be  found  to 
lend  the  least  shadow  of  support  to  any  such  scheme  of  doctrine. 
We  assume  this  position  advisedly,  and  shall  proceed  to  give 
the  reasons  on  which  it  is  based. 

Now,  in  the  interpretation  of  any  instrument  of  writing,  it  is 
a  universally  admitted  rule,  that  it  should  be  construed  with 
reference  to  the  subject  of  which  it  treats.  What,  then,  is  the 
subject  of  which  the  apostle  treats  in  the  ninth  chapter  of  Ro- 
mans? In  regard  to  this  point  there  is  no  dispute;  and,  to 
avoid  all  appearance  of  controversy  in  relation  to  it,  we  shall 
state  the  design  of  the  apostle,  in  this  part  of  his  discourse,  in 
the  words  of  one  by  whom  the  Calvinistic  scheme  of  election 
is  maintained.  "  With  the  eighth  chapter,"  says  Professor 
Hodge,  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  "the 
discussion  of  the  plan  of  salvation,  and  its  immediate  conse- 
quences, was  brought  to  a  close.  The  consideration  of  the 
calling  of  the  Gentiles,  and  the  rejection  of  the  Jews,  com- 
mences with  the  ninth,  and  extends  to  the  end  of  the  eleventh." 
Thus,  according  to  the  author,  "the  subject  which  the  apostle 
had  in  view,"  in  the  ninth  chapter,  is  "the  rejection  of  the 


318  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [P*rt  11 

Jews,  and  the  calling  of  the  Gentiles."  Now,  if  this  be  his 
subject,  and  if  the  discussion  of  the  plan  of  salvation  was 
brought  to  a  close  in  the  eighth  chapter,  how  can  the  doctrine 
of  election  and  reprobation,  which  lies  at  the  very  foundation 
of,  and  gives  both  shape  and  colouring  to,  the  whole  scheme  of 
salvation,  as  maintained  by  Calvinists,  be  found  in  the  nintb 
chapter?  How  has  it  happened  that  such  important  lights 
have  been  thrown  upon  the  plan  of  salvation,  and  such  funda- 
mental positions  established  in  relation  to  it,  after  its  discussion 
has  been  brought  to  a  close  ?  But  this  only  by  the  way ;  we 
shall  hereafter  see  how  these  important  lights  have  been  ex- 
tracted from  the  chapter  in  question. 

The  precise  passage  upon  which  the  greatest  stress  is  laid 
seems  to  be  the  following:  "The  children  being  not  yet  born, 
neither  having  done  any  good  or  evil,  that  the  purpose  of  God, 
according  to  election,  might  stand,  not  of  works,  but  of  him  that 
calleth  ;  it  was  said  unto  her,  The  elder  shall  serve  the  younger. 
As  it  is  written,  Jacob  have  I  loved,  but  Esau  have  I  hated." 
Now,  the  question  is,  Does  this  refer  to  the  election  of  Jacob  to 
eternal  life,  and  the  eternal  reprobation  of  Esau ;  or,  Does  it 
refer  to  the  selection  of  the  descendants  of  the  former  to  consti- 
tute the  visible  people  of  God  on  earth  ?  This  is  the  question  ; 
and  it  is  one  which,  we  think,  is  by  no  means  difficult  of 
solution. 

The  apostle  was  in  the  habit  of  quoting  only  a  few  words  of  a 
passage  of  the  Old  Testament,  to  which  he  had  occasion  to  refer ; 
and  in  the  present  instance  he  merely  cites  the  words  of  the 
prophecy,  "  The  elder  shall  serve  the  younger."  But,  according 
to  the  prophecy  to  which  he  refers,  it  was  said  to  Rebecca, 
"Two  nations  are  in  thy  womb,  and  two  manner  of  people  shall 
be  separated  from  thy  bowels;  and  the  one  people  shall  be 
stronger  than  the  other  people,  and  the  elder  shall  serve  the 
younger."  Nothing  can  be  plainer,  we  think,  than  that  this 
prophecy  relates  to  the  descendants  of  Jacob  and  Esau,  and 
not  to  the  individuals  themselves. 

This  view  of  the  above  passage,  if  it  needed  further  confirma- 
tion, is  corroborated  by  the  fact  that  Esau  did  not  serve  Jacob, 
and  that  this  part  of  the  prophecy  is  true  only  in  relation  to  his 
descendants.  Thus  the  prophecy,  when  interpreted  by  its  own 
express  words,  as  well  as  by  the  event,  shows  that  it  related  to 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  319 

"  two  nations,"  to  "  two  manner  of  people,"  and  not  to  two 
individuals. 

The  argument  of  St.  Paul  demands  tins  interpretation.  He 
is  not  discussing  the  plan  of  salvation.  The  question  before 
him  is  not  whether  some  are  elected  to  eternal  life  on  account 
of  their  works  or  not ;  and  hence,  if  he  had  quoted  &  prophecy* 
from  the  Old  Testament  to  establish  that  position,  he  would 
have  been  guilty  of  a  gross  solecism,  a  non  sequitur,  as  plain  as 
could  well  be  conceived. 

For  these  reasons,  we  think  there  can  be  but  little  doubt  with 
respect  to  the  true  mennin^  of  the  passage  in  question.  And 
besides,  this  construction  not  only  brings  the  language  of  the 
apostle  into  perfect  coniormity  with  the  providence  which  God 
is  actually  seen  to  exercise  over  the  world,  but  also  reconciles  it 
with  the  glory  of  the  divine  character. 

In  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the  terms  loved  and  hated,  used 
in  the  prophecy  under  consideration,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  interpretation  of  Professor  Hodge  is  perfectly  just. 
'"  The  meaning  is,"  says  he,  "  that  God  preferred  one  to  the 
other,  or  chose  one  instead  of  the  other.  As  this  is  the  idea 
meant  to  be  expressed,  it  is  evident  that  in  this  case  the  word 
hate  means  to  love  less,  to  regard  and  treat  with  less  favour. 
Thus  in  Gen.  xxix,  33,  Leah  says,  she  was  hated  by  her  hus- 
band ;  while,  in  the  thirtieth  verse,  tho  same  idea  is  expressed 
by  saying,  Jacob  *  loved  Rachel  more  than  Leah.'  Matt,  x,  37. 
Luke  xiv,  26 :  c  If  any  man  come  to  me,  and  hate  not  his 
father  and  mother,'  &c.  John  xii,  25." 

No  one  will  object  to  this  explanation.  P>ut  how  will  the 
language,  thus  understood,  apply  to  the  case  of  individual  elec- 
tion and  reprobation,  as  maintained  by  Calvinists  ?  We  can 
see,  indeed,  how  it  applies  to  the  descendants  of  Esau,  who  were 
in  many  respects  placed  in  less  advantageous  circumstances 
than  the  posterity  of  Jacob  ;  but  how  can  God  be  said  to  love 
the  elect  more  than  the  reprobate  ?  Can  he  be  said  to  love  the 
reprobate  at  all  ?  If,  from  all  eternity,  they  have  been  eter- 
nally damned  for  not  rendering  an  impossible  obedience,  should 
we  call  this  a  lesser  degree  of  love  than  that  which  is  bestowed 
upon  the  elect,  or  should  we  call  it  hate  ?  It  seems,  that  the 
commentator  feels  some  repugnance  at  the  idea  of  setting  apart 

p  Surely  a  very  singular  doctrine  to  be  found  in  a  prophecy. 


320  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

the  individual,  before  he  has  "  done  either  good  or  evil,"  as  an 
object  of  hate  ;  but  not  at  all  at  the  idea  of  setting  him  apart 
as  an  object  of  eternal  and  remediless  woe  ! 

"  It  is  no  doubt  true,"  says  Professor  Hodge,  "  that  the  pre- 
diction contained  in  this  passage  has  reference  not  only  to  the 
relative  standing  of  Jacob  and  Esau,  as  individuals,  but  also  to 
that  of  their  descendants.  It  may  even  be  allowed  that  the 
latter  was  principally  intended  in  the  communication  to  Re- 
becca. But  it  is  clear:  1.  That  this  distinction  between  the 
two  races  presupposed  and  included  a  distinction  between  the 
individuals.  Jacob,  made  the  special  heir  to  his  father  Isaac, 
obtained  as  an  individual  the  birthright  and  the  blessing ;  and 
Esau,  as  an  individual,  was  cut  off." 

This  may  all  be  perfectly  true ;  it  is  certainly  nothing  to  the 
purpose.  It  is  true,  that  Jacob  was  made  the  special  heir  to 
his  father ;  but  did  he  thereby  inherit  eternal  life  ?  The  dis- 
tinction between  him  and  Esau  was  undoubtedly  a  personal 
favour ;  the  very  fact  that  his  descendants  would  be  so  highly 
blessed,  must  have  been  a  source  of  personal  satisfaction  and 
joy,  which  his  less  favoured  brother  did  not  possess.  But  was 
this  birthright  and  this  blessing  the  fixed  and  irreversible  boon 
of  eternal  life?  There  is  not  the  least  shadow  of  any  such  thing 
in  the  whole  record.  The  only  blessings,  of  a  personal  or  indi- 
vidual nature,  of  which  the  account  gives  us  the  least  intima- 
tion, either  by  express  words  or  by  implication,  are  like  those 
wTith  which  God,  in  his  providence,  still  continues  to  distinguish 
some  individuals  from  others.  They  are  not  the  gift  of  eternal 
life,  but  of  certain  external  and  temporal  advantages.  Hence 
they  throw  no  light  upon  the  Calvinistic  scheme  of  election 
and  reprobation.  To  make  out  this  scheme,  or  anything  in 
support  of  it,  something  more  must  be  done  than  to  show  that 
God  distinguishes  one  nation,  or  one  individual,  from  another, 
in  the  distribution  of  his  favours.  This  is  conceded  on  all  sides ; 
and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  point  in  dispute.  It  must  also 
be  shown,  that  the  particular  favour  which  he  brings  home  to 
one  by  his  infinite  power,  and  which  he  withholds  from  an- 
other, is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  salvation  of  the  soul. 
It  must  be  shown,  that  the  mere  will  and  pleasure  of  God  makes 
such  a  distinction  among  the  souls  of  men,  that  while  some  are 
invincibly  made  the  heirs  of  glory,  others  are  stamped  with 


Chapter  V.I  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  321 

tlie  seal  of  eternal  death.  The  inheritance  of  Jacob,  and  the 
casting  off  of  Esau,  were,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  very  different 
from  the  awful  proceeding  which  is  ascribed  to  God  according 
to  the  Calvinistic  scheme  of  election  and  reprobation. 

The  same  remark  is  applicable  to  other  attempts  to  show, 
that  God's  favour  was  bestowed  upon  Jacob,  as  an  individual, 
in  preference  to  Esau.  "As  to  the  objection,"  says  Professor 
Hodge,  "  that  Esau  never  personally  served  Jacob,  it  is  founded 
on  the  mere  literal  sense  of  the  words.  Esau  did  acknowledge 
his  inferiority  to  Jacob,  and  was  postponed  to  him  on  various 
occasions.  This  is  the  real  spirit  of  the  passage.  This  prophecy, 
as  is  the  case  with  all  similar  predictions,  has  various  stages  of 
fulfilment.  The  relation  between  the  two  brothers  during  life ; 
the  loss  of  the  birthright  blessing  and  promises  on  the  part  of 
Esau  ;  the  temporary  subjugation  of  his  descendants  to  the 
Hebrews  under  David ;  their  final  and  complete  subjugation 
under  the  Maccabees ;  and  especially  their  exclusion  from  the 
peculiar  privileges  of  the  people  of  God,  through  all  the  periods 
of  their  history,  are  included."  Suppose  all  this  to  be  true, 
what  relation  has  it  to  the  election  of  some  individuals  to  eter- 
nal life,  and  the  reprobation  of  others  ? 

We  shall  not  dwell  upon  other  portions  of  the  chapter  in 
question ;  for,  if  the  foregoing  remarks  be  just,  it  will  be  easy 
to  dispose  of  every  text  which  may,  at  first  view,  appear  to  sup- 
port the  Calvinistic  doctrine  of  election.  We  shall  dismiss  the 
consideration  of  the  ninth  chapter  of  Romans  with  an  extract 
from  Dr.  Mackriight,  who,  although  a  firm  believer  in  the  Cal- 
vinistic view  of  election  and  reprobation,  does  not  find  any  sup- 
port for  his  doctrine  in  this  portion  of  Scripture.  "Although 
some  passages  in  this  chapter,"  says  he,  "  which  pious  and 
learned  men  have  understood  of  the  election  and  reprobation 
of  individuals,  are  in  the  foregoing  illustration  interpreted  of 
the  election  of  nations  to  be  the  people  of  God,  and  to  enjoy  th<j 
advantage  of  an  external  revelation,  and  of  their  losing  these 
honourable  distinctions,  the  reader  must  not,  on  that  account, 
suppose  the  author  rejects  the  doctrines  of  the  decree  and  fore- 
knowledge of  God.  These  doctrines  are  taught  in  other  pas- 
sages of  Scripture :  see  Rom.  viii,  29."  Thus  this  enlightened 
critic  candidly  abandons  the  ninth  chapter  of  Romans,  and  seekr 
support  for  his  Calvinistic  view  of  the  divine  decrees  elsewhere, 

21 


322  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

Let  us,  then,  proceed  to  examine  the  eighth  chapter  of  Ro- 
mans, upon  which  he  relies.  The  words  are  as  follow :  "  For 
whom  he  did  foreknow,  he  also  did  predestinate  to  be  con- 
formed to  the  image  of  his  Son,  that  he  might  be  the  first-born 
among  many  brethren.  Moreover,  whom  he  did  predestinate, 
them  he  also  called:  and  whom  he  called,  them  he  also  justi- 
fied :  and  whom  he  justified,  them  he  also  glorified."  We  need 
have  no  dispute  with  the  Calvinists  respecting  the  interpretation 
of  these  words.  If  we  mistake  not,  we  may  adopt  their  own 
construction  of  them,  and  yet  clearly  show  that  they  lend  not  the 
least  support  to  their  views  of  election  and  reprobation.  "  As 
to  know"  says  Professor  Hodge,  " is  often  to  approve  and  love, 
it  may  express  the  idea  of  peculiar  affection  in  the  case ;  or  it 
may  mean  to  select  or  determine  upon"  These  two  interpreta- 
tions, as  he  truly  says,  "  do  not  essentially  differ.  The  one  is 
but  a  modification  of  the  other."  "  The  idea,  therefore,  obvi- 
ously is,  that  those  whom  God  peculiarly  loved,  and  by  thus 
loving,  distinguished  or  selected  from  the  rest  of  mankind ;  or, 
to  express  both  ideas  in  one  word,  those  whom  he  elected  he 
predestinated,  &c."  Thus,  according  to  this  commentator,  those 
whom  God  elected,  he  also  predestinated,  called,  justified,  and, 
finally,  glorified. 

Now,  suppose  all  this  to  be  admitted,  let  us  consider  whether 
it  gives  any  support  to  the  Calvinistic  creed  of  election.  It 
teaches  that  all  those  whom  God  elects  shall  be  ultimately 
saved ;  but  not  one  word  or  one  syllable  does  it  say  with  respect 
to  the  principle  or  ground  of  his  election.  It  tells  us  that  God,  in 
his  infinite  wisdom,  selects  one  portion  of  mankind  as  the  objects 
of  his  saving  mercy, — the  heirs  of  eternal  glory  ;  but  it  does  not 
say  that  this  selection,  this  approbation,  this  peculiar  love,  is 
wholly  without  foundation  in  the  character  or  condition  of  the 
elect.  It  tells  us  that  God  has  numbered  the  elect,  and  written 
their  names  in  the  book  of  life ;  but  it  does  not  tell  us  that,  in 
any  case,  he  has  taken  precisely  such  as  he  has  left,  or  left  pre- 
cisely such  as  he  has  taken.  The  bare  fact  of  the  election  is 
all  that  is  here  disclosed.  The  reason,  or  the  ground,  or  tho 
principle,  of  that  election  is  not  even  alluded  to ;  and  we  are 
left  to  gather  it  either  from  other  portions  of  Scripture,  or  from 
the  eternal  dictates  of  justice  and  mercy.  Hence,  as  this  pas- 
sage makes  no  allusion  to  the  ground  or  reason  of  the  divine 


* 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  323 

election,  it  does  irt  begin  to  tonch  the  controversy  we  have 
with  theologians  of  the  Calvinistic  school.  Every  link  in  the 
chain  here  presented  is  perfect,  except  that  which  connects  its 
first  link,  the  election  to  eternal  life,  with  the  unconditional 
decree  of  God ;  and  that  link,  the  only  one  in  controversy,  is 
absolutely  wanting.  We  have  no  occasion  to  break  the  chain  ; 
for  it  is  only  to  the  imagination  that  it  seems  to  be  uncondition- 
ally bound  to  the  throne  of  the  Omnipotent. 

As  this  passage,  then,  determines  nothing  with  respect  to  the 
ground  or  reason  of  election,  so  we  have  as  much  right  to  affirm, 
even  in  the  presence  of  such  language,  that  God  did  really  fore- 
see a  difference  where  he  has  made  so  great  a  distinction,  as  the 
Calvinists  have  to  suppose  that  so  great  a  distinction  has  been 
made  by  a  mere  arbitrary  and  capricious  exercise  of  power. 
That  we  have  a  better  reason  for  this  position  than  our  opponents 
can  produce  for  theirs,  we  shall  endeavour  to  show  in  the  en- 
suing section. 

SECTION  m. 

The  Cahinistie  scheme  of  election  inconsistent  with  the  impartiality  and 
glory  of  the  divine  goodness. 

Having  seen  that  the  unequal  distribution  of  favours,  which 
obtains  in  the  wise  economy  of  Providence,  distinguishing  na- 
tion from  nation,  as  well  as  individual  from  individual,  is  not 
inconsistent  with  the  perfection  of  the  divine  goodness ;  and 
having  also  seen  that  the  Scripture  doctrine  of  election  makes 
no  other  distinctions  than  those  which  take  place  in  the  provi- 
dence of  God,  and  is  equally  reconcilable  with  the  glory  of  his 
character,  we  come  now  to  consider  the  Calvinistic  scheme  of 
election  and  reprobation.  AVe  have  shown  on  what  principles 
the  providence  of  God,  which  makes  so  many  distinctions  among 
men,  may  be  vindicated ;  let  us  now  see  on  what  principles  the 
Calvinistic  scheme  of  election  and  reprobation  seeks  to  justifv 
itself.  If  we  mistake  not,  this  scheme  of  predestination  is  as 
unlike  the  providence  of  God  in  its  principles  as  it  is  in  the  ap- 
palling distinctions  which  it  makes  among  the  subjects  of  the 
moral  government  of  the  world. 

"  Predestination,"  says  Calvin,  "  we  call  the  eternal  decree 
of  God,  by  which  he  has  determined  in  himself,  what  he  would 


324  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

have  to  become  of  every  individual  of  mankind.  For  they  are 
not  all  created  with  a  similar  destiny ;  but  eternal  life  is  fore- 
ordained for  some,  and  eternal  damnation  for  others.  Every 
man,  therefore,  being  created  for  one  or  the  other  of  these 
ends,  we  say,  he  is  predestinated  either  to  life  or  to  death."* 
Again :  "  In  conformity,  therefore,  to  the  clear  doctrine  of 
Scripture,  we  assert,  that  by  an  eternal  and  immutable  counsel, 
God  has  once  for  all  determined,  both  whom  he  would  admit 
to  salvation  and  whom  he  would  condemn  to  destruction."-)- 

The  doctrine  of  predestination  is  set  forth  in  the  Westminster 
Confession  of  Faith,  in  the  following  terms :  "  By  the  decree  of 
God,  for  the  manifestation  of  his  glory,  some  men  and  angels 
are  predestinated  unto  everlasting  life,  and  others  foreordained 
to  everlasting  death." 

"  These  men  and  angels,  thus  predestinated  and  foreordained, 
are  particularly  and  unchangeably  designed  ;  and  their  numbei 
is  so  certain  and  definite,  that  it  cannot  be  either  increased  01 
diminished." 

"  Those  of  mankind  that  are  predestinated  unto  life,  God, 
before  the  foundation  of  the  world  was  laid,  according  to  his 
eternal  and  immutable  purpose,  and  the  secret  counsel  and 
good  pleasure  of  his  will,  hath  chosen  in  Christ  unto  everlasting 
glory,  out  of  his  mere  free  grace  and  love,  without  any  fore- 
sight of  faith  or  good  works,  or  perseverance  in  either  of  them, 
or  any  other  thing  in  the  creature,  as  conditions  or  causes  moving 
him  thereunto  ;  and  all  to  the  praise  of  his  glorious  grace." 

"  As  God  hath  appointed  the  elect  unto  glory,  so  hath  he, 
by  the  eternal  and  most  free  purpose  of  his  will,  foreordained 
all  the  means  thereunto.  Wherefore,  they  who  are  elected, 
being  fallen  in  Adam,  are  redeemed  by  Christ,  are  effectually 
called  unto  faith  in  Christ  by  his  Spirit  working  in  due  season ; 
are  justified,  adopted,  sanctified,  and  kept  by  his  power  through 
faith  unto  salvation.  Neither  are  any  other  redeemed  by  Christ, 
effectually  called,  justified,  adopted,  sanctified,  and  saved,  but 
the  elect  only." 

"The  rest  of  mankind,  God  was  pleased,  according  to  the 
unsearchable  counsel  of  his  own  will,  whereby  he  extendeth 
or  withholdeth  mercy  as  he  pleaseth,  for  the  glory  of  his  sov- 
ereign power  over  his  creatures,  to  pass  by,  and  to  ordain  to 

0  Institutes,  book  iii,  ch.  xxi.  f 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF   GOD.  325 

dishonour  and  wrath  for  their  sin,  to  the  praise  of  his  glorious 
justice." 

The  defenders  of  this  system  assume  the  position,  that  as 
"  by  Adam's  sin  the  whole  human  race  became  a  corrupt  mass, 
and  justly  subject  to  eternal  damnation  ;  so  that  no  one  can 
blame  God's  righteous  decision,  if  none  are  saved  from  per- 
dition."* Augustine  expressly  says :  "  But  why  faith  is  not 
given  to  all,  need  not  move  the  faithful,  who  believe  that  by 
one  all  came  into  condemnation,  doubtless  the  most  just;  no 
that  there  would  be  no  just  complaining  of  God,  though  no  one 
shculd  be  freed"  And  again  :  "The  dominion  of  death  has  so 
far  prevailed  over  men,  that  the  deserved  punishment  would 
drive  all  headlong  into  a  second  death  likewise,  of  which  there 
is  no  end,  if  the  undeserved  grace  of  God  did  not  deliver  them 
from  it."f  Such  is  the  picture  of  the  divine  justice,  which  the 
advocates  of  predestination  have  presented,  from  the  time  of 
Augustine,  the  great  founder  of  the  doctrine,  down  to  the 
present  day.  It  surely  furnishes  a  sufficiently  dark  back- 
ground on  which  to  display  the  divine  mercy  to  advantage. 

We  are  told,  however,  that  we  should  not  judge  of  the  pro- 
ceeding of  God,  according  to  our  notions  of  justice.  This  is 
certainly  true,  if  the  divine  justice  is  fairly  represented  in  the 
8  jheme  of  predestination  ;  for  that  is  clearly  unlike  all  that  is 
called  justice  among  men.  If  God  can  create  countless  myriads 
of  beings,  who,  because  they  come  into  the  world  with  a 
depraved  nature,  and  "  can  do  nothing  but  sin,"  he  regards 
with  such  displeasure,  as  to  leave  them  without  hope  and  with- 
out remedy  ;  and  not  only  so,  but  dooms  them  to  eternal  mise'y 
on  account  of  an  unavoidable  continuance  in  sin ;  it  must  be 
confessed,  that  we  should  not  presume  to  apply  our  notions  of 
justice  to  his  dealings  with  the  world.  They  would  more 
exactly  accord  with  our  notions  of  injustice,  cruelty,  and 
oppression,  than  with  any  others  of  which  we  are  capable  of 
forming  any  conception. 

But,  if  we  are  not  to  decide  according  to  our  notions  of  jus- 
tice, how  shall  we  judge,  or  form  any  opinion  respecting  the 
equity  of  the  divine  proceeding  ?  Shall  we  judge  according  to 
some  notion  which  we  do  not  possess,  or  shall  we  not  judge 
at  all  ?  This  last  would  seem  to  be  the  wiser  course  ;  but  it  is 

°  Wiggers,  ch.  xvi.  f  Wiggers's  Presentation,  ch  xvi. 


3  '2  6  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  II, 

one  which  the  Calvinists  themselves  will  not  permit  us  to  adopt. 
They  tell  us,  that  the  predestination  of  the  greater  part  of 
mankind  to  eternal  death  is  "  to  the  praise  of  God's  glorious 
justice."  But  how  are  we  to  behold  this  glorious  manifestation 
of  the  divine  justice,  if  we  may  not  view  it  through  any  medium 
known  to  us,  or  contemplate  it  in  any  light  which  may  have 
dawned  upon  our  minds  ? 

Indeed,  although  the  defenders  of  this  doctrine  often  declare 
that  the  predestination  of  so  many  men  and  angels  to  eternal 
misery,  displays  the  justice  of  God  in  all  its  glory ;  yet  their 
own  writings  furnish  the  most  abundant  and  conclusive  evi- 
dence, that  they  themselves  can  see  no  appearance  of  justice 
in  such  a  proceeding.  On  various  occasions  they  do  not  hesi- 
tate to  tell  us,  that  although  they  cannot  recognise  the  justice 
of  such  a  proceeding,  yet  they  believe  it  to  be  just,  because  it 
is  the  proceeding  of  God.  But  how  can  that  be  a  display  of 
justice  to  us,  which,  according  to  all  our  notions,  wears  the 
appearance  of  the  most  frightful  injustice?  Calvin  himself 
admits,  that  the  justice  of  God,  which  is  supposed  to  be  so 
brightly  displayed  in  the  predestination  of  so  many  immortal 
beings  to  endless  woe,  is,  in  reality,  therein  involved  in  clouds 
and  darkness.  Yet  he  does  not  fail  to  deduce  an  argument 
in  its  favour  from  "  the  very  obscurity  which  excites  such 
dread."* 

It  seems  clear,  that  if  the  divine  justice  is  really  displayed 
in  the  punishment  of  the  reprobate,  it  would  have  been  exhibited 
on  a  still  more  magnificent  scale  by  the  condemnation  of  the 
whole  human  race.  For,  according  to  Calvinism,  all  were 
equally  deserving  of  the  divine  displeasure,  and  the  saved  are 
distinguished  from  the  lost  only  by  the  election  of  God.  Hence, 
this  scheme  shows  the  justice  of  God  to  be  limited,  or  not  dis- 
played on  so  grand  and  imposing  a  scale  as  it  might  have  been ; 
that  is  to  say,  it  shows  the  justice  of  God  to  be  less  than  infinite. 
But  if  such  be  the  justice  of  God,  we  certainly  should  not  com- 
plain that  it  has  been  limited  by  his  mercy ;  we  should  lather 
rejoice,  indeed,  to  believe  that  it  had  been  thereby  entirely 
extinguished. 

Notwithstanding  the  claims  of  divine  justice,  all  were  not 
reprobated  and  doomed  to  eternal  death.  A  certain  portion  of 
0  Institutes,  book  iii,  ch.  xxi. 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  327 

mankind  are  elected  and  saved,  "  to  the  praise  of  his  glorious 
grace."  Now,  it  is  conceded  by  Calvinists,  that  "  all  the  cir- 
cumstances which  distinguish  the  elect  from  others  are  the 
fruit  of  their  election."*  This  proposition  is  deduced  by  a  Cal- 
vinistic  divine  from  the  "Westminster  Confession  of  Faith." 
It  is  also  conceded,  that  if  the  same  grace  w^hich  is  given  to 
the  elect,  should  be  bestowed  upon  the  reprobate,  they  also 
would  be  saved.f  Why,  then,  is  it  not  bestowed  ?  Why  this 
fearful  limitation  of  the  divine  mercy  ?  Can  the  justice  of  God 
be  manifested  only  at  the  expense  of  his  mercy,  and  his  mercy 
only  at  the  expense  of  his  justice  ?  Or,  is  the  everlasting  mercy 
of  God,  that  sublime  attribute  which  constitutes  the  excellency 
and  glory  of  his  moral  nature,  so  limited  and  straitened  on 
all  sides,  that  it  merely  selects  here  and  there  an  object  of  its 
favour,  while  it  leaves  thousands  and  millions,  equally  within 
its  reach,  exposed  to  the  eternal  ravages  of  the  spoiler  ?  If  so, 
then  are  we  bound  to  conclude,  that  the  mercy  of  God  is  not 
infinite  ;  that  it  is  not  only  limited,  but  also  partial  and  arbi- 
trary in  its  operation.  But  such  is  not  the  mercy  of  God.  This 
is  not  a  capricious  fondness,  nor  yet  an  arbitrary  dictate  of  feel- 
ing ;  it  is  a  uniform  and  universal  rule  of  goodness. 

To  select  one  here  and  there  out  of  the  mass  of  mankind, 
while  others,  precisely  like  them  in  all  respects,  are  left  to 
perish,  is  not  mercy  ;  it  is  favouritism.  The  tyrant  may  have 
his  favourites  as  well  as  others.  But  God  is  not  a  respecter  of 
persons.  If  he  selects  one,  as  the  object  of  his  saving  mercy, 
he  will  select  all  who  stand  in  the  like  condition ;  otherwise, 
his  mercy  were  no  more  mercy,  but  a  certain  capricious  fondness 
of  feeling,  unworthy  of  an  earthly  monarch,  and  much  more  of 
the  august  Head  and  Ruler  of  the  moral  universe. 

These  views  and  feelings  are  not  peculiar  to  the  opponents 
of  Calvinism.  They  exist  in  the  bosom  of  Calvinists  themselves ; 
only  they  are  so  crushed  beneath  a  system,  that  they  cannot 
find  that  freedom  of  development,  nor  that  fulness  of  utterance, 
which  sc  rightfully  belongs  to  them,  and  which  is  so  essential 
to  their  entire  healthfulness  and  beauty. 

We  shall  give  only  one  illustration  of  the  justness  of  this 
remark,  although  we  might  produce  a  hundred.  After  having 
endeavoured  to  vindicate  the  mercy  of  God,  as  displayed  in  the 
0  Hill's  Divinity,  p.  525.  f  Id.,  p.  526. 


•328  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  11, 

scheme  of  predestination,  Dr.  Hill  candidly  declares :  "  Still, 
however,  a  cloud  Jiangs  over  the  subject  •  and  there  is  a  difficulty 
in  reconciling  the  mind  to  a  system,  which,  after  laying  this 
foundation,  that  special  grace  is  necessary  to  the  production  of 
human  virtue,  adopts  as  its  distinguishing  tenet  this  position, 
that  that  grace  is  denied  to  many."*  Notwithstanding  his 
most  elaborate  defence  of  predestination,  he  may  well  say, 
that  "a  cloud  still  hangs  over  the  subject,"  and  darkens  the 
mercy  of  God. 

Some  of  the  stereotyped  attempts  of  Calvinists  to  escape  from 
the  cloud  which  hangs  over  their  doctrine  are  too  weak  to 
deserve  a  serious  refutation.  We  are  often  asked,  for  example, 
if  God  may  not  do  what  he  pleases  with  his  own?  Most 
assuredly  he  may ;  but  does  it  please  him,  according  to  the 
high  supralapsarian  notion  of  Calvin,  to  create  myriads  of  men 
and  angels,  to  the  end  that  they  may  be  eternally  damned  ? 
Does  it  please  him,  according  even  to  the  sublapsarian  scheme,  to 
leave  the  great  mass  of  mankind  in  the  helpless  and  forlorn 
condition  in  which  they  were  born,  without  assistance,  and 
then  subject  them  to  eternal  misery,  because  they  would  not 
render  an  obedience  beyond  their  power  ?  Truly,  the  sovereign 
Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  world  may  do  what  lie  pleases  with 
his  own  ;  but  yet  we  insist,  that  it  is  his  supremest  pleasure  to 
deal  with  his  creatures  according  to  the  eternal  principles  of 
justice  and  mercy. 

His  power  is  infinite,  we  admit,  nay,  we  joyfully  believe ; 
but  yet  it  is  not  a  power  which  works  according  to  the  lawless 
pleasure  of  an  unmitigated  despot.  It  moves  within  a  sphere 
of  light  and  love.  God's  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  super- 
intend and  surround  all  its  workings ;  otherwise  its  omnipotent 
actings  would  soon  carry  the  goodly  frame  of  the  world,  to- 
gether with  all  the  blessed  inhabitants  thereof,  into  a  state  of 
utter  confusion  and  chaotic  night ;  leaving  occasion  for  none, 
save  the  blind  idolaters  of  power,  to  exclaim,  "  May  he  not  do 
what  he  pleases  with  his  own  ?" 

We  are  also  told,  that  "God  is  under  no  obligation  to  his 
creatures."  Supposing  this  to  be  true,  (though  true  most  cer- 
tainly it  is  not,)  yet  does  he  not  owe  it  to  himself — does  he  not 
owe  it  to  the  eternal  principles  of  truth  and  goodness — does  he 

0  Hill's  Divinity,  p.  562. 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  329 

not  owe  it  to  the  glory  of  his  own  empire  over  the  world — to 
deal  with  his  rational  and  immortal  creatures,  otherwise  than 
according  to  the  dark  scheme  of  Calviriistic  predestination? 
Nay,  is  it  not  due  to  the  creature  himself,  that  he  should  have 
60in  3  little  chance  or  opportunity  to  embrace  the  life  which 
God  has  set  before  him  ?  Or,  in  default  of  such  opportunity,  is 
it  not  due  to  him  that  he  should  be  exempt  from  the  wages  of 
the  second  death? 

Confessing  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  predestination,  as  main- 
tained by  themselves,  to  be  above  our  comprehension,  the 
Calvinists  are  accustomed  to  remind  us  of  the  littleness,  the 
weakness,  and  the  blindness  of  the  human  mind,  and  how 
dangerous  it  is  for  beings  like  ourselves  to  pry  into  mysteries. 
We  are  aware,  indeed,  that  our  faculties  are  limited  on  all  sides, 
and  that  we  are  exceedingly  prone  to  assume  more  than  belongs 
to  us.  We  are  not  sure  that  the  human  mind,  so  little  and  so 
assuming,  appears  to  any  very  great  advantage  in  its  advocacy 
of  the  Calvinistic  scheme  of  predestination.  This  scheme  is  not 
only  found  in  the  ninth  chapter  of  Romans,  by  a  strange  mis- 
apprehension of  the  whole  scope  and  design  of  the  apostle's 
argument,  but,  after  having  based  it  upon  this  misinterpretation 
of  the  divine  word,  its  advocates  persist  in  regarding  all  opposi- 
tion to  it  as  an  opposition  against  God.  As  often  as  we  dispute 
the  doctrine,  they  cry  out,  "Nay,  but,  O  man,  who  art  thou 
that  repliest  against  God  ?" 

This  rebuke  was  well  administered  by  St.  Paul.  He  applied 
it  to  those  who,  understanding  his  doctrine,  did  not  hesitate  to 
arraign  the  equity  of  the  divine  proceeding  in  the  election  of 
one  nation  in  preference  to  another  to  constitute  the  visible 
Church  on  earth.  This  was  not  only  to  reply  against  God's 
word,  but  also  against  the  manifest  arrangements  and  dispensa- 
tions of  his  providence.  But  it  is  not  well  applied  by  Calvin- 
ists, unless  they  possess  an  infallibility  which  authorizes  them 
to  identify  their  interpretation  of  the  word  of  God  with  the 
'ttord  itself.  It  is  not  well  applied  by  them,  unless  they  are 
authorized  to  put  themselves  in  the  place  of  God.  If  they  have 
no  right  to  do  this,  we  must  insist  upon  it  that  it  is  one  thing  to 
reply  against  God,  and  quite  another  to  reply  against  Calvin 
and  his  followers. 


NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  H, 


SECTION  IV. 

The  true  ground  and  reason  of  election  to  eternal  life  shjws  it  to  fie  consistent 
with  the  infinite  goodness  of  God. 

"We  agree  with  botli  Calvinistic  and  Arminian  writers  in  the 
position,  that  no  man  is  elected  to  eternal  life  on  account  of  his 
merits.  Indeed,  the  idea  that  a  human  being  can  merit  any- 
thing, much  less  eternal  life,  of  God,  is  preposterous  in  the 
extreme.  All  his  gifts  are  of  pure  grace.  The  creation  of  the 
soul  with  glorious  and  immortal  powers  was  an  act  of  pure,  un- 
mixed favour.  The  duty  of  loving  and  serving  him,  which  wre 
are  permitted  to  enjoy,  is  an  exalted  privilege,  and  should  in- 
spire us  with  gratitude,  instead  of  begetting  the  miserable 
conceit  that  our  service,  even  when  most  perfect,  could  deserve 
anything  further  from  God,  or  establish  any  claims  upon  his 
justice.  This  view,  which  we  take  to  be  the  true  one,  as  com- 
pletely shuts  out  all  occasion  of  boasting  as  does  the  scheme  of 
election  maintained  by  the  Calvinists. 

It  is  objected,  that  God  did  not  elect  individuals  to  eternal 
life,  because  he  foresaw  that  they  would  repent  and  believe; 
since  repentance  and  faith  themselves  are  the  fruits  of  election. 
If  this  objection  have  any  force,  we  are  persuaded  that  it  arises 
from  an  improper  wording,  or  presentation,  of  the  truth  against 
which  it  is  directed.  We  cannot  suppose  that  God  elected  any 
one  because  he  foresaw  his  good  works,  so  as  to  make  election 
to  depend  upon  them,  instead  of  making  them  to  depend  upon 
election.  This  does  not  prevent  an  individual,  however,  from 
having  been  elected,  because  God  foresaw  from  all  eternity  that 
the  influences  attending  upon  his  election  would,  by  his  own 
voluntary  cooperation  therewith,  be  rendered  effectual  to  his 
salvation.  This  is  the  ground  on  which  we  believe  the  election 
of  individuals  to  eternal  life  to  proceed.  Accordingly,  we  sup- 
pose that  God  never  selected,  or  determined  to  save,  any  one 
who  he  foresaw  would  not  yield  to  the  influences  of  his  grace, 
provided  they  should  be  given.  And  we  also  suppose  that  such 
is  the  overflowing  goodness  of  God,  that  all  were  elected  by 
him,  and  had  their  names  written  in  the  book  of  life,  who  he 
foresaw  would  yield  to  the  influences  of  his  grace,  and,  by  the 
cooperation  therewith,  "make  their  calling  and  election  sure." 


Chapter  V.]  WITH   THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  331 

This  scheme  appears  to  possess  the  following  very  great  ad- 
vantages : — 

1.  It  does  not  give  such  a  pervading  energy  to  the  operations 
of  divine  grace  as  to  exclude  all  subordinate  moral  agency  from 
the  world,  and  destroy  the  very  foundation  of  man's  account- 
ability. 

2.  It  does  not  weaken  the  motives  to  the  practice  of  a  virtu- 
ous and  decent  life,  by  assuring  the  worst  part  of  mankind  that 
they  are  just  as  likely  to  be  made  the  objects  of  the  saving 
grace  of  God  as  any  others.     On  the  contrary,  it  holds  out  this 
terrible  warning,  that  by  an  obstinate  continuance  in  evil-doing, 
the  wicked  may  place  themselves  beyond  the  effectual  influ- 
ences of  divine  grace,  and  set  the  seal  of  eternal  death  to  their 
own  souls. 

3.  It  shows  the  mercy  of  God  to  be  infinite.     No  one,  except 
those  who  place  themselves  beyond  the  possibility  of  salvation 
by  their  own  evil  deeds,  is  ever  lost.     Hence,  the  mercy  of 
God,  which  takes  in  all  whose  salvation  is  within  the  range  of 
possibility,  appears  in  full-orbed  and  unclouded  splendour.     It 
could  not  possibly  appear  greater,  or  more  beautiful,  than  as  it 
presents  itself  to  our  view  in  this  scheme. 

4.  It  shows  the  justice  of  God  to  be  infinite.    This,  according 
to  the  above  view,  is  neither  limited  by,  nor  does  it  limit,  the 
mercy  of  God.      It  acts  merely  upon  those  who  were  not,  and 
never  could  be  made,  the  objects  of  mercy;   and  it  acts  upon 
these  according  to  the  full  measure  of  their  ill-desert,  as  well  as 
according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moral  empire  of  God.    It  has 
no  limits,  except  those  which  circumscribe  and  bound  the  ob- 
jects of  infinite  justice. 

5.  It  not  only  shows  the  mercy  and  justice  of  God  to  be  as 
great  as  can  possibly  be  conceived,  but  it  also  shows  the  per- 
fect harmony  and   agreement  which   subsists  between   these 
sublime  attributes  of  the  Divine  Being.     It  marks  out  and 
defines  the  orbit,  in  which  each  revolves  in  all  the  perfection 
and  plenitude  of  its  glory,  without  the  least  clashing  or  inter- 
ference vith  the  other. 

In  cono-ision,  we  would  simply  ask  the  candid  and  impartial 
reader,  Does  any  dark  or  perplexing  "  cloud  still  hang  over  the 
subject?"  Is  "there  a  difficulty  in  reconciling  the  mind  to  a 
system,"  which  exhibits  the  character  of  God,  and  his  govern 


332  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT  [Part  H, 

ment  of  the  world,  in  so  pleasing  and  so  advantageous  a  light  ? 
Does  not  a  system,  which  gives  so  glad  and  joyous  a  response 
to  the  demand  of  God,  "  Are  not  my  ways  equal  ?"  recommend 
itself  to  the  affections  of  the  pious  mind  ? 

It  very  clearly  seems  to  us,  that,  strong  as  are  the  convictions 
of  Dr.  Chalmers  in  favour  of  "a  rigid  and  absolute  predes- 
tination,"* his  affections  cannot  always  be  restrained  within 
the  narrow  confines  of  so  dark  a  scheme.  His  language,  in 
pleading  for  the  universality  of  the  gospel  offer,  contains,  it  seems 
to  us,  as  direct,  and  pointed,  and  powerful  condemnation  of 
his  own  scheme  as  can  well  be  found  in  the  whole  range  of 
theological  literature.  "  There  must  be,"  says  he,  "  a  sad  mis- 
understanding somewhere.  The  commission  put  into  our  hands 
is  to  go  and  preach  the  gospel  to  every  creature  under  heaven  ; 
and  the  announcement  sounded  forth  in  the  world  from  heaven's 
vault  was,  Peace  on  earth,  good-will  to  men.  There  is  no 
freezing  limitation  here,  but  a  largeness  and  munificence  of 
mercy  boundless  as  space,  free  and  open  as  the  expanse  of  the 
firmament.  We  hope,  therefore,  the  gospel,  the  real  gospel, 
is  as  unlike  the  views  of  some  of  its  interpreters,  as  creation,  in 
all  its  boundless  extent  and  beauty,  is  unlike  the  paltry  scheme  of 
some  wretched  scholastic  in  the  middle  ages.  The  middle  age 
of  science  and  civilization  is  now  terminated  ;  but  Christianity 
also  had  its  middle  age,  and  this,  perhaps,  is  not  yet  fulty 
terminated.  There  is  still  a  remainder  of  the  old  spell,  even 
the  spell  of  human  authority,  and  by  which  a  certain  cramp 
or  confinement  has  been  laid  on  the  genius  of  Christianity.  We 
cannot  doubt  that  the  time  of  its  complete  emancipation  is 
coming,  when  it  shall  break  loose  from  the  imprisonment  in 
which  it  is  held  ;  but  meanwhile  there  is,  as  it  were,  a  stricture 
upon  it,  not  yet  wholly  removed,  and  in  virtue  of  which  the 
largeness  and  liberality  of  Heaven's  own  purposes  have  been 
made  to  descend  in  partial  and  scanty  droppings  through  the 
strainers  of  an  artificial  theology,  instead  of  falling,  as  they 
ought,  in  a  universal  shower  upon  the  world."^ 

Is  it  possible,  that  this  is  the  language  of  a  man  who  believes 
that  Heaven's  purposes  of  mercy  descend,  not  upon  all  men,  but 
only  upon  the  elect?  It  is  even  so.  Boundless  and  beautiful 
as  the  goodness  of  God  is  in  itself;  yet,  through  the  strainers  of 

0  Institutes  of  Theology.  |  Institutes  of  Theology,  vol.  ii,  ch.  yii. 


Chapter  V.]  WITH  THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  333 

his  theology,  is  it  made  to  descend  in  partial  and  scanty  drop- 
pings merely,  and  not  in  one  universal  shower.  It  is  good-will, 
not  to  men,  but  to  the  elect.  Such  is  the  "  chilling  limitation," 
and  such  the  frightful  "stricture,"  on  the  genius  of  Chris- 
tianity, from  which,  in  the  fervour  of  his  imagination,  the  great 
heart  of  Chalmers  burst  into  a  higher  and  a  more  genial  ele- 
ment of  light  and  love. 

Alas !  how  sad  and  how  sudden  the  descent,  when  in  the 
very  next  paragraph  he  says  :  "  The  names  and  number  of  the 
saved  may  have  been  in  the  view,  nay,  even  in  the  design  and 
destination  of  God  from  all  eternity  ;  and  still  the  distinction 
is  carried  into  effect,  not  by  means  of  a  gospel  addressed  par- 
tially and  exclusively  to  them,  but  by  means  of  a  gospel  ad- 
dressed generally  to  all.  A  partial  gospel,  in  fact,  could  not 
have  achieved  tlie  conversion  of  the  elect :"  that  is  to  say,  though 
it  was  the  design  and  destination  of  God  from  all  eternity  to 
save  only  a  small  portion  of  those  whom  he  might  have  saved ; 
yet  he  made  the  offer  of  salvation  to  all,  in  order  to  save  the 
chosen  few  !  And  if  he  had  not  proclaimed  this  universal  offer, 
by  which  "  the  largeness  and  munificence "  of  his  mercy  are 
made  to  appear  as  "  boundless  as  space,"  the  elect  could  not 
have  been  saved  !  If  so,  is  it  the  real  goodness  of  God,  then,  or 
merely  the  appearance  of  universal  goodness,  that  leadeth  men 
to  repentance  ? 

"  Any  charm,"  says  he,  "  which  there  is  in  Christianity  to 
recall  or  to  regenerate  some,  lies  in  those  of  its  overtures  which 
are  so  framed  as  to  hold  out  the  offered  friendship  of  God  to 
all  :"*  that  is,  that  although  God  intends  and  seeks  to  save  only 
a  few,  he  offers  the  same  salvation  to  all,  to  give  an  efficacious 
charm  to  the  scheme  of  redemption !  Indeed,  if  the  Calvin- 
istic  scheme  of  an  absolute  predestination  be  true,  then  we 
admit  that  there  is  a  charm  and  a  glory  in  the  magnificent 
delusion,  arising  from  God's  offer  of  friendship  to  all,  which  is 
not  to  be  found  in  the  truth.  But  that  scheme,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  not  true ;  and  also,  that  the  goodness  of  God  is  as 
boundless  and  beautiful  in  reality,  as  it  could  possibly  be  in 
appearance. 

We  agree  with  Dr.  Chalmers,  that  the  goodness  of  God  should 
be  viewed,  not  through  the  medium  of  predestination,  but  as  it 

0  Institutes  of  Theology,  vol.  ii,  ch.  vii. 


334  NATURAL  EVIL  CONSISTENT,   ETC.  [Part  IL 

sliines  forth  in  the  light  of  the  glorious  gospel.  We  agree  with 
him,  that  "  we  ought  to  proceed  on  the  obvious  representations 
which  Scripture  gives  of  the  Deity ;  and  these  beheld  in  their 
own  immediate  light,  untinged  by  the  dogma  of  predestination. 
God  waiting  to  be  gracious — God  not  willing  that  any  should 
perish,  but  that  all  should  come  to  repentance — God  swearing 
by  himself  that  he  has  no  pleasure  in  the  death  of  a  sinner,  but 
rather  that  all  should  come  unto  him  and  Iwe — God  beseeching 
men  to  enter  into  reconciliation,  and  this  not  as  elect,  but  simply 
and  generally  as  men  and  sinners  / — these  are  the  attitudes  in 
which  the  Father  of  the  human  family  sets  himself  forth  unto 
the  world — these  the  terms  in  which  he  speaks  to  us  from 
heaven."  It  is  precisely  in  this  sublime  attitude,  and  in  this 
transporting  light,  that  we  rejoice  to  contemplate  the  Father  of 
mercies ;  and  this  view,  it  must  be  confessed,  is  wholly  "  un- 
tinged  with  the  dogma  of  predestination." 


CONCLUSION. 


A  SUMMARY  VIEW  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  AND  ADVANTAGES 
OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 


There  is  a  lamp  within  the  lofty  dome 

Of  the  dim  world,  whose  radiance  clear  acth  show 

Its  awful  beauty;  and,  through  the  wide  gloom, 
Make  all  its  obscure  mystic  symbols  glow 

With  pleasing  light, — that  we  may  see  and  know 
The  glurious  world,  and  all  its  wondrous  scheme ; 

Not  as  distorted  in  the  mind  below, 
Nor  in  philosopher's,  nor  poet's  dream, 
But  as  it  was,  and  is,  high  in  the  Mind  Supreme. 

Atrox. 


CONCLUSION. 


I. 

SUMMARY  OF  THE  FIRST  PART  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

THE  commonly  received  systems  of  theology  are,  it  is  confessed 
by  their  advocates,  attended  with  manifold  inconveniences  and 
difficulties.  The  habit  of  mind  by  which,  notwithstanding  such 
difficulties,  it  clings  to  the  great  truths  of  those  systems,  is  wor- 
thy of  all  admiration,  and  forms  one  of  the  best  guarantees  of 
the  stability  and  progress  of  human  knowledge.  For  in  every 
department  of  science  the  great  truths  which  dawn  upon  the 
mind  are  usually  attended  with  a  cloud  of  difficulties,  and,  but 
for  the  habit  in  question,  they  would  soon  be  permitted  to  fade 
away,  and  be  lost  in  their  original  obscurity.  Copernicus  has, 
therefore,  been  justly  applauded,*  not  only  for  conceiving,  but 
for  firmly  grasping  the  heliocentric  theory  of  the  world,  not- 
withstanding the  many  formidable  objections  which  it  had  to 
encounter  in  his  own  mind.  Even  the  sublime  law  of  the  ma- 
terial universe,  before  it  finally  established  itself  in  the  mind  of 
Newton,  more  than  once  fell,  in  its  struggles  for  acceptance, 
beneath  the  apparently  insuperable  objections  by  which  it  was 
attended;  and,  after  all,  the  overpowering  evidence  which 
caused  it  to  be  embraced,  still  left  it  surrounded  by  an  immense 
penumbra  of  difficulties.  These,  together  with  the  sublime 
truth,  he  bequeathed  to  his  successors.  They  have  retained  the 
truth,  and  removed  the  difficulties.  In  like  manner,  admirable 
though  the  habit  of  clinging  to  every  sufficiently  accredited 
truth  may  be,  yet,  whether  in  the  physical  or  in  the  moral 
sciences,  the  effort  to  disencumber  the  truth  of  the  difficulties 
by  which  its  progress  is  embarrassed  should  never  be  remitted. 

0  Whe well's  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  vol.  i. 

00 


338  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

The  scientific  impulse,  by  which  a  great  truth  is  grasped,  and 
established  upon  its  own  appropriate  evidence,  should  ever  bo 
followed  by  the  subordinate  movement,  which  strives  to  removo 
every  obstacle  out  of  the  way,  and  cause  it  to  secure  a  wider 
and  a  brighter  dominion  in  the  human  mind.  And  in  propor- 
tion as  any  scheme,  whether  in  relation  to  natural  or  to  divine 
things,  shall,  without  a  sacrifice  or  mutilation  of  the  truth,  divest 
itself  of  the  darkness  which  must  ever  accompany  all  one-sided 
and  partial  views,  will  it  possess  a  decided  advantage  and 
superiority  over  other  systems.  Since  this  general  principle 
will  not  be  denied,  let  us  proceed,  in  conclusion,  to  take  a  brief 
survey  of  the  foregoing  scheme  of  doctrine,  and  determine,  if 
we  can,  whether  to  any  truth  it  has  given  any  such  advantage. 
It  clearly  seems  free  from  the  stupendous  cloud  of  difficulties 
that  overhang  that  view  of  the  moral  universe  which  supposes 
its  entire  constitution  and  government  to  be  in  accordance  with 
the  scheme  of  necessity.  These  difficulties  pertain,  first,  to  the 
responsibility  of  man ;  secondly,  to  the  purity  of  God ;  and, 
thirdly,  to  the  reality  of  moral  distinctions.  These  three  several 
branches  of  the  difficulty  in  question  have  been  respectively 
considered  in  the  first  three  chapters  of  the  first  part  of  the 
present  work ;  and  we  shall  now  briefly  recapitulate  the  views 
therein  presented,  in  the  three  following  sections. 

SECTION  I. 
The  scheme  of  necessity  denies  that  man  is  the  responsible  author  of  sin. 

If,  according  to  this  scheme,  all  things  in  heaven  and  earth, 
the  volitions  of  the  human  mind  not  excepted,  be  under  the 
dominion  of  necessitating  causes,  then  may  we  well  ask,  How 
can  man  be  a  free  and  responsible  agent  ?  To  this  inquiry  the 
most  illustrious  advocates  of  the  scheme  in  question  have  not 
been  able  to  return  a  coherent  or  satisfactory  reply.  After  the 
search  of  ages,  and  the  joint  labour  of  all  their  gigantic  intel- 
lects, they  have  found  no  position  in  their  system  on  which  the 
freedom  of  the  human  mind  may  be  securely  planted.  Flie 
position  set  up  for  this  purpose  by  one  is  pulled  down  by  an- 
other, who,  in  his  turn,  indicates  some  other  position  only  to  be 
demolished  by  some  other  advocate  of  his  own  scheme.  The 
more  we  look  into  their  writings  on  this  subject,  the  more 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  339 

irreconcilable  seems  the  conflict  of  opinion  in  which  they  are 
among  themselves  involved.  The  more  closely  we  contemplate 
the  labour  of  their  hands,  the  more  clearly  we  perceive  that  all 
their  attempts,  in  opposition  to  the  voice  of  heaven  and  earth, 
to  rear  the  great  metaphysical  tower  of  necessity,  have  only 
ended  in  an  utter  confusion  of  tongues.  So  far,  indeed,  are 
they  from  having  found  and  presented  any  such  view  of  the 
freedom  and  responsibility  of  man,  as  shall,  by  the  intrinsic  and 
overpowering  lustre  of  its  evidence,  stand  some  chance  to  dis 
arm  the  enemies  of  God,  that  they  have  not  even  found  one  in 
which  they  themselves  can  rest.  The  school  of  the  necessitarian 
is,  in  reality,  a  house  divided  against  itself;  and  that,  too,  in 
regard  to  the  most  vital  and  fundamental  point  of  its  philos- 
ophy. 

There  seems  to  be  one  exception  to  the  truth  of  this  general 
remark :  for  there  is  one  scheme  or  definition  of  liberty,  in 
which  many,  if  not  most,  of  the  advocates  of  necessity  have 
concurred ;  that  is,  the  definition  of  Hobbes.  As  the  current 
of  a  river,  says  he,  is  free  to  flow  down  its  channel,  provided 
there  be  no  obstruction  in  the  way ;  so  the  human  will,  though 
compelled  to  act  by  causes  over  which  it  has  no  control,  is  free, 
provided  there  be  no  external  impediment  to  prevent  its  voli- 
tion from  passing  into  effect.  This  idea  of  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  though  much  older  than  Hobbes,  is  primarily  indebted  to 
his  influence  for  its  prevalence  in  modern  times.;  for  it  de- 
scended from  Hobbes  to  Locke,  from  Locke  to  Edwards,  and 
from  Edwards  to  the  modern  school  of  Calvinistic  divines. 

No  matter  how  we  come  by  our  volitions,  says  Edwards,  yet 
are  we  perfectly  free  when  there  is  no  external  impediment  to 
hinder  our  volitions  from  passing  into  effect :  that  is  to  say, 
though  our  volitions  be  absolutely  produced  by  the  divine 
omnipotence  itself,  or  in  any  other  way ;  yet  is  the  will  free, 
provided  no  external  cause  interpose  to  prevent  its  volition  from 
moving  the  body.  According  to  this  definition  of  the  liberty 
of  the  will,  it  is  not  a  property  of  the  soul  at  all,  but  only  an 
accidental  circumstance  or  condition  of  the  body.  In  the  sig- 
nificant language  of  Leibnitz,  it  is  not  the  freedom  of  the  mind; 
it  is  merely  "  elbow-room."  It  consists  not  in  an  attribute,  or 
property,  or  power  of  the  soul,  but  only  in  the  external  oppor- 
tunity which  its  necessitated  volitions  may  have  to  necessitate 


340  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

an  effect.  We  ask,  How  can  the  mind  be  free?  and  they  tell 
us,  When  the  body  may  be  so  !  We  inquire  about  an  attribute 
of  the  spiritual  principle  within,  and  they  turn  us  off  with  an 
answer  respecting  an  accident  of  the  material  principle  without ! 
An  ignoratio  elenchi  more  flagrant — a  mistaking  of  the  question 
more  palpable — it  is  surely  not  possible  to  conceive.  Yet  this 
definition  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  though  so  superficially 
false,  is  precisely  that  which  has  found  the  most  general  accept- 
ance among  necessitarians.  Though  vehemently  condemned 
by  Calvin  himself,  unanswerably  refuted  by  Leibnitz,  sneered 
at  by  Edwards  the  younger,  and  pronounced  utterly  inadequate 
by  Dr.  John  Dick ;  yet,  as  we  have  seen,  is  it  now  held  up  as 
"  the  Calvinistic  idea  of  the  freedom  of  the  will." 

We  do  not  wonder  that  such  a  definition  of  free-will  should 
have  been  adopted  by  atheizing  philosophers,  such  as  Hume 
and  Hobbes,  for  example  ;  because  we  cannot  suppose  them  to 
have  been  penetrated  with  any  very  profound  design  to  uphold 
the  cause  of  human  responsibility,  or  to  vindicate  the  immaculate 
purity  of  the  divine  glory.  But  that  it  should  have  been 
accepted  with  such  unquestioning  simplicity  by  a  large  body 
of  Christian  divines,  having  the  great  interests  of  the  moral 
world  at  heart,  is,  we  cannot  but  think,  a  sufficient  ground  for 
the  most  profound  astonishment  and  regret ;  for,  surely,  to  plant 
the  great  cause  of  human  responsibility  on  a  foundation  so  slen- 
der, on  a  fallacy  so  palpable,  on  a  position  so  utterly  untenable, 
is  to  expose  it  to  the  victorious  assaults  of  its  weakest  enemy 
and  invader. 

SECTION  II. 
The  scheme  of  necessity  makes  God  the  author  of  sin. 

The  necessitarian,  in  his  attempts  to  vindicate  the  purity  of 
God,  has  not  been  more  successful  than  in  his  endeavours  to 
establish  the  freedom  and  accountability  of  man.  If,  according 
to  his  scheme,  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  world  be  the  primal 
cause  of  all  things,  the  volitions  of  men  included ;  it  certainly 
geems  exceedingly  difficult  to  conceive,  that  he  is  not  impli- 
cated in  the  sin  of  the  world.  And  this  difficulty,  so  appalling 
at  first  view,  remains  just  as  great  after  all  that  the  most  enlight- 
ened advocates  of  that  scheme  have  advanced  as  it  was  before. 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  341 

We  have  witnessed  the  efforts  of  a  Leibnitz,  an  Edwards,  and 
a  Chalmers,  to  repel  this  objection  to  the  scheme  of  necessity ; 
and  if  we  mistake  not,  we  have  seen  how  utterly  ineffectual 
they  have  proved  to  break  its  force,  or  resist  its  influence.  The 
sum  and  substance  of  that  defence  is,  as  we  have  seen,  that  God 
may  do  evil  that  good  may  come ;  a  defence  which,  instead  of 
vindicating  the  purity  of  the  divine  proceeding,  represents  it  as 
having  been  governed  by  the  most  corrupt  maxim  of  the  most 
corrupt  system  of  casuistry  the  world  has  ever  seen.  It  darkens, 
rather  than  illuminates,  that  profound  and  portentous  obscurity 
of  the  system  of  the  world,  arising  from  the  origin  and  ex- 
istence of  moral  evil.  So  far  from  removing  the  difficulty 
from  their  scheme,  they  have  only  illustrated  its  force  by  the 
ineffable  weakness  of  the  means  and  methods  which  that  scheme 
has  necessitated  them  to  employ  for  its  destruction. 

SECTION  III. 

The  scheme  of  necessity  denies  the  reality  of  moral  distinctions. 

For,  if  all  things  in  the  world,  the  acts  .of  the  will  not 
excepted,  be  produced  by  an  extraneous  agency,  it  seems  clear 
that  it  is  absurd  to  attach  praise  or  blame  to  men  on  account 
of  their  volitions.  Nothing  appears  more  self-evident  than  the 
position,  that  whatever  is  thus  produced  in  us  can  neither  be 
our  virtue  nor  our  vice.  The  advocates  of  necessity,  at  leasi 
those  of  them  who  do  not  admit  the  inference  in  question, 
invoke  the  aid  of  logic  to  extinguish  the  light  of  the  principle 
on  which  it  is  based.  But  where  have  they  found,  or  where- 
can  they  find,  a  principle  more  clear,  more  simple,  or  more 
unquestionable  on  which  to  ground  their  arguments  ?  Where, 
in  the  whole  armory  of  logic,  can  be  found  a  principle  more 
unquestionable  than  this,  that  no  man  can  be  to  praise  or  to 
blame  for  that  which  is  produced  in  him,  by  causes  over  which 
he  had  no  control  ? 

We  have  examined  those  arguments  in  detail,  and  exhibited 
the  principles  on  which  they  proceed.  Those  principles,  instead 
of  being  of  such  a  nature  as  to  subserve  the  purposes  of  valid 
argument,  are  either  insignificant  truisms  w-hich  prove  nothing, 
or  else  they  reach  the  point  in  dispute  only  by  means  of  an 
ambiguity  of  words.  Of  the  first  description  is  the  celebrated 


342  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

maxim  of  Edwards,  that  the  essence  of  virtue  and  vice  consists 
in  their  nature,  and  not  in  their  cause.  By  which  he  means, 
that  no  matter  how  we  come  by  our  virtue  and  vice,  though 
they  be  produced  in  us  according  to  the  scheme  of  necessity, 
yet  are  they  our  virtue  and  vice.  If  a  horse  should  fall  from 
the  moon,  it  would  be  a  horse :  for  no  matter  where  it  conn  s 
from,  a  horse  is  a  horse  ;  or,  more  scientifically  expressed,  the 
essence  of  a  horse  consists  in  the  nature  of  a  horse,  and  not  in 
its  origin  or  cause.  All  this  is  very  true.  But  then,  we  no 
more  believe  that  horses  fall  from  the  moon,  than  we  do  that  vir- 
tue and  vice  are  produced  according  to  the  scheme  of  necessity. 

Of  the  last  description  is  that  other  maxim  of  Edwards,  that 
men  are  adjudged  virtuous  or  vicious  on  account  of  actions  pro- 
ceeding from  the  will,  without  considering  how  they  came  by 
their  volition.  True,  we  may  judge  of  external  actions  accord- 
ing as  their  origin  is  in  the  will  or  otherwise,  without  consider- 
ing how  its  volitions  come  to  pass ;  but  then  this  is  because  we 
proceed  on  the  tacit  assumption  that  the  will  is  free,  and  not 
under  the  dominion  of  necessitating  causes.  But  the  question 
relates,  not  to  external  actions  or  movements  of  the  body,  but 
to  the  volitions  of  the  mind  itself.  And  this  being  the  case,  it 
does  make  a  vast  difference  in  our  estimate,  whether  we  con- 
sider those  volitions  as  coming  to  pass  freely ;  or  whether, 
according  to  the  scheme  of  necessity,  we  regard  them  as  being 
produced  by  the  operation  of  causes  over  which  we  have  no 
control.  In  this  case,  it  is  impossible  for  the  human  mind  to 
attach  praise  or  blame  to  them,  or  view  them  as  constituting 
either  virtue  or  vice.  For  nothing  can  be  plainer  than  the 
position,  that  if  anything  in  us  be  produced  by  the  mighty  and 
irresistible  operation  of  an  extraneous  agency,  it  can  neither  be 
our  virtue  nor  vice.  This  principle  is  so  clear,  that  logic  can 
neither  add  to  nor  detract  from  the  intrinsic  lustre  of  its  evi- 
dence. And  all  the  cloudy  sophistications  of  an  Edwards,  in- 
genious as  they  are,  can  obscure  it  only  to  the  minds  of  those 
who  have  not  sufficient  penetration  to  see  through  the  nature  of 
his  arguments. 

At  this  point,  then,  as  well  as  at  others,  the  scheme  of  neces- 
sity, instead  of  clearing  up  the  old,  has  introduced  new  difficul- 
ties into  the  system  of  the  world.  Instead  of  diffusing  light,  it 
has  actually  extended  the  empire  of  darkness,  by  investing  in 


SUMMARY   OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  343 

the  clouds  and  mists  of  its  own  raising,  some  of  the  brightest 
elements  which  enter  into  its  organization.  By  scholastic  re- 
finements and  sophistical  devices,  it  has  sought  to  overturn  and 
destroy,  not  the  elements  of  error  and  confusion,  but  some  of 
the  clearest  and  most  indestructible  intuitional  convictions  of 
the  human  head  and  heart. 

But  great  as  these  difficulties  are,  we  may  still  be  asked  to 
embrace  the  scheme  from  which  they  flow,  on  the  ground  that 
it  is  true.  Indeed,  this  is  the  course  pursued  by  some  of  the 
most  enlightened  Calvinistic  necessitarians  of  the  present  day. 
Freely  admitting  that  all  the  attempts  of  Leibnitz,  of  Edwards, 
and  others,  to  bring  the  scheme  of  necessity  into  an  agreement 
with  the  dictates  of  reason,  have  left  its  stupendous  difficult]' on 
pretty  much  where  they  found  them — wrapped  in  impenetrable 
gloom;  they  nevertheless  maintain  this  scheme,  and  propose  it 
to  our  acceptance,  on  the  sole  and  sufficient  ground  of  its  evi- 
dence. If  we  may  judge  from  those  of  their  writings  which  we 
have  seen,  this  course  of  proceeding  is  getting  to  be  very  much 
the  fashion  among  the  Calvinists  of  the  present  day ;  and  they 
have  a  great  deal  to  say  in  praise  of  simply  adhering  to  the 
truth,  without  being  over-solicitous  about  its  difficulties,  or  pay- 
ing too  much  attention  to  them.  That  man,  say  they,  is  in 
imminent  danger  of  heresy  wrho,  instead  of  receiving  the  truth 
with  the  simplicity  of  a  little  child,  goes  about  to  worry  himself 
with  its  difficulties.  He  walks  in  dark  and  slippery  places. 
We  agree  writh  them  in  this,  and  commend  their  wisdom :  for 
it  presents  the  only  chance  which  their  system  has  of  retaining 
its  hold  on  the  human  mind.  But  before  accepting  this  scheme 
on  the  ground  of  its  evidence,  we  have  deemed  it  prudent  to 
look  into  the  very  interior  of  the  scheme  itself,  and  weigh  the 
evidence  on  which  it  is  so  confidently  recommended. 

SECTION  IV. 

The  moral  world  not  constituted  according  to  the  scheme  of  necessity. 

In  the  prosecution  of  this  inquiry,  we  have  appeared  to  our- 
selves to  find,  that  this  boasted  scheme  of  necessity  is  neither 
more  nor  less  than  one  grand  tissue  of  sophisms.  We  have 
found,  we  believe,  that  this  huge  imposition  on  the  reason  of 
man  is  a  vile  congregation  of  pestilential  errors,  through  which, 


344  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

if  the  glory  of  God  and  his  marvellous  ways  be  contemplated, 
they  must  appear  most  horribly  distorted.  We  have  found  that 
this  scheme  is  as  weak  and  crazy  in  the  mechanism  of  its  inter- 
nal structure  as  it  is  frightful  in  its  consequences.  Instead  of 
that  closely  articulated  body  of  thought,  which  we  were  led  to 
expect  therein,  we  have  found  little  more  than  a  jumble  of  in- 
coherences, a  semi-chaotic  mass  of  plausible  blunders.  We 
have  seen  and  shown,  we  trust,  that  this  grand  and  imposing 
scheme  of  necessity  is,  in  reality,  based  on  a  false  psychology, 
— directed  against  a  false  issue, — supported  by  false  logic, — 
fortified  by  false  conceptions, — recommended  by  false  analogies, 
— and  rendered  plausible  by  a  false  phraseology.  And,  besides, 
we  have  ascertained  that  it  originates  in  a  false  method,  and 
terminates  in  a  false  religion.  As  such,  we  deem  it  far  better 
adapted  to  represent  the  little,  narrow,  dark,  crooked,  and  per- 
verted world  within,  than  the  great  and  all-glorious  world  of 
God  without.  So  have  we  not  spared  its  deformities. 


SECTION  V. 
The  relation  between  the  human  agency  and  the  divine. 

Having  got  rid  of  the  scheme  of  necessity,  which  opposed  so 
many  obstacles  to  the  prosecution  of  our  design,  we  were  then 
prepared  to  investigate  the  great  problem  of  evil :  but,  before 
entering  on  this  subject,  we  paused  to  consider  the  difficulty 
which,  in  all  ages,  the  human  mind  has  found  in  attempting  to 
reconcile  the  influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit  with  the  freedom  of 
the  will.  In  regard  to  this  difficulty,  it  has  been  made  to  ap- 
pear, we  trust,  that  we  need  not  understand  how  the  Spirit  of 
God  acts,  in  order  to  reconcile"  his  influence  with  the  free- 
agency  of  man.  We  need  to  know,  not  how  the  one  Spirit  acts 
on  the  other,  but  only  what  is  done  by  each,  in  order  to  see  a 
perfect  agreement  and  harmony  in  their  cooperation.  The  in- 
quiry relates,  then,  to  the  precise  thing  done  by  each  and  not 
to  the  modus  operandi.  Having,  in  opposition  to  the  commonly 
received  notion,  ascertained  this  to  be  the  difficulty,  we  lave 
found  it  comparatively  easy  of  solution. 

For  the  improved  psychology  of  the  present  day,  which  gives 
so  clear  and  steady  a  view  of  the  simple  facts  of  consciousness, 
has  enabled  us  to  see  what  may,  and  what  may  not,  be  pro- 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  345 

duced  by  an  extraneous  agency.  This  again  has  enabled  us  to 
make  out  and  define  the  sphere  of  the  divine  power,  as  well  as  that 
of  the  human ;  and  to  determine  the  point  at  which  they  come 
into  contact,  without  interfering  with  or  intersecting  each  other. 

The  same  means  have  also  shown  us,  that  the  opposite  errors 
of  Telagianism  and  Augustinism  have  a  common  root  in  a  false 
psychology.  The  psychology  of  the  past,  which  identifies  the 
passive  states  of  the  sensibility  with  the  active  states  of  the  will, 
is  common  to  both  of  these  schemes.  From  this  common  root 
the  two  doctrines  branch  out  in  opposite  directions ;  the  one  on 
the  side  of  the  mind's  activity,  and  the  other  on  that  of  its 
passivity.  Each  perceives  only  one  phase  of  the  complex 
whole,  and  denies  the  reality  of  the  other.  With  one,  the 
active  phase  is  the  w^hole ;  writh  the  other,  the  passive  impression 
is  the  whole.  Hence  the  one  recognises  the  human  power  alone ; 
while  the  other  causes  this  power  entirely  to  disappear  beneath 
the  overshadowing  influence  of  the  divine. 

Now  the  foregoing  system,  by  availing  itself  of  the  psychology 
of  the  present  day,  not  only  does  not  cause  the  one  of  these 
great  facts  to  exclude  the  other,  but,  by  showing  their  logical 
coherency  and  agreement,  it  removes  the  temptation  that  the 
speculative  reason  has  ever  felt  to  do  such  violence  to  the  cause 
of  truth.  It  embraces  the  half  views  of  both  schemes,  and 
moulds  them  into  one  great  and  full-orbed  truth.  In  the  great 
theandric  work  of  regeneration,  in  particular,"  it  neither  causes 
the  human  element  to  exclude  the  divine,  nor  the  divine  to 
swallow  up  the  human  ;  but  preserves  each  in  its  integrity,  and 
both  in  their  harmonious  union  and  cooperation.  The  mutual 
inter-dependency,  and  the  undisturbed  inter-working,  of  these 
all-important  elements  of  the  moral  world,  it  aims  to  place  on 
a  firm  basis,  and  exhibit  in  a  clear  light.  If  this  object  has 
been  accomplished,  though  but  in  part,  or  by  way  of  a  first 
approximation  only,  it  will  be  conceded  to  be  no  small  gain,  or 
advantage,  to  the  cause  of  truth. 

SECTION  VL 
The  existence  of  moral  evil  consistent  with  the  infinite  purity  of  God. 

The  relation  of  the  foregoing  treatise  to  the  great  problem 
rf  the  spiritual  world,  concerning  the  origin  and  existence  of 


346  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

evil,  may  be  easily  indicated,  and  the  solution  it  proposes  dis- 
tinguished from  that  of  others.  This  may  be  best  done,  per- 
haps, with  the  aid  of  logical  forms. 

The  world,  created  by  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  says  the 
sceptic,  must  needs  be  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds :  but  the 
I  actual  world  is  not  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds  :  therefore  it 
[_  was  not  created  by  an  infinitely  perfect  Being.  Now  in  reply- 
ing to  this  argument,  no  theist  denies  the  major  premiss.  All 
have  conceded,  that  the  idea  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being 
necessarily  implies  the  existence  and  preservation  of  the  great- 
,  est  possible  perfection  in  the  created  universe.  In  the  two 
celebrated  works  of  M.  Leibnitz  and  Archbishop  King,  both 
put  forth  in  reply  to  Bayle,  this  admission  is  repeatedly  and 
distinctly  made.  This  seems  to  have  been  rightly  done  ;  for,  in 
the  language  of  Cudworth,  "  To  believe  a  God,  is  to  believe  the 
existence  of  all  possible  good  and  perfection  in  the  universe."* 
In  this,  says  Leibnitz,  is  embosomed  all  possible  good.  But 
how  is  this  point  established?  "We  judge  from  the  event 
itself,"  says  he  ;  "  since  God  has  made  it,  it  was  not  possible  to 
have  made  a  fatter"\  But  this  is  the  language  of  faith,  and 
riot  of  reason.  As  an  argument  addressed  to  the  sceptic,  it  is 
radically  unsound ;  for  as  a  medium  of  proof,  it  employs  the 
very  thing  in  dispute,  namely,  that  God  is  infinitely  perfect. 
Hence  this  is  &petitio  principii,  a  begging  of  the  question.  If 
this  were  all  that  M.  Leibnitz  had  to  oifer,  he  might  as  \vell 
have  believed,  and  remained  silent. 

But  this  was  not  all.  He  endeavours  to  show,  that  the  world 
is  absolutely  perfect,  without  inferring  its  perfection  from  the 
assumed  infinite  perfection  of  its  Author.  At  first  view,  this 
does  not  appear  to  be  so  ;  for  the  sin  and  misery  which  over- 
flow this  lower  part  of  the  world  seem  to  detract  from  the 
perfection  and  beauty  of  the  whole.  Not  so,  says  Leibnitz: 
"  there  are  some  disorders  in  the  parts,  which  marvelloi  isly 
heighten  the  beauty  of  the  whole  ;  as  certain  discords,  skilfully 
employed,  render  the  harmony  more  exquisite. "if  Considered 
as  an  argument,  this  is  likewise  quite  unsatisfactory.  It  is,  in 
fact,  merely  the  light  of  the  imagination,  playing  over  the 
bosom  of  the  cloud ;  not  the  concentrated  blaze  of  the  intelli- 

^  Intellectual  System,  vol.  ii,  p.  349.  f  Theodicee,  Abrege  do  la  Controverse. 

J  Ibid. 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  347 

gence,  dispelling  its  gloom.  And  besides,  this  analogy  proceeds 
on  a  false  principle ;  inasmuch  as  it  supposes  that  God  has  him- 
self introduced  sin  into  the  world,  with  a  view  to  its  happy- 
effects.  We  could  sooner  believe,  indeed,  that  the  principle 
of  evil  had  introduced  harmony  into  the  world  in  order  to 
heighten  the  frightful  effects  of  its  discord,  than  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  all  good  had  produced  the  frightful  discord  of  the 
world,  in  order  to  enhance  the  effects  of  its  harmony.  But  we 
shall  let  all  such  fine  sayings  pass.  Perhaps  they  were  intended 
as  the  ornaments  of  faith,  rather  than  as  the  radiant  armour  and 
the  invincible  weapons  of  reason. 

Though  Leibnitz  frequently  insists,  that  "  the  permission  of 
evil  tends  to  the  good  of  the  universe,"*  he  does  not  always 
seem  to  mean  that  evil  would  be  better  than  holiness  in  its 
stead ;  but  that  the  permission  of  sin  is  not  so  great  an  incon- 
venience as  would  be  its  universal  prevention.  "  We  ought  to 
say,"  says  he,  "  that  God  permits  sin,  because  otherwise  he 
would  himself  do  a  worse  action  (une  action  pire)  than  all  the 
sin  of  his  creatures."f  But  what  is  this  worse,  this  more  unrea- 
sonable action  of  which  God  would  be  guilty,  if  he  should  pre- 
vent all  sin  ?  •  One  bad  feature  thereof  would  be,  according  to 
Leibnitz,  that  it  would  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  the  will. 
In  his  "  Abreg6  de  la  Controverse,"  he  says :  "  We  have  added, 
after  many  good  authors,  that  it  is  in  conformity  with  the  gen- 
eral order  and  good,  for  God  to  leave  to  certain  creatures  an  occa- 
sion for  the  exercise  of  their  liberty."  This  argument  comes 
with  a  bad  grace  from  one  who  has  already  denied  the  liberty 
of  the  will ;  and,  indeed,  from  the  very  form  of  his  expression, 
Leibnitz  seems  to  have  adopted  it  from  authority,  rather  than 
from  a  perception  of  any  support  it  derives  from  his  own  prin- 
ciples. He  asserts  the  freedom  of  the  will,  it  is  true,  but  he 
does  this,  as  we  have  seen,  only  in  opposition  to  the  "  absolute 
necessity"  of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  ;  according  to  whom  nothing 
in  the  universe  could  possibly  have  been  otherwise  than  it  is. 
In  his  "  Reflexions  sur  le  Livre  de  Hobbes,"  he  says,  that 
although  the  will  is  determined  in  all  cases  by  the  divine  omnipo- 
tence, yet  is  it  free  from  an  absolute  or  mathematical  necessity, 
"  because  the  contrary  volition  might  happen  without  implying 
a  contradiction.''1  True,  the  contrary  volition  might  happen 

°  Abrege  de  la  Controverse.  f  Reflexions  sur  le  Livre  de  Hobbes. 


348  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

without  implying  a  contradiction ;  for  God  himself  might  cause  it 
to  exist.  And  if,  by  his  almighty  and  irresistible  power,  he  should 
cause  it  to  exist,  the  will  would  still  be  free  in  Leibnitz's  sense 
of  the  word  ;  since  its  contrary  might  have  happened.  Hence, 
according  to  this  definition  of  liberty,  if  God  should,  in  all  cases, 
determine  the  will  to  good,  it  would  nevertheless  be  free  ;  since 
the  contrary  determination  might  have  been  produced  by  his 
power.  In  other  \vords,  if  such  be  the  liberty  of  the  will,  no 
operation  of  the  Almighty  could  possibly  interfere  therewith ; 
as  no  volition  produced  by  him  would  have  rendered  it  impos- 
sible for  him  to  have  caused  the  opposite  volition,  if  he  had  so 
chosen  and  exerted  his  omnipotence  for  that  purpose.  This 
defence  of  the  divine  procedure,  then,  has  no  foundation  in  the 
scheme  of  Leibnitz  ;  and  the  only  thing  he  can  say  in  its  favour 
is,  that  after  the  authority  u  of  many  good  authors,"  we  have 
added  it  to  our  own  views. 

Archbishop  King,  too,  as  is  well  known,  assumes  the  ground 
that  God  permits  sin,  on  account  of  the  greater  inconvenience 
that  would  result  to  the  world  from  an  interference  with  the 
freedom  of  the  will.  But  so  extravagant  are  his  views  respect- 
ing this  freedom,  that  the  position  in  question  is  one  of  the 
weakest  parts  of  his  system.  The  mind  chooses  objects,  says 
lie,  not  because  they  please  it;  but  they  are  agreeable  and 
pleasant  to  the  mind,  because  it  chooses  them.  Surely,  such 
a  liberty  as  this,  consisting  in  a  mere  arbitrary  or  capricious' 
movement  of  the  soul,  that  owns  not  the  guidance  of  reason,  or 
wisdom,  or  anything  apparently  good,  cannot  possess  so  great  a 
value  that  the  moral  good  of  the  universe  should  be  permitted  to 
suffer,  rather  than  that  it  should  be  interfered  with  or  restrained. 

But  these  are  merely  argumenta  ad  Tiominem.  There  are 
"  many  good  authors"  who,  although  they  maintain  neither  of 
the  above  views  of  liberty,  insist  that  it  is  better  for  God 
to  permit  sin,  than  to  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  his  crea- 
tures. But  is  it  clear,  that  greater  inconveniences  would  have 
arisen  from  such  an  interference,  than  from  the  frightful  reign 
of  all  the  sin  and  misery  that  have  afflicted  the  world  ?  If  God 
can  so  easily  prevent  all  sin,  and  secure  all  holiness,  by  restrain- 
ing the  liberty  of  his  creatures,  is  it  clear,  that  in  preferring 
their  unrestrained  freedom  to  the  highest  moral  good  of  the 
universe,  he  makes  a  choice  worthy  of  his  infinite  wisdom  ?  In 


SUMMARY   OF  THE   FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  349 

other  words,  is  it  not  more  desirable  that  moral  evil  should 
everywhere  disappear,  and  the  beauty  of  holiness  everywhere 
shine  forth,  than  that  the  creature  should  be  left  to  abuse  his 
liberty  by  the  introduction  of  sin  and  death  into  the  world? 
Besides,  it  is  admitted  by  all  the  authors  in  question,  that  God 
sometimes  interposes  the  arm  of  his  omnipotence,  in  order  to 
the  production  of  holiness.  Now,  in  such  an  exertion  of  his 
power,  he  cither  interferes  with  the  freedom  of  the  creature,  or 
he  does  not.  If  lie  does  not  interfere  with  that  freedom,  why 
may  he  not  produce  holiness  in  other  cases  also,  'without  any 
such  interference  ?  And  if,  in  some  cases,  he  does  interfere 
therewith,  in  order  to  secure  the  holiness  of  his  creatures,  why 
should  lie  not,  in  all  cases,  prefer  their  highest  moral  good  to 
so  fatal  an  abuse  of  their  prerogatives  ?  Is  his  proceeding 
therein  merely  arbitrary  and  capricious,  or  is  it  governed  by 
the  best  of  reasons  ?  Undoubtedly  by  the  best  of  reasons,  say 
all  the  authors  in  question :  but  then,  when  we  come  to  this 
point  of  the  inquiry,  they  always  tell  us,  that  those  reasons  are 
profoundly  concealed  in  the  unsearchable  depths  of  the  divine 
wisdom ;  that  is  to  say,  they  believe  them  to  be  the  best,  not 
because  they  have  seen  and  considered  them,  but  because  they 
are  the  reasons  of  an  infinitely  perfect  mind.  ISTow,  all  this  is 
very  well ;  but  it  is  not  to  the  purpose.  It  is  to  retire  from  the 
arena  of  logic,  and  fall  back  on  the  very  point  in  dispute  for 
support.  It  is  not  to  argue  ;  it  is  simply  to  drop  the  weapons 
of  our  warfare,  and  oppose  the  shield  of  faith  to  the  shafts  of 
the  adversary. 

It  is  also  contended  by  Leibnitz  and  King,  as  well  as  many 
other  good  authors,  that  there  is  an  established  order,  or  system 
of  laws,  in  the  government  of  the  world ;  into  which  so  great  a 
confusion  would  be  introduced  by  the  interposition  of  divine 
power  to  prevent  all  sin,  that  some  had  better  be  permitted. 
This,  which  Leibnitz  so  positively  asserts,  is  thrown  out  as  a 
conjecture  by  Bishop  Butler.*  But  in  the  present  controversy, 
it  is  not  to  the  point.  For  here  the  question  is  concerning  the 
order  and  government  of  the  moral  world  itself.  And  this 
being  the  question,  it  is  not  admissible  for  one  of  the  parties 
to  say,  that  the  proposed  plan  for  the  government  of  the  world 
is  not  the  best,  because  it  would  interfere  with  and  disturb  the 

0  Analogy,  part  i,  chap.  vii. 


350  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM 

arrangements  of  that  which  is  established.  This  is  clearly  to 
beg  the  question.  It  is  to  assume  that  the  established  method 
is  the  best,  and  therefore  should  not  have  been  superseded  by 
another  ;  but  this  is  the  very  point  in  dispute. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  theist  has  assailed  the  sceptic  in  his 
strong  and  impregnable  point,  and  left  the  vulnerable  part  of 
his  system  untouched.  This  may  be  easily  seen.  Tli^e_abj.ectioji_ 
of  the  sceptic  is  thus  stated  by  Leibnitz :  Whoever  can  prevent 
the  sin  of  another,  and  does  not,  but  rather  contributes  to  itjbj 
his  concourse  and  by  the  occasions  he  gives  rise  to,  though  he 
possesses  a  perfect  knowledge,  is  an  accomplice.  God  can 
prevent  the  sin  of  his  intelligent  creatures  :  but  he  does  it  not, 
though  his  knowledge  be  perfect,  and  contributes ^to_JLby_Jhis 
concourse  and  the  occasions  to  which  he  gives  rise :  therefore 
he  is  an  accomplice.  Now  Leibnitz  admits  the  minor,  and 
denies  the  major,  premiss  of  this  argument.  He  should  have 
done  the  contrary.  For,  admitting  that  God  might  easily  pre- 
vent sin,  and  cause  holiness  to  reign  universally,  what  had  he 
left  to  oppose  to  the  attacks  of  the  sceptic  but  the  shield  of 
faith  ?  He  might  say,  indeed,  as  he  often  does,  that  God  volun- 
tarily permits  sin,  because  it  is  a  part  and  parcel  of  the  best 
possible)  universe.  But  how  easy  for  the  sceptic  to  demand, 
"What  good  purpose  does  it  answer  ?  Can  it  add  to  the  holiness 
or  happiness  of  the  universe  ?  Cannot  these  high  ends,  these 
glorious  purposes  of  the  Divine  Being,  be  as  well  attained  by 
the  universal  rectitude  and  purity  of  his  creatures,  as  by  any 
other  means  ?  Cannot  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  world,  in  the 
resources  of  his  infinite  mind,  bring  as  much  good  out  of  holi- 
ness as  can  be  brought  out  of  sin  ?  And  if  so,  why  permit  sin 
in  order  to  the  good  of  the  creation  ?  Are  not  the  perfect  holi- 
ness and  happiness  of  each  and  every  part  of  the  moral  world 
better  for  each  and  every  part  thereof  than  are  their  contraries  \ 
And  if  so,  are  they  not  better  for  the  whole  ?  By  this  reply, 
the  theist  is,  in  our  opinion,  disarmed,  and  the  sceptic  victorious. 
Hence  we  say,  that  the  former  should  have  conceded  the  major, 
and  denied  the  minor,  premiss  of  the  above  argument ;  that  is, 
he  should  have  admitted,  that  whoever  can  prevent  the  sin  of 
another,  but,  instead  of  so  doing,  contributes  to  it  by  his  con- 
course, is  an  accomplice :  and  he  should  have  denied  that 
God,  being  able  to  produce  holiness  in  the  place  of  sin,  both 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  351 

permits  and  contributes  to  the  reign  of  the  latter  in  his  domin- 
ions. The  theist  should  have  denied  this,  we  say,  if  he  would 
have  raised  the  ever-blessed  God  above  all  contact  with  sin, 
and  placed  his  cause  upon  high  and  impregnable  ground,  far 
above  the  attacks  of  the  sceptic.  But  as  it  is,  he  has  placed 
that  cause  upon  false  grounds,  and  thereby  exposed  it  to  the 
successful  shafts  of  the  adversary. 

Another  reason  assigned  by  Leibnitz*  and  Kingf  for  the  per- 
mission of  moral  evil  is,  that  if  God  should  interpose  to  prevent 
it,  this  would  be  to  work  a  constant  and  universal  miracle.  But 
if  such  a  thing  were  possible,  why  should  he  not  work  such  a 
miracle  ?  By  these  authors  themselves  it  is  conceded,  that  the 
Almighty  often  works  a  miracle  for  the  production  of  moral 
good ;  and,  this  being  the  case,  why  should  he  not  exhibit  this 
miracle  on  the  most  grand  and  magnificent  scale  of  which  it  is 
possible  to  conceive  ?  In  other  words,  why  should  he  not  ren- 
der it  worthy  of  his  infinite  wisdom,  and  power,  and  goodness  ? 
Is  it  not  by  a  like  miracle,  by  a  like  universal  interposition  of 
his  power,  that  the  majestic  fabric  of  the  material  globe  is  up- 
held, and  the  sublime  movement  of  all  its  countless  orbs  con- 
tinually carried  on  ?  And  if  so,  are  not  the  order  and  harmony 
of  the  moral  universe  as  worthy  such  an  exercise  of  his  omnipo- 
tence as  are  the  regularity  and  beauty  of  the  material?  We 
defend  the  Divine  Author  and  Preserver  of  all  things  on  no 
such  grounds.  We  say  that  a  universal  holiness  is  not  produced 
by  the  omnipresent  energy  of  his  power,  not  because  this  would 
be  to  work  a  miracle,  but  because  it  would  be  to  work  a  con- 
tradiction. 

But  we  are  becoming  weary  of  such  replies.  The  very  ques- 
tion is,  Why  is  there  not  a  universal  interposition  of  the  divine 
power  ?  and  the  reply,  Because  this  would  be  a  universal  inter- 
position of  the  divine  power !  What  is  all  this  but  a  grand  at- 
tempt to  solve  the  awful  mystery  of  the  world,  which  ends  in 
the  assurance  that  God  does  not  universally  interpose  to  prevent 
sin,  because  he  does  not  universally  interpose  to  prevent  it? 
Or,  in  fewer  words,  that  he  does  not,  because  he  does  not? 

Since  sin  exists,  says  the  sceptic,  it  follows  that  God  Js  either 
urable  or  unwilling  to  prevent  it.  "  Able,  but  unwilling"  re- 

0  Remarques  sur  Le  Livre  de  M.  King,  sec.  xvi. 
f  Origin  of  Evil,  vol.  ii,  ch.  v,  sec.  v. 


352  SUMMAEY  OF  THE   FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

pliesthejtlieist.  Such  is  the  answer  which  has  come  down  to 
us  from  theearliest  times ;  from  a  Lactantius  to  a  Leibnitz,  and 
from  a  Leibnitz  to  a  M'Cosh.  No  wonder  that  in  all  this  time 
they  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  reason  why  God  is  unwilling 
to  prevent  sin ;  since,  in  truth  and  reality,  he  is  infinitely  more 
than  willing  to  do  so. 

But,  saying  that  he  is  willing,  shall  we  concede  that  he  is  un- 
able ?  By  no  means  :  for  such  language  implies  that  the  power 
of  God  is  limited,  and  he  is  omnipotent.  We  choose  to  impale 
ourselves  upon  neither  horn  of  the  dilemma.  We  are  content 
to  leave  M.  Bayle  upon  the  one,  and  M.  Yoltaire  upon  the  other, 
while  we  bestow  our  company  elsewhere.  In  plain  English,  we 
neither  reply  unwilling  nor  unable. 

We  do  say,  however,  that  although  God  is  infinitely  willing 
to  secure  the  existence  of  universal  holin\ess,  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  sin,  yet  such  a  thing  is  not  an  object  of  power,  and  there- 
fore cannot  be  produced  by  omnipotence  itself.  The  produc- 
tion of  holiness  by  the  application  of  power  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
an  absurd  and  impossible  conceit,  which  may  exist  in  the  brain 
of  man,  but  which  can  never  be  embodied  in  the  fair  and 
orderly  creation  of  God.  It  can  no  more  be  realized  by  the 
Divine  Omnipotence  than  a  mathematical  absurdity  can  be 
caused  to  be  true. 

Hence,  we  no  longer  ask  why  God  permits  sin.  This  were 
to  seek  a  ground  and  reason  of  that  which  has  no  existence,  ex- 
cept in  the  imagination  of  man.  God  does  not  permit  sin.  He 
chooses  it  not,  arid  he  permits  it  not,  as  an  essential  part  of  the 
best  possible  universe.  Sin  is  that  which  his  soul  abhors,  and 
which  all  the  perfections  of  his  nature,  his  infinite  power  and 
wisdom,  no  less  than  his  holiness,  are  pledged  to  wipe  out  from 
the  face  of  his  creation.  He  does  not  cause,  he  does  not  toler- 
ate sin,  on  account  of  its  happy  effects,  or  on  account  of  the 
uses  to  which  it  may  be  turned.  The  only  word  he  has  for 
such  a  thing  is  woe  ;  and  the  only  attitude  he  bears  toward  it 
is  one  of  eternal  and  inexorable  vengeance.  All  the  schemes 
of  men  make  light  of  sin ;  but  God  is  in  earnest,  infinitely  and 
immutably  in  earnest,  in  the  purpose  to  root  out  and  destroy 
the  odious  thing,  that  it  may  have  no  place  amid  the  glory  of 
his  dominions. 

As  sin  did  not  originate  by  his  permission,  so  it  does  not  con- 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTE 


tin  ue  by  his  sufferance.  He  permits  it,  indeed,  in  that  he  per- 
mits the  existence  of  beings  capable  of  sinning;  and  he  permits 
tho  existence  of  such  beings  in  the  very  act  of  permitting  the 
existence  of  those  who  are  capable  of  knowing,  and  loving,  and 
serving  him.  An  infinitely  good  Being,  says  M.  Bayle,  would 
not  have  conferred  on  his  creature  the  fatal  power  to  do  evil. 
But  he  did  not  reflect  that  a  power  to  do  good  is,  ex  necessitate 
f/vi,  a  power  to  do  evil.  Surely,  a  good  Being  would  bestow  on 
his  creature  the  power  to  do  good  —  the  power  to  become  like 
himself,  and  to  partake  of  the  incommunicable  blessedness  of  a 
holy  will.  But  if  he  would  bestow  this,  he  would  certainly  con- 
fer power  to  do  evil  ;  for  the  one  is  identical  w^ith  the  other. 
And  sin  has  arisen,  not  from  any  power  conferred  for  that  pur- 
pose, but  from  that  wrhich  constitutes  the  brightest  element  in 
the  sublime  structure  and  glory  of  the  moral  world.  It  arises, 
not  from  any  imperfection  in  the  work  of  God,  but  from  that 
without  which  it  would  have  been  infinitely  less  than  perfect. 

"  All  divines  admit,"  says  Bayle,  "  that  God  can  infallibly 
produce  a  good  act  of  the  will  in  a  human  soul  without  depriv- 
ing it  of  the  use  of  liberty."*  This  is  no  longer  admitted.  We 
call  it  in  question.  We  deny  that  such  an  act  can  be  produced, 
either  with  or  without  depriving  the  soul  of  liberty.  We  deny 
that  it  can  be  produced  at  all  :  for  whatever  God  may  produce 
in  the  human  soul,  this  is  not,  this  cannot  be,  the  moral  good- 
ness or  virtue  of  the  soul  in  which  it  is  produced.  In  other 
words,  it  is  not,  and  it  cannot  be,  an  object  of  praise  or  of  moral 
approbation  in  him  in  whom  it  is  thus  caused  to  exist.  His 
virtue  or  moral  goodness  can  exist  only  by  reason,  and  in  case 
of  an  exercise  of  his  own  will.  It  can  no  more  be  the  effect  of 
an  extraneous  force  than  two  and  two  can  be  made  equal  to 
five. 

In  conclusion,  the  plain  truth  is,  that  the  actual  universe  is 
nut  in  the  best  of  all  possible  conditions  ;  for  we  might  con- 
ceive it  to  be  better  than  it  is.  If  there  were  no  sin  and  no 
Buffering,  but  everywhere  a  purity  and  bliss  as  great  as  it  is 
possible  to  conceive,  this  wrould  be  a  vast  improvement  in  the 
actual  state  of  the  universe.  Such  is  the  magnificent  dream  of 
the  sceptic  ;  and,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  not  without  truth  and 
justice  that  he  thus  dreams.  But  with  this  dream  of  his,  mag 

0  Dictionary,  Article  Paulicians. 
23 


354  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

nificent  as  it  is,  there  is  connected  another  which  is  infinitely 
false :  for  he  imagines  that  the  sublime  spectacle  of  a  world 
without  sin,  that  the  beatific  vision  of  a  universe  robed  in  stain- 
less splendour  might  have  been  realized  by  the  Divine  Omnipo- 
tence ;  whereas,  this  could  have  been  realized  only  by  the  uni- 
versal and  continued  cooperation  of  the  whole  intelligent  crea- 
tion with  the  grand  design  of  God.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
theist,  by  conceding  the  error  and  contesting  the  truth  of  the 
sceptic,  has  inextricably  entangled  himself  in  the  toils  of  the 
adversary. 

The  only  remaining  question  which  the  sceptic  has  to  ask  is, 
that  since  God  might  have  prevented  moral  evil  by  the  crea- 
tion of  no  beings  who  he  foresaw  would  sin,  why  did  he 
create  such  beings  ?  Why  did  he  not  leave  all  such  uncreated, 
and  call  into  existence  only  such  as  he  foreknew  would  obey 
his  law,  and  become  like  himself  in  purity  and  bliss?  This 
question  has  been  fully  answered  both  from  reason  and  revela- 
tion. We  have  shown  that  the  highest  good,  of  the  universe 
required  the  creation  of  such  beings.  We  have  shown  that  it 
is  by  his  dealings  with  the  sinner  that  the  foundation  of  his 
spiritual  empire  is  secured,  and  its  boundaries  enlarged.  In 
particular,  we  have  showrn,  from  revelation,  that  it  is  by  the 
redemption  of  a  fallen  world  that  all  unfallen  worlds  are  pre- 
served in  their  allegiance  to  his  throne,  and  kept  warm  in  the 
bosom  of  his  blessedness. 

If  the  sceptic  should  complain  that  this  is  to  meet  him,  not 
with  weapons  drawn  from  the  armory  of  reason,  but  from  that 
of  revelation,  our  reply  is  at  hand :  he  has  no  longer  anything 
left  to  be  met.  His  argument,  which  assumes  that  a  Being  of 
infinite  power  could  easily  cause  holiness  to  exist,  has  been 
shown  to  be  false.  This  very  assumption,  this  major  premiss, 
which  has  been  so  long  conceded  to  him,  has  been  taken  out  of 
his  hands,  and  demolished.  Hence,  we  do  not  oppose  the  shield 
of  faith  to  his  argument ;  we  hold  it  in  triumph  over  his  ex- 
ploded sophism.  We  merely  recall  our  faith,  and  exult  in  the 
divine  glory  which  it  so  magnificently  brings  to  view,  and 
against  which  his  once  blind  and  blundering  reason  has  now  no 

raoretosay' 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  355 


II. 

SUMMARY  OF  THE  SECOND  PART  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

HAVING  reconciled  the  existence  of  sin  with  the  purity  of  God, 
and  refuted  the  objections  against  the  principles  on  which  that 
reconciliation  is  based,  we  next  proceeded  to  the  second  part  of 
the  work,  in  which  the  natural  evil,  or  suffering,  that  afflicts 
humanity,  is  shown  to  be  consistent  with  his  goodness.  This 
part  consists  of  five  chapters,  of  whose  leading  principles  and 
position  we  shall  now  proceed  to  take  a  rapid  survey  in  the  re- 
maining sections  of  the  present  chapter. 

SECTION  L 
God  desires  the  salvation  of  all  men. 

The  fact  that  all  men  are  not  saved,  at  first  view,  seems  in- 
consistent with  the  goodness  of  the  Divine  Beir»£,  and  the 
sincerity  of  his  endeavours  for  their  conversion.  We  naturally 
ask,  that  if  God  could  so  easily  cause  all  men  to  turn  and  live, 
why  should  he  in>ain  call  upon  them  to  do  so?  Is  he  really 
sincere  in  the  use  of  means  for  the  salvation  of  all,  since  he 
permits  so  many  to  hold  out  in  their  rebellion  and  perish  ?  In 
other  words,  if  he  really  and  sincerely  seeks  the  salvation  of  all, 
why  are  not  all  saved?  This  is  confessedly  one  of  the  most 
perplexing  and  confounding  difficulties  which  attach  to  the 
commonly  received  systems  of  theology.  It  constitutes  one  of 
those  profound  obscurities  from  which,  it  is  admitted,  theology 
has  not  been  able  to  extricate  itself,  and  come  out  into  the  clear 
light  of  the  divine  glory. 

By  many  theologians  this  difficulty,  instead  of  being  solved, 
is  most  fearfully  aggravated.  Luther,  for  example,  finds  it  so 
great,  that  he  denies  the  sincerity  of  God  in  calling  upon  sin- 
ners to  forsake  their  evil  ways  and  live ;  and  that,  as  addressed 
to  the  finally  impenitent,  his  language  is  that  of  mockery  and 
scorn.  And  Calvin  imagines  that  such  exhortations,  as  well  as 
the  other  means  of  ,grace  offered  to  all,  are  designed,  not  for  the 


35$  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

real  conversion  of  those  who  shall  finally  perish,  but  to  enhance 
their  guilt,  and  overwhelm  them  in  the  more  fearful  condemna- 
tion. If  it  were  possible  to  go  even  one  step  beyond  such  doc- 
trines, that  step  is  taken  by  President  Edwards :  for  he  is  so 
far  from  supposing  that  God  really  intends  to  lead  all  mon  into 
a  conformity  with  his  revealed  will,  that  he  contends  that  God 
possesses  another  and  a  secret  will  by  which,  for  some  good 
purpose,  he  chooses  their  sin,  and  infallibly  brings  it  to  pass. 
If  any  mind  be  not  appalled  by  such  doctrines,  and  chilled  with 
horror,  surely  nothing  can  be  too  monstrous  for  its  credulity, 
provided  only  it  relate  to  the  divine  sovereignty. 

The  Arminian  with  indignation  rejects  such  views  of  the 
divine  glory.  But  does  he  escape  the  great  difficulty  in  ques- 
tion ?  If  God  forms  the  design,  says  he,  not  to  save  all  men,  he 
is  not  infinitely  good ;  but  yet  he  admits  that  God  actually  re- 
fuses to  save  some.  Now,  what  difference  can  it  make  whether 
God's  intention  not  to  save  all  be  evidenced  by  a  preexisting 
design,  or  by  a  present  reality  ?  Is  not  everything  that  is  done 
by  him,  or  left  undone,  in  pursuance  of  his  eternal  purpose  and 
design  ?  What,  then,  in  reference  to  the  point  in  question,  is 
the  difference  between  the  Arminian  and  the  Calvinist  ?  Both 
admit  that  God  could  easily  save  all  men  if  he  would  /  that  is, 
render  all  men  holy  and  happy.  But  the  one  says  that  he  did 
not  design  to  save  all,  while  the  other  affirms  that  he  actually 
refuses  to  save  some.  Surely,  if  we  may  assume  what  is  con- 
ceded by  both  parties,  the  infinite  goodness  of  God  is  no  more 
disproved  by  a  scheme  of  salvation  limited  in  its  design,  than 
by  a  scheme  of  salvation  limited  in  its  execution.  Hence,  it  is 
admitted  by  many  Arminians  themselves,  that  their  own  scheme 
merely  mitigates  and  softens  down,  without  removing,  the  ap- 
palling difficulty  in  question. 

There  are  many  exceptions  to  this  remark.  One  of  the  most 
memorable  of  these  is  the  judgment  which  Robert  Hail*  pro- 
nounces concerning  the  solution  of  this  difficulty  by  the  "  Won- 
derful Howe."  This  solution,  as  we  have  seen,  labours  under 
the  same  defect  with  those  of  its  predecessors,  in  that  it  rejects 

0  It  is  not  exactly  just  to  rank  Hall  among  the  Arminians.  His  scheme  of 
doctrine,  if  scheme  it  may  be  called,  is,  like  that  of  so  many  others,  a  hetero- 
geneous mixture  of  Calvinism  and  Arminianism — a  mixture,  and  not  an  organic 
compound,  of  the  conflicting  elements  of  the  two  systems 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM,  357 

the  truth  that  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contradiction  in  terms. 
Instead  of  following  the  guidance  of  this  truth,  he  wanders 
amid  the  obscurities  of  the  subject,  becomes  involved  in  nu- 
merous self-contradictions,  and  is  misled  by  the  deceit!  ul  light 
of  false  analogies. 

We  shall  not  here  reproduce  his  inconsistencies  and  self- 
contradictions.  We  shall  simply  add,  that  although  he,  too, 
attempts  to  show  why  it  is  for  the  best  that  all  should  not  be 
saved,  he  frequently  betrays  the  feeble  and  unsatisfactory  nature 
of  the  impression  which  his  own  reasons  made  upon  his  mind. 
For  the  light  of  these  reasons  soon  fades  from  his  recollection ; 
and,  like  all  who  have  gone  before  him,  when  he  comes  to  con- 
template the  subject  from  another  point  of  view,  he  declares 
that  the  reasons  of  the  thing  he  has  endeavoured  to  explain, 
are  hid  from  the  human  mind  in  the  profound  depths  of  the 
divine  wisdom. 

If  we  would  realize,  then,  that  God  sincerely  desires  the  sai- 
vation  of  all  men,  we  must  plant  ourselves  on  the  truth,  that 
holiness,  which  is  of  the  very  essence  of  salvation,  cannot  be 
wrought  in  us  by  an  extraneous  force.  It  is  under  the  guidance 
of  this  principle,  and  of  this  principle  alone,  that  we  can  find 
our  way  out  from  the  dark  labyrinth  of  error  and  self-contra- 
diction, in  which  others  are  involved,  into  the  clear  and  beaiv 
tiful  light  of  the  gospel,  that  God  "  will  have  all  men  to  be 
saved,  and  come  unto  a  knowledge  of  the  truth."  It  is  with 
the  aid  of  this  principle,  and  of  this  alone,  that  we  may  hear 
the  sublime  teachings  of  the  divine  wisdom,  unmingled  with 
the  discordant  sounds  of  human  folly. 

SECTION  II. 

The  sufferings  of  the  innocent,  and  especially  of  infants,  consistent  with  the 
goodness  of  God. 

By  the  Calvinistic  school  of  divines  it  is  most  positively  and 
peremptorily  pronounced  that  the  innocent  can  never  suffer 
under  the  administration  of  a  Being  of  infinite  goodness.  They 
cannot  possibly  allow  that  such  a  Being  would  permit  one  of 
his  innocent  creatures  to  suffer ;  but  they  can  very  well  believe 
that  he  can  permit  them  both  to  sin  and  to  suffer.  Is  not  this 
to  strain  at  a  gnat,  and  swallow  a  camel  ? 


358  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

Having  predetermined  that  the  innocent  never  suffer,  they 
have  felt  tiie  necessity  of  finding  some  sin  in  infants,  by  which 
their  suffeilngs  might  be.  shown  to  be  deserved,  and  thereby 
reconciled  with  the  divine  goodness.  This  has  proved  a  hard 
task.  From  the  time  of  Augustine  down  to  the  present  day,  it 
has  been  diligently  prosecuted  ;  and  with  what  success,  we  have 
endeavoured  to  show.  The  series  of  hypotheses  to  which  this 
effort  has  given  rise,  are,  perhaps,  as  wild  and  wonderful  as  any 
to  be  foun^.  in  the  history  of  the  human  mind.  We  need  not 
again  recount  those  dark  dreams  and  inventions  in  the  past 
history  of  Calvinism.  Perhaps  the  hypothesis  of  the  present 
day,  by  which  it  endeavours  to  vindicate  the  suffering  of  infants, 
will  seem  scarcely  less  astonishing  to  posterity,  than  those  ex- 
ploded fictions  of  the  past  appear  to  this  generation. 

According  to  this  hypothesis,  the  infant  wrorld  deserves 
to  suffer,  because  the  sin  of  Adam,  their  federal  head  and 
representative,  is  imputed  to  them.  It  is  even  contended  that 
this  constitution,  by  which  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  world 
was  suspended  on  the  conduct  of  the  first  man,  is  a  bright 
display  of  the  divine  goodness,  since  it  was  so  likely  to  be 
attended  with  a  happy  issue  to  the  human  race.  Likely  to  be 
attended  with  a  happy  issue  !  And  did  not  the  Almighty  fore- 
see and  kT»ow,  that  if  the  guilt  of  the  world  were  made  to 
depend  on  the  conduct  of  Adam,  it  would  infallibly  be  attended 
with  a  fatal  result  ? 

We  have  examined,  at  length,  the  arguments  of  an  Edwards 
to  show  that  such  a  divine  scheme  and  constitution  of  things 
is  a  display  or  manifestation  of  goodness.  Those  arguments 
are,  perhaps,  as  ingenious  and  plausible  as  it  is  possible  for  the 
human  intellect  to  invent  in  the  defence  of  such  a  cause. 
When  closely  examined  and  searched  to  the  bottom,  they  cer- 
tainly appear  as  puerile  and  weak  as  it  is  possible  for  the  human 
imagination  to  conceive. 

Indeed,  no  coherent  hypothesis  can  be  invented  on  this  sub- 
ject, so  long  as  the  mind  of  the  inventor  fails  to  recognise  the 
impossibility  of  excluding  all  sin  from  the  moral  system  of  the 
universe :  for  if  all  sin,  then  all  suffering,  likewise,  may  be 
excluded  ;  and  we  can  never  understand  why  either  should  be 
permitted  ;  much  less  can  we  comprehend  why  the  innocent 
should  be  allowed  to  suffer.  But  having  recognised  this  impos- 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM,  359 

sibility,  we  have  been  conducted  to  three  grounds,  on  which, 
it  is  believed,  the  sufferings  of  the  innocent  may  be  reconciled 
with  the  goodness  of  God. 

First,  the  sufferings  of  the  innocent,  in  so  far  as  they  are  the 
consequences  of  sin,  serve  to  show  its  terrific  nature,  and  tend 
to  prevent  its  introduction  into  the  world.  If  this  end  could 
have  been  accomplished  by  the  divine  power,  such  a  provision 
would  have  been  unnecessary,  and  all  the  misery  of  the  world 
only  so  much  "  suffering  in  waste."  Secondly,  the  sufferings 
of  the  innocent  serve  as  a  foil  to  set  off  and  enhance  the  bless- 
edness of  eternity.  They  are  but  a  short  and  discordant  prelude 
to  an  everlasting  harmony.  Thirdly,  difficulties  and  trials, 
temptations  and  wants,  are  indispensable  to  the  rise  of  moral 
good  in  the  soul  of  the  innocent ;  for  if  there  were  no  tempta- 
tion to  wrong,  there  could  be  no  merit  in  obedience,  and  no 
virtue  in  the  world.  Suffering  is,  then,  essential  to  the  moral 
discipline  and  improvement  of  mankind.  On  the  one  or  the 
other  of  these  grounds,  it  is  believed  that  every  instance  in 
which  suffering  falls  upon  the  innocent,  or  falls  not  as  a  pun- 
ishment of  sin,  may  be  vindicated  and  reconciled  with  the 
goodness  of  God. 

SECTION"  III. 
The  sufferings  of  Christ  consistent  with  the  divine  goodness. 

The  usual  defences  of  the  atonement  are  good,  so  far  as  they 
go,  but  not  complete.  The  vicarious  sufferings  of  Christ  are 
well  vindicated  on  the  ground,  that  they  are  necessary  to  cause 
the  majesty  and  honour  of  the  divine  law  to  be  respected ;  but 
this  defence,  though  sound,  has  been  left  on  an  insecure  founda- 
tion ;  for  it  has  been  admitted  that  God,  by  the  word  of  his 
power,  might  easily  have  caused  his  laws  to  be  universally 
respected  and  obeyed.  Hence,  according  to  this  admission, 
the  sufferings  of  Christ  might  have  been  easily  dispensed  with, 
and  were  not  necessary  in  order  to  maintain  the  honour  and 
glory  of  the  divine  government.  According  to  this  admission, 
they  were  not  necessary,  and  consequently  not  consistent  with 
the  goodness  of  God. 

Again :  by  distinguishing  between  the  administrative  and 
the  retributive  justice  of  God,  and  showing  that  the  vica- 


360  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

rious  sufferings  of  Christ  were  a  satisfaction  to  the  first,  and  not 
to  the  last,  we  annihilate  the  objections  of  the  Socinian.  By 
means  of  this  view  of  the  satisfaction  rendered  to  the  divine 
justice,  we  think  we  have  placed  the  great  doctrine  of  the 
atonement  in  a  clearer  and  more  satisfactory  light  than  usual. 
We  have  shown  that  the  vicarious  sufferings  of  the  INNOCENT 
are  so  far  from  being  inconsistent  with  the  divine  justice,  that 
they  are,  in  fact,  free  from  the  least  shadow  or  appearance  of 
hardship  either  to  him  or  to  the  world.  Nay,  that  they  are  a 
bright  manifestation  of  the  divine  goodness  both  to  himself 
and  to  those  for  whom  he  suffered  ;  the  brightest  manifestation 
thereof,  indeed,  which  the  universe  has  ever  beheld. 


SECTION  IV. 
The  eternity  of  future  punishment  consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God. 

The  genuine  Calvinist,  if  he  reason  consecutively  from  some 
of  the  principles  of  his  system,  can  never  escape  the  conclusion 
that  all  men  will  be  saved  :  for  so  long  as  he  denies  the  ability 
of  men  to  obey  without  the  efficacious  grace  of  God,  and  affirms 
that  this  grace  is  not  given  to  such  as  shall  finally  perish,  it 
must  follow  that  their  punishment  is  unjust,  and  that  their 
eternal  punishment  were  an  act  of  cruelty  and  oppression 
greater  than  it  is  possible  for  the  imagination  of  man  to  con- 
ceive. 

It  was  precisely  from  such  premises,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
John  Foster  denied  the  eternal  duration  of  future  punishment. 
His  logic  is  good ;  but  even  an  illogical  escape  from  such  a 
conclusion  were  better  than  the  rejection  of  one  of  the  great 
fundamental  doctrines  of  revealed  religion.  By  having  shown 
his  premises  to  be  false,  we  demolished  the  very  foundation  of 
his  arguments.  But,  not  satisfied  with  this,  we  pursued  th3se 
arguments  into  all  their  branches  and  ramifications,  and  exposed 
their  futility.  By  these  means  we  have  removed  the  objec- 
tions and  solved  the  difficulties  pertaining  to  this  doctrine  of 
revealed  religion.  In  one  word,  we  have  shown  that  it  is  not 
inconsistent  with  the  dictates  of  reason,  or  with  the  principle 
of  the  divine  goodness. 

"We  have  shown  that  the  eternal  punishment  of  the  wicked 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  361 

is  deserved,  and  therefore  demanded  by  the  divine  justice ; 
that  they  serve  to  promote  the  highest  moral  interests  of  the 
universe,  and  are  consequently  imposed  by  the  divine  goodness 
itself.  We  have  shown,  that  in  the  administration  of  his  eter- 
nal government,  the  infliction  of  an  endless  punishment  is  even 
more  consistent  with  goodness  than  the  use  of  temporal  pun- 
ishment in  the  management  of  a  temporal  government ;  for  the 
Grst,  besides  being  eternal  in  duration,  is  unbounded  in  extent. 
Thus  reason  itself,  when  disenchanted  of  its  strong  Calvinistic 
prejudices  and  its  weak  Socinian  sentimentalities,  utters  no 
other  voice  than  that  which  proceeds  from  revelation  ;  and 
this  it  echoes  rather  than  utters.  In  plainer  words,  though 
reason  does  not  prove  or  establish  the  eternity  of  future  pun- 
ishment, it  has  not  one  syllable  to  say  against  its  wisdom,  its 
justice,  or  its  goodness. 

SECTION  V. 

The  true  doctrine  of  election  and  predestination  consistent  with  the  goodness 

of  God. 

The  Calvinists  endeavour  to  support  their  scheme  of  elec- 
tion and  predestination  by  means  of  analogies  drawn  from  the 
unequal  distribution  of  the  divine  favours,  which  is  observable 
in  the  natural  economy  and  government  of  the  world.  But 
the  two  cases  are  not  parallel.  According  to  the  one,  though 
the  divine  favours  are  unequally  distributed,  no  man  is  ever 
required  to  render  an  account  of  more  than  he  receives. 
Whereas,  according  to  the  other,  countless  millions  of  human 
beings  are  doomed  to  eternal  misery  for  the  non-observance  of 
a  law  which  they  never  had  it  in  their  power  to  obey.  Tin's 
is  to  judge  them,  not  according  to  what  they  receive,  but 
according  to  what  they  receive  not,  and  cannot  obtain.  It  is 
to  call  them  to  give  an  account  of  talents  never  committed  to 
their  charge.  The  difference  between  the  two  cases  is,  indeed, 
precisely  that  between  the  conduct  of  a  munificent  prince  w^ho 
bestows  his  favours  unequally,  but  without  making  unreason- 
able demands,  and  the  proceeding  of  a  capricious  tyrant  who, 
while  he  confers  the  most  exalted  privileges  and  honours  on 
one  portion  of  his  subjects,  consigns  all  the  rest,  not  more  unde- 
serving than  they,  to  hopeless  and  remediless  destruction  ;  and 


362  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM. 

that,  too,  for  the  non-performance  of  an  impossible  condition. 
Is  it  not  wonderful  that  two  cases  so  widely  and  so  glaringly 
different,  should  have  been  so  long  and  so  obstinately  con- 
founded by  serious  inquirers  after  truth  ? 

The  Calvinistic  scheme  of  predestination,  it  is  pretended, 
derives  support  from  revelation.  The  ninth  chapter  of  Romans 
which,  from  the  time  of  Augustine  down  to  the  present  day, 
has  been  so  confide)  itly  appealed  to  in  its  support,  has,  as  we 
have  seen,  no  relation  to  the  subject.  It  relates,  not  to  the 
election  of  individuals  to  eternal  life,  but  of  a  nation  to  the 
enjoyment  of  external  privileges  and  advantages.  This  is  so 
plain,  that  Dr.  Macknight,  though  an  advocate  of  the  Calvin- 
istic dogma  of  predestination,  refuses  to  employ  that  portion  of 
Scripture  in  support  of  his  doctrine. 

Nor  does  the  celebrated  passage  of  the  eighth  chapter  of  the 
same  epistle  touch  the  point  in  controversy.  We  might  well 
call  in  question  the  Calvinistic  interpretation  of  that  passage, 
if  this  were  necessary ;  but  we  take  it  in  their  own  sense,  and 
show  that  it  lends  no  support  to  their  views.  The  Calvinists 
themselves  being  the  interpreters,  that  passage  teaches  that 
God,  according  to  his  eternal  purpose,  chose  or  selected  a  cer- 
tain portion  out  of  the  great  mass  of  mankind  as  the  heirs  of 
eternal  life.  Granted,  then,  that  a  certain  portion  of  the  human 
race  were  thus  made  the  objects  of  a  peculiar  favour,  and  pros- 
pectively  endowed  with  the  greatest  of  all  conceivable  blessings. 
But  who  were  thus  chosen,  or  selected  ?  and  on  what  principle 
was  the  election  made  ?  In  regard  to  this  point,  it  is  not  pre- 
tended by  them  that  the  passage  in  question  utters  a  single 
syllable.  They  themselves  being  the  judges,  this  Scripture 
merely  affirms  that  a  certain  portion  of  mankind  are  chosen  or 
elected  to  eternal  life ;  while  in  regard  to  the  ground,  or  the 
reason,  of  their  election,  it  is  most  perfectly  and  profoundly 
silent. 

Hence  it  leaves  us  free  to  assume  the  position,  that  those  per- 
sons were  elected  or  chosen  who  God  foresaw  would,  by  a 
cooperation  with  his  Spirit,  make  their  calling  and  election 
sure.  And  being  thus  left  free,  this  is  precisely  the  position 
in  which  we  choose  to  plant  ourselves,  in  order  to  vindicate 
the  divine  glory  against  the  awful  misrepresentations  of  Calvin- 
ism :  for,  in  the  first  place,  this  view  harmonizes  the  passage 


SUMMARY   OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  363 

in  question  with  other  portions  of  the  divine  record,  and  allows 
us,  without  the  least  feeling  of  self-contradiction,  to  embrace 
the  sublime  word,  that  God  "  will  have  all  men  to  be  saved ;" 
and  that  if  any  are  not  made  the  heirs  of  his  great  salvation, 
it  is  because  his  grace  would  have  proved  unavailing  to 
Iliem. 

Secondly,  this  view  not  only  harmonizes  two  classes  of  seem- 
ingly opposed  texts  of  Scripture,  but  it  also  serves  to  vindicate 
the  unbounded  glory  of  the  divine  goodness.  It  shows  that  the 
goodness  of  God  is  not  partial  in  its  operation ;  neither  taking 
such  as  it  leaves,  nor  leaving  such  as  it  takes ;  but  embracing 
all  of  the  same  class,  and  that  class  consisting  of  all  who,  by 
wicked  works,  do  not  place  themselves  beyond  the  possibility 
of  being  saved.  Unlike  Calvinism,  it  presents  us,  not  with  the 
spectacle  of  a  mercy  which  might  easily  save  all,  but  which, 
nevertheless,  contenting  itself  with  a  few  only,  abandons  the 
rest  to  the  ravages  of  the  never-dying  worm. 

Thirdly,  at  the  same  time  that  it  vindicates  the  glory  of  the 
divine  mercy,  it  rectifies  the  frightful  distortion  of  the  divine 
justice,  which  is  exhibited  in  the  scheme  of  Calvinism.  Accord- 
ing to  this  scheme,  all  those  who  are  not  elected  to  eternal  life 
are  set  apart  as  the  objects  on  which  the  Almighty  intends  to 
manifest  the  glory  of  his  justice.  But  how  is  this  glory,  or  his 
justice,  manifested?  Displayed,  wre  are  told,  by  dooming  its 
helpless  objects  to  eternal  misery  for  the  non-performance  of 
an  impossible  condition!  A  display  of  justice  this,  which,  to 
the  human  mind,  bears  every  mark  of  the  most  appalling 
cruelty  and  oppression.  A  display  of  justice  stamped  uith  the 
most  terrifie  features  of  its  opposite  /  so  that  no  human  mind 
can  see  the  glory  of  the  one,  for  the  inevitable  mairfestation  of 
the  other !  No  wonder  that  Calvinists  themselves  so  often  fly 
from  the  defence  of  such  a  display  of  the  divine  justice,  and 
hide  themselves  in  the  unsearchable  clouds  and  darkness  of  the 
divine  wisdom.  This  being  of  course  a  display  for  eternity, 
and  not  for  time,  they  may  there  await  the  light  of  another 
world  to  clear  away  these  clouds,  and  reveal  to  them  the  great 
mystery  of  such  a  manifestation  of  the  divine  justice.  But 
whether  that  light  will  bring  to  view  the  great  mystery  of  the 
divine  wisdom  therein  displayed,  or  the  great  secret  of  human 
folly  therein  concealed,  we  can  hardly  say  remains  to  be  seen. 


364  SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING   SYSTEM. 

The  view  we  take  presents  a  glorious  display  of  the  divine 
justice  for  time  as  well  as  for  eternity. 

Fourthly,  this  view  not  only  shows  the  justice  and  the  mercy 
of  God,  separately  considered,  in  the  most  advantageous  light, 
but  it  exhibits  the  sublime  harmony  which  subsists  between 
them.  It  presents  not,  like  Calvinism,  a  mercy  limited  by  jus- 
tice, and  a  justice  limited  by  mercy  ;  but  it  exhibits  each  in  its 
absolute  perfection,  and  in  its  agreement  with  the  other :  for, 
according  to  this  view,  the  claim  of  mercy  extends  to  all  who 
may  be  saved,  and  that  of  justice  to  those  who  may  choose  to 
remain  incorrigibly  wicked.  Hence,  the  claim  of  the  one  does 
not  interfere  with  that  of  the  other ;  nor  can  we  conceive  how 
either  could  be  more  gloriously  displayed.  We  behold  the 
infinite  amplitude,  as  well  as  the  ineffable,  unclouded  splendour 
of  each  divine  perfection,  without  the  least  disturbance  or  col- 
lision between  them.  In  the  very  act  of  punishment,  the  tender 
mercy  of  God,  which  is  over  all  his  works,  concurs,  and  inflicts 
that  suffering  which  is  demanded  by  the  good  of  the  uni- 
verse. The  torment  of  the  lost,  is  "  the  wrath  of  the  Lamb." 
The  glory  of  the  redeemed,  is  the  pity  of  the  Judge.  Hence, 
instead  of  that  frightful  conflict  which  the  scheme  of  Calvinism 
presents,  we  behold  a  reconciliation  and  agreement  among  the 
divine  attributes,  worthy  the  great  principle  of  order,  and  har- 
mony, and  beauty  in  the  universe. 

SECTION  VI. 
The  question  submitted. 

We  must  now  take  leave  of  the  reader.  We  have  honestly 
endeavoured  to  construct  a  Theodicy,  or  to  vindicate  the  divine 
glory  as  manifested  in  the  constitution  and  government  of  the 
moral  world.  We  have  endeavoured  to  reconcile  the  great 
fundamental  doctrines  of  God  and  man  with  each  other,  as  well 
as  with  the  eternal  principles  of  truth.  It  has  likewise  been 
our  earnest  aim,  to  evince  the  harmony  of  the  divine  attributes 
among  themselves,  as  well  as  their  agreement  with  the  condition 
of  the  universe.  In  one  word,  we  have  aimed  to  repel  the 
objections,  and  solve  the  difficulties  which  have  been  permitted 
to  obscure  the  glory  of  the  Divine  Being ;  whether  those  diffi- 
culties and  objections  have  seemed  to  proceed  from  the  false 


SUMMARY  OF  THE  FOREGOING  SYSTEM.  365 

philosophy  of  his  enemies,  or  the  mistaken  views  and  misguided 
zeal  of  his  friends.  How  far  we  have  succeeded  in  this  attempt, 
no  Vess  arduous  than  laudable,  it  is  not  for  us  to  determine. 
We  shall,  therefore,  respectfully  submit  the  determination  of 
this  point  to  the  calm  and  impartial  judgment  of  those  who 
may  possess  both  the  desire  and  the  capacity  to  think  for 
themselves. 


NOTE. 


IN  this  work,  beginning  at  page  seventy,  Dr.  M'Cosh  is  accused  of  being  on 
both  sides  of  tne  great  question  respecting  the  freedom  of  the  will,  which  has 
been  so  long  debated  between  Arminians  and  Calvinists.  In  the  fourth  edition 
of  his  "  Divine  Government "  he  replies,  in  an  appendix,  that  "  it  is  much 
easier  to  assert  than  to  prove  this."  I  have  not  laboured  to  show  his  self-con- 
tradiction I  have  simply  exhibited  his  statements  on  both  sides  of  the  ques- 
tion, and  left  the  reader  to  determine  whether  the  contradiction  does  not  show 
itself. 

Dr.  M'Cosh  says,  "Mr.  B.  has  made  his  use  of  some  unguarded  expressions 
used  in  the  first  edition  of  this  work,  but  which  had  disappeared  from  the  later 
British  editions  before  the  Theodicy  was  published  ;*  we  do  not  think  the 
statements  now  made  are  inconsistent,"  &c.  Now  does  not  this  indirectly 
admit  that  the  statements  as  before  made  by  him  were  inconsistent? 

But  what  are  these  "  unguarded  expressions  V"  Only  two  of  the  expres- 
sions noticed  by  me  have  disappeared  from  the  work  of  Dr.  M.  The  one  is 
the  extract,  on  page  seventy,  concluding  with  the  words  of  Coleridge:  "It  is 
the  man  that  makes  the  motive,  and  not  the  motive  the  man."  Now  here, 
let  it  be  remembered,  the  whole  controversy  is  concerning  the  relation  between 
motive  and  the  will.  Dr.  M.  says  that  Necessitarians  have  erred  because  they 
have  been  "  afraid  of  making  admissions  to  their  opponents."  He  entertains 
no  such  fear.  He  boldly  proceeds  to  adopt  the  pointed  and  well-known 
expression  of  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  these  opponents ;  an  expression 
relating  to  the  very  point  in  controversy,  and,  if  true,  decisive  of  the  whole 
question.  Now  who  could,  for  one  moment,  have  imagined  that  in  adopting 
such  language  Dr.  M.  was  merely  putting  forth  "an  unguarded  expression?" 
If  it  were  not  his  mature  and  deliberate  opinion,  I  make  bold  to  affirm  that  it 
ought  to  have  been  so  ere  it  was  given  to  the  world. 

The  other  position  of  the  author,  considered  as  an  unguarded  expression, 
will  appear  still  more  wonderful.  It  relates  to  the  nature  of  liberty.  In  the 
first  edition  of  his  work  Dr.  M.  adopted  that  notion  of  the  freedom  of  the  will 
which  is  maintained  by  President  Edwards  and  other  Calvinistic  divines.  It 
has  been,  indeed,  called,  by  a  distinguished  Calvinist,  the  Calvinistic  idea  of 
moral  liberty.  (See  page  69.)  It  is  discussed  at  length  in  the  first  chapter 
0  My  strictures  were  on  the  only  American  edition. 


NOTE.  3C7 

of  this  work,  and  in  section  fourteen  of  my  "  Examination  of  Edwards  on  the 
Will." 

When  I  saw  the  same  idea  put  forth  by  Dr.  M'Cosh,  I  supposed  that  as  he 
was  a  Calvinistic  divine  so  he  had  adopted  the  Calviriistic  idea  and  definition 
of  free-will.  I  certainly  did  not  imagine  for  an  instant  that  such  a  position 
was  merely  "  an  unguarded  expression  "  on  his  part.  I  should,  indeed,  just  as 
aoon  have  supposed  that  his  whole  work,  from  beginning  to  end,  was  made  up 
of  "unguarded  expressions."  Nay,  I  should  as  soon  have  supposed  that  the 
same  position  in  President  Edwards,  though  so  elaborately  wrought  out  and 
explicitly  laid  down  by  him,  was  merely  an  "  unguarded  expression."  Indeed, 
if  we  would  write  on  these  great  themes  at  all,  we  should  take  care  how  we 
speak  of  moral  liberty,  the  very  thing  in  dispute.  It  will  not  do  to  speak  in 
unguarded  expressions;  and  if  we  adopt  the  stereotyped  definition  or  idea  of 
any  particular  school,  we  should  not  complain  that  it  is  supposed  to  be  our 
real  opinion. 

It  is  a  little  remarkable,  I  think,  that,  although  it  is  in  this  work  that  Dr.  M. 
is  accused  of  self-contradiction,  he  notices  only  certain  passages  in  the  ex- 
amination aforesaid,  and  attempts  no  reply  to  my  strictures  upon  his  work.  I 
still  think  he  contradicts  himself.  Let  the  reader  judge. 

"  Mr.  B."  says  he, "  deals  much  more  in  the  criticism  of  others  than  in  the 
exposition  of  his  own  system."  This  is  true,  and  especially  in  regard  to  his 
"  Examination."  For  all  that  is  necessary  to  establish  "  his  own  system"  of 
free-will  is  to  show  that  the  scheme  of  his  opponents  is  false.  In  other  words, 
if  it  be  shown  that  there  is  no  power  over  the  will  by  which  its  volitions  are 
determined,  then  are  we  free.  Hence,  to  batter  down  the  scheme  of  necessity 
is  to  establish  the  doctrine  of  free-will. 

"  In  such  a  subject  as  the  freedom  of  the  will,"  says  Dr.  M.,  "  it  is  easy  to 
start  objections,  but  not  so  easy  to  evolve  a  doctrine  free  from  all  difficulties." 
Hence,  even  if  Mr.  B.  has  not  evolved  any  system  of  his  own,  it  is  to  be  hoped 
he  has  committed  no  very  great  sin.  It  will  be  time,  he  thinks,  to  evolve  a 
system  when  he  can  find  one  which  shall  be  free  from  contradiction. 

But  I  have,  according  to  Dr.  M.,  been  singularly  unfortunate  in  having 
landed  myself  in  many  difficulties,  although  I  have  evolved  no  doctrine  of  my 
own.  Here  is  one  of  these  many  difficulties :  "  In  order  to  support  his  theory, 
he  is  obliged  to  strip  causation  of  its  very  peculiarities  to  make  effect  mean 
simply  what  is  effected,"  &c.  Now,  if  an  effect  does  not  mean  what  is 
effected,  I  should  like  to  know  what  it  does  mean.  Does  it  mean  something 
that  is  not  effected  V  If  so,  what  becomes  of  Dr.  M.'s  great  principle,  that, 
every  effect  must  have  a  cause?  "  See  this  defective  view  noticed,"  says  Dr. 
M.,  "  in  Art.  Ill,  p.  523."  On  turning  to  that  article  we  find  him  saying : 
"  There  is  something  new  implied  in  the  very  conception  of  effect — it  is  some- 
thing effected,  something  which  did  not  exist  before,  or  put  in  a  new  state  ' 
What!  is  it  possible,  after  all,  that  an  effect  w  something  effected?  in  its  very 
conception,  tomething  effected? 

According  to  my  scheme,  says  Dr.  M.,  "  there  can  be  no  guarantee,  even  in 
the  power  of  God,  against  the  very  saints  in  glory  falling  away,  or  even — we 
use  tne  language  reluctantly — in  the  continuance  of  the  Divine  Excellence.** 


368  NOTE. 

This  objection  has  been  a  thousand  times  urged  against  the  scheme  of  Armin- 
ians.  Jt  is  repeatedly  noticed  in  this  volume.  (See  Part  I,  chap,  vii,  sec.  3  ; 
also  Part  I,  chap,  vi,  sec.  7  ;  and  also  Part  II,  chap,  ii,  sec.  4.)  The  bare 
restatement  of  this  objection  by  Dr.  M.,  who  makes  no  allusion  to  my  answers 
does  not  entitle  it  to  further  notice. 

According  to  Dr.  M.,  Mr.  B.  says:  "  We  are  conscious  of  action,  and  a 
thing  which  acts  cannot  be  caused."  Now  here,  Dr.  M.  has  not  only  made 
his  use  of  this  unguarded  expression ;  he  has  made  the  unguarded  expression 
itself.  It  is  not  mine.  It  can  nowhere  be  found  in  my  works ;  for  I  have 
taken  the  utmost  pains  to  guard  against  any  and  every  such  blundering 
expression  of  my  views.  It  is  true,  and  I  admit,  that  "  a  thing  which  acts 
can  be  caused."  The  mind,  for  example,  acts;  and  yet  the  mind  is  caused, 
vea,  it  is  created  by  the  power  of  the  Almighty. 

I  have  never  doubted  that  "  a  thing  which  acts  can  be  caused."  BuU/?a/  is 
not  the  question  ;  for  that  is,  on  all  sides,  conceded.  "  The  question  is,"  as  I 
have  said  in  my  examination,  (p.  121,)  "can  the  mind  be  efficiency  caused  to 
act?  Or,  in  other  words,  has  an  act  of  the  will — not  has  the  mind — not  has 
tlie  will  itself — but  has  an  act  of  the  will  an  efficient  cause  ?  Is  each  act 
produced  by  a  preceding  act?  That  is  the  question  which  T  have  put,  and 
put  with  emphasis,  in  order  that  my  position  might  not  be  misunderstood.  I 
have  not  only  clearly,  distinctly,  and  most  emphatically  put  this  precise  ques- 
tion, but  I  have  also  accompanied  its  terms  with  an  elaborate  explanation  of 
the  precise  sense  in  which  they  are  used  by  me.  But  all  this  is  overlooked, 
and  other  words  are  substituted  in  their  place.  All  my  arguments  and  illus- 
trations are  passed  by,  and  I  am  made  to  father  a  proposition  which  I  have  not 
put  forth,  and  which  I  utterly  repudiate  and  reject  as  false. 

Having  done  this,  Dr.  M.  may  well  add,  "  There  is  an  obvious  mistake 
here,  and  indeed  in  his  whole  view  of  action  and  passion.  Surely  that  which 
is  acted  on  may  itself  have  power  of  action."  Surely,  I  repeat,  it  may.  The 
mind,  though  acted  on,  not  only  may  have,  but  it  has,  a  power  of  action  in 
itself.  I  know  not  what  mistakes  Dr.  M.  may  have  discovered  in  my  "  whole 
view  of  action  and  passion ;"  but  I  do  know  that  the  only  mistake  therein 
which  he  attempts  to  point  out  is  one  of  his  own  creation.  He  convicts  me 
of  a  gross  blunder,  not  by  quoting  my  own  expressions,  but  simply  by  invent- 
ing an  expression  for  me.  He  should  be  more  guarded. 

NOTE. — Some  of  my  quotations  from  Dr.  M'Cosh's  work  will  be  found  in  the  fourth 
edition,  iu  Article  VII.  of  the  Appendix. 


APPENDIX 


24 


APPENDIX. 


WHEN  I  determined  to  publish  the  foregoing  "THEODICY;  OB, 
VINDICATION  OF  THE  DIVINE  GLORY  AS  MANIFESTED  IN  THE 
CONSTITUTION  AND  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  MORAL  WORLD,"  the 
learned  and  accomplished  gentleman  to  whom  it  was*  submitted 
for  examination  by  the  publishers  told  me  plainly  that  he  did 
not  believe  it  would  be  in  his  power  to  recommend  them  to  pub- 
lish it,  because,  in  his  opinion,  no  one  could  write  a  work  on  a 
subject  so  high,  so  abstruse,  and  so  difficult  that  would  be  read. 
Alter  an  examination  of  the  work,  however,  he  advised  its  publica- 
tion, and  the  result  has  justified  his  decision.  It  has  passed 
through  many  editions,  the  first  three  having  been  issued  within 
four  months  after  its  publication,  and  it  has  ran  the  gauntlet  of 
criticism.  This,  as  a  general  thing,  as  well  as  the  reception  of  the 
work  by  the  public,  has  been  far,  very  far,  more  favourable  than 
was  anticipated  by  its  author. 

The  leading  idea  or  principle  of  the  work,  in  particular,  has  en- 
countered for  less  hostile  criticism  than  I  had  imagined  it  would 
have  to  encounter.  For  this  idea  or  principle  so  clearly  seems,  at 
first  view,  to  set  limits  to  the  Divine  Omnipotence,  that,  in  spite  of 
all  my  pains  to  guard  against  such  a  misconception,  I  expected  it 
would  be  very  extensively,  if  not  almost  universally,  assailed  with 
the  charge  of  atheism.  Nor  would  this,  however  unjust,  have 
been  anything  new  under  the  sun. 

An:i\agor.;s,  the  first  among  the  Greek  philosophers  to  rise  to 
the  sublime  conception  of  a  God,  or  a  Superintending  Mind,  was 
accused  of  atheism,  and  condemned  to  death  for  the  great  offence. 
Truly  has  it  been  said  by  a  celebrated  writer,  "In  the  persecution 
of  Anaxagoras  the  e  is  nothing  but  wh;  ry  natural;  it  oc- 

curred at"  erward  in  the  cu-  ^  crates,  and  it  has  subsequently 
occurred  a  thousand  times  in  the  history  of  mankind  as  the  simple 

:  of  outraged  con \  ict ions.       V  icked  the  rvl 

of  his  time:  he  was  tried  and  condemned  for  his  temerit} 
as  is  now  universally  acknowledged,  his  sublime  vu 
God  and  the  order  of  the  universe  were  infinitely  more  worthy 


370  APPENDIX. 

of  a  rational  being  than  were  the  religious  notions  for  attacking 
which  he  was  tried  as  an  atheist  and  condemned  to  death.  In 
like  manner,  though  Cudworth,  "  at  his  fir.st  essay,  penetrated  the 
very  darkest  recesses  of  antiquity,  to  strip  atheism  of  all  its  dis- 
guises, and  drag  up  the  lurking  monster  to  conviction,"  yet, 
however  wonderful  it  may  seem,  was  he  accused  of  atheism  it-self. 
"  Though  few  readers  could  follow  him,"  says  his  biographer,  "  the 
very  slowest  were  able  to  unravel  his  secret  purpose — to  tell  the 
world  that  he  was  an  atheist  in  his  heart.  .  .  .  The  silly  calumny 
was  believed;  the  much  injured  author  grew  disgusted  ;  his  ardour 
slackened ;  and  the  rust  and  far  greatest  part  of  his  immortal  work 
never  appeared."  If,  then,  so  many  illustrious  men,  both  in  the 
ancient  and  in  the  modern  world,  incurred  the  charge  of  atheism 
simply  by  their  enlightened  zeal  in  the  cause  of  God,  how  could 
the  obscure  author  of  the  work  in  question  hope  to  escape  a  similar 
accusation  ?  Indeed,  the  more  firmly  he  was  convinced  of  the  cor- 
rectness of  his  views,  and  of  their  importance  to  the  glory  of  God, 
the  more  confidently  he  anticipated  they  would  be  pronounced 
atheistical  by  those  whose  theological  convictions  differed  from 
his  own.  However,  although  he  counted  the  cost,  he  has  been  de- 
lighted to  find  it  much  less  than  he  anticipated.  The  principal 
reason  of  this,  perhaps,  is  the  fact  that  the  work  was  published  by 
a  well-known  and  orthodox  religious  house,  arid  that  it  received, 
from  the  very  first,  the  sanction  of  so  many  orthodox  religious 
periodicals.  "  The  Methodist  Quarterly  Review,"  in  its  notice  of 
the  book,  did  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  it  "  the  best  work  on  the 
Divine  Government  ever  written ; "  and  identically  the  same  opin- 
ion, or  at  least  one  equally  strong,  was  expressed  by  "The  Meth- 
odist Quarterly,  South."  In  various  quarters,  also,  the  secular 
press,  as  well  as  periodicals  of  different  religious  denominations, 
both  in  this  country  and  in  Great  Britain,  have  given  criticisms 
on  the  work  in  the  highest  degree  gratifying  to  the  author.  Nay, 
authors  who  are  themselves  celebrated,  both  in  Europe  and 
America,  have  expressed  opinions  of  the  work  which  corroborate 
the  most  favourable  criticisms  of  the  press.  For  all  these  favour- 
able opinions  I  am  most  profoundly  grateful.  There  have  been,  how- 
ever, a  few  adverse  criticisms,  whose  tone  and  temper  are  more  or 
less  violent.  Now  1  do  not,  for  one  moment,  entertain  the  shadow 
of  a  complaint  against  the  authors  of  any  of  these  adverse  criti- 
cisms or  attacks.  On  the  contrary,  I  thank  them  from  my  heart 
for  the  opportunity  which  they  have  thus  afforded  me  of  replying 
to  the  objections  against  my  views  of  God  and  his  all-glorious 


APPENDIX.  871 

universe.  Having  barely  alluded  to  a  few  of  the  favourable  criti- 
cisms, as  an  offset  to  those  of  an  opposite  character,  I  shall  now 
proceed  to  examine  in  detail  the  objections  of  those  who  have  been 
pleased  to  favour  me  with  their  adverse  criticisms. 

Nothing  couM  be  more  natural,  or  more  inevitable,  than  such 
objections.  Indeed,  the  author  had  to  combat  them  in  his  own 
mind  loner  before  he  met  with  them  from  others.  When  the  lead- 

£? 

ing  idea  of  his  "Theodicy"  first  dawned  on  his  own  mind  he  was 
afraid  to  entertain  it  himself,  lest  the  taint  of  some  terrible  heresy 
should  enter  into  his  soul ;  and  it  was  only  after  long  and  painful 
reflection,  and  a  careful  examination  of  all  its  consequences,  that  he 
ventured  to  embrace  that  leading  idea  or  principle.  After  much 
additional  meditation,  however,  he  saw  so  clearly,  as  it  seemed  to 
him,  the  transcendent  truth  of  that  principle,  and  the  glory  of  its 
consequences,  that  Pie  resolved  to  launch  it  on  the  angry  sea  of 
theological  controversy.  Of  course,  it  was  destined  to  encounter 
opposition  in  the  minds  of  others  as  it  had  done  in  his  own  mind; 
and  he  was  not  so  weak  as  to  imagine  for  a  moment  that  others 
would  bestow  on  their  objections  the  calm,  cautious,  and  impartial 
consideration  which  the  infinite  importance  of  the  subject  de- 
manded. Hence  in  this  paper  he  proposes  to  do  for  these  critics 
what  they  failed  to  do  for  themselves,  by  showing  how  their  hasty 
objections  melt  down  and  disappear  beneath  the  power  of  patient 
reflection. 

The  London  "AthensBum"  lays  great  stress  on  the  charge  of 
presumption.  It  seems  to  this  journal  in  the  highest  degree  ab- 
surd that  any  one  at  the  present  day  should  presume  to  offer  a 
solution  of  "  the  old  problem"  of  evil,  at  which  so  many  centuries 
have  toiled  in  vain.  Now  this  objection,  it  must  be  admitted, 
carries  great  force  along  with  it,  and  even  makes  out  9,  prima  facie 
case  against  the  author.  It  must  be  admitted,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  this  objection  may  be  just  as  easily  urged  by  a  simpleton 
as  by  a  sage,  by  a  fool  as  by  a  philosopher.  Indeed,  it  may,  per- 
haps, be  far  more  easily  urged  by  the  former  than  by  the  latter, 
especially  as  it  disposes  of  the  whole  matter  without  the  least  ex- 
ercise of  thought  or  reflection.  It  enables  the  facile  critic,  too,  to 
pass  over  without  notice  all  that  had  been  said  in  anticipation  of 
this  very  charge. 

The  facetious  writer  in  the  "  AthenaBum,"  makes  himself  merry 
over  '•  the  Professor  of  Mathematics  in  the  University  of  Virginia," 
who  has  been  so  absurd  as  to  undertake  "  the  old  problem  of  the 
moral  quadrature  of  the  circle."  Now  the  fact  is  that  the  Pro- 


372  APPENDIX. 

fessor  of  Mathematics  in  question  has  never  been  so  weak  as  to 
attempt  the  mathematical  quadrature  of  the  circle,  much  less  its 
moral  quadrature.  If  this  very  pleasant  critic  had  only  read  the 
introduction  to  the  work  he  assails,  he  would  have  seen  that  in 
reality  its  author  had  not  undertaken  to  solve  any  problem  what- 
ever ;  for,  as  he  there  informs  the  reader,  "  he  did  not  enter  on  the 
apparently  dark  problem  of  the  moral  world  with  the  least  hope 
that  he  should  be  able  to  throw  any  light  upon  it,  nor  with  any  other 
set  purpose  or  design.  Pie  simply  revolved  the  subject  in  mind, 
because  he  was  by  nature  prone  to  such  meditations."  (P.  25.) 
Now,  if,  in  his  studies  of  Plato,  and  King,  and  Leibnitz,  and 
Cudworth,  it  was  presumption  in  him  to  think  of  what  he  was 
reading,  or  "  simply  to  revolve  in  mind"  the  awful  subject  of  their 
immortal  works,  then  was  the  author  of  "A  Theodicy"  guilty  of 
presumption.  Or  if,  while  revolving  this  subject  in  mind,  it  was 
presumption  to  notice  the  truths  which,  as  he  believed,  had  ap- 
peared to  him,  and  even  to  write  them  down  in  a  book  and  submit 
them  to  the  judgment  of  others,  then  was  the  author  in  question 
guilty  of  presumption.  But  then  how  has  any  branch  of  human 
knowledge  ever  been  delivered  from  its  obscurities,  or  had  its 
boundaries  enlarged  and  lighted  up,  except  by  precisely  that  sort 
of  presumption  ?  Anaxagoras,  who,  looking  above  and  beyond 
the  religious  notions  of  his  day,  rose  to  the  sublime  conception 
of  the  supreme  vovg,  by  whom  the  universe  was  "ordered  and 
adorned,"  was  guilty  of  precisely  that  sort  of  presumption,  and 
paid  the  fearful  penalty  of  his  crime.  But  has  not  the  world  owed 
more  to  his  presumption  than  to  the  extreme  modesty  of  all  his 
persecutors  ?  u  It  is  not  I,"  said  he,  "  who  have  lost  the  Athenians ; 
it  is  the  Athenians  who  have  lost  me."  But,  in  point  of  fact,  the 
Athenians  did  not  lose  him,  for  Socrates  rose  out  of  his  ashes. 
The  torch  kindled  by  him  was  seized  by  his  successors,  and  in  the 
hand  of  a  Socrates,  a  Plato,  and  an  Aristotle,  made  to  illuminate 
the  civilized  world.  Who,  then,  cares  about  the  charge  of 
presumption?  The  only  question  is  whether  the  author  of  "A 
Theodicy  "  has  given  a  true,  or  a  false,  solution  of  the  stupendous 
problem  of  the  moral  world.  If  it  be  false,  it  is  no  very  great  dis- 
grace to  fail  in  company  with  a  Plato  or  a  Leibnitz;  and  if  it  be 
true,  he  has  still  less  reason  to  blush  under  the  rebuke  of  those  who, 
without  once  looking  into  his  solution,  have  the  ability  to  raise  the 
cry  of  presumption.  His  solution  was  submitted,  not  to  the  critics 
of  this  class,  but  to  those  who  possess  "  both  the  desire  and  the 
capacity  to  think  for  themselves,"  (p.  365 ;)  and,  having  received 


APPENDIX.  873 

from  so  many  eminent  judges  of  this  description  a  verdict  in  his 
favour,  he  now  leaves  the  charge  of  presumption  to  take  care  of 
itself.  He  abandons  it  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  facile  and  face- 
tious critic  of  the  London  "  Athenaeum." 

This  critic,  in  making  himself  and  his  readers  merry  over  "the 
Professor  of  Mathematics,"  calls  to  his  aid,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
the  devils  of  Milton.  Having  quoted,  just  as  if  it  were  something 
new,  the  hackneyed  passage  from  u  Paradise  Lost,"  the  critic 
continues:  "In  this  Milton  showed  himself  more  knowing  than 
Michael  Scott,  who  could  think  of  nothing  better  than  setting  his 
friends  to  make  ropes  out  of  sea  sand.  But  a  clever  devil  would 
turn  all  the  shores  upon  earth  into  cordage  long  before  a  clever 
man,  though  a  Professor  of  Mathematics  into  the  bargain,  would 
make  the  slightest  progress  in  settling  free  will."  I  agree  with 
the  witty  critic  that  Michael  Scott  might  have  found  far  more 
suitable  work  for  his  small  friends.  If  he  had  only  introduced 
them  among  philosophers,  cracking  their  stale  jokes  and  sorry 
gibes  at  the  grave  discussions  of  the  greatest  question  that  ever 
engaged  the  attention  of  men  or  of  angels,  he  would  have  assigned 
to  them  an  employment  far  more  suitable  to  their  real  character 
than  the  innocent  occupation  of  merely  making  ropes  of  sand.  As 
it  is,  this  hopeless  task  of  making  ropes  out  of  sea  sand  is  a  very 
harmless  work  for  devils,  and  reminds  one,  to  say  the  worst  of  it, 
of  our  critic's  attempt  to  manufacture  chains  of  reasoning  out  of 
the  fleeting  fancies  of  his  facetious  brain.  Now,  to  tell  the  plain 
truth,  "  the  Professor  of  Mathematics "  would  infinitely  rather 
argue  the  great  question  of  "Fixed  fate,  free  will,  foreknowledge 
absolute,"  with  the  great  demons  of  Milton  than  with  the  small 
critic  of  the  London  "  AthenaBum."  He  might  have,  it  is  true,  just 
as  little  hope  of  converting  them  to  the  truth ;  but  then  he  would 
have,  at  least,  an  attentive  and  respectful  hearing.  For,  if  any  one 
will  consult  the  passage  in  question,  he  will  find  that  the  demons 
referred  to  by  our  critic  are  a  most  respectable  race  of  great  poets 
and  philosophers.  They  are  not  of  those  malignant  fiends  whose 

"  Vast  Typhsean  rage  more  fell 
Rend  up  both  rocks  and  hills,  and  ride  the  air 
In  whirlwind." 

On  the  contrary,  they  are  the  "  others  more  mild  "  who 

"  Retired  in  a  silent  valle}',  sing 
With  notes  angelical,  to  many  a  harp, 
Their  own  heroic  deeds,  and  hapless  fall. 
Free  virtue  should  enthral  to  force  or  chance." 


374  APPENDIX. 

They  sing  the  false  song  of  fate,  it  is  true,  but  then  how  divinely 
do  they  sing  !     In  the  words  of  the  poet : 

"Their  song  was  partial;  but  the  harmony 
(What  could  it  less  when  spirits  immortal  sing?) 
Suspended  hell,  and  took  with  ravishment 
The  thronging  audience." 

Now  who,  on  such  awful  themes,  would  not  rather  listen  to  the 
sublime  song  of  such  demons  than  the  small  wit  of  our  critic  ? 
The  poet  thus  describes  his  great  philosophers : 

"  In  discourse  more  sweet, 
(For  eloquence  the  soul,  song  charms  the  sense,) 
Others  apart  sat.  on  a  hill  retired, 
In  thoughts  more  elevate,  and  reasoned  high 
Of  providence,  foreknowledge,  will,  and  fate." 

The  poet  truly  adds,  "Vain  wisdom  all,  and  false  philosophy;" 
for  these  philosophers  of  the  pit  were  all  fatalists.  As  their  char- 
acters were  invariably  bad,  so  they  naturally  laid  their  sins  on 
"  fate,"  on  "  God's  decree,"  and  not  upon  themselves.  No  wonder, 
then,  that  they  "found  no  end  in  wandering  mazes  lost;"  for,  be- 
ing fast  bound  in  the  everlasting  coils  of  error  as  well  as  of  sin, 
there  was  no  egress  for  them  into  the  light  and  joy  of  the  upper 
world.  But  yet,  though  wandering  forever  amid  the  endless  mazes 
of  error,  sin,  and  death,  their  "  discourse  more  sweet  "  charms  "  the 
soul,"  as  the  sublime  song  of  the  poet  "  charms  the  sense."  These 
give  us  the  song,  and  those  the  logic,  of  fate  or  necessity.  Who, 
then,  would  not  rather  listen  to  the  "reasonings  high"  of  su^ch 
demons,  than  to  the  flashy  rhetoric  of  the  London  "Athenaeum?" 
We  doubt,  however,  if  these  demons  reasoned  much  better  in 
favour  of  necessity  than  did  Spinoza,  or  Leibnitz,  or  Edwards,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  London  "Athenaeum" 

"Necessity  rides  logic,"  says  that  journal,  "and  free  will  rides 
consciousness ;  and  consciousness  is  first  and  logic  nowhere." 
Now  this  seems  to  be  one  of  those  smart  imitations  of  Macaulay 
which  occur  so  frequently  in  the  pages  of  the  "Athenaeum,"  and 
which  sound  more  like  the  crackling  of  thorns  under  a  pot  than 
the  gra\e  discourse  of  philosophers.  Necessity  does  ride  logic, 
it  is  true;  but  then,  as  we  have  just  seen,  it  rides  the  logic  of 
devils.  Now,  it  was  one  great  leading  object  of  the  author  of  "  A 
Theodicy"  to  break  the  fetters  of  that  false  logic,  and  scatter  its 
fragments  to  the  winds,  in  order  that  mortals  may  no  longer  ride 
with  devils,  or  with  doctors  of  divinity  "in  endless  mazes  lost." 
Consciousness  is  truly  first,  but  logic  is,  nevertheless,  somewhere 


APPENDIX.  375 

and  is  something.  The  logic  of  onr  critic  may,  if  he  pleases,  be 
nowhere  ;  and,  in  my  humble  opinion,  is  little  better  than  nothing. 
But  there  is  a  true  logic,  as  well  as  a  false ;  a  logic  which,  instead 
of  warring  against  the  light  of  consciousness,  shines  all  through 
that  transcendent  light,  and  redoubles  its  effulgence  in  favor  of 
free-will.  For,  as  there  is  a  logic  of  hell  and  of  devils,  so  is  there 
a  logic  of  heaven  and  of  its  blessed  angels,  whose  sublime  song  of 
freedom  and  whose  still  "  sweet  discourse "  of  reason  infinitely 
transcend  the  song  of  fate  and  all  "  reasonings  high  "  of  the  bot- 
tomless pit.  The  echoes  of  this  song,  of  this  divine  harmony,  are 
everywhere  heard  in  the  great  poem  of  Milton,  except  among  his 
demons,  and  its  principles  are  expounded  in  the  preceding  work. 
Let  the  reader  examine  and  decide  for  himself. 

Now,  who  would  have  believed  it  possible  that,  directly  in  the 
face  of  all  our  critic  has  so  pleasantly  said  against  the  possibility 
of  ever  settling  the  question  of  free-will,  he  sets  up  a  method  of  his 
own  for  the  settlement  of  this  very  question?  "There  are,"  says 
he,  "  two  ways  of  settling  the  question,  which  deserve  very  differ- 
ent degrees  of  attention."  Then,  after  dispatching  one  of  these 
ways,  he  proceeds  to  give  the  second,  which  is  approved  and 
adopted  by  himself.  "The  other  explanation,"  says  he,  "sins 
grievously  against  theology  as  usually  understood.  It  supposes 
complete  fore-ordinance,  but  looks  forward  to  a  final  state  in  which 
what  appeared  evil  shall  be  seen  to  be  on  the  whole  nothing  but 
good,  and  in  which  the  condition  of  created  beings  shall  be  one 
of  mixed  enjoyment  and  utility.  St.  Paul  is  strongly  suspected 
of  having  held  this  opinion.  .  .  .  The  Privy  Council  having  de- 
cided that  a  clergyman  may  hope  for  such  a  final  restoration 
without  losing  his  livelihood,  it  may  now  be  lawful  for  the  gre- 
garious laity  to  contemplate  as  possible  what  those  who  dare  think 
for  themselves  have  regarded  as  the  easiest  and  most  probable 
solution  of  the  difficulty."  Such  is  our  critic's  short  and  easy 
method  for  solving  the  absolutely  insoluble  problem  of  evil !  Such 
is  his  Amoral  quadrature  of  the  circle!"  Let  us  look,  then,  at 
this  wondeiful  solution  of  the  wonderful  problem,  and  mark  its 
characteristics. 

(1.)  It  is  an  easy  solution.  It  is  unspeakably  more  easy  than 
the  one  set  forth  in  "  A  Theodicy."  It  took  twenty  years  for  the 
elaboration  of  this;  and  that  could  not  have  cost  its  author  more 
than  twenty  minutes. 

(2.)  It  possesses  the  very  great  merit  of  sinning  "grievously 
against  theology,  as  usually  understood."  Hence,  those  who  hap- 


376  APPENDIX. 

pen  to  entertain  a  profound  contempt  for  all  orthodox  systems  of 
theology,  whether  Catholic  or  Protestant,  will  find  this  an  exceed- 
ingly easy  solution.  The  simple  fact  that  it  sins  so  egregiously 
against  theology  will  give  it  a  powerful  attraction,  if  not  an  irre- 
sistible charm,  to  their  highly  illuminated  minds.  On  the  con- 
trary, those  who  may  happen  to  retain  some  little  respect  for  the 
opinions  of  the  wise  and  good  of  all  ages  will  find  some  little  dif- 
ficulty in  the  adoption  of  such  a  solution  of  the  stupendous  prob- 
lem of  evil.  They  will  think  twice  before  they  jump  to  such  a 
conclusion. 

(3.)  This  solution  is  wonderfully  adapted  to  the  genius  of  the 
present  age.  In  this  age,  in  which  all  reverence  seems  to  be  well 
nigh  lost  out  of  the  world,  and  few  things,  except  egotism  and  self- 
conceit,  seem  to  take  deep  root,  the  above  solution  may  hope  to 
find  many  adherents.  The  opinions  of  its  flippant  critics  will,  no 
doubt,  flow  into  such  a  solution,  even  as  the  air  rushes  into  a 
vacuum. 

(4.)  No  conscience  is  required  for  the  adoption  of  such  a  solu- 
tion. Indeed,  the  less  conscience  a  man  has  the  more  easily  may 
he  embrace  the  above  solution.  Hence,  if  a  clergyman  may  hold 
this  theory  without  losing  his  livelihood,  of  course  the  gregarious 
laity  may  embrace  it  without  the  least  danger  to  their  souls. 
The  Privy  Council  will,  of  course,  throw  wide  the  gates  of  Para- 
dise .  to  all  the  gregarious  bipeds  by  whom  it  may  be  adopted. 
All,  then,  who  "dare  think  for  themselves"  will  embrace  this 
solution  as  "  the  easiest  and  most  probable,"  and  also  as  tl  the 
safest "  ever  vouchsafed  to  the  world. 

(6.)  The  above  solution  saves  a  great  deal  of  trouble.  Solving, 
as  it  does,  "  the  old  problem  "  by  a  single  dash  of  the  pen,  it  spares 
the  sad  votaries  of  truth  the  old  means  of  thinking  and  reading 
and  painful  meditation  in  order  to  comprehend  the  system  of  the 
universe.  They  can,  with  the  aid  of  this  solution,  not  only  see 
through  the  system  of  the  world  at  a  glance,  but  they  can  also  tell 
you  all  about  "A  Theodicy"  without  once  looking  into  its  pages. 
Such  are  a  few  of  the  unspeakable  advantages  which  the  above 
solution  possesses  over  all  others  that  have  ever  been  conceived 
or  invented  by  the  ingenuity  and  wit  of  man. 

"  Dr.  Bledsoe,"  says  our  facile  critic,  "  is  strong  in  the  opinions 
of  others.  He  has  read  much,  and  gives  the  minds  of  many." 
"Strong  in  the  opinions  of  others  !"  No  criticism  could  possibly 
be  further  from  the  truth.  "  He  has  given  the  minds  of  many," 
it  is  true,  but  the  opinions  so  freely  and  so  fully  quoted  by  him 


APPENDIX.  377 

are  opposite  to  his  own  views,  and  are,  consequently,  combattod 
by  him.  Indeed,  in  the  investigation  of  any  great  subject  it  has 
always  been  the  habit  of  his  mind  to  read  and  examine  almost 
exclusively  the  great  works  of  those  most  opposed  to  his  own 
views,  and  to  see  that  they  are  fairly  and  fully  represented  in  his 
reply  to  them  by  the  quotation  of  their  own  language.  This  fact 
is  obvious  to  all  who  have  read  his  works.  How  any  one,  then, 
can  assert  in  the  face  of  this  fact  that  he  is  "  strong  in  the  opin- 
ions of  others  "  is  more  than  he  can  conceive,  at  least  on  the  sup- 
position that  the  critic  has  read  the  work  he  criticises.  Can  a 
man  be  said  to  be  strong  in  the  opinions  which  he  opposes  or 
combats  ?  If  so,  then  is  Dr.  Bledsoe  strong  in  the  opinions  so 
freely  and  so  fully  quoted  in  his  "  Theodicy,"  but  not  otherwise. 
Before  proceeding  to  lay  his  own  foundation  he  aimed  to  clear 
the  ground  of  all  rubbish  and  loose  material,  and  hence  the 
appearance  of  the  numerous  quotations  in  his  "  Theodicy." 
Our  facetious  critic,  evidently  not  having  read  the  work,  sup- 
poses that  they  are  brought  forward  to  bolster  up  the  opinion  of 
its  author ! 

The  complaint  of  our  critic  that  he  cannot  distinguish  between 
what  is  Dr.  Bledsoe's  and  what  belongs  to  others  is  an  equally 
unjust  criticism.  Or,  if  he  cannot  distinguish  between  these  two 
things,  it  is  because  he  has  not  read  the  book  or  made  the  effort. 
The  leading  idea  of  his  "  Theodicy  "  is  Dr.  Bledsoe's,  and  also  the 
consequences  to  which  it  leads,  as  well  as  the  manner  in  which 
other  principles  are  coordinated  with  that  leading  idea.  Now  all 
this  is  so  distinctly  claimed  in  the  "  Theodicy,"  is  so  clearly  set 
forth,  and  so  conclusively  established,  that  "  he  who  runs  may 
read."  Why,  then,  did  the  critic  complain  of  such  a  defect  in  Dr. 
Bledsoe's  work  ?  Simply  because,  as  the  critic  says,  this  "  is  a 
frequent  fault,"  and  because  the  imputation  of  it  to  Dr.  Bledsoe 
would  afford  the  critic  a  fine  opportunity  to  get  off  one  of  his 
brilliant  coruscations  of  wit.  "  We  are  vexed  with  a  writer,"  says 
he,  "who  loses  himself  in  descriptions  of  others.  We  are  inclined 
to  imitate  Front-de-Bceuf.  When  the  poor  priest  is  explaining 
what  has  happened  to  his  abbot,  and  becomes  discursive  with, 
*  What  saith  St.  Augustine?'  the  impatient  baron  breaks  in  with, 
'What  saith  the  devil?'  or,  rather,  what  dost  thou  say,  sir 
priest?'" 

Having  got  off  this  fine  coruscation,  the  critic  then  tells  exactly 
what  Dr.  Bledsoe  does  say,  and  proceeds  to  blow  him  out  of  the 
water.  He  quotes  the  leading  idea  or  principle  of  his  "  Theodicy," 


378  APPENDIX. 

and  then  with  his  usual  ease  shows  that  it  is  merely  "the  silly- 
perversion  of  a  logical  phrase."  Alas  for  the  vanity  of  all  human 
hopes  !  Dr.  Bledsoe  laboured  for  twenty  long  years,  and  yet,  after 
all,  he  brought  forth  only  "  the  silly  perversion  of  a  logical 
phrase  ! "  Our  critic  finds  this  silly  perversion  of  a  logical  phrase 
in  the  proposition  that  "  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms."  Now  this  proposition,  as  understood  by  our  critic,  is,  it 
must  be  conceded,  "  the  silly  perversion  "  of  a  great  truth.  But 
the  reader  is  invited  to  consider  this  great  truth,  not  as  it  is  seen 
in  its  silly  perversion,  but  as  it  is  spread  out,  explained,  and  illu- 
minated in  the  pages  of  "  A  Theodicy." 

The  great  truth,  then,  that  a  "  necessitated  holiness  is  a  contra- 
diction in  terms,"  is  "the  precise  point  from  which  we  should 
contemplate  the  world  if  we  would  behold  the  power  and  good- 
ness of  God  therein  manifested.  This  is  the  secret  of  the  world  by 
which  the  dark  enigma  of  evil  is  solved"  ("  Theodicy,"  p.  200.)  But 
no  one  can  see  from  this  bare  statement  (much  less  from  the  silly 
perversion,  of  our  critic)  how  the  great  truth  is  made  to  solve  the 
enigma  of  evil,  and  light  up  all  things,  from  the  highest  heavens 
to  the  lowest  hell,  with  the  boundless  glory  of  God's  infinite  wis- 
dom, power,  and  goodness.  If  the  reader  would  see  this,  or  com- 
prehend the  full  import  and  illuminating  power  of  the  great  truth 
in  question,  let  him  take  his  stand  on  that  truth  itself,  as  it  is  ex- 
plained, illustrated,  carried  out,  and  guarded  on  all  sides  against 
perversions,  and  then  contemplate  the  wonderful  order,  harmony, 
and  beauty  of  the  universe. 

"  Necessary  holiness,"  says  our  critic,  "  is  not  a  contradiction  in 
terms ;  the  terms  do  not  contradict  each  other.  '  Necessary '  is 
said  of  that  which  must  have  been,  *  holiness '  of  that  which  is  free 
from  sin."  Now  precisely  here  is  the  gross  blunder,  the  silly  per- 
version, of  the  careless  critic.  "  Holiness  is  said  of  that  which  is 
free  from  sin  !"  Why,  the  stars  of  heaven  and  the  stones  of  earth, 
the  winds  of  the  air  and  the  waves  of  the  sea,  are  all  "  free  from 
sin,"  yet  who  ever  predicated  holiness,  or  virtue,  or  moral  good- 
ness, of  such  things  ?  Their  motions  too  are  necessary,  but  they 
are  not  holy,  nor  virtuous,  nor  morally  good.  Though  "  a  neces- 
sary holiness  is  a  contradiction  in  terms,"  yet  this  cnn  be  seen 
only  by  those  who  understand  the  meaning  of  the  terms,  and  not 
by  those  who  lose  themselves  in  "  silly  perversions "  of  that 
meaning. 

Our  critic  at  last,  we  are  glad  to  perceive,  approaches  something 
like  a  solid  argument.  "  The  holiness  of  God,"  he  urges,  a  is  said 


APPENDIX.  379 

to  be  necessary."  Now,  in  one  sense  of  the  words  this  is  true. 
The  holiness  of  God  is  necessary  just  because  he  is  raised  above 
all  temptation  to  evil,  and  because  there  is  no  greater  power  in  the 
universe  than  himself  by  which  his  omnipotent  will  could  be 
turned  from  its  self-appointed  course.  The  idea  would,  however, 
be  much  better  expressed  by  the  term  certainty  than  by  the  word 
necessity.  His  holiness  is  not  necessitated.  If,  indeed,  there  were 
any  power  greater  than  his  own  by  which  his  will  was  determined 
or  necessitated  then  he  would  not  be  free ;  he  would  not  be  holy ; 
nay,  he  would  not  be  God.  On  the  contrary,  the  power  greatei 
than  himself  by  which  his  will  was  coerced  or  necessitated  would 
be  the  real,  the  ruling  God  of  the  universe.  But  there  is  "no  God 
but  the  Lord."  He  alone  is  absolutely  free,  and  his  holiness  is 
absolutely  certain.  Moving  always  freely,  as  it  does,  in  directions 
prescribed  by  his  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,  his  will  is  holy, 
just,  and  good,  but  it  is  not  necessitated  as  the  human  mind  is 
said  to  be  necessitated  by  the  advocates  of  the  scheme  of  necessity. 
If  it  were  not  free,  it  could  not  be  holy;  and  if  it  did  not  move  in 
Obedience  to  the  dictates  of  his  infinite  wisdom,  justice,  and  mercy, 
it  would  not  be  the  will  of  God.  It  would,  on  the  contrary,  be  an 
unholy  thing. 

In  like  manner,  the  assertion  that  the  holiness  of  man,  or  of 
angels,  is  necessitated,  is  "a  contradiction  in  terms.  It  is  one  of 
those  absurd  and  impossible  conceits,  which  has  no  existence  in 
the  universe  of  God,  except  in  the  blind  logic  or  the  darkened 
imagination  of  the  necessitarian.  Moral  goodness,  or  virtue,  or 
holiness,  consists  not  in  the  possession  of  moral  powers,  but  in  the 
free,  proper,  and  obedient  exercise  of  those  powers.  If  infinite 
wisdom  and  goodness  and  power  should  muster  all  the  means 
and  appliances  in  the  universe,  and  cause  them  to  bear  with  united 
energy  on  a  single  mind,  the  effect  produced,  however  grand  and 
beautiful,  would  not  be  the  virtue  of  the  agent  in  whom  it  is  pro- 
duced. Nothing  can  be  his  virtue  which  is  produced  by  an  ex- 
traneous agency,  [any  more  than  any  thing  could  be  the  holiness 
of  God  if  it  were  produced  in  him  by  fate,  or  by  any  cause  ab 
extra .]  This  is  a  dictate  of  the  universal  reason  and  consciousness 
of  mankind.  It  needs  no  metaphysical  refinement  for  its  support, 
and  no  scholastic  jargon  for  its  illustration.  On  this  broad  prin- 
ciple, then,  which  is  so  clearly  deduced,  not  from  the  confined 
darkness  of  the  schools,  but  from  the  open  light  of  nature,  we  in- 
tend to  take  our  stand  in  opposition  to  the  embattled  ranks  of 
atheism."  Now,  the  appeal  is  submitted  to  the  reader,  if  this  be 


380  APPENDIX. 

merely  "  the  silly  perversion  of  a  logical  phrase,"  or  simply  the 
utterance  of  a  great  and  undeniable  truth  ? 

In  addition  to  the  charge  of  presumption,  the  "Athenaeum"  ac- 
cuses "the  Professor  of  Mathematics"  of  having  set  limits  to  the 
power  of  God.  Now,  this  objection  was  anticipated,  and  is  dis- 
tinctly answered  in  the  foregoing  work,  ("Theodicy,"  Part  I, 
chap,  vii,  section  11,)  an  answer  upon  which,  however,  our  critic 
has  not  been  pleased  to  bestow  even  a  passing  notice.  He  found 
it  very  easy  to  repeat  the  objection ;  he  would  have  found  it  more 
difficult,  perhaps,  to  refute  the  answer.  Indeed,  he  seems  to  have 
taken  but  little  more  pains  to  understand  the  work  he  criticises, 
and  in  fact  he  does  understand  it  but  little  more  than  if  he  were 
merely  a  magpie  or  a  parrot.  As  he  has  not  condescended  to 
notice  my  reply  to  the  objection  which  he  has  merely  echoed,  so  I 
shall  bestow  no  further  attention  upon  his  echo. 

Though  my  "  Theodicy  "  sprang,  as  I  was  most  profoundly  con- 
scious, from  a  burning  and  almost  consuming  zeal  for  the  glory  of 
God,  yet  was  I  perfectly  aware  that  the  charge  of  irreligion  and 
atheism  would  be  hurled  at  the  author.  I  was  perfectly  aware 
that  this  accusation  would  proceed  from  two  sources,  namely, 
from  those  whose  theological  convictions  this  work  might  disturb, 
and  from  those  whose  feeble  brains  might  be  tortured  to  follow  its 
severe  analysis  and  close  chains  of  reasoning.  I  have  not  been 
disappointed.  For,  amid  the  tierce  roar  of  the  artillery  of  the  first 
class  of  opponents,  I  have  also  heard,  in  their  wildest  fury,  the 
pop-guns  of  the  second  class  of  antagonists.  Having  considered, 
at  too  great  length  already,  the  principal  pop-gun,  I  now  pro- 
ceed to  examine  the  enemy's  artillery. 

Some  fifteen  or  sixteen  years  ago  it  was  that  a  writer  in  the 
"Methodist  Quarterly  Review,  South,"  delivered  his  broadside 
against  my  "Theodicy;"  with  what  effect  it  will  soon  be  in  the 
power  of  the  reader  to  judge  for  himself.  It  is  my  intention,  first 
to  return  his  fire,  to  silence  his  battery,  and  then  to  spike  his 
guns.  Indeed,  if  I  had  been  at  all  disturbed  by  his  broadside  I 
should  have  made  the  attempt  long  ago,  and  that,  too,  of  my  own 
motion,  without  waiting  to  be  solicited  to  prepare  this  reply.  The 
distinguished  theologian  (now  a  bishop)  by  whom  the  "Review" 
was  then  edited  had,  with  nearly  every  eminent  man  of  his  de- 
nomination, most  warmly,  not  to  say  most  enthusiastically,  recom- 
mended the  work  in  question ;  and  yet  he  very  properly  admitted 
the  said  article  into  the  pages  of  his  periodical.  It  was,  indeed, 
but  fair  and  just  that  the  dissentient  few  should  have  a  hearing 


APPENDIX.  881 

in  the  very  "  Review  "  which  had  so  warmly  recommended  a  work 
that  had  proved  so  obnoxious  to  them.  Long  has  it  been  since 
the  author  of  that  work  heard  the  shout  of  their  victory,  and  even 
since  he  had  forgotten  its  dying  echoes.  It  has  indeed  seemed  an 
age — an  awful  age  ;  for,  in  the  meantime,  the  thunder  and  the 
shouts  of  the  mo>t  awful  revolution  the  world  has  ever  seen  have 
been  heard  and  passed  away. 

The  grave  charge  which  the  writer  of  the  article  in  question 
brings  against  the  author  of  the  "  Theodicy,"  is  that  he  denies  the 
omnipotence  of  God,  and  takes  ground  with  the  Atheist.  The 
specification  under  this  charge  is  that  the  culprit  has  been  so  bold 
as  to  assert  that  "  God  cannot  work  contradictions."  The  reviewer 
is  greatly  offended  that  "  Dr.  Bledsoe  should  have  thus  denied  the 
omnipotence  of  God,  and  impaled  himself  on  one  of  the  horns  of 
the  atheistic  dilemma."  "  It  is  certainly  very  bold  and  rash," 
says  he,  "in  our  author  ...  to  assert  that  Omnipotence  cannot  do 
this  or  that,  it  matters  not  what  it  may  be,"  and  he  indignantly 
demands,  "  When  and  where  did  he  learn  so  fully  to  comprehend 
Omnipotence  as  to  make  such  confident  assertions  ?  "  Thus,  in  the 
estimation  of  the  reviewer,  it  is  the  great  heresy  of  the  work  in 
question,  and  the  crying  sin  of  its  author,  that  it  actually  asserts 
that  "  God  cannot  work  contradictions."  When  and  where  did 
he  learn  to  make  "  such  confident  assertions  ? "  such  bold,  rash, 
impious,  atheistical  assertions  ? 

He  answers,  When  he  was  a  very  young  man,  and  merely  a 
student  of  the  first  lessons  of  theology.  He  learned  to  make  this 
assertion  then,  and  he  learned  it  everywhere ;  or,  in  other  words, 
from  all  the  great  teachers  of  all  the  orthodox  denominations  of 
the  Christian  world.  He  told  his  reviewer  that  the  assertion  in 
question  "  is  universally  acknowledged,"  ("Theodicy,"  p.  193;)  but 
he  found  it  impossible  to  put  him  on  his  guard.  So  heated  was 
our  critic,  indeed,  by  his  burning  zeal  for  the  glory  of  God,  and 
his  blind  zeal  against  Atheism,  that  he  could  not  be  restrained 
from  pouring  ridicule  and  contempt  on  one  of  the  most  universally 
received  and  most  firmly  established  truisms  in  the  whole  range 
of  theological  literature.  Nay,  he  not  only  rejects  with  impatient 
and  imperial  scorn  this  "universally  acknowledged"  truism,  but 
he  actually  treats  it  as  a  dangerous  novelty,  as  a  first  principle 
and  postulate  of  Atheism,  which  the  author  of  "  A  Theodicy  "  has 
had  the  audacity  to  assert  in  the  face  and  to  the  astonishment  of 
the  Christian  world  !  He  certainly  refutes  one  assertion,  at  least, 
of  "A  Theodicy;"  the  assertion,  namely,  that  the  truism  in 


382  APPENDIX. 

question  "  will  be  readily  admitted  "  by  every  one,  (p.  193.)  By 
his  passionate  denial  of  this  truism  he  has  unfortunately  dashed 
his  brains  against  a  rock,  and  great  is  the  pity,  for  if  he  had  not 
done  so  he  might  have  had  some  use  for  them  in  combatting  the 
less  certain  principles  of  "  A  Theodicy."  The  heaviest  piece  of 
artillery,  indeed,  can  make  no  more  impression  on  such  a  rock  than 
the  very  feeblest  of  pop-guns.  If  our  reviewer  had  only  recog- 
nised the  assertion  in  question  as  a  universally  accepted  truism  in 
theology,  and  undertaken  to  refute  all  the  great  Christian  divines 
by  whom  it  is  accepted,  then  we  might  have  admired  his  boldness ; 
but  since,  in  the  plenitude  of  his  power,  he  has  been  pleased  to 
treat  this  very  innocent  truism  as  an  impious  novelty,  we  cannot 
but  admire  his  zeal  more  than  his  knowledge.  Having  sufficiently 
met  the  reviewer's  assertions,  it  is  now  high  time  to  proceed  with 
the  proof. 

I  begin  with  the  great  teachers  and  divines  of  the  reviewer's 
own  denomination.  Watson,  in  his  "  Institutes,"  says  :  "  Where 
things  in  themselves  imply  a  contradiction,  as  that  a  body  may  be 
extended  and  not  extended  at  the  same  time,  such  things,  I  say, 
cannot  be  done  by  God,  because  contradictions  are  impossible  in 
their  own  nature ;  nor  is  it  any  derogation  from  the  divine  power 
to  say  that  they  cannot  be  done."1"1  I  have,  in  fact,  been  more  care- 
ful than  Watson  to  shun,  even  in  appearance,  any  the  least  limita- 
tion of  the  Divine  Omnipotence;  for  he  says  that  such, things  do 
form  "  one  limitation  "  of  the  divine  power,  whereas  I  have  re- 
peatedly declared  in  my  "Theodicy"  that  they  constitute  no 
limitation  whatever  of  his  power.  Thus  on  page  193  it  is  said, 
"  It  is  no  limitation  of  the  Divine  Omnipotence  to  say  that  it  can- 
not work  contradictions.  There  will  be  little  difficulty  in  estab- 
lishing this  point.  Indeed  it  will  be  readily  conceded  /  and  if  we 
offer  a  few  remarks  upon  it,  it  is  only  that  we  may  leave  nothing 
dark  or  obscure  behind  us,  even  to  those  whose  minds  are  not  ac- 
customed to  such  speculations"  Then  follow  the  remarks  which 
are  intended  to  show,  even  to  the  novice  in  theology,  that  the  as- 
sertion in  question  does  not  limit  the  power  of  God. 

Since  this  assertion,  however,  thus  universally  received,  has  been 
denied  by  a  learned  theologian,  it  may  be  well  to  repeat  in  this 
place  the  remarks  in  question.  They  are  as  follows :  u  As  contra- 
dictions are  impossible  in  themselves,  so  to  say  that  God  could 
perform  them  would  not  be  to  magnify  his  power,  but  only  to  ex- 
pose our  own  absurdity.  When  we  affirm  that  Omnipotence  can- 
not cause  a  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  one  and  the  same  time, 


APPENDIX,  383 

or  cannot  make  two  nnd  two  equal  to  five,  we  do  not  set  limits 
to  it ;  we  simply  declare  that  such  things  are  not  the  objects  of 
power.  A  circle  cannot  be  made  to  possess  the  properties  of  a 
square,  nor  a  square  the  properties  of  a  circle.  Infinite  power 
cannot  confer  the  properties  of  the  one  of  these  figures  upon 
the  other ;  not  because  it  is  less  than  infinite  power,  but  because 
il  is  not  within  the  nature  or  province  or  dominion  of  power 
to  perform  such  things,  to  embody  such  inherent  and  immutable 
absurdities  in  an  actual  existence.  In  regard  to  the  doing  of  such 
things,  or  rather  of  such  absurd  and  inconceivable  nothings^  Om- 
nipotence itself  possesses  no  advantage  over  weakness.  Power, 
from  its  very  nature  and  essence,  is  confined  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  such  things  as  are  possible,  or  imply  no  contradiction. 
Hence  it  is  beyond  the  reach  of  almighty  power  itself  to  break  up 
and  confound  the  immutable  foundations  of  reason  and  truth. 
God  possesses  no  such  miserable  power,  no  such  horribly  distorted 
attribute,  no  such  inconceivably  monstrous  imperfection  and  de- 
formity of  nature,  as  would  enable  him  to  embody  absurdities  and 
contradictions  in  an  actual  existence.  It  is  one  of  the  chief  excel- 
lences and  glories  of  the  divine  nature  that  its  infinite  power 
works  within  a  sphere  of  light  and  love  without  the  least  tendency 
to  break  over  the  sacred  bounds  of  eternal  truth  into  the  outer 
darkness  of  chaotic  night." 

Again,  Bishop  Burnet,  in  his  "  Exposition  of  the  Thirty-nine 
Articles,"  (pp.  31,  32,)  says  :  "A  power  of  creating  must  be  infinite, 
since  nothing  can  resist  it.  If  some  things  are  in  their  own  nature 
impossible,  that  does  not  arise  from  a  want  of  power  in  God, 
which  extends  to  every  thing  that  is  possible ;  but  that  which  is 
supposed  to  be  impossible  of  its  own  nature  cannot  actually  be, 
otherwise  a  thing  might  both  b«  and  not  be  at  the  same  time  ; 
and  it  is  perceptible  to  every  man  that  this  is'  impossible,"  except 
to  the  writer  in  the  "Methodist  Quarterly  Review,  South."  In  the 
"  Princeton  Theological  Essays"  it  is  said  that  "  God  is  not  hon- 
oured by  attributing  to  him  absurdities  and  contradictions.  Om- 
nipotence c:m  perform  whatever  is  an  object  of  power,  but  to  cause 
the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time  is  not  a  pos- 
sible or  conceivable  thing."  Would  our  critic,  then,  seek  to  honour 
the  great  and  Almighty  God,  who  built  and  beautified  the  uni- 
verse, by  imputing  to  him  the  ability  to  make  two  and  two  equal 
to  five,  or  to  make  a  yardstick  or  measure  with  only  one  end  to 
it  ?  Would  he  insist  that  he  can  make  a  circle  exactly  like  a 
square,  or  a  square  exactly  like  a  circle,  without  changing  the 

25 


384  APPENDIX. 

form  of  the  figure  ?  If  so,  then  all  that  can  be  said  is  that,  in- 
stead of  magnifying  the  power  of  God,  he  would  only  display  his 
own  weakness. 

In  the  "  Theological  Lectures  "  of  Dr.  John  Dick,  one  of  the 
staunchest  advocates  of  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  divine 
omnipotence  that  ever  lived,  it  is  said,  "  God  cannot  work  contra- 
dictions, as  make  a  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time,  to 
make  a  part  greater  than  the  whole ;  to  make  what  is  past  pres- 
ent, or  what  is  present  future."  (Lecture  XXIII.)  In  like  manner 
the  immortal  Cudworth  says :  "  That  which  implies  a  contradic- 
tion is  a  nonentity,  and  therefore  cannot  be  an  object  of  the  divine 
power.  .  .  .  Neither  is  it  any  derogation  at  all  from  the  power  of 
God  to  say  that  he  cannot  make  a  thing  to  be  that  which  it  is 
not."  (k<  Immutable  Morality,"  chap.  III.)  If  it  were  necessary,  ex- 
tracts to  precisely  the  same  effect  from  all  the  great  teachers  of  the 
Christian  world  might  be  indefinitely  multiplied  ;  but  surely  those 
already  adduced  are  amply  sufficient. 

In  reply  to  the  question  then,  u  Where  has  the  author  of  the 
'Theodicy'  learned  his  confident  assertion?"  he  may  truly  say, 
Everywhere  !  From  all  the  great  divines  of  all  orthodox  denom- 
inations !  If  he  had  not  learned  to  make  this  assertion,  indeed, 
the  first  gleam  of  light  respecting  the  order,  harmony,  anrl  beauty 
of  the  universe  had  never  visited  his  poor  benighted  mind.  It  is, 
in  fact,  the  very  first  letter  in  the  alphabet  of  those  who,  pro- 
foundly conscious  of  the  darkness,  the  littleness,  and  the  misery 
of  their  own  minds,  would  fain  spell  out  the  infinite  glory  of  the 
Divine  Mind,  as  manifested  in  the  constitution  and  government  of 
the  moral  world.  If  our  reviewer  will  not  learn  this  letter  it  is 
not  because  we  have  not  taken  the  utmost  pains  and  shown  the 
utmost  patience  in  our  feeble  efforts  to  impress  it  upon  his  mind. 

He  repays  our  deep  solicitude  with  supercilious  scorn  and  con- 
tempt. He  even  makes  himself  merry  at  our  supposed  ignorance 
and  imbecility,  and  fairly  exults  that,  after  reading  the  great  work 
of  Leibnitz,  we  should  straightway  go,  in  spite  of  his  instructions, 
and  hang  ourselves  on  one  of  the  horns  of  the  atheistic  dilemma." 
"  What  a  melancholy  suicide,"  he  exclaims,  "  and  for  what  small 
cause ! "  Poor  man  !  how  sadly  his  pious  soul  must  have  been 
grieved  to  see  me  in  such  a  plight !  for  he  had  never  before  seen 
any  one,  save  a  vile  Atheist,  in  so  pitiable  a  condition.  If  he  had 
only  seen  a  Watson,  a  Burnet,  an  Alexander,  a  Dick,  and  a  Cud- 
worth  impaled  on  precisely  the  same  horn  of  the  same  dilemmn,, 
he  might  perhaps  have  borne  the  spectacle  with  more  composure. 


APPENDIX.  385 

"  Leibnitz's  showing  of  this  fallacy,"  says  he,  "mined  the  Athe- 
istic argument,  and  rendered  it  quite  unnecessary  for  our  author 
to  trouble  himself  about  it.  He  read  the  reply  of  Leibnitz,  did 
appreciate  its  force,  considered  it  unsatisfactory,  and  straightway 
went  and  hung  [hanged  ?]  himself  on  the  very  "horn  of  the  di- 
lemma" which  Leibnitz  had  so  effectually  broken.  Now  if  Leib- 
nitz had  so  completely  "  ruined  the  Atheist  argument,"  and  vindi- 
cated the  cause  of  God,  how  has  it  happened  that  no  one  ever 
made  the  discovery  except  the  reviewer  now  under  consideration  ? 
The  usual  p'ea  has  been  that  we  should  cease  to  trouble  ourselves 
with  the  argument  of  the  Atheist,  not  because  Leibnitz  had  de- 
molished it,  but  because  he  had  exerted  his  wonderful  powers  to 
do  so  and  failed.  If,  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  the  learned  world, 
Leibnitz  has  rendered  every  subsequent  attempt  to  refute  the 
Atheist  and  reconcile  the  existence  of  evil  with  the  glory  of  God 
a  sheer  work  of  supererogation,  is  it  not  incumbent  on  our  re- 
viewer to  show  how  this  has  been  done  by  Leibnitz,  in  order  that 
the  rest  of  mankind  may  see  the  sublime  truth  as  well  as  himself? 
We  insist  that  he  should  reveal  his  grand  discovery  to  the  world, 
and  lay  mankind  under  an  everlasting  obligation  to  him  for  so 
consoling  a  revelation.  But  before  he  undertakes  to  expound  the 
•"  Essais  de  Theodicie,"  and  show  how  Leibnitz  has  therein  forever 
"ruined  the  Atheist  argument"  and  vindicated  the  glory  of  God, 
would  it  not  be  well  for  him  to  read  that  great  work  ? 

If  he  will  only  read  that  work  he  will  find  that  Leilmitz,  so  far 
from  having  disputed  or  denied  the  assertion  or  truism  in  ques- 
tion, has  affirmed  it  as  distinctly  and  as  confidently  as  any  Chris- 
tian theist  whatever,  for  in  that  very  work  Leibnitz  asserts,  "  God 
can  create  matter,  a  man,  a  circle,  or  leave  them  in  nothingness, 
(dans  le  ne'ant,)  bat  he  cannot  produce  them  without  giving  them 
their  essential  properties"  (Essais  de  Theodicie,  Partie  ii,  §  183.) 
Tims,  instead  of  denying  the  proposition,  or  having  broken  it  as 
"  one  of  the  horns  of  the  atheistic  dilemma,"  Leibnitz  affirms  it  as 
a  clear  and  unquestionable  truth.  If,  then,  our  author  had  only 
read  the  work  about  which  he  talks  so  learnedly,  he  would  have 
found  that  Leibnitz  held  the  very  doctrine  which  he  is  boldly 
asserted  to  have  completely  demolished.  If  we  may  believe  our 
reviewer,  in  vain  did  Leibnitz  demolish  this  "  horn  of  the  atheistic 
dilemma  ;"  for  "  our  author,"  after  reading  his  work,  "  was  not 
Fatisfied  with  his  reply,"  and  straightway  went  and  hanged  him- 
self on  that  very  horn.  Alas  !  how  desperately  must  "  our  author  " 
have  been  bent  on  suicide  !  Yet,  after  all,  the  simple  truth  is  that 


38fi  APPENDIX. 

the  proposition  or  truism  under  consideration  is  no  horn  of  any 
atheistical  dilemma  that  ever  had  an  existence  save  in  the  imagin- 
ation of  the  reviewer,  and  that  Leibnitz,  instead  of  having  at- 
tempted to  refute  the  proposition,  distinctly  affirms  it  as  his  own. 
Nor  is  this  all.  For  if  our  reviewer  had  only  read  the  "  Ess*ais  de 
Theodicie,"  he  would  have  learned  from  Leibnitz  himself  that  the 
truism  which  is  so  obnoxious  to  him  "is  the  doctrine  of  an  infinity 
of  grave  authors."  (Partie  ii,  §  183.)  It  is  the  doctrine  not  only 
of  a  Watson,  a  Burnet,  an  Alexander,  a  Dick,  and  a  Cud  worth, 
but,  according  to  Leibnitz,  "  of  an  infinity  of  grave  authors." 

The  reviewer  under  consideration  says :  "  Our  author  lacks,  we 
think,  the  reverence  and  modesty  of  a  profound  and  devout  phi- 
losopher. '  A  circle  cannot  be  made  to  possess  the  properties  of  a 
square,  nor  a  square  the  properties  of  a  circle.  Infinite  power 
cannot  confer  the  properties  of  one  of  these  figures  upon  the  other, 
not  because  it  is  less  than  infinite  power,  but  because  it  is  not  in 
the  nature  or  province  or  dominion  of  power  to  perform  such 
things,  to  embody  such  inherent  and  immutable  absurdities  in  an 
actual  existence.'  What  an  air  of  competency  to  judge  and  decide 
where  an  arch  angel  might  tremble  to  be  pryingly  curious ! " 
Now  all  this  may  be  very  fine,  and  the  writer  by  whom  it  is  so 
eloquently  uttered  may  be  a  very  profound  and  a  very  devout 
philosopher,  but  still  we  prefer  the  company  of  "  an  infinity  of 
grave  authors"  to  that  of  the  reviewer  before  us.  Is  it  necessary, 
indeed,  that  a  philosopher,  in  order  to  be  esteemed  profound, 
should  be  so  very  modest  as  to  believe  that  two  and  two  may  be 
equal  to  five,  or  that  a  circle  may  possess  the  properties  of  a 
square  ?  If  so,  then  "  our  author,"  .it  must  be  confessed,  lacks  the 
modesty  of  a  profound  philosopher.  He  is  still,  it  cannot  be  de- 
nied, in  the  conceited  shallows  of  philosophy,  and  devoutly  hopes 
he  may  never  get  so  very  far  into  its  modest  depths  as  to  lose  the 
little  common  sense  with  which  nature  may  have  endowed  him. 
The  philosopher,  indeed,  who  does  not  know  that  two  and  two  may 
not  be  equal  to  five  should  truly  be  very  modest ;  but  then  it  would 
hardly  follow  that  his  modesty  would  be  conclusive  proof  of  the 
profundity  of  his  wisdom  and  knowledge.  As  for  the  other  attri- 
bute of  the  great  philosopher,  lie  must,  it  seems  to  us,  possess  a 
"  reverence  "  for  absurdity  rather  than  for  truth  who  should  be. 
lieve  that  two  and  two  may  be  equal  to  five,  or  that  a  circle  may 
possess  the  properties  of  a  square.  It  is  true,  no  doubt,  as  our 
reviewer  intimates,  that  frequently  "  fools  rush  in  where  angels 
fear  to  tread  ;'r  but  still  it  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  an  angel, 


APPENDIX.  387 

and  much  less  u  an  archangel,"  would  tremble  at  the  enunciation 
of  the  awful  proposition  that  two  and  two  are  necessarily  equal  to 
four.  Angels  may  sometimes  be,  for  aught  we  know,  very  calm 
and  composed  when  poor  weak  mortals  tremble.  If  the  piety  of 
deep  philosophy  consists  in  denouncing  as  atheism  the  simple 
truisms  of  "  an  infinity  of  grave  authors,"  as  well  as  of  Christian 
theists,  then  is  it  to  be  seriously  feared  that  the  devout  philoso- 
pher is  mad.  In  one  word,  if  our  critic  "  possesses  the  reverence 
and  modesty  of  a  profound  and  devout  philosopher,"  we  are  glad 
that  we  lack  them.  He  is  perfectly  welcome  to  a  monopoly  of  all 
such  admirable  qualities. 

To  prove  that  God  can  work  contradictions  if  he  chooses  to  do 
so,  the  reviewer  asks  "  our  author "  if  he  does  not  know  that 
"men  not  unfrequently  perpetrate  contradictions?"  Our  author 
does  know  this,  and  if  he  had  never  known  it  before,  he  would 
have  been  convinced  of  the  fact  by  the  article  before  him.  He 
agrees,  for  once  at  least,  with  his  learned  reviewer,  that  even  "  the 
human  mind  is  capable  of  contradictions,  and  sometimes  performs 
them  ;"  a  truth  which  the  article  under  consideration  has  most 
abundantly  established  both  by  precept  and  example.  But,  then, 
he  has  always  entertained  the  suspicion  that  it  was  not  the  power 
but  the  weakness  of  the  human  mind  which  gives  it  such  a  facility 
in  the  "  perpetration  of  contradictions."  It  would  be  no  very 
great  honour,  one  would  suppose,  to  attribute  to  the  omnipotence 
of  God  that  which  solely  and  exclusively  results  from  the  weak- 
ness and  blindness  of  man.  Is  it  not  barely  possible,  indeed,  that 
the  weakness  which  the  critic  sees  in  the  positions  of  his  author, 
or  <kthe  madness"  which  he  discovers  in  his  speculations,* may 
exist  only  in  his  own  distracted  imagination  ? 

For  his  most  eloquent  and  pathetic  criticism  he  selects  from  his 
author  the  following  words :  "  In  regard  to  the  doing  of  such 
things,  or  rather  of  such  absurd  and  inconceivable  nothings,  Om- 
nipotence possesses  no  advantage  over  weakness."  Now  is  not 
this  perfectly  true  ?  Cannot  weakness  just  sit  still  and  do  noth- 
ing as  well  as  omnipotence  itself?  Weakness  may,  indeed,  mis- 
take "  such  absurd  and  inconceivable  nothings "  for  possibilities 
or  for  realities ;  omniscience  cannot  do  this,  for  it  is  the  sublime 
quality  of  omniscience  to  see  every  thing  exactly  as  it  is  in  itself. 
Weakness  may  advance  contradictory  propositions,  and  believe 
them  to  be  true,  but  omniscience  is  utterly  incapable  of  such  im- 
becility. But  even  if  omniscience  could  regard  such  contradic- 
tions as  true,  omnipotence  could  not  embody  them  in  an  actual 


388  APPENDIX, 

existence.  In  the  language  of  Leibnitz,  and  of  "  an  infinity  of 
grave  authors,"  "It  is  certain  that  the  existence  of  God  is  not  an 
effect  of  his  own  will.  He  did  not  create  himself.  If  he  had  not 
existed  he  could  not  have  created  himself,  for  nonentity  or  noth- 
ing could  not  create  an  infinite  God.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he 
did  exist,  he  could  not  create  himself,  for  that  cannot  be  brought 
into  existence  which  is  already  in  existence.  It  is  perfectly  cer- 
tain, then,  that  God  did  not  create  himself,  and  it  is  equally  cer- 
tain that  he  could  not  have  created  himself.  He  is,  indeed,  the 
uncreated,  self-existent,  eternal,  and  immutable  God.  He  exists 
not  because  he  will  exist,  but  by  the  necessity  of  his  infinite  nature. 
He  is  not  all-powerful,  and  he  knows  not  all  things,  because  he 
wills  it  so,  but  because  these  attributes  are  necessarily  identical 
with  himself.  The  empire  of  his  will  regards  only  the  exercise  of 
his  power ;  he  actually  produces  only  that  which  he  wills,  and  he 
leaves  all  the  rest  in  pure  possibility.  Hence  it  is  that  his  empire 
extends  only  to  the  existence  of  his  creatures,  and  not  to  their 
essences.  God  can  create  matter,  a  man,  a  circle,  or  leave  them  in 
nothingness  ;  but  he  cannot  produce  them  without  giving  them 
their  essential  properties"  That  is  to  say,  he  cannot  make  them 
what  they  are  and  not  what  they  are  at  the  same  time.  He  can- 
not make  a  circle  without  giving  it  a  round  figure,  or  a  rational 
being  without  endowing  it  with  the  attribute  of  rationality.  Such 
are,  in  fact,  precisely,  and  in  his  own  words,  the  illustrations  of 
Leibnitz,  and  of  his  u  infinity  of  grave  authors."  (See  Essais  de 
Theodicie,  Partie  ii,  §  183.) 

In  the  passage,  then,  which  our  reviewer  has  selected  for  his 
most-  pathetic  criticism  there  is  nothing  but  one  of  the  merest 
commonplaces  of  theology ;  yet  he  indignantly  exclaims,  "  How 
he  talks  about  omnipotence,  as  if  he  understood  all  about  it,  and 
comprehended  the  whole  range  of  its  possibilities  !  How  aston- 
ishing the  assertion  that  omnipotence  is  in  any  way  on  a  level 
with  weakness,  having  '  no  advantage  over  it ! '  If  we  were  a 
weeping  philosopher  we  should  undoubtedly  shed  tears  here.71 
That  is  to  say,  if  he  were  only  a  weeping  philosopher  he  would 
shed  tears  over  the  presumption  and  want  of  modesty  in  others, 
and  not  over  his  own.  It  is  said  that  charity  begins  at  home ;  it 
is  certain  that  repentance  should  do  so. 

The  above  specimens  of  our  reviewer's  blunders 'must  suffice. 
Many  others  might  have  been  selected  for  examination,  but  as  the 
object  of  this  reply  is  to  refute  the  charge  of  Atheism,  so  it  was 
necessary  to  notice  only  the  blunders  made  in  his  attempts  to  es- 


APPENDIX.  889 

tablish  that  charge.  If  we  did  not  believe  that  the  writer  h-»s  a 
far  greater  power,  if  power  it  may  be  called,  "  to  perpetrate  con- 
tradictions "  than  God  himself,  then  we  should,  indeed,  consider 
Durselves  guilty  of  the  rankest  Atheism.  In  this  respect  he  lias 
decidedly  ihe  advantage,  if  advantage  it  may  be  called,  over  om- 
nipotence itself. 

He  reminds  his  author,  in  conclusion,  that  it  takes  "  a  very  great 
man  indeed — 'one  of  the  aloe  blossoms  of  humanity,'  as  they  have 
been  beautifully  called— to  know  well,  and  at  nil  times,  what  he  is 
doing  in  the  ethereal  regions  of  thought."  Now  this  is  very  true. 
It  takes  a  wise  man,  a  very  wise  man  indeed,  to  know  at  all  times 
what  he  is  about  in  those  ethereal  regions.  Not  one  in  a  million 
ever  makes  the  discovery.  The  author  of  "  A  Theodicy,"  who  is 
not  a  wise  man,  had  to  pore  over  "  an  infinity  of  grave  authors," 
and  read,  and  reflect,  and  compare,  and  analyze,  and  combine,  and 
reason,  and  meditate,  long,  long  before  he  began  to  dream  of  what 
he  was  doing  in  the  regions  of  pure  thought.  He  could  admire, 
but  he  could  not  imitate,  the  free  and  imperial  flights  of  more 
gifted  minds  in  the  lofty  regions  of  speculation.  He  had,  on  the 
contrary,  to  grope  his  way  along  the  solid  earth,  and  make  care- 
ful, cautious  observation  of  the  regions  above.  Our  critic  would, 
perhaps,  have  found  himself  under  the  necessity  of  pursuing  a 
somewhat  similar  course  if  he  had  not  been  tw  one  of  the  aloe  blos- 
soms of  humanity."  As  it  is,  we  can  discover  no  signs  of  the 
conscientious  care,  the  truth-loving  caution,  or  the  persevering 
patience  which  should  accompany  and  guide  every  sincere  and 
devout  inquirer  after  triuh.  He  soars,  by  one  grand  flight,  far 
above  an  infinity  of  Christian  authors,  and,  without  even  having 
read  one  of  them,  he  is  perfectly  sure  that  the  truth  which  has 
been  learned  from  them  is  "  atheistical."  Hence  he  does  not  hesi- 
tate to  hang  the  author  of  "  A  Theodicy  "  on  "one  of  the  horns 
of  the  atheistical  dilemma."  It  was  to  have  been  expected,  in- 
deed, that  when  the  author  in  question  came  into  contact  with  his 
little,  hasty,  crude,  and  superficial  notions  he  would  incur  the 
charge  of  atheism.  If  in  Egypt  he  had  refused  divine  honours  to 
an  onion  or  a  cat,  he  would  in  like  manner  have  been  regarded  as 
an  atheist  by  the  devout  worshippers  of  those  great  deities.  If, 
indeed,  he  were  compelled  to  make  a  choice,  he  would  decidedly 
rather  worship  an  Egyptian  cat  or  onion  than  the  little,  crooked, 
absurd  notions  of  such  a  writer. 

In  the  a  Southern  Presbyterian  Review"  for  April,  1855,  there 
is  an  elaborate  reply  to  u  Bledsoe's  Theodicy."  I  shall  abstain  at 


390  APPENDIX. 

present  from  characterizing  this  reply  as  it  seems  to  deserve,  pre- 
ferring to  proceed  at  once  to  lay  before  the  reader  a  few  specimens 
of  the  writer's  c&**£i0ft,  candour,  fairness,  modesty,  and  love  of 
truth,  in  order  that  he  may  judge  for  himself.  The  article  begins 
as  follows  :  "  We  feel  rather  surprised  that  this  book  says  nothing 
about  poor,  dear  Servetus.  It  omits  also  the  nasal  psalms  of  the 
ancient  Covenanters,  says  nothing  about  the  burning  of  witches  in 
New  England,  nothing  about  the  grief  of  St.  Augustine  at  parting 
with  his  concubine."  The  writer  is  quite  sure,  however,  that  these 
things  are  in  "  the  author's  heart,"  and  will  come  out  yet,  "in  some 
future  edition  "  of  his  work,  when  his  heart  shall  be  set  up  in  type. 
Now  what  had  this  writer,  as  a  decent  critic,  to  do  with  u  the  au- 
thor's heart "  before  it  has  appeared  in  his  work?  What  have  his 
malignant  surmises  respecting  the  unexpressed  malignity  of  "  the 
author's  heart "  to  do  with  the  great  questions  discussed  in  his 
"Theodicy?"  Are  they  not,  indeed,  a  low  and  mean  appeal  to 
the  prejudices  of  his  readers — an  attempt,  in  the  very  first  sen- 
tence of  his  attack,  to  cover  both  the  author  and  his  work  with 
the  odium  theologie.um  f  In  perfect  keeping  with  this  design  is  the 
assertion  of  the  writer  that  the  author  displays  at  times  "  a  hot 
and  half-frenzied  antipathy  to  the  theology  of  the  Apostle  Paul;" 
from  which  the  reader  might  infer  that  ihe  author  has  indulged  in 
fierce  and  passionate  denunciations  of  the  doctrines  of  St.  Paul. 
Nothing  could  possibly  be  farther  from  the  truth.  Indeed,  no  man, 
whether  inspired  or  uninspired,  has  ever  lived  for  whose  character 
and  doctrines  the  author  entertains  a  more  exalted  and  enthu- 
siastic admiration  than  for  those  of  the  Apostle  Paul.  But  then 
there  is,  unless  we  are  greatly  mistaken,  some  slight  difference 
between  the  great  Apostle  to  the  Gentiles  and  the  great  writer  in 
the  "  Presbyterian  Review."  This  very  modest  gentleman  may 
not  be  able  to  see  the  difference,  and  may  consequently  denounce 
every  attack  aimed  at  his  theology  as  hostility  to  the  doctrines  of 
St.  Paul ;  but  the  reader  will,  unless  we  are  much  deceived,  see 
the  difference  before  we  are  done  with  the  article  under  con- 
sideration. 

If  Mr.  Bocock,  the  writer  of  the  article  in  question,  were  at  all 
like  the  Apostle  to  the  Gentiles,  he  would  at  least  show  some  little 
regard  for  truth  in  his  statements.  So  far  is  he,  however,  from 
showing  such  a  regard  for  truth  that  his  statements  are  frequently 
put  forth  not  only  without  the  least  shadow  of  a  foundation  in 
truth,  but  directly  and  flatly  in  the  face  of  truth.  However 
serious  this  charge,  it  is  not  more  serious  than  true,  and  may  be 


APPENDIX.  391 

most  conclusively  established  against  this  great  apostle  of  Cal- 
vinism. 

"  The  easy  and  merry  facility  with  which  this  author  frequently 
deems  himself  to  have  refuted  President  Edwards,  the  actual  con- 
tempt with  which  that  great  man  is  treated,  the  different  appear- 
ance of  Edwards  on  the  pages  of  the  l  Theodicy '  from  that  which 
he  makes  on  his  own  pages,  as  well  as  the  dignity  and  importance 
of  the  matter  itself,  all  require  us  to  look  closely  at  the  reasonings 
of  the  l  Theodicy '  concerning  the  will,  and  the  influence  of  mo- 
tives over  it.  The  giant  error  of  the  book  lies  there.  We  hope 
we  may  be  fortunate  enough  to  give  the  reader  such  an  insight 
into  it,  though  so  sadly  cooped  up  by  the  limits  of  a  single  article, 
that  he  may  afterward  deliberately  and  thoroughly  unravel  it  for 
himself.  In  order  to  do  so  we  must  attend  closely  to  the  author's 
various  expressions  of  his  own  idea  as  it  occurs  in  different  pages 
of  his  book"  etc.  Now  here  how  solemnly  all  this  is  introduced, 
just  as  if  the  writer  had  some  conscience  in  what  he  was  doing, 
and  really  intended  to  point  out  the  giant  error  of  the  "  Theodicy," 
as  set  forth  "  in  various  expressions "  on  "  different  pages  of  the 
book."  But  what,  after  all,  has  he  actually  done  ?  I  pass  by  for 
the  present  the  utter  falsehood  of  the  statement  with  respect  to 
contempt  for  Edwards  on  the  pages  of  the  u  Theodicy,"  and  come 
directly  to  the  question  of  fact.  What,  then,  is  "  the  giant  error" 
of  the  "  Theodicy  "  which  the  Rev.  Mr.  Bocock  has  so  very  care- 
fully arid  confidently  gathered  from  "  the  various  expressions  "  of 
the  book  ?  In  pretending  to  lay  this  error  before  his  readers,  the 
reverend  gentleman,  with  a  solemn  air,  assures  them  that  Profes- 
sor Bledsoe  "  denies  indeed  that  volitions  have  any  efficient  cause 
or  antecedent  of  any  kind."  P.  524.  Now  in  the  "  Theodicy  "  of 
Professor  Bledsoe  there  is  not  the  least  sign  or  shadow  of  any 
such  monstrous  error  or  absurdity.  On  the  contrary,  this  very 
error  or  absurdity  is  treated  in  his  <%  Theodicy  "  as  an  opinion  too 
wild  and  monstrous  to  be  entertained  by  any  sane  mind.  By  im- 
puting it  to  Professor  Bledsoe,  then,  the  writer  in  the  "  Presby- 
terian Review,"  as  we  shall  presently  see,  has  utterly  failed  to 
"  attend  closely  to  the  author's  various  expressions  of  his  own 
idea,"  unless  it  was  with  a  view  to  outrage  them  as  much  as  pos- 
sible by  ascribing  to  him  diametrically  opposite  expressions  or 
ideas. 

On  page  150,  for  example,  it  is  clearly  and  explicitly  said,  "The 
term  cause  is  very  often  used  to  designate  the  condition  of  a 
thing,  or  that  without  which  it  could  not  happen  or  come  to  pass. 


892  APPENDIX. 

Thus  we  are  told  by  Edwards  that  he  sometimes  uses  c  the  word 
cause  to  signify  any  antecedent '  of  an  event,  k  whether  it  has  any 
influence  or  not '  in  the  production  of  such  event.  If  this  be  the 
meaning,  when  it  is  said  that  motive  is  the  cause  of  volition,  the 
truth  of  the  proposition  is  conceded  by  the  advocates  of  free 
agency.  In  speaking  of  arguments  and  motives,  Dr.  Samuel 
Clarke  says,  '  Occasions  indeed  they  may  be,  and  are,  upon  what 
that  substance  in  man,  wherever  the  self-moving  principle  resides, 
freely  exerts  its  active  power.'  Herein,  then,  there  is  a  perfect 
agreement  between  the  contending  parties."  Thus  it  is  expressly 
stated  that  all  agree — all  the  advocates  of  free  agency,  and  all  the 
advocates  of  necessity — that  motives  are  the  conditions,  the  indis- 
pensable prerequisites,  to  every  volition,  "  or  that  without  which 
it  could  not  happen  or  come  to  pass."  "The  advocates  of  free 
agency,"  I  say,  (page  151,)  "have  readily  admitted  that  motives 
are  the  occasional  causes  of  volition.  We  must  look  out  for  some 
other  meaning  of  the  term,  then,  if  we  would  clearly  and  distinctly 
fix  our  minds  on  the  point  in  controversy"  Yet,  directly  in  the 
face  of  this  admission — nay,  directly  in  the  face  of  the  whole  doc- 
trine of  my  "  Theodicy  " — Mr.  Bocock  makes  me  deny  that  voli- 
tions have  any  "  antecedent  of  any  kind."  In  vain  have  I  asserted 
in  more  than  a  hundred  places,  both  in  my  work  on  the  will  and 
in  my  "  Theodicy,"  that  motives  always  are  "  the  grounds  and 
reasons  "  of  volitions,  without  which  they  "  could  not  happen  or 
come  to  pass."  Yet  will  Mr.  Bocock  still  impute  to  me  the  oppo- 
site opinion  as  one  of  "  the  great  errors  "  of  my  "  Theodicy  ! " 

If  there  is  no  antecedent  to  volition,  no  ground  or  reason  of  its 
existence,  nothing  standing  before  it  to  help  it  into  being,  how 
could  it  possibly  happen  or  come  to  pass  ?  Could  nonentity  bring 
forth?  Could  a  volition  just  rise  out  of  nothing  and  bring  itself 
into  existence  ?  Did  any  sane  man  ever  entertain  so  wild  a  no- 
tion or  belief?  President  Edwards  seems  to  think  at  least  that 
some  persons  have  maintained  such  a  notion,  such  palpable  and 
infidel  nonsense,  for  it  is  seriously  combatted  by  him  with  all  the 
arms  and  armour  of  his  tremendous  logic.  This  gigantic  feat  of  his 
is  signalized  in  the  pages  of  the  "Theodicy."  (See  from  page  142 
to  148.)  He  first  supposes,  with  his  adversary,  that  "nonentity 
is  about  to  bring  forth,"  and  he  then  proceeds  to  show  by  the 
most  irresistible  logic  that  nonentity  cannot  really  bring  forth  or 
produce  anything.  After  having  quoted  a  small  portion  of  his 
logic,  I  ventured  to  say,  (Theodicy,  p.  146,)  "Now  all  these  words 
are  put  together  to  prove  that  nonentity  cannot  bring  forth  at 


APPENDIX.  393 

least  such  effects  as  we  see  in  the  world.  .  .  .  Surely  if  any  thing 
can  equal  the  fatuity  of  the  hypothesis  that  nonentity  can  bring 
forth,  or  that  a  tiling  can  produce  itself,  it  is  a  serious  attempt  to 
refute  it."  Yet  in  spite  of  all  this,  in  profound  contempt  of  all 
this  and  of  the  truth,  the  Rev.  Mr.  Bocock  makes  me  assert  that 
a  volition  has  no  "  antecedent  of  any  kind ;"  or,  in  other  words, 
that  without  cause,  condition,  or  antecedent,  it  brings  itself  into 
existence.  In  vain  have  I  treated  this  wild  notion  as  an  absurdity 
too  great  and  too  glaring  to  be  embraced  by  any  sane  mind ;  for 
the  Rev.  Mr.  Bocock  will  have  it  that  this  very  notion  is  the  lead- 
ing idea  "and  the  great  error"  of  my  "  bad  book." 

In  a  subsequent  article  by  the  same  writer,  which  appeared  in 
the  "Southern  Presbyterian  Review"  for  April,  1856,  the  same 
error  is  imputed  to  the  author  of  the  "  Theodicy,"  and  it  is  thus 
scouted  from  the  presence  of  all  rational  beings.  "  One  would 
think,  for  example,"  says  he,  "  that  Dr.  Chalmers  of  Scotland  had 
possessed  quite  as  clear  and  legible  a  consciousness,  and  was  quite 
as  reliable  a  reader  of  the  records  inscribed  by  the  finger  of  God 
upon  the  soul  of  man,  as  Professor  Bledsoe  or  any  person  whom 
this  age  has  known  ;  and  yet  it  is  the  only  matter  about  which  we 
remember  to  have  met  with  any  thing  like  indignant  contempt  in 
all  the  theological  lectures  of  that  great  thinker."  Very  well. 
What  is,  then,  the  sole  object  of  "  the  indignant  contempt "  of 
that  great  thinker,  "  Dr.  Chalmers  of  Scotland  ?"  Whatever  else 
it  may  be,  it  is  certainly,  if  we  believe  that  great  thinker,  the  Rev. 
John  H.  Bocock  of  Virginia,  a  crushing  blow  to  Professor  Bled- 
soe. Having  duly  prepared  his  readers  to  witness  the  utter  anni- 
hilation of  the  contemptible  pigmy,  Professor  Bledsoe,  by  the 
great  "  Dr.  Chalmers  of  Scotland,"  he  adds,  "  When  he  [Dr.  Chal- 
mers] comes  to  speak  of  this  theory  (Institutes,  vol.  ii,  p.  328)  of 
an  act  of  the  will  that  comes  of  itself  unbidden,  and  without  any 
parentnge  whatever  in  the  order  of  successive  nature,  he  says, 
'There  is  the  revolt  of  all  human  sense  and  human  experience 
against  it.' "  Now  the  plain  truth  is  that  no  man  in  his  right 
mind  ever  believed  that  a  volition  ever  "comes  of  itself"  at  all, 
for  it  inevitably  comes  of  the  mind.  "If  we  mean  by  the  cause 
of  volition,"  says  the  "Theodicy,"  (p.  150,)  "that  which  wills  or 
exerts  the  volition,  there  is  no  controversy,  for  in  this  sense  tho 
advocates  of  necessity  admit  that  mind  is  the  cause  of  volition." 
According  to  Professor  Bledsoe,  then,  volition  never  comes  of 
itself  at  all ;  it  always  comes  of  mind.  Nothing  is  further  from 
his  philosophy  than  the  notion  that  "  volition  is  without  any 


394  APPENDIX. 

parentage  whatever;"  for,  as  it  is  everywhere  asserted  by  him, 
volition  always  has  its  parentage  in  mind ;  nor  does  it,  according 
to  "  Professor  Bledsoe,"  come  "  unbidden  of  itself ;"  for,  as  he 
everywhere  asserts,  it  comes  at  the  bidding  of  motive,  "  without 
which  it  could  not  happen  or  ever  come  to  pass"  at  all.  [Theod- 
icy, p.  150.]  The  tremendous  blow  of  Dr.  Chalmers,  then,  does 
not  even  touch  "  Professor  Bledsoe,"  much  less  does  it  annihilate 
him.  He  is  still  a  living  man.  That  terrific  blow,  indeed,  blazing 
with  all  its  "  indignant  contempt,"  falls  only  upon  the  insane 
notion  that  "  nonentity  may  bring  forth,"  or  volition  may,  and 
actually  does,  "  come  unbidden  of  itself,  and  without  any  parent- 
age whatever,"  in  the  universe  of  God.  Professor  Bledsoe  has 
never  known,  and  has  never  read  of  any  one  by  whom  such  an 
absurd  notion  or  wild  conceit  has  been  entertained.  Hence,  after 
all,  he  shrewdly  suspects  that  the  overwhelming  and  crushing  in- 
dignation of  Dr.  Chalmers 

u  Is  only  ocean  into  tempest  wrought, 
To  waft  a  feather  or  to  drown  a  fly." 

The  same  fly  had  long  before  been  killed  by  the  logic  of  Presi- 
dent Edwards ;  and  after  quoting  the  passage  in  which  this  thir- 
teenth labour  of  the  New  England  Hercules  was  performed,  the 
"Theodicy"  (p.  146)  says,  "We  do  not  intend  to  comment  on 
this  passage,  we  merely  wish  to  advert  to  the  fact  that  it  is  a 
laboured  and  logical  effort  to  demolish  the  hypothesis  that  acts  of 
the  will  do  not  bring  themselves  into  existence,  or  to  show  that 
there  must  be  some  antecedent  to  account  for  their  coming  into 
being.  We  shall  only  add,  'It  is  true  [as  President  Edwards 
says]  that  nothing  has  no  choice  ;'  but  who  ever  pretended  to 
believe  that  nothing  puts  forth  volition ;  that  there  is  no  mind,  no 
motive,  no  ground  or  reason  of  volition  ?  Is  it  not  wonderful  that 
the  great  metaphysician  of  New  England  should  thus  worry  him- 
self and  exhaust  his  powers  in  grappling  with  shadows  and  com- 
batting dreams  which  no  sane  man  ever  seriously  entertained  for 
a  moment  ?  " 

Again,  Mr.  Bocock  says,  "Professor  Bledsoe  denies  that  voli- 
tions and  their  antecedents  are  necessarily  connected."  Now  this 
is  not  true,  for  Professor  Bledsoe  denies  this  general  proposition 
in  only  one  sense  of  the  term,  while  he  admits  it  in  another  sense. 
He  admits,  and  has  always  admitted,  that  in  one  sense  of  the 
word  volitions  and  their  antecedents  are  necessarily  connected. 
They  are  necessarily  connected  in  the  sense  that  volitions,  as  the 


APPENDIX.  395 

"  Theodicy "  expressly  declares,  could  not  possibly  "  happen  or 
come  to  pass  "  without  motives.  As  a  bird  cannot  fly  in  a  vacuum, 
so  the  presence  of  air  is  absolutely  and  indispensably  necessary  to 
enable  it  to  fly.  In  like  manner,  as  the  mind  can  never  act  as  a 
rational  being  without  the  presence  of  motive,  so  an  atmosphere 
of  thought  and  feeling  is  absolutely  and  indispensably  necessary 
to  its  free  moral  agency.  Such  precisely,  and  not  otherwise,  is  the 
necessary  connexion  between  volitions  and  their  antecedents  or 
motives;  but  the  atmosphere,  which  is  so  necessary  to  the  flight 
of  the  bird,  does  not  cause  or  compel  or  necessitate  its  flight.  The 
bird  itself  flies.  In  like  manner  the  antecedents,  the  motives,  the 
thoughts  and  feelings,  (call  them  what  you  please,)  which  are  so 
necessary  to  the  mind's  activity,  do  not  efficiently  cause  or  com- 
pel or  necessitate  action.  The  mind  itself  acts,  otherwise  it  would 
not  be  free.  If  its  volitions  were  efficiently  caused  or  compelled 
or  necessitated  to  come  into  existence  by  the  action  of  motives, 
then  it  would  not  be  free  or  accountable  for  its  actions.  Now  all 
this  is  most  abundantly  set  forth  in  the  "Theodicy."  It  is  there 
stated  as  clearly  and  distinctly  as  possible  in  what  precise  sense 
the  necessary  connexion  between  motives  and  volitions  is  denied, 
and  also  in  what  sense  it  is  admitted ;  but  all  this  is  lost  upon 
Mr.  Bocock.  He  will  not  stick  to  the  precise  point  or  issue  pre- 
sented by  the  work  before  him.  It  suits  his  purpose  far  better, 
and  is  infinitely  better  adapted  to  his  peculiar  mode  of  warfare  to 
launch  out  into  vngue  generalities,  and  let  his  tremendous  artillery 
of  words  fly  in  all  directions.  So  prodigiously  does  it  scatter,  in- 
deed, and  so  wide  does  it  fly  of  the  mark  before  him,  that  his 
friends  are  in  as  much  danger  as  his  opponents  from  his  blind 
fury.  There  might,  if  necessary,  be  produced  from  his  two  arti- 
cles a  hundred  conclusive  proofs  of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  but 
one  or  two  only  will  answer  all  the  purposes  of  the  present  reply 
to  his  furious  attack. 

Is  motive  the  cause  of  volition  ?  In  the  discussion  of  this  ques- 
tion there  has  been  infinite  confusion  and  logomachy  arising  from 
the  ambiguity  of  the  word  cause.  If  any  would  see  his  way,  and 
is  really  in  pursuit  of  truth,  he  must  consider  the  various  senses 
of  this  word,  and  make  up  his  mind,  distinctly  and  definitely,  re- 
specting the  above  question,  taken  according  to  each  sense  of  the 
term  cftuse,  otherwise  he  will  lose  himself  in  vague  generalities, 
and  beat  the  air  to  no  purpose.  Hence,  desiring  to  ascertain  the 
exact  truth,  and  to  separate  it  from  all  error,  the  author  of  the 
"  Theodicy  "  has  been  at  great  pains  to  consider  in  what  sense  it 


396  APPENDIX. 

is  false.  After  having  completed  this  analysis  of  the  meanings  of 
the  term  cause,  and  given  his  reasons  for  his  decision  in  each  case, 
the  author  of  the  "Theodicy"  concludes  in  these  words:  "Our 
decision  (for  the  correctness  of  which  we  appeal  to  the  calm,  im- 
partial judgment  of  the  reader)  is  as  follows:  If  the  term  cause 
be  understood  in  the  first  or  second  sense  above  mentioned,  there 
is  no  disagreement  between  the  contending  parties ;  and  if  it  be 
understood  in  the  third  sense,  then  both  parties  are  in  error." 
Now  all  this  is  utterly  lost  on  Mr.  Bocock.  Instead  of  contending 
for  the  position  which  I  have  really  denied,  he  first  makes  me  deny 
those  which  I  have  clearly  and  explicitly  admitted  as  true,  and 
then  proceeds  to  overwhelm  and  demolish  his  man  of  straw  with 
the  indignant  scorn  and  contempt  not  only  of  himself,  but  also  of 
the  great  "Dr.  Chalmers  of  Scotland."  In  other  words,  instead 
of  condescending  to  argue  the  question  in  regard  to  any  one  pre- 
cise or  particular  sense  of  the  term  cause,  he  throws  all  its  various 
senses  into  hotch-potch  again,  and  lays  around  him  in  all  the  dark- 
ness and  confusion  of  an  utterly  blind  logomachy.  The  Rev.  Mr. 
Bocock,  indeed,  like  a  mad  bull  in  a  china  shop,  rushes  to  the 
onset,  and  dashes  around  amid  the  flying  fragments  of  its  once 
well-arrayed  wares. 

Take,  for  example,  one  specimen  of  his  blind  fury.  After  hav- 
ing shown  that  both  parties  agree  most  perfectly  in  regard  to  the 
above  proposition  in  two  senses  of  the  word  cause,  the  "  Theodicy  " 
continues :  "  We  must  look  out  for  some  other  meaning  of  the 
term,  then,  if  we  would  clearly  and  distinctly  fix  our  minds  on 
the  point  in  controversy.  We  say  that  an  antecedent  is  the  cause 
of  its  consequent  when  the  latter  is  produced  by  the1  action  of  the 
former.  For  example,  a  motion  of  the  body  is  said  to  be  caused 
by  the  mind,  because  it  is  produced  by  an  act  of  the  mind.  This 
seems  to  be  what  is  meant  by  an  efficient  cause.  It  is,  no  doubt, 
the  most  proper  sense  of  the  word,  and  around  this  it  is  that  the 
controversy  still  rages,  and  has  for  centuries  raged."  ("Theodicy," 
p.  151.)  And  it  has,  no  doubt,  raged  so  long,  and  with  so  little 
satisfaction,  just  because  "the  real  point  in  controversy"  has  not 
been  sifted  out  and  distinctly  set  apart  from  those  which  are  not 
really  in  dispute.  "Here  the  precise  point  in  dispute,"  continues 
the  "  Theodicy,"  '•  is  clearly  pre>ented,  and  let  us  hear  the  con- 
tending parties  before  we  proceed  to  decide  between  them." 
President  Edwards  is  first  heard. 

"  You  are  in  error,"  says  the  necessitarian  [President  Edwards] 
to  his  opponents,  "  in  denying  that  motive  and  in  affirming  that 


APPENDIX.  397 

mind  is  the  efficient  cause  of  volition.  For  if  an  act  of  the  mind, 
or  a  volition,  is  caused  by  the  mind,  [in  this  sense,]  it  must  be 
produced  by  another  preceding  act  of  the  mind,  and  this  act  must 
be  produced  by  another  preceding  act  of  the  mind,  and  so  on  ad 
mfinitam,  which  reduces  the  matter  to  a  plain  impossibility.'* 
Now,  this  reasoning  of  President  Edwards  is  admitted,  both  in  my 
work  on  the  will  and  in  my  '•  Theodicy,"  to  show  most  conclusively 
that  mind  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  volition. 

The  advocate  of  free-agency  is  next  heard.  "  The  necessitarian," 
says  he,  "  contends  that  volition,  or  an  act  of  the  mind,  is  the 
effect  of  motive,  and  that  it  is  subject  to  the  power  and  action  of 
its  cause" — Edwards'1  Inquiry,  p.  178.  The  advocate  of  free-will 
replies,  "  If  we  must  suppose  an  action  of  motive  on  the  mind 
to  account  for  its  act,  we  must  likewise  suppose  another  action 
to  account  for  the  action  of  motive,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 
Thus  the  necessitarian  seems  to  be  fairly  caught  in  his  own  toils, 
and  entrapped  by  his  own  definition  and  arguments." — Theodicy, 
p.  152.  .  .  .  "Each  party  has  refuted  his  adversary,  and  in 
the  enjoyment  of  his  triumph  he  seems  not  to  have  duly  reflected 
on  the  destruction  of  his  own  position.  Both  are  in  the  right,  and 
both  are  in  the  wrong;  but,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  not  equally 
so.  If  we  adopt  the  argument  of  both  sides,  in  so  far  as  it  is  true, 
we  shall  come  to  the  conclusion  that  action  must  take  its  rise 
somewhere  in  the  universe,  without  being  caused  by  preceding 
action.  And  if  so,  where  shall  we  look  for  its  origin  ?  In  that 
which  by  nature  is  endowed  with  active  power,  or  in  that  which  is 
purely  and  altogether  passive? 

"  We  lay  it  down,  then,  as  an  established  and  fundamental  posi- 
tion, that  the  mind  acts  or  puts  forth  its  volitions  without  being 
efficiently  caused  to  do  so,  without  being  impelled  by  its  own  prior 
action,  or  by  the  prior  action  of  any  thing  else.  The  conditions 
or  occasions  of  volition  being  supplied,  the  mind  itself  acts  in  view 
thereof,  without  being  subject  to  the  power  or  action  of  any  cause 
whatever.  All  rational  beings  must,  as  we  have  seen,  either  admit 
this  exemption  of  the  mind  in  willing  from  the  power  and  action 
of  any  cause,  or  else  lose  themselves  in  the  labyrinth  of  an  infinite 
series  of  causes.  It  is  this  exemption  which  constitut  es  the  freedom 
of  the  human  mind." 

Now  all  this  is  lost  on  Mr.  Bocock.  The  analysis,  the  definition, 
and  the  reasoning,  which  are  intended  to  disentangle  the  skein  of 
logomachy  respecting  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  are  all  utterly 
ignored  by  him.  They  have  brought  light,  a  clear  and  satisfying 


398  APPENDIX. 

light,  to  many  readers  of  the  "  Theodicy ;"  yet  Mr.  Bocock  does  not 
even  condescend  to  notice  them.  On  the  contrary,  he  just  seizes 
upon  the  conclusion  which,  without  all  that  goes  before  and  all 
that  follows,  must  appear  strange  and  unsatisfactory  to  his  readers. 
He  tells  them  nothing  about  the  manner  in  which  the  conclusion 
has  been  reached,  or  the  reasoning  by  which  it  has  been  estab- 
lished; he  merely  holds  up  the  naked  conclusion  itself,  without 
even  the  author's  explanation  of  its  meaning,  and  calls  upon  his 
readers  to  laugh  at  it !  It  is,  says  he,  "  one  of  the  most  deliberate 
and  measured  declarations  of  the  whole  book,"  but  he  is  careful 
not  to  let  his  readers  see  the  analysis,  the  explanation,  and  the 
reasoning  by  which  it  is  supported.  He  merely  gives  the  naked 
conclusion  itself,  as  follows :  "  Hence  we  conclude  that  an  act  of 
the  mind,  or  a  volition,  is  not  produced  by  the  action  of  either 
mind  or  motive,  but  takes  its  rise  in  the  world  without  any  such 
efficient  cause  of  its  existence."  That  is,  without  any  such  efficient 
cause  as  is  explained  in  the  "  Theodicy,"  and  which  is  there  shown 
to  lead  to  the  great  absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of  causes.  Mr. 
Bocock  adds,  "This  is  the  proposition  on  which  he  builds;"  but 
he  does  not  tell  on  what  this  proposition  is  built.  Knowing  that 
this  proposition,  if  presented  without  the  author's  careful  explana- 
tion, and  without  all  that  goes  before  and  all  that  follows  it,  would 
not.  be  acceptable  to  his  readers,  he  took  the  most  sure  method  to 
carry  his  point,  and  to  shout  victory  with  success.  Does  not 
every  body  know  that  volition  has  an  efficient  cause?  True.  In 
some  sense  of  the  words,  but  not  in  the  author's  sense.  This  sense 
is  not  given  to  his  readers.  On  the  contrary,  instead  of  giving 
the  author's  sense  of  his  own  words,  Mr.  Bocock  puts  his  own 
nonsense  upon  them,  and  then  raves  over  them,  and  excites  "  the 
indignant  contempt"  of  his  readers  to  his  heart's  content.  But 
this  is  to  bring  the  great  question  down  from  the  high  court  of 
reason,  and  submit  it  to  the  low  tribunal  of  ignorance,  and  preju- 
dice, and  passion.  Mr.  Bocock  is  welcome  to  all  the  applause  he 
may  gain  by  such  means.  As  he  will  have  Calvinists  for  his 
hearers,  so  he  will,  no  doubt,  gain  applause  as  a  great  champion 
of  Calvinism.  But  in  the  end  such  a  course  will  reflect  as  little 
honour  on  himself  as  on  his  sect. 

We  have  now  seen  that  the  "  Theodicy"  affirms,  as  clearly  and 
emphatically  as  language  can  possibly  affirm,  the  doctrine  that 
motives  are  "  the  antecedents  of  volitions,"  are  "  the  grounds  and 
reasons  "  of  their  existence,  without  which  they  "  could  not  happen 
or  come  to  pass."  We  have  also  seen  that  it  repudiates  with 


APPENDIX.  399 

equal  clearness  and  deci-ion,  the  wild  notion  that  volition  "pro- 
duces itself,"  or  "  comes  of  itself  unbidden,  and  without  any 
parentage,"  into  the  universe  of  God.  Yet,  in  spite  of  all  this, 
Mr.  Bocock  makes  it  deny  the  first,  and  affirm  the  last  of  the 
above  propositions.  By  the  same  method  any  book  may  be  made 
to  teach  any  doctrine,  even  the  most  wildly  absurd  doctrines, 
directly  in  the  face  of  its  most  distinct  and  unequivocal  utterances. 
Having  done  this  with  my  k<  Theodicy,"  only  see  how  Mr.  Bocock 
rants  and  raves  over  its  monstrous  absurdities !  Beginning  with 
the  declaration,  "  We  affirm  that  the  free  moral  agency  above- 
described  is  the  moral  agency  of  a  madhouse,  and  of  no  other 
place,  or  world,  that  we  know  any  thing  of,  that  ever  did,  or  can 
exist,"  (p.  524,)  he  goes  on  ranting  and  raving  for  several  pages. 
"No  dramatist  ever  did,"  says  he,  "or  ever  will,  indite  either 
tragedy,  or  comedy,  to  give  correct  views  of  human  nature,  out  of 
a  lunatic  asylum,  on  the  principles  of  moral  agency  on  which  the 
1  Theodicy  '  is  built."— P.  525.  Thus,  again,  the  roar  of  his  raving 
winds  up  with  the  charge  of  Atheism  :  u  Eve  was  only  acting  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  her  nature,  in  eating  the  forbidden 
fruit.  In  giving  her  a  command  not  to  eat,  and  threatening  her 
\vith  death  if  she  should  eat,  God  did  not  employ  means  which 
had  a  controlling  power  over  her.  The  volition  to  eat  '•took  its 
rise  in,  the  world  without  any  controlling  power  within  or  without.'' 
According  to  Professor  Bledsoe,  the  '  rise  in  the  world '  of  that 
volition  was  an  entirely  legitimate  and  natural  phenomenon.  It 
was  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  laws  of  Eve's  created  nature, 
and  was,  of  course,  perfectly  innocent!  According  to  this  theory 
there  seems  to  be  no  such  thing  as  moral  agency  connected  with 
volition,  for  volitions  take  their  rise  in  the  world  independently 
of  considerations  of  right  and  wrong.  They  are,  indeed,  but  the 
productions  of  blind,  unthinking,  undetermined  chance!  Threats 
of  death,  and  promises  of  life,  can  have  no  controlling  power  over 
them  !  Mount  Sinai  and  Mount  Calvary  are  both  swept  off  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  and  nothing  is  left  but  volitions  '  taking  their 
rise  in  the  world  without  any  controlling  power  either  within  or 
without.'  What  progress  has  this  writer  made  in  escaping  from 
Atheism?" 

Now,  according  to  the  philosophy  of  the  "  Theodicy,"  the  mind 
of  Eve  was  the  controlling  power  in  the  case  of  her  disobedience. 
In  the  opinion  of  the  said  writer,  however,  God  is  the  only  con- 
trolling power  in  the  universe,  and  he  is,  consequently,  highly  in- 
dignant at  the  doctrine  that  his  "  command  not  to  eat,"  with  the 

26 


400  APPENDIX. 

awful  threat  of  death  in  case  of  disobedience,  had  not  "  a  con- 
trolling power  over  her."  Now,  with  ail  due  respect  to  Mr. 
Bocock,  I  think  that  the  command  and  threat  of  God  did  not  have 
a  controlling  power  over  her,  for  the  simple  reason  that  they  did 
not  control  her.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  her  own  mind  did,  in  con- 
tempt of  the  command  and  threat  of  God,  pluck  the  forbidden 
fruit,  and  bring  death  into  the  world?  If  so,  then  may  we  not  be 
allowed  to  believe  this  fact,  rather  than  the  ridiculous  assertion 
of  Mr.  Bocock  that  God  did  "  employ  means  which  had  a  con- 
trolling power  over  her."  We  assert  the  contrary,  that  "  they  had 
[not]  a  controlling  power  over  her,"  for  the  sole,  simple,  all-suffi- 
cient reason  that  they  did  not  control  her.  Is  it  inconsistent  with 
the  divine  glory,  is  it  Atheism,  to  look  a  simple  fact  in  the  face 
and  call  it  a  fact  ?  If  so,  then  the  author  of  the  "  Theodicy  "  fears 
that  he  shall  never  make  the  least  progress  "  in  escaping  from 
Atheism,"  until  he  concludes  to  renounce  his  reason,  and,  flying 
from  all  the  glorious  lights  of  heaven  and  earth,  hide  himself  in 
the  gloomy  cells  of  Calvinism. 

If  we  may  believe  Mr.  Bocock,  then  Professor  Bledsoe  holds 
that  "the  volition  to  eat  ''took  its  rise  in  the  world  without  any 
controlling  power  within  or  without? "  The  words  are  under- 
scored by  him ;  and,  being  admirably  adapted  to  his  purpose,  he 
repeatedly  harps  upon  them,  and  holds  them  up  to  the  scorn  and 
contempt  of  his  readers.  These  readers  may,  perhaps,  be  a  little 
surprised  to  learn  the  fact  that  they  are  not  the  words  of  Professor 
Bledsoe  at  all.  They  can  nowhere  be  found  in  his  "Theodicy." 
They  are,  on  the  contrary,  a  gross  perversion  of  both  the  language 
and  the  meaning  of  that  book.  Now,  in  order  to  establish  this 
very  heavy  charge,  it  is  only  necessary  to  look  at  what  he  makes 
Professor  Bledsoe  sa}r,  and  then  at  what  Professor  Bledsoe  says 
for  himself.  He  makes  Professor  Bledsoe  say,  then,  that  " '  the 
volition  to  eat'  took  its  rise  in  the  world  without  any  controlling 
power  within  or  without"  Or,  in  other  words,  that,  in  regard  to 
volition,  there  is  no  controlling  power  in  the  universe.  "  Accord- 
ing to  this  theory,"  says  he,  "  volitions  take  their  '  rise  in  the 
world  '  independently  of  considerations  of  right  and  wrong.  They 
are,  indeed,  but  the  productions  of  blind,  unthinking,  undetermin- 
ing  chance.  .  .  .  Mount  Sinai  and  Mount  Calvary  are  both  swept 
off  from  the  face  of  the  earth,  and  nothing  is  left  but  volitions 
taking  their  rise  in  the  world  without  any  controlling  power  either 
within  or  without."  This,  of  course,  is  Atheism.  God  is  de- 
throned. All  the  glories  of  heaven,  and  all  the  terrors  of  hell,  are 


APPENDIX.  401 

blotted  out,  and  nothing  is  left  in  the  wide  universe  but  a  wild 
wilderness  of  \olitions  proceeding  from  the  bosom  of  a  "blind, 
unthinking,  nndetermining  chance."  O  how  awful!  Surely,  this 
vile  Atheist,  Professor  Bledsoe,  should  be  put  in  the  "  madhouse," 
or  the  "  lunatic  asylum,"  for  which  alone  his  philosophy  is  fit ! 
But,  before  so  severe  a  sentence  is  pronounced  against  him,  let  us 
look  at  what  he  has  himself  said,  and  see  how  a  few  plain  words 
will  put  down  this  ranting,  raving,  reviling  Calvinist. 

"The  mind  is  free,"  says  he,  u because  it  possesses  a  power  of 
acting  over  which  there  is  no  controlling  power  either  within  or 
without  itself." — P.  155.  Now,  in  the  sentence  from  which  Mr. 
Bocock  takes  only  as  much  as  suits  his  purpose,  it  is  not  said  that 
volition  is  "without  any  controlling  power  within  or  without." 
On  the  contrary,  it  expressly  asserts,  in  the  part  carefully  kept  out 
of  view  by  Mr.  Bocock,  that  the  mind  has  "  a  power  of  acting;" 
and,  according  to  the  uniform  and  invariable  doctrine  of  the 
44  Theodicy,"  this  power  is,  in  regard  to  volitions,  the  controlling 
power.  All  free  acts  or  volitions  proceed  from  this  controlling 
power  of  the  mind;  and,  hence,  to  represent  the  "Theodicy"  as 
affirming  that  volitions  take  their  rise  "  without  any  controlling 
power,"  is  a  gross  perversion  of  both  the  express  language  and 
meaning  of  the  book  in  question. 

It  only  denies  that  over  this  "  controlling  power  of  the  mind,'' 
from  which  volitions  proceed,  there  is  a  controlling  power,  by 
whose  acts  its  own  acts  are  caused.  If  we  suppose,  or  admit,  the 
existence  of  such  a  controlling  power  within  over  the  controlling 
power  of  the  mind,  then  President  Edwards  has  clearly  shown 
there  is  no  escape  from  the  great  absurdity  of  an  infinite  series  of 
causes.  This  argument  of  President  Edwards  is  set  forth  in  the 
words  which  immediately  preceded  those  quoted  by  Mr.  Bocock, 
and  which  he  must  have  found  it  very  convenient  to  omit.  These 
omitted  words  are  as  follows:  "One  of  the  notions  to  which  the 
cause  of  necessity  owes  much  of  its  strength  is  a  false  conception 
of  liberty,  as  consisting  of  a  power  over  the  determinations  of  the 
will."  Hence  it  is  said  that  this  power  over  the  will  can  do  noth- 
ing, can  cause  no  determination,  except  by  acting  to  produce  it. 
But,  according  to  this  notion  of  liberty,  this  causative  act  cannot 
be,  unless  it  be  also  caused  by  a  preceding  act,  and  so  on  ad  in- 
finitnm.  Such  is  one  of  the  favourite  arguments  of  the  necessi- 
tarian." Such  is,  indeed,  precisely  the  argument  of  President 
Edwards  in  his  work  on  the  will.  Then  follow  the  words  quoted 
by  Mr.  Bocock. 


402  APPENDIX. 

Admitting  the  force  of  the  above  argument  of  Edwards,  the 
author  of  the  "  Theodicy  "  rejected  the  "  false  conception,"  and 
refused  to  use  the  language  which  speaks  of  a  power  of  the  mind 
over  its  power  or  will.  He  still  regarded  it,  however,  as  infinitely 
absurd  to  consider  "  volitions  "  as  "  taking  their  rise  in  the  world 
without  any  controlling  power  either  within  or  without ; "  for,  in 
fact,  they  do  always  arise  from  the  controlling  power  of  the  mind 
itself,  which,  in  view  of  motives  as  the  grounds  and  reasons  of  its 
acts,  are  freely  put  forth  ;  except,  as  Aristotle  has  well  declared, 
when  the  mind  has  enslaved  itself  by  the  formation  of  bad  habits. 

Now,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  argument  of  Edwards  applies 
to  his  own  scheme,  as  well  as  to  that  of  his  opponents.  For,  if  we 
must  suppose  the  action  of  motive  to  account  for  the  action  of 
mind,  then  must  we  also  suppose  the  preceding  action  of  some- 
thin^  else  to  account  for  the  action  of  motive,  and  so  on  ad  in- 

o  ' 

finitum.  Thus,  having  accepted  the  argument  of  Edwards  in  its 
application  to  the  doctrine,  or,  at  least,  to  the  language  of  Clarke, 
and  Reid,  and  Stewart,  and  Coleridge,  the  very  presumptuous 
author  of  the  "  Theodicy  "  saw  no  very  great  harm  in  applying  it 
to  his  own  scheme.  He  found  the  logic  of  Edwards,  indeed,  much 
better  than  its  author  had  imagined,  for  it  was,  in  reality,  a  two- 
edged  sword,  which  cut  both  ways  instead  of  one  only.  If,  then, 
it  be  the  great  heresy,  nay,  the  Atheism,  of  the  "  Theodicy,"  that  it 
came  finally  to  rest  on  the  simple  conclusion,  on  the  apparently 
clear  and  incontestable  fact,  that  volition  does  take  its  rise  some- 
where in  the  universe  of  mind,  without  any  controlling  power  over 
the  mind's  power  of  action,  the  sin  of  such  awful  apostasy  must 
be  laid  on  the  logic  of  President  Edwards.  Mr.  Bocock  has,  it  is 
true,  been  pleased  to  ignore  the  logic  of  President  Edwards,  as 
well  as  of  Professor  Bledsoe.  But  it  is  here  brought  forth,  and 
held  up  as  a  protecting  shield  between  the  poor  professor  of  mathe- 
matics and  the  divine  wrath  of  the  Rev.  John  Bocock.  This 
branch  of  our  subject  is  for  the  present,  and  perhaps  for  ever,  dis- 
missed. 

The  author  of  the  "  Theodicy  "  is  not  only  an  "  Atheist,"  he  is 
also  a  "  Pelagian."  That  is  to  say,  the  vile  heretic  denies  the 
influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit  within  the  heart  and  mind.  "He 
seems,"  says  Dr.  Bocock,  "heartily  to  adopt  that  peculiar  mode 
of  mental  philosophy,  as  to  the  nature  of  moral  agents,  which 
removes  the  human  soul  from  under  divine,  influence"  etc. — • 
P.  519.  Again,  he  says,  "The  book  is  equally  explicit  in  deny- 
ing the  efficacy  of  the  other  mode  of  influence  over  the  human 


APPENDIX.  403 

soul,  usually  ascribed  to  God,  that  is,  the  influence  of  the  Divine 
Spirit  within  the  heart." — P.  519.  Now,  all  that  is  necessary  to 
dispose  of  these  accusations  is  simply  to  produce  a  few  extracts 
from  that  chapter  of  the  "book"  which  treats  of  the  divine 
influence,  and  then  just  laugh  all  such  Calvinistic  calumnies  to 
scorn. 

Take,  for  example,  the  following  extract :  "  Nothing  is  more 
wonderful  to  my  mind  than  that  Pelagius  should  have  such  fol- 
lowers as  Reimarus  and  Lessing,  not  to  mention  hundreds  of 
others,  who  deny  the  possibility  of  a  divine  influence  becanse  it 
seems  to  them  to  conflict  with  the  intellectual  and  moral  nature 
of  man.  To  assert,  as  these  philosophers  do,  that  the  power  of 
God  cannot  act  upon  the  human  mind  without  infringing  upon  its 
freedom,  betrays,  as  we  venture  to  affirm,  a  profound  and  astonish- 
ing ignorance  of  the  whole  doctrine  of  free-agency." — "  Theodicy," 
p.  173.  Now,  directly  in  the  face  of  this  most  explicit  and  com- 
plete repudiation  of  the  doctrine  of  Pelagius,  the  writer  before  us 
is  pleased  to  ascribe  it  to  the  author  of  the  "  Theodicy."  He  is, 
if  we  may  believe  the  writer,  "  a  Pelagian  "  who  denies  the  influ- 
ence of  the  Spirit  of  God !  Nothing  could,  indeed,  be  a  more 
direct  or  more  shameless  violation  of  truth.  In  default  of  sound 
pleas  for  Calvinism,  this  unscrupulous  writer  pelts  his  opponent 
with  odious  epithets,  a  mode  of  warfare  adopted  by  those  only 
whose  malignant  passions  are  as  strong  as  their  regard  for  truth 
is  weak.  What  care  such  writers  for  the  contempt  of  mankind  if 
they  can  only  gain  the  applause  of  a  sect ! 

Again,  on  page  174  of  the  "Theodicy"  it  is  said:  "As  every 
state  of  the  intelligence  is  necessitated,  so  God  may  act  on  this 
department  of  our  mental  frame  without  infringing  upon  the 
nature  of  man  in  the  slightest  possible  degree.  As  the  law  of 
necessity  is  the  law  of  the  intelligence,  so  God  may  absolutely 
necessitate  its  states  by  the  presentation  of  truth,  or  by  his  direct 
and  irresistible  agency  in  connection  with  the  truth,  without 
doing  violence  to  the  laws  of  our  intellectual  and  moral  nature. 
Nay,  in  so  acting  he  proceeds  in  perfect  conformity  with  those 
laws.  Hence,  no  matter  how  deep  a  human  soul  may  be  sunk  in 
ignorance  and  stupidity,  God  may  flash  the  light  of  truth  into  it 
in  perfect  accordance  with  the  laws  of  its  nature.  And,  as  has 
been  well  said,  '  The  first  effect  of  the  divine  power  in  the  new,  as 
in  the  old,  creation  is  light.' "  It'  Mr.  Bocock  had  happened  to 
know  that  these  words  were  quoted  from  a  celebrated  Calvinist 
divine,  he  would  not,  perhaps,  have  had  the  unblushing  hardihood 


404  APPENDIX. 

to  look  them  in  the  face  and  cry,  Heresy  !  a  denial  of  the  divine 
influence  !  a  vile  Pelagian  heresy  ! 

But  the  "Theodicy"  (p.  174)  continues:  "This  is  not  all. 
Every  state  of  the  sensibility  is  a  passive  impression,  a  necessi- 
tated phenomenon  of  the  human  mind.  No  matter  what  fact,  or 
what  truth,  may  be  present  to  the  mind,  either  by  its  own  volun- 
tary attention  or  by  the  agency  of  God, or  by  the  cooperation  of  both, 
the  impression  it  makes  upon  the  sensibility  is  beyond  the  control 
of  the  will,  except  by  refusing  to  give  the  attention  of  the  mind  to 
it.  Hence,  although  truth  may  be  vividly  impressed  on  the  intelli- 
gence, although  the  glories  of  heaven  and  the  terrors  of  hell  m;iy 
be  made  to  shine  into  it,  yet  the  sensibility  may  remain  unaffected 
by  them.  It  may  be  dead.  Hence,  God  may  act  upon  this,  may 
cause  it  to  melt  with  sorrow  or  to  glow  with  love,  without  doing 
violence  to  any  law  of  our  moral  nature.  There  is  no  difficulty, 
then,  in  conceiving  that  the  second  effect  of  the  divine  power  in 
the  new  creation  is  '  a  new  heart.' "  Yet  does  Mr.  Bocock,  in 
profound  contempt  of  truth,  look  this  passage  in  the  face,  and 
assert  that  the  "  Theodicy  "  denies  the  influence  of  God  on  the 
heart  of  man !  Though  it  asserts,  in  as  strong  language  as  possi- 
ble, that  God  "  creates  a  new  heart "  within  us,  yet  Mr.  Bocock 
declares  that  it  denies  his  influence  upon  the  heart !  He  does  not 
condescend  to  pervert  or  misrepresent  the  language  of  the  book, 
he  simply  puts  into  the  author's  mouth  words  and  sentiments 
which  are  utterly  arid  emphatically  repudiated  by  him.  How 
could  he  dare  to  venture  on  such  dishonest  tricks  ?  Did  he  sup- 
pose that  they  would  escape  detection  because  his  very  pious 
readers  would  never  look  into  so  vile  a  book  as  the  "  Theodicy  ?  " 
or  if,  in  spite  of  his  abuse,  they  should  venture  to  read  for  them- 
selves, they  would  at  least  tolerate,  if  not  applaud,  his  pious  fraud  s^ 
on  the  principle  that  the  end  sanctifies  the  means  ?  Is  the  con- 
tempt of  mankind  nothing  to  him,  if  he  may  only  gain  the  applause 
of  his  sect,  and  stand  forth  as  one  of  the  anointed  champions  of 
Calvinism  ? 

Such  writers  are  never  satisfied  unless  you  will  cause  the  om- 
nipotence of  God  to  annihilate  the  freedom  of  the  human  will. 
You  may  assert  the  influence  of  the  Divine  Spirit  to  illuminate  the 
reason,  and  to  renovate  the  affections,  or  ''create  a  new  heart," 
but  still  you  are  a  vile  heretic  unless  you  will  make  it  force  the 
will,  and  convert  the  universe  of  mind  into  a  mere  machine.  God 
may  give  a  perfect  moral  law,  and  also  the  power  to  obey,  and  yet 
this  is  nothing  unless  he  gives,  at  the  same  time,  the  obedience 


APPENDIX.  405 

itself.  He  may  pour  the  light  of  divine  truth  into  the  reason,  or 
renovate  the  affections,  and  "  create  a  new  heart ;"  but  this — all 
this — is  nothing,  unless  yon  will  also  admit  that  lie  absolute  y 
necessitates  the  will.  But  this  is  the  very  doctrine,  the  monstrous 
error,  which  it  is  the  object  of  the  a  Theodicy  "  to  refute,  so  as  to 
vindicate  the  infinite  glory  of  God  against  the  horrible  aspersions 
of  his  mistaken  friends,  as  well  as  of  lais  malignant  enemies. 

This  vindication  was  no  short  or  easy  ta^k.  It  was  the  result 
of  twenty  years'  reading  and  close  reflection.  It  occupies  all  the 
chapters  of  both  parts  of  my  "Theodicy,"  which  was  written  over, 
from  beginning  to  end,  no  less  than  five  times  with  my  own  hand, 
and  condensed  as  much  as  possible.  Yet  has  our  most  infallible 
and  omnipotent  critic  set  forth  the  whole  of  this  vindication  in 
one  short  sentence!  Great  man!  Wonderful  genius  !  Surely  he 
could  easily  put  the  ocean  in  an  egg-shell,  or  construct  a  palace 
with  a  single  pebble  !  Let  us  see,  then,  how  the  poor  "  Theodicy  " 
Is  m.'jde  to  hide  its  diminished  head  in  a  single  sentence.  "The 
solution,"  says  our  critic,  "  which  Professor  Bledsoe  brings  is  this  : 
*  On  the  supposition  of  such  a  world,  God  did  not  permit  sin  at 
all;  it  could  not  have  been  prevented.'"  Now  these  words,  taken 
by  themselves,  are  a  worse  representation  of  my  "  Theodicy"  than 
i  siricfle  brick  would  be  of  a  house,  for,  so  taken  and  considered, 

o  " 

they  suggest  a  false  sense  to  the  reader.  They  not  only  fail  to 
exhibit  the  dimensions  of  the  work,  they  utterly  falsify  the  real 
sense  of  its  fundamental  principle.  Let  us  glance,  then,  at  Pro- 
fessor Bledsoe's  solution  of  the  great  problem  of  evil,  as  it  is  in  his 
own  work,  and  not  as  it  is  diminished  and  distorted  in  the  "  South- 
ern Presbyterian  Review." 

"The  opinion  of  Necessity,"  says  Bishop  Butler,  (Analogy, 
chap  vi,)  ''  seems  to  be  the  very  basis  on  which  infidelity  grounds 
itsell."  It  is  also  the  very  foundation  on  which  Calvinism  grounds 
itself,  and  erects  its  gloomy  edifice  of  cloud-capped  metaphysics. 
It  was  impossible  for  even  an  Edwards,  or  a  Leibnitz,  to  refute 
the  Atheist,  and  vindicate  the  glory  of  God,  because  they  occupied 
the  same  ground  with  him,  or  maintained  the  same  fundamental 
falsehood.  Hence,  in  order  to  vindicate  the  glory  of  God,  Profes- 
sor Bledsoe  found  it  necessary,  in  the  first  place,  to  demolish  this 
common  ground  of  Atheism  and  Calvinism,  and  the  metaphysical 
tower  of  Babel  thereon  erected  by  the  joint  labours  of  the  mistaken 
friends  and  the  malignant  foes  of  God.  To  this  preliminary  por- 
tion of  this  work  no  less  than  four  long  and  elaborate  chapters 
are  devoted. 


406  APPENDIX. 

In  the  first  of  these  chapters  it  is  clearly  shown,  unless  many 
readers  of  the  u  Theodicy  "  are  greatly  mistaken,  "  that  the  scheme 
of  necessity  denies  that  man  is  responsible  for  the  existence  of  sin." 
In  the  same  chapter  it  is  also  shown  that  the  attempts  of  Calvin 
and  Luther,  as  well  as  of  Hobbes  and  Collins,  of  all  atheizing  Cal- 
vinists,  as  well  as  of  Calvinizing  Atheists,  are  absolute,  total,  and 
ignominious  failures.  In  the  second  chapter  it  is  demonstrated, 
at  least  to  the  perfect  satisfaction  of  many  of  its  readers,  that 
"  the  scheme  of  necessity  makes  God  the  author  of  sin."  It  is  also 
shown  therein  that  "the  attempts  of  Calvin  and  other  reformers," 
as  well  as  of  Leibnitz,  and  Edwards,  and  Chalmers,  to  rebut  this 
impious  consequence  of  their  favourite  scheme  of  necessity,  are 
utter  failures — are  merely  sophistical  devices  to  hide  the  horrible 
features  of  the  dogma  of  necessity. 

It  is  then  shown  in  the  third  chapter  that  "  the  scheme  of  neces- 
sity denies  the  reality  of  moral  distinctions,"  and  that  all  the 
attempts  of  all  the  great  advocates  of  that  scheme,  and  especially 
the  great  attempt  of  President  Edwards  to  reconcile  it  with  the 
reality  of  such  distinctions,  are  total  failures.  Thus,  by  a  three- 
fold reductio  ad  absurdum,  it  is  shown  that  the  scheme  of  necessity 
is  false.  But  this  argument,  it  is  evident,  is  addressed  to  those 
only  whose  sense  of  sin  and  of  God  would  indignantly  reject  the 
scheme  of  necessity  on  account  of  its  consequences.  Hence,  in 
order  to  complete  the  argument,  and  effect  the  entire  destruction 
of  the  scheme  of  necessity,  it  was  incumbent  on  the  author  of  the 
"  Theodicy  "  to  show  that  it  is  inherently  false,  that  it  is  as  unten- 
able in  itself  as  it  is  horrible  in  its  consequences. 

Accordingly,  this  is  undertaken  in  the  fourth  chapter  of  the 
'•Theodicy,"  in  which,  in  seven  several  sections,  it  is  shown  that 
the  scheme  of  necessity  is  based  on  a  "  false  psychology  ;"  that  it 
"  is  directed  against  a  false  issue  ;  "  that  it  u  is  supported  by  false 
logic;"  that  it'-is  fortified  by  false  conceptions;"  that  it  "is 
recommended  by  false  analysis;"  that  it  u  is  rendered  plausible 
by  a  false  phraseology ;  "  and,  finally,  that  it  :c  originates  in  a  false 
method,  and  terminates  in  a  false  religion."  Having  established 
these  seven  propositions,  the  fourth  chapter  concludes  as  follows . 

"  These  are  some  of  the  hidden  mysteries  of  the  scheme  of 
necessity;  which,  having  been  detected  and  exposed,  we  do  not 
hesitate  to  pronounce  it  a  grand  imposition  on  the  reason  of  man- 
kind. As  such,  we  set  aside  this  stupendous  sophism,  [big  with  so 
many  sophisms,]  whose  dark  shadow  has  so  long  rested  on  the 
beauty  of  the  world,  obscuring  the  intrinsic  glory  of  the  infinite 


APPENDIX.  407 

goodness  therein  displayed.  We  put  away  and  repudiate  this 
vast  assemblage  of  errors,  which  has  so  sadly  perplexed  our  mental 
vision,  and  so  frightfully  distorted  the  real  proportions  of  the 
world  as  to  lead  philosophers,  such  as  Kant  and  others,  to  pro- 
nounce a  theodicy  impossible.  We  put  them  aside  utterly  in 
order  that  we  may  proceed  to  vindicate  the  glory  of  God,  as  mani- 
fested in  the  constitution  and  government  of  the  moral  world." 

Now,  why  does  the  "Southern  Presbyterian  Review"  neglect 
to  notice  these  four  long  and  elaborate  chapters  of  the  work  it 
pretends  to  examine  and  review  ?  They  contain  the  substance  of 
Professor  Bledsoe's  solution,  and  yet  his  solution  is  set  before  the 
readers  of  the  "  Review  "  in  question  without  the  least  allusion  to 
them !  The  patient  and  the  painstaking  analysis  is  wholly  over- 
looked ;  the  careful  and  the  conscientious  argument  is  treated  with 
silent  contempt ;  and  the  conclusion  to  which  they  conduct  the 
mind  is  severed  from  all  that  precedes  and  supports  it,  and  nakedly 
held  up  as  "  Professor  Bledsoe's  solution."  Is  there  no  difference, 
then,  between  the  solution  of  a  problem  and  its  bare  enunciation  ? 
or  between  a  thesis  or  a  theorem,  and  its  demonstration  ?  The 
solution  which  "  Professor  Bledsoe  brings,"  says  Mr.  Bocock,  "  is 
this :  '  On  the  supposition  of  such  a  world  (that  is,  of  a  moral 
world  or  system)  God  did  not  permit  sin  at  all ;  it  could  not  have 
been  prevented.'"  Now,  this  is  not  Professor  Bledsoe's  solution, 
it  is  merely  his  thesis.  It  is  not  his  demonstration ;  it  is  merely 
the  proposition  to  be  demonstrated.  This  solution  or  demonstra- 
tion nowhere  appears,  either  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  the  very  candid 
review  of  Dr.  Bocock.  This  very  prudent  critic  is,  on  the  contrary, 
careful  not  to  afford  his  readers  a  glimpse,  however  faint  and 
feeble,  of  the  "  solution  "  which  he  affects  to  treat  with  so  much 
contempt.  Utterly  ignoring  that  solution,  he  merely  exhibits  the 
conclusion  at  which  it  arrives,  just  as  if,  while  it  holds  up  every 
thing  else,  it  is  itself  upheld  by  nothing.  Nor  is  this  all.  The 
naked  conclusion  is  not  only  severed  from  all  that  precedes  and 
supports  it,  but  it  is  also  most  imperfectly  represented  by  Mr. 
Bocock.  If  he  wished  to  represent  Professor  Bledsoe  fairly,  why 
does  he  make  him  say  that  "  God  does  not  permit  sin  at  all,"  that 
"it  could  not  have  been  prevented"  by  him?  This  is  only  one 
half  of  Professor  Bledsoe's  statement  of  his  thesis,  or  doctrine,  and 
this  half  statement,  taken  by  itself,  is  admirably  adapted  to  shock 
the  mind  of  every  pious  reader,  and  prejudice  him  against  the 
"Theodicy."  Hence  it  is  the  never-failing  resource  of  nil  the 
small  critics  who  have  attacked  that  "  Vindication  of  the  Divine 


408  APPENDIX. 

Glory."  If,  indeed,  the  author  of  that  work  was  solicitous  about  any 
thing,  it  was  not  to  shock  the  pious  mind  by  any  statement  which 
might  even  seem  to  limit  the  omnipotence  of  God.  Th:s  may, 
however,  be  very  easily  done  by  skilfully  selected  and  partial 
extracts  from  his  work,  as  Mr.  Bocock  has  most  abundantly 
proved.  The  bare  statement,  for  example,  that  "  God  cannot  pre- 
vent sin,"  and  therefore  does  "  permit  it,"  is  a  flagrant  instance  of 
this  method  of  gross  misrepresentation  by  the  skilful  use  of  partial 
extracts.  I  would  ask  the  reader,  then,  to  consider  this  state- 
ment as  it  stands,  not  in  the  pages  of  the  theological  adversaries 
of  my  u  Theodicy,"  but  in  those  of  the  work  itself.  I  would  ask 
him,  before  proceeding,  under  the  guidance  of  Presbyterian  re- 
views and  papers,  to  condemn  the  work,  to  examine  the  chapters 
in  which  its  foundations  are  laid,  and  then  read,  with  calm  and 
judicial  fairness,  the  chapter  of  twenty-nine  pages  in  which  the 
conclusion  is  drawn.  If  he  will  only  do  so  he  will  find  that  this 
conclusion,  stated  in  a  single  line,  is  not  the  solution  which  my 
*'  Theodicy  "  brings  to  the  great  problem  of  evil.  He  will  find,  on 
the  contrary,  that  it  is  no  more  like  that  solution,  than  a  little 
crooked  straw  is  like  a  bird's  nest. 

After  reviewing,  in  the  chapter  last  referred  to,  four  several 
solutions  of  the  problem  of  evil,  I  proceed  to  lay  down  the  conclu- 
sion of  my  own.  It  is,  indeed,  impossible  to  do  more  than  partial 
justice  to  this  conclusion  without  giving  the  whole  chapter.  The 
following  extracts  will,  however,  be  amply  sufficient  to  show  how 
very  partial,  imperfect,  and  unjust  is  the  representation  in  and  by 
the  "  Southern  Presbyterian  Review." 

"Supposing  God  to  possess- perfect  holiness,  (p.  192,)  he  would 
certainly  prevent  all  moral  evil,  says  the  Atheist,  unless  his  power 
were  limited.  This  inference  was  drawn  from  a  false  premiss ; 
namely,  that  if  God  is  omnipotent  he  could  easily  prevent  moral 
evil,  and  cause  virtue  to  exist  without  any  mixture  of  vice.  This 
assumption  has  been  incautiously  conceded  to  the  Atheist  by  his 
opponent,  and  hence  his  argument  has  not  been  clearly  and  fully 
refuted.  To  refute  this  argument  with  perfect  clearness  it  is 
necessary  to  show  twro  things:  first,  that  it  is  no  limitation  of  the 
divine  omnipotence  to  say  that  it  cannot  work  contradictions; 
and,  secondly,  that  if  God  should  cause  virtue  to  exist  in  the  heart 
of  a  moral  agent  he  would  work  a  contradiction.  We  shall  en- 
deavour to  evince  these  two  things  in  order  to  refute  the  grand 
sophism  of  the  atheist,  and  lay  a  solid  foundation  for  a  genuine 
scheme  of  optimism,  against  which  no  valid  objection  can  be  urged." 


APPENDIX. 

Having  shown  these  two  things,  which  it  is  much  easier  for  a  critic 
to  ignore  than  to  refute,  I  draw  the  following  conclusion  :  uThe 
argument  of  the  Atheist  assumes,  as  we  have  seen,  that  a  Being  of 
infinite  power  could  easily  prevent  sin,  and  cause  holiness  to  exist. 
[That  is,  could  easily  prevent  all  sin,  and  necessarily  cause  holi- 
ness to  exist  every  where  in  its  place.]  It  assumes  that  it  is  pos- 
sible, that  it  implies  no  contradiction  to  create  an  intelligent  moral 
agent,  and  place  it  beyond  all  liability  to  sin.  But  this  is  a  mis- 
take. Almighty  power  itself,  we  may  say  with  the  most  profound 
reverence,  cannot  create  such  a  being  and  place  it  beyond  the 
possibility  of  sinning.  If  it  could  not  sin,  there  would  be  no 
merit,  no  virtue,  in  its  obedience.  That  is  to  say,  it  would  not  be 
a  moral  agent  at  all,  but  a  machine  merely.  The  power  to  do 
wrong,  as  well  as  to  do  right,  is  included  in  the  very  idea  of  a 
moral  and  accountable  agent,  and  no  such  agent  can  possibly  exist 
without  being  invested  with  such  a  power.  To  suppose  an  agent 
to  be  created,  and  placed  beyond  all  liability  to  sin,  is  to  suppose  it  to 
be  what  it  is,  and  not  what  it  is,  at  one  and  the  same  time ;  it  is  to 
suppose  a  creature  to  be  endowed  with  the  power  to  do  wrong, 
and  yet  destitute  of  such  a  power,  which  is  a  plain  contradiction. 
Hence  Omnipotence  cannot  create  such  a  being  and  deny  to  it  a 
power  to  do  evil,  or  secure  it  against  the  possibility  of  sinning. 

"  We  may,  with  the  Atheist,  conceive  of  a  universe  of  such 
beings,  if  we  please,  and  we  may  suppose  them  to  be  at  all  times 
prevented  from  sinning  by  the  omnipotent  and  irresistible  energy 
of  the  Divine  Being;  and  having  imagined  all  this,  we  may  be 
infinitely  better  pleased  with  this  ideal  creation  of  our  owTn  than 
with  that  which  God  has  called  into  actual  existence  around  us. 
But  then  we  should  only  prefer  the  absurd  and  contradictory 
model  of  a  universe  engendered  in  our  own  weak  brains  to  that 
with  which  infinite  wisdom  and  power  and  goodness  have  actu- 
ally projected  into  being.  Such  a  universe,  if  freed  from  contra- 
dictions, might  also  be  free  from  evil,  nay,  from  the  very  possi- 
bility of  evil,  but  only  on  condition  that  it  should  at  the  same 
time  be  free  from  the  very  possibility  of  good.  It  admits  into  its 
dominions  moral  and  accountable  creatures,  capable  of  knowing 
and  serving  God,  and  of  drinking  at  the  purest  fountain  of  un- 
created bliss,  only  by  being  involved  in  irreconcilable  contradic- 
tions. It  may  appear  more  delightful  to  the  imagination,  before 
it  comes  to  be  more  narrowly  inspected,  than  the  universe  of  God ; 
ami  the  latter,  being  compared  with  it,  may  seem  less  worthy  of 
the  infinite  perfections  of  its  Author;  but,  after  all,  it  is  but  a  weak 


410  APPENDIX. 

and  crazy  thing,  a  contradictious  and  impossible  conceit.  W(» 
may  admire  it,  and  make  it  the  standard  by  which  to  try  the 
work  of  God ;  but,  after  all,  it  is  but  '  an  idol  of  the  human  mind  ' 
and  not  an  *  idea  of  the  divine  mind.'  It  is  a  little  distorted 
image  of  human  weakness,  and  not  a  harmonious  manifestation  of 
divine  power.  Among  all  the  possible  models  of  a  universe  which 
lay  open  to  the  mind  and  choice  of  God,  a  thing  so  deformed  had 
no  place ;  and  when  the  sceptic  concludes  that  the  perfections  of 
the  Supreme  Architect  are  limited,  because  he  did  not  work  after 
such  a  model,  he  only  displays  the  impotency  of  his  own  wisdom, 
and  the  blindness  of  his  own  presumption. 

"  Hence,  the  error  of  the  Atheist  is  obvious.  He  does  not  con- 
sider that  the  only  way  to  place  all  creatures  beyond  a  liability  to 
sin,  is  to  place  them  below  the  rank  of  intelligent  and  accountable 
beings.  He  does  not  consider  that  the  only  way  to  prevent  '  sin 
from  raising  its  head '  is  to  prevent  holiness  from  the  possibility 
of  appearing  in  the  universe.  He  does  not  consider  that  among 
all  the  ideal  worlds  present  to  the  Divine  Mind  there  was  not  one 
which,  if  called  into  existence,  would  have  been  capable  of  serving 
and  glorifying  its  Maker,  and  yet  incapable  of  throwing  off  his 
authority.  Hence,  he  really  finds  fault  with  the  work  of  the  Al- 
mighty, because  he  had  not  framed  the  world  according  to  a 
model  which  is  involved  in  the  most  irreconcilable  contradictions. 
In  other  words,  he  fancies  that  God  is  not  perfect,  because  he  has 
not  embodied  an  absurdity  in  the  creature.  If  God,  he  asks,  is 
perfect,  why  did  he  not  render  virtue  possible  and  vice  impossi- 
ble? Why  did  he  not  create  moral  agents,  and  yet  deny  to  them 
the  attributes  of  moral  agents  ?  Why  did  he  not  give  his  creatures 
the  power  to  do  evil,  and  yet  withhold  this  power  from  them  ?  He 
might  just  as  well  have  demanded  why  he  did  not  create  matter 
without  dimensions,  and  circles  without  the  properties  of  a  circle. 
Poor  man !  He  cannot  see  the  wisdom  and  power  of  God  mani- 
fested in  the  world,  because  it  is  not  filled  with  moral  agents 
which  are  not  moral  agents,  and  with  glorious  realities  that  are 
mere  empty  shadows ! 

"  If  the  above  remarks  be  just,  then  the  great  question,  Why  has 
God  permitted  sin?  which  has  exercised  the  ingenuity  of  man  in 
all  ages,  is  a  most  idle  and  insignificant  inquiry.  The  only  real 
question  is,  why  he  created  such  beings  as  men  at  all,  and  not  why 
he  created  them  and  then  permitted  them  to  sin.  The  first  ques- 
tion is  easily  answered.  The  second,  though  often  propounded, 
seems  to  be  a  most  unmeaning  question.  It  is  unmeaning,  because 


APPENDIX.  411 

it  seeks  to  ascertain  the  reason  why  God  has  permitted  a  thing 
which,  in  reality,  lie  has  not  permitted  at  all.  Having  created  a 
world  of  moral  agents,  that  is,  a  world  endowed  with  a  power  to 
sin,  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  prevent  sin  so  long  as  they 
retained  this  power,  or,  in  other  words,  so  long  as  they  continued 
to  exist  as  moral  agents.  A  universe  of  such  agents  given,  its  lia- 
bility to  sin  is  not  a  matter  for  the  will  of  God  to  permit;  this  is  a 
necessary  consequence  from  the  nature  of  moral  agents.  He  could 
no  more  deny  peccability  to  such  creatures  than  he  could  deny  the 
properties  of  the  circle  to  a  circle  ;  and  if  he  could  not  prevent 
such  a  thing,  it  is  surely  very  absurd  to  ask  why  he  permitted  it. 

"  On  the  supposition  of  such  a  world,  God  did  not  permit  sin  at 
all ;  it  could  not  have  been  prevented.  It  would  be  considered  a 
very  absurd  inquiry  if  we  should  ask  why  God  has  permitted  two 
and  two  to  be  equal  to  four,  or  why  he  permitted  the  three  angles 
of  a  triangle  to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles.  But  all  such  ques- 
tions, however  idle  and  absurd,  are  not  more  so  than  the  great 
inquiry  respecting  the  permission  of  moral  evil.  If  this  does  not 
so  appear  to  our  minds,  it  is  because  we  have  not  sufficiently 
reflected  on  the  great  truth  that  a  necessary  virtue  is  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms,  an  inherent  and  utter  impossibility.  The  full  pos- 
session of  this  truth  will  show  us  that  the  cause  of  Theism  has  been 
encumbered  with  great  difficulties  because  its  advocates  have  en- 
deavoured to  explain  the  reason  why  God  has  permitted  a  thing 
which,  in  point  of  fact,  he  has  not  permitted.  Having  attempted 
to  explain  a  fact  which  has  no  existence,  it  is  no  wonder  that  they 
should  have  involved  themselves  in  clouds  and  darkness.  Let  us 
cease,  then,  to  seek  the  reason  of  that  which  is  not,  in  order  that 
we  may  behold  the  glory  of  that  which  is" 

This  extract  is  long,  but  less  would  not  have  given  even  a  toler- 
able view  of  the  great  leading  idea  or  principle  of  my  "  Theodicy." 
According  to  this  work,  the  world  had  not  "  sufficiently  reflected 
on  the  great  truth  that  a  necessary  holiness  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms,  an  inherent  and  utter  impossibility  ;  "  and  had,  consequently, 
remained  in  clouds  and  darkness  respecting  the  existence  of  evil. 
It  is,  indeed,  the  avowed  object  of  this  work  to  bring  that  great 
truth  to  light,  and  thereby  dispel  the  clouds  and  darkness  around 
the  origin  and  existence  of  evil.  Yet  all  this  is  overlooked  by  the 
very  candid  critic  under  consideration.  Omitting  to  notice  all 
that  precedes  and  all  that  follows  the  great  truth  in  question, 
though  it  was  all  written  to  elucidate  and  establish  that  truth,  and 
apply  it  to  the  problem  of  evil,  he  merely  exhibits  the  conclusion 


412  APPENDIX. 

which  I  have  drawn  from  that  great  unseen  truth  and  calls  it  my 
solution  !  That  is  to  say,  without  notice  or  mention  of  the  theorem, 
or  its  demonstration,  he  exhibits  merely  the  corollary  which  flows 
from  it,  and  then  laughs  that  naked  and  unsupported  corollary  to 
scorn!  Easy  victory!  Memorable  triumph  !  How  many  critics, 
in  precisely  the  same  way,  demolished  the  doctrine  of  Copernicus ! 
Seeing  only  the  conclusion  at  which  he  had  arrived,  and  knowing 
nothing  of  the  demonstration  from  which  it  flowed,  they  laughed 
to  scorn  the  strange  idea  that  the  sun  is  the  fixed  centre  around 
which  the  earth  and  all  the  other  planets  revolve.  They  could 
laugh  all  the  more  easily  and  heartily  at  this  apparently  absurd 
conclusion,  because  they  knew  nothing  of  the  demonstration  on 
which  it  rested.  The  grandest  scheme  of  thought,  indeed,  that 
was  ever  reared  by  the  patient  labour  of  years,  may  be  easily  mis- 
represented and  ridiculed  in  a  minute  by  the  most  thoughtless 
and  flippant  of  men. 

It  is  certainly  easy  to  misrepresent  and  ridicule  my-"  Theodicy," 
if  we  may  judge  from  the  habit  of  its  Calvinistic  adversaries.  But 
who,  or  where,  is  the  adversary  by  whom  its  foundations  have 
been  shaken  ?  It  is  easy  to  pick  out  a  phrase  here  and  there,  and, 
detaching  this  from  its  place  in  the  body  of  the  work,  cry,  Absurd, 
or  impious,  or  monstrous !  But  who,  or  where,  is  the  opponent 
that  has  ever  grappled  with  its  principles  and  arguments,  or  pre- 
tended to  show  that  they  are  false?  Are  all  the  great  champions 
of  Calvinism  dead  ?  Or  are  they  only  ashamed,  in  this  enlightened 
nineteenth  century,  to  come  before  the  world  in  defence  of  their 
dark  doctrines?  I  should  certainly  not  have  noticed  Mr.  Bocock, 
or  the  other  adversaries  above  referred  to,  if  abler  ones  could  have 
been  found,  or  had  made  their  appearance ;  and  if,  after  a  silence 
of  seventeen  years,  I  have  at  last  replied  to  them,  this  is  only  in 
deference  to  the  opinion  of  friends. 

Let  me  now  sum  up  and  conclude  this  whole  matter.  How  any 
one  could,  without  a  burning  sense  of  shame,  pronounce  my 
"Theodicy"  the  work  of  a  Pelagian,  is  more  than  I  am  able  to 
conceive.  It  seems  impossible,  indeed,  that  the  heresy  of  Pelagius 
could  be  more  explicitly  or  emphatically  repudiated  than  it  is  in 
both  the  language  and  the  doctrines  of  my  "  Theodicy."  For  ex- 
ample, it  is  asserted,  (p.  178,)  "Nothing  is  more  wonderful  to 
my  mind  than  that  Pelagius  should  have  such  followers  as  Rei- 
marus  and  Leasing,  not  to  mention  hundreds  of  others,  who  deny 
the  possibility  of  a  divine  influence  because  it  seems  to  them  to 
conflict  with  the  intellectual  and  moral  nature  of  man. 


APPENDIX.  413 

Yet  in  the  face  of  all  this,  and  much  more  to  the  same  effect — 
nay,  in  profound  and  unblushing  contempt  of  all  this — I  have  been 
persistently  ranked  with  Reimarus  and  Lessing,  and  other  one- 
sided advocates  of  free-agency,  as  a  follower  of  Pelagius  !  I  have 
been  thus  maligned  and  vilified,  not  by  low  and  mean  adversaries 
of  no  reputation,  but  by  learned  divines — the  chosen  champions 
of  Calvinism — and  their  followers.  It  is,  indeed,  the  circulation 
of  such  utterly  unfounded  and  false  misrepresentations  which  has 
induced  my  friends  to  believe  that  the  truth  should  be  made 
known,  and,  if  possible,  its  enemies  put  to  the  blush. 

Nor  is  this  all;  for  mnny  have,  with  Mr.  Bocock,  explicitly 
asserted  that  my  "  Theodicy  "  denies  "  the  influence  of  the  Spirit 
on  the  mind  and  heart  of  man."  So  far,  however,  is  this  assertion 
from  the  truth,  that  my  "  Theodicy"  does,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the 
words  of  a  distinguished  Calvinistic  divine,  recognize  and  affirm 
the  reality  of  such  an  influence  of  the  Spirit.  "No  matter,"  it 
asserts,  (p.  174,)  "how  deep  a  human  soul  may  be  sunk  in  igno- 
rance and  stupidity,  God  may  flash  the  light  of  truth  into  it,  in 
perfect  accordance  with  the  laws  of  its  nature.  And,  as  has  been 
well  said,  '  The  first  effect  of  the  divine  power  in  the  new,  as  in  the 
old,  creature  is  light.''1  It  is  also  asserted  (p.  175)  that  "God 
may  act  upon  this,  (that  is,  the  sensibility,)  may  cause  it  to  melt 
with  sorrow  or  to  glow  with  love  without  doing  violence  to  any 
Lrw  of  our  moral  nature.  There  is  no  difficulty,  then,  in  conceiv- 
ing that  the  sacred  effect  of  the  divine  power  in  a  new  creation  is 
a  new  heart."  Now,  Dr.  Dick  himself,  whose  language  is  here 
quoted  by  me,  does  not  go  one  inch  beyond  this  in  his  assertion 
of  the  influence  of  the  Spirit  on  the  mind  and  heart  of  man.  Yet, 
directly  in  the  face  of  all  this,  in  profound  contempt  of  nil  this, 
have  the  admirers  and  followers  of  Dr.  Dick,  one  of  the  most  rigid 
and  renowned  of  the  champions  of  Calvinism,  unblushingly  as- 
serted tha't  my  "Theodicy"  denies  and  repudiates  the  doctrine 
of  the  influence  of  the  Spirit  on  the  human  heart !  Is  it  possible, 
then,  for  misrepresentation  to  be  more  flagrant  or  more  inexcusa- 
ble than  that  which  has  been  directed  against  my  "Theodicy?" 
Or  does  it  speak  well  for  the  cause  of  Calvinism,  that,  instead  of 
fair  argument  and  honest  opposition,  it  is  compelled  to  resort  to 
such  means  for  its  defence? 

But,  however  glaring  and  gross  such  misrepresentations,  the 
climax  of  this  mode  of  warfare  has  yet  to  be  noticed.  My 
"  Theodicy  "  has  been  actually  accused  of  Atheism,  and  its  author 
denounced  as  an  Atheist.  Although  from  a  burning  zeal  in  the 


41-1  APPENDIX. 

cause  ot  God,  and  an  unconquerable  desire  to  vindicate  his  efiory, 
the  book  was  conceived  and  written,  yet  has  it  been  accused  of 
Atheism!  Strange  and  wonderful  as  such  a  phenomenon  may 
seem,  it  is,  as  I  have  already  said,  nothing  new  under  the  sun. 
For  although  Anaxngoras,  as  is  well  known,  was  the  first  of  the 
Greek  philosophers  by  whom  the  sublime  idea  of  a  God  was  truly 
conceived  and  set  forth,  he  was  reviled  and  denounced  as  an  Atheist 
by  his  benighted  and  bigoted  contemporaries.  In  like  manner 
Ralph  Cudworth,  who,  in  the  cause  of  God,  exhausted  all  the 
resources  of  a  vast  erudition,  and  exerted  all  the  powers  of  an 
unsurpassed  genius,  was,  nevertheless,  reviled  and  calumniated  as 
an  Atheist  in  disguise.  Disgusted  by  the  credence  which  was 
given  to  this  calumny,  in  consequence  of  the  never-ceasing  activity 
of  his  enemies,  he  abandoned  his  labours  in  despair,  and  left  his 
"  Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe  "  an  unfinished,  but  still  a 
magnificent,  monument  of  his  zeal  in  the  cause  of  God.  His  genius 
was  sublime  and  his  design  pure,  but,  unfortunately,  his  will  was 
too  weak  to  withstand  the  storm  of  vituperation  and  abuse  by 
which  his  good  name  was  assailed.  His  great  work,  however,  has 
survived  the  attacks  of  his  enemies,  and  stands,  at  this  moment, 
a  noble  monument  to  the  wisdom  and  glory  of  God,  as  well  as  to 
the  wickedness  and  folly  of  man.  In  like  manner  (if  I  may  be 
permitted  to  compare  small  things  with  great)  my  "Theodicy" 
has  also  survived  the  vituperation  and  abuse  of  its  enemies,  and, 
having  passed  through  many  editions,  has  crossed  the  great  seas, 
and  found  its  way  into  foreign  lands. 

Having  answered  his  arguments,  and  exposed  his  false  state- 
ments, I  shall  not  bestow  one  word  on  the  scurrility  and  abuse  of 
the  Rev.  Mr.  Bocock,  or  of  any  other  metaphysician  or  theologian 
of  the  same  school  of  divines.  I  shall,  on  the  contrary,  henceforth 
submit,  as  I  have  heretofore  submitted,  my  work  to  the  verdict 
of  time  and  the  judgment  of  the  learned  world.  I  can  now  do  so 
with  the  greater  confidence,  since,  in  spite  of  all  the  charges  of 
"  ignorance  "  and  "  presumption  "  and  u  impiety  "  which  have  been 
directed  against  me  the  learned  world  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  has  recognized  my  right  to  meet  and  contest,  in  an  open 
and  fair  field,  the  arguments  and  opinions  of  Augustine  and 
Calvin,  and  Leibnitz  and  Edwards.  If,  in  the  face  of  such  fear- 
ful and  overwhelming  odds,  I  have  been  able  to  maintain  my 
ground,  even  for  a  moment,  this  has  been  only  because  the  truth 
and  the  providence  of  God  were  beneath  my  feet  and  around  my 
path. 


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